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1 Introduction 
The environment in International Relations: 
legacies and contentions 
John Vogler 
The modem academic study of International Relations (IR) was a consequence of 
the great inter-state conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century. Its prob-
lematic was war, endemic insecurity and the possibilities of peace through 
international cooperation, and its focus was upon nation-state actors in an inter-
national system without centralised authority. In the dominant Realist concep-
tion, a Hobbesian anarchy prevailed in which order might only precariously be 
maintained through a balance of power. Twentieth-century political Realism, as 
most famously expounded by Carr (1939) and Morgenthau (1948), was in itself 
a conscious reaction to political and military events of the 1930s and 1940s, and 
in particular to the way in which they supposedly demonstrated the bankruptcy of 
an earlier academic orthodoxy, liberal internationalism - or, as the Realists would 
style it, Idealism or Utopianism. The latter flourished in the aftermath of the Great 
War and brought an essentially optimistic and liberal approach to the project of 
reforming the international system through the building of cooperative insti-
tutions and the development of international law. 
The response of academic IR to the emergent problems of global environ-
mental change (GEC) inevitably reflects this intellectual legacy. Just as modem 
Realism was a reaction to the rise of Hitler, the collapse of the collective security 
aspirations of the League of Nations and the onset of the Second World War, so 
in lesser fashion the recent spate of interest in international environmental 
politics is, with certain exceptions (Young 1977, 1982, 1989; Boardman 1981; 
Kay and Jacobson 1983), a fairly direct reaction to political events. Others 
(McCormick 1989; Thomas 1992; Brenton 1994) have charted the rise in salience 
of GEC issues during the 1980s. 'Ozone diplomacy' led to the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol, and climate change and even biodiversity became 'high politics' issues. 
The culmination was the Rio 'Earth Summit' of 1992, or more properly the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The 
latter was estimated to have been the largest diplomatic gathering ever held, and 
it is, thus, small wonder that by the time of its inception in 1989 the environment 
was beginning to attract the interest of IR specialists. The British International 
Studies Association, whose GEC seminars supported by the Economic and Social 
Research Council form the basis of this book, was itself created in 1990.1 
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It is fair to say that this surge of interest generally led to the incorporation of 
GEC issues into the existing IR paradigm. The introduction to an influential 
collection of articles makes the point clearly. The central problem for the IR 
scholar is seen as a variant of that which preoccupied earlier generations of 
Realists and liberal internationalists: 
Can a fragmented and often highly conflictual political system made up of 
over 170 sovereign states and numerous other actors achieve the high (and 
historically unprecedented) levels of co-operation and policy co-ordination 
needed to manage environmental problems on a global scale? 
(Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992: 1) 
The connection between environmental matters and the abiding concerns of IR 
can be traced most explicitly in the current debate over whether traditional 
concepts of national security, involving armed threats, should be expanded to 
comprehend a 'new' range of environmental threats to human well-being. Yet, 
important as security concerns are, they have not been at the heart of the IR 
community's response to its discovery of GEC issues. Instead, much of the 
current work on GEC problems can be seen as an extension of long-standing 
concerns with international cooperation as a means to 'managing' the global 
economy. In this area, the dominant approach for the last twenty years has been 
that of regime analysis. Such work is often 'policy driven', involving attempts to 
solve the immediate problems of international environmental cooperation. 
Although the contributors to this volume cannot divorce themselves entirely 
from questions of international cooperation, the debates that occurred within the 
Group nonetheless had a wider scope. No consensus view emerges from the 
chapters below, but they do reflect both an attempt to rethink and broaden the 
treatment of environmental change within International Relations and a parallel 
awareness that this process may have implications for the discipline itself. In this 
sense the present volume follows the course set by the first in the Global 
Environmental Change series where it is argued that, while environmental debate 
profits from the insights of social science (including in this case insights into the 
political and institutional bases of international cooperation), there is also a 
reciprocal benefit for the social sciences themselves. Two reasons are suggested 
for this. First, the environmental crisis exposes 'to critical examination some very 
basic "settled" assumptions of the "mainstream" traditions of the social sciences'. 
Second, environmental issues reflect 'several long-standing and unresolved 
disputes within social theory' (Redclift and Benton 1994: 2). In the experience of 
the Group, this is as true for international relations as it is for sociology and social 
theory. 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 
To say that the GEC problems were 'discovered' by IR scholars after they had 
already become matters of foreign policy concern suggests that there had been 
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little or no previous interest in environmental matters. A reading of some current 
literature might well convey this impression, and it is, of course, true that the 
awareness of certain environmental problems (such as stratospheric ozone-layer 
depletion) and indeed the very concept of global-scale change are both of recent 
origin. Nonetheless, states have been concluding agreements about their mutual 
resource and environmental interests for more than a century (Carroll 1988: 
17-18). Since 1945 - to judge from the number of agreements made, organ-
isations created and conferences convened - there has been an exponential 
increase in international environmental concern. Much of the framework of 
current environmental regimes, in the areas of maritime pollution or trans-
boundary air pollution, was in place well before the 1980s, but as an essentially 
technical and 'functional' activity received little public or, it has to be said, 
academic attention. Often, environmental matters were encountered as a sub-
sidiary aspect of the extensive study of the law of the sea and the disposition of 
sea-bed mineral resources, or of the special demilitarised Antarctic Treaty regime. 2 
It is not the case that the natural environment has never been considered in IR 
writing, although in most analyses it was taken as either an implicit or explicit 
constant in human affairs. The way in which the term 'environment' has come, 
only recently, to connote the geo- and biosphere is significant. The etymology of 
the term can be traced to the Old French 'envirroner' ('to surround'), and the 
standard English meaning has generally been 'external conditions and sur-
roundings'. It was in this way that the term was utilised by, for example, Sprout 
and Sprout (1968), who were responsible for several well-known discussions of 
'man-milieu relations' in politics. The natural environment was only part of the 
milieu or 'operational environment' of decision-makers, and attention was 
focused upon the implications of technological change and the way in which, 
over time, geographic constants were reinterpreted. This approach was in re-
sponse to older geopolitical debates (reflected in the works of Mahan (1890) and 
Mackinder (1904, 1919)) concerning the determinative role of 'physical reality' 
over the patterns of power and supremacy found in relations between nations. For 
Sprout and Sprout, physical conditions may have remained relatively stable, but 
their political significance was constantly altered by technological change (this 
was the era in which long-range rocketry transformed the spatial bases of 
strategy) and by shifts in the 'psychological environment' of foreign policy. This 
represents quite a sophisticated interpretation of relationships and resources 
which were seen by the dominant Realist school merely as constituents of 
national power capability. Indeed, the leading work in the Realist canon, by 
Morgenthau (1948: 109-12), devotes only three and a half of its 500 or more 
pages to natural resources. They are seen as a 'relatively stable' but important 
element of national power alongside others such as population, industrial 
capacity and national character and morale- the decisive factor being the 'quality 
of society and government' (ibid.: 132). 
While sharing an overriding concern with the power relations between states, 
not all commentators regarded the physical environment as a constant. In a 
now-forgotten book published in 1915, Ellsworth Huntington advanced the thesis 
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that there are long cycles of climate change, and (Huntington 1919) that a form 
of climatic geopolitics might be discerned in history. Shortly after the Second 
World War, Wheeler (1946) elaborated this view in ways which have surprising 
resonance today. The climate moved in 500-year rhythms, with the termination 
of the current cycle around 1980. Climate, culture and human activity were 
'fluctuating back and forth in rhythmic fashion as a vast, complex but integrated 
whole' and there is 'no question but that nations or empires rise and fall on tides 
of climatic change' (Wheeler 1946: 346-7). In what might seem a premonition of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the author advised world 
leaders to be cognisant of the fact that 'an intensive study of the climate of the 
past will ultimately lead to an accurate prediction of trends far ahead into the 
future' (ibid.: 349). However, this cyclical process would produce the same social 
and political effects as in the past, mainly through influencing the 'vitality' and 
'energy level' of nations. Elsewhere, a form of global warming with more than 
cyclical effects was already being discussed which provided Russia, Scandinavia 
and Canada with their 'place in the sun' and showed a potential to melt the polar 
ice caps. A 1949 article in Science thus gave the following investment advice: 
anyone desiring to make use of this information for long term investment in 
northern real estate should buy high land, however, for the ocean level will rise 
roughly 150 feet as the ice caps disappear. 
(Mills 1949: 352) 
Most prescient was John von Neumann, the co-founder of game theory. In the 
year before his death, he pondered whether 'we could survive technology' now 
that it threatened the finite resources of the earth by removing the geographical 
and political lebensraum that had, hitherto, served as a safety mechanism. Noting 
the likely impact of increasing carbon dioxide emissions on the world climate and 
the possibility of sea-level rises, he was mainly concerned with deliberate and 
possibly hostile human interventions to modify the natural environment. His 
conclusions foreshadow the concerns of a later generation: 
Extensive human intervention would deeply affect the atmosphere's general 
circulation, which depends on the earth's rotation and intensive solar heating 
of the tropics .... All this will merge each nation's affairs with those of every 
other, more thoroughly than the threat of nuclear war or any other war may 
already have done. 
(von Neumann 1955: 248) 
It required a combination of circumstances in the early 1970s to focus political 
and academic attention on natural environmental and resource issues, and it is 
worth reiterating that in international relations they are usually inseparable. After 
decades of technological optimism, Malthusian 'limits to growth' were redis-
covered in the controversial computer simulations published as a Club of Rome 
report under that name (Meadows et al 1972, 1992). In terms of formal inter-
national politics, the first UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 
held at Stockholm in 1972 was a landmark in many ways. It was the starting point 
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for much institutional activity centred upon the new United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP); and in the preparation and proceedings of the Conference 
itself, what was to become a persistent linkage between the environmental 
concerns of the North and the development demands of the South was already 
evident. The Conference enunciated twenty-six Principles and no less than 109 
recommendations ranging from restrictions on the use of DDT to the call for a 
moratorium on commercial whaling. Stockholm excited a relatively brief flurry 
of interest within the IR community (Kay and Skolnikoff 1972). Although 
commentators frequently employed the metaphor of 'spaceship earth', the focus 
of this Conference was still upon 'point source pollution' and its transboundary 
effects. Its approach was best summed up in the wording of Principle 21, a piece 
of diplomatic craftsmanship that combined Southern demands for economic 
sovereignty with developed-world concern over responsibility for transboundary 
pollution. States had the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control did not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of other areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 3 
In the next year, the Middle East war and the quadrupling of the price of crude oil 
by Arab producers were to have profound economic and political effects, and 
gave immediate point to the debates about resource scarcity and the limits to 
growth. The pressure created by the oil crisis was the indispensable basis for the 
development of the so-called North-South dialogue in which Northern govern-
ments, throughout the mid-1970s, listened to Southern demands for the reform of 
the international economy - demands articulated by the Group of 77 in the UN as 
the programme for a New International Economic Order. 
The academic response to these events betrayed a shift away from the 
orthodox Realist analysis of power relations towards a new appreciation of the 
economic dimensions of international politics and above all of the complexities 
of interdependence. The oil crisis demonstrated the extent of the mutual vulner-
ability of societies. Keohane and Nye (1977) provided the most influential 
treatment of the new condition of 'complex interdependence' where societies 
were increasingly interconnected at various levels, where the priorities of foreign 
policy were reordered and where the use of force, at least between advanced 
countries, was of decreasing relevance. In this 'transformation' there was an 
abiding concern with a loss of control on the part of governments (Morse 1976), 
which mirrored an immediate concern with the diminished position of the USA. 
Although common vulnerability to environmental degradation could be regarded 
as the ultimate form of interdependence, this aspect did not become a focus of 
attention. In the hiatus between Stockholm and the preparations for UNCED in 
the late 1980s, international environmental relations remained the rather narrow 
preserve of a handful of specialists (Boardman 1981; Kay and Jacobson 1983; 
Caldwell 1984; Young 1977, 1982). 
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The dominating concern was with the management of international economic 
relations in the aftermath of the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Woods system of 
managed exchange rates and the recession induced by the oil-price 'shocks' of 
1973 and 1979. It was hardly surprising that a great deal of academic effort was 
devoted to the problem of international economic cooperation and coordination 
in the 'management' of economic relations that seemed to be spinning out of 
control. The issues were conceptualised as an extension of the classic problem in 
international relations: how to provide some form of order and governance in an 
'anarchic' system composed of sovereign nation states. An institutional approach 
involving the study of regimes - comprising systems of international principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures - provided, and continues to 
provide, the dominant mode of analysis (Krasner 1983). Arguments about the 
origins, significance and fate of such regimes were clearly related to earlier 
debates about security between liberal internationalists and Realists (Strange 
1982). The overwhelming concern until the end of the 1980s (and perhaps still) 
was with the institutions for global economic management. 
Environmental degradation was inextricably related to the whole complex of 
economic, resource, population and North-South development issues, but it still 
did not occupy the centre of the stage. The Brandt Report (1980), which 
attempted to suggest management solutions to the twin problems of recession and 
underdevelopment, mentioned, but did not prioritise, environmental sustain-
ability. In the interim between this Report and Brundtland (1987) - which can be 
seen as its successor - something clearly occurred which altered the salience of 
environmental questions, just at the time when the Second Cold War brought the 
old security and nuclear concerns back to the forefront of international attention, 
and when the resource anxieties of the 1970s, along with the North-South 
dialogue, appeared to recede. A convincing history of all of this has yet to be 
written, but what is evident is that by the late 1980s, and in the preparatory period 
prior to UNCED, there was a clear and measurable increase in the level of public 
and governmental environmental concern, which was now set in the context of 
fears about the scale of global change. The ESRC GEC programme itself and the 
current wave of IR research and writing were a direct consequence. 
Why had there been so little previous interest? The simple answer, emerging 
from the preceding paragraphs, is that the discipline suffers from an excessively 
close association with policy questions and tends to respond, often rather belat-
edly, to the shifting international political agenda. In the main this is undoubtedly 
true. However, the continuing dominance of Realist thought has also been a 
hindrance. Initially leading to a consideration of natural resources and the en-
vironment from the perspective of geopolitics, the Realist analysis simply excludes 
or marginalises environmental concerns, even where they have profound (though 
less immediate) security implications. It took long enough for neorealism to come 
to terms with economic variables, and as a number of the contributing authors to 
this volume point out, even neorealism is intellectually incapable of embracing 
questions of ecological interdependence. Realism makes positivist claims to 
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objective knowledge and explicitly excludes values not associated with national 
interest. It would not admit that universalistic values of the type associated with 
the preservation of the biosphere can have political relevance in a world of selfish 
and competing nation states. In parallel with the intellectual dominance of Real-
ism there emerged the behavioural social-scientific approaches to IR which 
caused so much controversy in the 1960s and 1970s, and also militated against a 
full consideration of environmental issues. The behavioural approach was so 
focused on the observation and explanation of human beings, particularly as 
political and military decision-makers, that it was generally incapable of taking 
an ecologically holistic view of the human species. According to many critics, it 
shared with the Western scientific tradition, from which it was derived, a dis-
astrously manipulative orientation towards the natural environment. In IR, this 
was coupled, as Vasquez (1983) has shown, with an implicit acceptance of the 
assumptions of state-centric Realism. 
All this may help to explain why in the period after Stockholm environmental 
issues were regarded by most IR scholars as a technical specialism peripheral to 
their interests. However, this situation no longer pertains. It has already been 
argued that academic IR tends to echo 'real world' policy agendas, but there may 
well be something more profound at work in the awakening of interest in the 
environment. The key here may lie in the paradigmatic shift that was clearly 
evident in the interval between Stockholm and Rio. Simply stated, it involved the 
shift to an awareness of gwbal rather than purely localised or transboundary 
phenomena. Stratospheric ozone-layer depletion and the projected climate change 
associated with the enhanced 'greenhouse effect' have a truly global scope. The 
extraordinary interconnection between the issues involved and the extraordinary 
range of interdependencies evident from even a cursory examination of global 
environmental change bear upon the fundamental concerns of students of inter-
national relations and international political economy. It was, therefore, no longer 
possible to pigeonhole environmental issues in International Relations as a 
narrow technical specialism. 
THE INSTITUTIONALIST MAINSTREAM 
The response on the part of academic IR to the international environmental 
politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s was essentially in the liberal-institu-
tionalist or - as Smith (1993) calls it - pluralist tradition. As reflected in works 
such as Young (1989), Mathews (1991), Porter and Brown (1991), Hurrell and 
Kingsbury (1992) and Haas, Keohane and Levy (1993), the discipline was 
resolutely 'problem-solving' rather than 'critical' in its approach.4 The prob-
lematic was set from outside, by the Brundtland Report, by the Hague Declaration 
of 1989, by national funding agencies and by those involved in the UNCED 
process. All of them singled out international cooperation as a key determinant of 
sustainable development. In the words of the Chairman of UNCED: 
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The need for international cooperation is inescapable and growing almost 
exponentially ... the United Nations and its system of agencies, organizations 
and programs . . . provide the indispensable structure and fora on which 
international co-operation depends .... They represent not the precursors of 
world government but the basic framework for a world system of governance 
which is imperative to the effective functioning of global society. 
(Maurice Strong, cited in Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993: 6) 
The problem was, once again, conceptualised as the management of interde-
pendence in a system of sovereign states lacking the kind of central authorities 
which are assumed (often quite erroneously) to be capable of providing order and 
regulation within domestic societies. A contemporary formulation expresses this 
in terms of 'governance without government' (Rosenau and Cziempel 1992). 
Awareness of the close interconnections between an increasingly globalised 
economic system and global-scale environmental change made the contrast with 
a political system fragmented into rival sovereignties even more compelling. The 
environment was thus added to a list of pressing issues confronting statesmen. 
According to one widely cited analysis, environmental issues were: 
now established on the diplomatic agenda, but a degree of worldwide alarm 
and the resulting public pressure to act are still not felt in executive offices and 
legislatures. 
(Newsom 1988/9: 41) 
The requirement was for cooperative international management, in much the same 
way as ministers, bureaucrats and commentators fretted about their inability to exert 
collective control over the footloose operations of deregulated financial markets. 
The study of cooperation tends to assume the efficacy of international law and 
organisation. In many cases it builds directly upon regime analysis, which, as we 
have seen, was principally directed during the 1970s and 1980s towards 
understanding international-level economic management. Now the focus is upon 
'Institutions for the Earth' (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993) or the 'Global 
Commons' (Vogler 1995), or the reform of the United Nations system (Imber 
1994). In line with a similar interest in the role of institutions elsewhere in the 
social sciences (in economics, for example - see North 1990), this new approach 
assumes institutions to be critical to the setting of agendas, to the coordination of 
policy at the international level and most significantly to the environmentally 
related behaviour of governments and other actors. The dominant school com-
prises what Paterson, in this volume, describes as neoliberal institutionalism, 
heavily influenced by the theoretical assumptions of both microeconomic and 
game theory. Above all, it assumes the efficacy and indeed necessity of inter-
national institutions in managing the behaviour responsible for environmental 
degradation. Its neorealist counterpart, the main protagonist in debates about 
international cooperation, is less convinced of the efficacy of institutions per se 
and places great emphasis on the underlying power structure, and in particular the 
requirement for hegemonic leadership. 
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Highly influential in any discussion of international cooperation and GEC, and 
often erroneously cited in discussions of climate change, is the regime for 
stratospheric ozone centred upon the 1987 Montreal Protocol. For environmental 
specialists, this bas almost assumed a paradigmatic status equivalent to that once 
enjoyed in strategic studies circles by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It 
demonstrates both the need for, and effectiveness of, international-level rules (to 
maintain incentives to develop ozone-friendly technology) and, above all, the 
way in which policy can be rapidly developed in line with advancing scientific 
understanding (Benedick 1991). 
Although the efficacy of regime institutions tends to be taken for granted in 
most of the mainstream writing, this assumption bas always been subject to 
challenge. The most influential collection of essays on regime analysis made this 
abundantly clear more than a decade ago (Krasner 1983). It was only those 
occupying a broadly liberal or 'Grotian' position who were happy to assume the 
independent role of regimes in shaping state behaviour. On the other band, 
Realist or Marxist commentators would treat them as mere 'epiphenomena', the 
product either of power (notably hegemonic) relationships or of the underlying 
material and class bases for the international political and legal system (see 
Williams, Paterson and Saurin in this volume). 
Those of a liberal-internationalist persuasion proceed to investigate the ways 
in which the undoubted influence of institutions can be made more effective. 
Effective regimes do not 'supersede or overshadow states' but instead, according 
to Haas, Keohane and Levy (1993: 24), 'create networks over, around and within 
states that generate the means and incentives for effective cooperation'. The task 
for the researcher is to 'try to ascertain the conditions under which they have been 
more or less effective in so doing'. This is a relatively restrained view. Others 
have perceived a global policy process (Soroos 1986), and even some govern-
mental representatives in the Hague Declaration of 1989 spoke openly of the 
imperatives for a supranational global environmental authority (Porter and Brown 
1991: 153). The legacy of internationalist and Idealist thinking is clear in the 
normative purpose of mainstream writing, much of which bas a quite technical 
character, relating as it does to the specifics of negotiation (Sjostedt 1993; 
Susskind 1994) or the elaboration of international law (Sand 1991, 1992; see also 
Ogley in this volume). 
This legacy is also evident in research on the role of 'epistemic communities' 
(Haas 1990, 1990a, 1992) which stresses the role of transnational expert groups 
in developing environmentally desirable agreements in the face of resistance 
from reluctant politicians. As Haas himself says, this research is to be seen as an 
adjunct to a broader institutionalist approach, yet it is also clearly descended from 
earlier functionalist thought, associated in the first instance with Mitrany and 
others who sought the means towards a 'working peace system' through de-
politicised technical cooperation. The proponents of 'epistemic' communities 
emphasise another key defining characteristic of international environmental 
cooperation, namely the critical interface between science and policy. This is 
something relatively novel for statecraft and bas attracted much attention at 
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academic and policy levels, where foreign offices have had to contend with a 
range of scientific and technical interests. The problem is usually stated in terms 
of the difficulty of persuading short-sighted and narrowly self-interested national 
politicians to respond to enlightened scientific prediction in a timely way. Once 
again, the Montreal Protocol provides a model, and the ongoing work of the 
significantly named Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change gives an 
example of the problems involved in, and prospects for, the generation of con-
sensual scientific knowledge and its application to international policy-making 
(Boehmer-Christiansen mounts a critical investigation in this volume). 
Smith (1993) has argued that what has been described here as the mainstream 
approach to the International Relations of GEC remains at the margin of the 
discipline as a whole. In his view, most exponents of the IR of global environ-
mental change share an essentially uncontested pluralist viewpoint. For Smith 
this is doubly unfortunate because, on the one hand, such exponents can be 
consigned to irrelevance by the still-dominant Realist school of power politics, 
while, on the other hand, missing the opportunity to engage in a variety of critical, 
normative, post-structuralist and gender debates that have opened up elsewhere 
in the discipline. 
The pluralist label is appropriate if it means that most existing work ack-
nowledges an international system in which there are a plurality of issues and 
where actors do not, as in the cruder versions of Realism, exhibit a monomaniacal 
pursuit of power. However, it is one thing to use the rhetoric of plural interests 
and values and quite another to develop and utilise an operational model of the 
international system which effectively supplants state-centric approaches by 
positing a variety of significant actors and connections across national frontiers. 
While most commentators on international environmental politics stress the 
particular significance of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, in line 
with the liberal-internationalist tradition, 'the rising influence of international 
public opinion' (Mathews 1991: 32), their focus of analysis remains resolutely 
fixed upon the interaction between nation states. International cooperation is, in 
effect, regarded as inter-state or intergovernmental cooperation. This may reflect 
the judgement, of which most Realists would approve, that despite all the rhetoric 
of sovereignty's erosion, state governments remain the essential agents of en-
vironmental improvement. For those of a more liberal inclination, it may also 
relate to the parsimony associated with the microeconomic and game-theoretical 
analysis which has been a key feature in the development of theories concerning 
the creation, maintenance and significance of regimes. 
Attempts have been made to invoke and even alter the Realist agenda in 
discussions of the redefinition of security (Buzan 1991, and the critique by Dyer 
in this volume). While often well intentioned, they run the risk, as Deudney 
(1990) and others have argued, of co-option, such that environmental questions 
are considered as an item somewhere near the bottom of a list of militarised 
national security priorities. In any case, environmental and orthodox national 
security concerns are usually regarded as being profoundly antithetical in almost 
every possible respect. 
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This leaves Smith's other major reason for marginalisation: the theoretical 
isolation in which, he claims, exponents of the International Relations of the 
environment exist. They tend to be 'a very closed group, nearly all of whom share 
the same theoretical assumptions . . . insiders who work within a theoretical 
tradition, rather than questioning the boundaries and assumptions of that tradition' 
(Smith 1993: 40). Opinions may differ as to the validity of this assertion, 
although a great deal of evidence in its favour can be derived from reading the 
standard technical literature on international environmental cooperation. Most of 
the participants in the GEC seminars would disagree with Smith's assertion as 
regards their own work, but the statement actually provides both a challenge and 
a justification for the present volume. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VOLUME 
The contributions collected here and the discussions that they inspired in the 
seminars are critical and theoretically diverse. They are rather arbitrarily divided 
into two sections. The first is avowedly theoretical and considers the 'boundaries 
and assumptions' of the existing tradition, such as it is, of the study of the 
international relations of the environment. Dyer writes from the standpoint of 
normative international relations theory, while Paterson views orthodox accounts 
of international cooperation from the perspective of 'critical theory'. Saurin 
provides a radical reinterpretation of the meaning of the environment in IR from 
a critical social-ecological perspective, while the chapter by Bretherton includes a 
feminist account of the various roles that have been ascribed to women in discussions 
of GEC. Willetts' contribution provides a contrast to the others in this section with its 
reassertion of positivist epistemology within a global politics model. 
A wide-ranging account, which helps to place those that follow in context, is 
provided by Williams' essay on international political economy and GEC. Much 
contemporary work on international cooperation, including the debates between 
neorealist and neoliberal regime theorists scrutinised by Paterson, may be re-
garded as falling properly within the field of International Political Economy 
(IPE). Saurin's analysis of global capitalist accumulation and the environmental 
crisis is also located squarely within a different tradition of IPE. 
Arguing that the engagement of orthodox IR in environmental issues has 
served to 'reproduce orthodoxy', Williams considers whether International Poli-
tical Economy allows a more satisfactory perspective. IPE shares many of the 
theoretical assumptions of orthodox International Relations ( of which it may be 
seen as a sub-field) but it has the further advantage of focusing upon those 
economic structures and processes which are directly responsible for environ-
mental degradation. Unfortunately, the three main approaches to IPE, which are 
derived from realist, liberal and Marxist paradigms, are all burdened by techno-
and anthropocentric assumptions serving to externalise environmental variables. 
Nonetheless, the 'expanded terrain' of IPE does have significant academic ad-
vantages especially if it proves possible to incorporate ecological rather than 
merely environmental economics. 
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The second part of the volume puts a more concrete focus on the organisations 
and processes that usually figure in treatments of global environmental issues. 
Most of the contributors in this section have themselves been actively involved 
in detailed and policy-related research on international organisation (Imber), 
scientific advice and policy (Boehmer-Christiansen), and the development and 
implementation of international agreements (Ogley, Humphreys and Greene). 
They provide a great deal of commentary on current environmental issues while 
at the same time attempting to adopt a reflective and critical stance towards their 
own work. Thus, the second part of this volume is determinedly not a survey of 
the post-Rio landscape of international environmental politics but instead a 
counterpart to the broader theoretical concerns raised in the first. 
A key question for all participants (and indeed for the whole GEC series) is 
whether IR (or social science generally) should merely incorporate GEC as an 
issue amongst others or whether it must itself be fundamentally altered. If the 
British ESRC Global Environmental Change Programme has a slogan, it is 'to 
take GEC to the heart of the social sciences and the social sciences to the heart of 
GEC'. The debate within IR reflects the tension between these two objectives. On 
the one hand, scholars are naturally concerned to apply their existing knowledge 
of the workings of the international system to the new and complex problems of 
global environmental diplomacy. The obvious contribution to be made here, as 
we have seen, is in the study of international cooperation. An excellent example 
of the potential that this affords is provided by the coordination of arms-control 
experience with monitoring and verification procedures as a means to the 
implementation of international environmental agreements (see Greene in this 
volume). What it does mean is that GEC is treated as another issue on the agenda 
of international politics, to be handled through the normal channels with refer-
ence to existing precedents and conceptions found in IR. However, GEC may not 
simply be 'another issue', and 'taking it to the heart of the social sciences' may 
require the radical revision of those sciences. Saurin asserts that the 'processes of 
global environmental change are subversive of both the theory and practice of 
orthodox IR'. By regarding GEC as an external problem to be handled by state 
bureaucracies and international organisations, and 'by continuing to focus on 
those institutional practices of modernity which have caused the environmental 
problem in the first place, prevailing scholarship misses the opportunity to step 
outside the premises of its own entrapment'. 
Beneath this overarching concern three sets of issues recur which can be 
characterised as critical responses to three cardinal assumptions found in much of 
the existing work in IR. The first assumes the primacy of national interests 
(whether in terms of relative power maximisation in Realist theory or in terms of 
absolute wealth maximisation in neoliberal accounts). This assumption neglects 
the normative dimension of politics, both in theory and in practice, which is 
essential to debates about environment and development and emerges strongly 
from the empirical study of political activism and change. The second assumption 
relates to the basic ontology of modern IR and its definition as the study of the 
relations between states. The argument here is that it may be impossible to 
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comprehend the causes of environmental concern within a state-centric paradigm, 
and that the retention of this paradigm serves to avoid such questions in favour of 
the consideration of inter-state 'solutions'. There is a growing body of opinion 
which states that even the latter cannot be adequately theorised in terms of the 
orthodox inter-state assumptions, and that some form of global politics model is 
more appropriate. The third set of assumptions centres around ideas about science 
and epistemology. For some time, mainstream IR (involving both Realism and 
behavioural social science) embraced an essentially positivist epistemology 
involving the relative neglect of normative theorising (as noted above). The 
vigorous intellectual challenge to which this has been subjected is reflected in the 
contributions to this volume. The point has already been made that this challenge 
may make it easier than it was in the past to come to terms with environmental 
issues. There is also a wider debate about science and its 'privileged discourse' in 
environmental politics. At the immediate level this involves questions about the 
interface between scientific expertise and policy-making. At a deeper level, 
however, it provokes speculation about the underlying responsibility of Western 
rationalistic civilisation for the global environmental predicament. Discussions 
within the field of International Relations can hardly be immune from this. 
INTERESTS, VALUES AND NORMS 
The starting point of Dyer's chapter is provided by the standard and essentially 
Realist conception of security. From the perspective of normative theory, he 
criticises attempts to encompass environmental issues within the existing na-
tional security agenda and proceeds to explore the implications of environmental 
security as a universal value. Normative theorising has had enormous historical 
significance in the development of the discipline, not least in the Realist-Idealist 
debates of the inter-war period, but it was eclipsed during the Cold War. Renewed 
interest in normative theory is particularly relevant to the international relations 
of GEC because of the stress that it places upon the dichotomy between com-
munitarian and cosmopolitan traditions (Brown 1992; Hoffman 1994). It is 
exactly this tension, between citizen and national community on the one hand and 
a broader conception of human beings as a single species within the global 
biosphere on the other, which is at the heart of much of the discussion of GEC. 
For Dyer, environmental security and national security are alternative values 
arising in the context of alternative world-views. 
The meaning of and relationship between interests and values are at the core 
of Dyer's discussion, which is animated by an awareness that GEC has 'brought 
the traditional meanings of political concepts into doubt and opened the way for 
changes in International Relations theory'. Universalistic cosmopolitan values 
involving the preservation of the wilderness, of different species and, at the 
highest level, of the planetary biosphere counterpose communitarian interests. 
There are complex normative questions here, involving trade-offs between 
existing concepts of justice, equity and development and the broader long-term 
requirement of the preservation of the bases of existence. They were paraded but 
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left unresolved by UNCED. As Imber's chapter demonstrates, although 'sustain-
able development' may have been a necessary political compromise, the UN 
system in general and the Commission for Sustainable Development in particular 
continue to face enormous difficulties in providing an operational definition. The 
real politics of GEC issues may be represented as a complex melange of national 
and particularistic interests, values and - as Greene reminds us - learning 
processes. However, Willetts argues that the whole values-interests distinction is 
misleading, and that we ought to refer simply to values. In his view, the really 
critical questions are those which concern the circumstances in which environ-
mental values assume priority over security or material-wealth values. 
This conception of the significance of the contention between values ( or their 
programmatic assertion as ideologies) for international environmental politics 
forms the basis of a detailed discussion of the International Tropical Timber 
Organisation by Humphreys. In an analysis which owes something to Gramscian 
approaches to IPE, the nexus between the dominant neoliberal ideology, the 
countervailing ideas of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and eco-
logism and environmentalism are examined. The objective is to trace their 
influence on the shifting norms of the International Tropical Timber Agreement 
between 1983 and 1994. 
Hitherto, normative and other discussions in IR could be conducted without 
reference to gender (a characteristic often shared with discussion of environ-
mental issues). In the last decade, feminist critics have at minimum ensured that 
'the era ofIR as (uncontested) masculinity is over' (Light and Halliday 1994: 52). 
In this volume Bretherton explores the ways in which gender relations figure in 
the politics of GEC. Gender analysis demonstrates how views of the natural 
world have had a masculine cast. Recently, however, unprecedented official 
attention has been paid to women-environment links in the context of sustainable 
development. Although women have been variously portrayed as part of the 
problem or as the principal victims, in recent UN activities and recent environ-
mental theorising they have also been portrayed as the saviours of the planet. The 
close connections between women's productive and reproductive roles and 
environmental change (and the fact that they are everywhere more disadvantaged 
than men) should not result in their being assigned special responsibility for 
nurturing the earth in circumstances of disempowerment. It is these latter circum-
stances that are revealed by social gender analysis. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR GLOBAL POLITICS? 
The debate about the validity of state-centric models is an enduring one in 
International Relations. Calling into question the independent existence of the 
discipline, it can be regarded as the empirical version of the normative debate 
between communitarian and cosmopolitan thought. Orthodox IR is state-centric, 
and as we have seen, environmental change is usually presented in terms of global 
problems mismanaged by a fragmented international system. The majority of 
authors in this volume accept that some attempt needs to be made to break free 
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from the legalistic straitjacket of the inter-state system and acknowledge the 
role of transnational forces and non-governmental agencies. One of the most 
significant challenges to the discipline posed by gender analysis is the reminder, 
as evidenced in Bretherton's chapter, that people must be incorporated in the 
study ofIR. 
There is, however, no underlying agreement concerning what has been des-
cribed in various social sciences as the 'agent structure debate'. Should the focus 
of analysis be upon the actions of individuals, transnational actors and governments, 
and upon inter-state politics, or instead upon the determinative role of inter-
national institutions, or upon the totality of the global system - however 
construed? The answer will naturally depend upon the theoretical standpoint 
taken but it will, in a very important sense, also be determined by the kinds of 
questions that are asked. 
If the question is about the socioeconomic causes of the world environmental 
predicament, then, as various authors in this volume observe, International Rela-
tions has had very little to say of any significance. This question, Saurin argues, 
relates to the 'processes whereby the environment is defined and comes to be 
known', which are highly political. Orthodox IR singularly fails to comprehend 
the historical dynamic of the global system of capital accumulation which has 
been integral to the production of environmental degradation. There is a 'radical 
dis juncture between the dynamics and processes of environmental change and the 
development of the territorially based authority of the state'. The state is in-
appropriate both as 'a basic causal unit of environmental change and as the most 
competent unit for the mediation of environmental change'. Williams agrees to 
the extent that 'Neo-Marxist analysis with its emphasis on the structural relation-
ship between labour and capital and its location of environmental degradation in 
the political and economic structures of capitalist societies does appear to repre-
sent an advance.' 
Saurin is clear that the focus on states and inter-state cooperation is also 
inappropriate if the questions being asked concern both political activism and 
attempts to contain or reverse environmental decline. Such a focus has been the 
main defining characteristic of the discipline's response to GEC. Since the 
inevitable depression that followed UNCED, disillusionment with international 
cooperation and the UN system has been a marked feature of radical environ-
mental commentaries. They have called instead for action at the 'grass-roots' and 
communal levels, and have focused on the significance of a variegated host of 
non-governmental actors (Sachs 1993; Middleton, O'Keefe andMoyo 1993; The 
Ecologist 1993). Interestingly, the idea of a 'global civil society' has been 
advanced not just as a normative cosmopolitan construct but also as a focus of 
political activity and empirical study (Ekins 1992). 
Willetts sketches out an alternative global politics model to accommodate the 
analysis of such phenomena (the unprecedented significance of non-
governmental organisations in environmental politics is something that achieves 
near-universal academic agreement). The focus on inter-state relations is replaced 
by a pluralist conception of open but interconnected systems that emphasises 
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transnational interaction and reminds us that in empirical and behavioural terms 
the state is a legal abstraction. Changes in the old international system that have 
occurred since 1945, amongst which has been the rise in environmental con-
cerns, have left it unrecognisable, and this makes the traditional emphasis on a 
world of states lacking supranational authority misplaced. 'Governments are still 
the focus of policy-making, but the systems of interaction have fundamentally 
changed, not only in the values that are dominant but also structurally.' 
Despite all the questioning of the relevance of statehood and of the utility of 
international organisation and institutions, the latter still provide a primary focus 
of interest for those who define themselves as students of IR. The dilemmas are 
well captured in Imber's essay on the environment and the United Nations. The 
UN is 'both the best and the worst place in which to conduct environmental 
diplomacy'. On the one hand, if some form of global regulation is required (many 
problems can be dealt with on a regional basis), the UN is unavoidable as the 
'only global forum or arena in which norms and laws for the management of GEC 
can be negotiated'. On the other hand, however, the UN is 'the worst place' 
because it is an organisation of states acting in defence of their own narrow 
sovereign interests. Imber is also painfully aware of the sheer scale of the 
'structural' inequalities and sources of degradation, embedded in the operation of 
the global economy, that underlie discussions at UNCED or at the Commission 
for Sustainable Development. In this context, the activities of a fragmented and 
'feudal' UN system can be represented as an 'institutional bandage applied to a 
structural haemorrhage'. The only politically realistic path remains that of 'con-
stant agitation for reform'. 
The generation of norms for changing and governing behaviour is, as Imber 
notes, a crucial function of the UN system and cannot be dispensed with. This 
view is shared by those other contributors whose primary concern is with the 
development and maintenance of effective international environmental regimes. 
Norm generation has also been the practical objective of the many NGO activists 
who have been an increasingly evident and recognised presence in international 
negotiations. Ogley addresses the highly salient question of the 'supply side' of 
global norm generation. He provides both a close analysis of the negotiating 
circumstances and processes involved and an assessment of their relative import-
ance in the light of some recent environmental agreements. Informing the dis-
cussion throughout is the experience of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, the 
broadest and most sustained attempt ever to reform and codify a set of global 
environmental norms. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was the product of a 
decade of the most complex multilateral negotiations, and it only entered into 
force, in somewhat truncated form, in November 1994. Described by the UN 
Secretary-General as one of the 'greatest achievements of this century', one of the 
most 'definitive contributions of our era' and 'one of our most enduring 
legacies' ,5 it provides a range of precedents and often salutary lessons. 
As Ogley concludes, the point of all this activity is that of 'changing human 
behaviour'. When the fundamental question of regime effectiveness is addressed, 
the disjuncture between the international dimension and the global system of 
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commerce, investment, consumption and pollution becomes very evident. It is 
too often assumed that the conclusion of international agreements and formal 
'compliance' by governments will have the desired environmental effects. The 
chapter by Greene reflects on the problem of implementation and on the complex 
national-international linkages which determine regime effectiveness. The actual 
implementation of agreements involves altering the behaviour of a whole range 
of transnational, corporate and even individual actors who may fall within state 
jurisdiction but not necessarily under governmental control. Implementation and 
learning strategies, therefore, have major policy implications for institutional 
design. 
SCIENCE AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
The growing awareness of environmental issues in the late 1980s coincided with 
a period of theoretical flux and uncertainty in International Relations. This state 
of uncertainty was associated with the collapse of the ideological and political 
certainties that had characterised the Cold War, but it was also a small part of a 
wider unease that permeated the social sciences as a whole. The positivist 
epistemology of orthodox IR came under attack from a number of theoretical 
directions. Paterson's essay on the explanation of the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change reflects this critical approach. The focus is upon neorealism and 
neoliberalism. Paterson applies them to the case of the climate-change negoti-
ations and concludes that neoliberal institutionalism provides the more adequate 
account. On the other hand, however, both have an oversimplified view of 
international as opposed to domestic phenomena, and share a flawed positivist 
epistemology. This is particularly serious because supposedly value-free, 
problem-solving theories do in effect 'privilege' certain positions and social 
groups, and this is evident in discussions of climate change. 
Positivist epistemology remains a source of deep contention. Willetts, for 
example, sets out a forthright defence asserting the possibility of the objective 
study of values in environmental politics, while at the same time completely 
disassociating himself from the ontological assumptions of political Realism. 
Beyond epistemological introspection in IR, the social construction and politics 
of science are a central question for all those interested in global environmental 
change issues. At the deepest level, radical critics of modernity have linked 
global environmental degradation with the entire 'enlightenment project' where-
by science, since Bacon and Descartes, has enshrined a manipulative division 
between human beings and nature. A striking example is provided by a recent 
study of the World Bank's environmental policy containing an interpretative 
chapter entitled 'From Descartes to Chico Mendes' in which the Bank is des-
cribed as the 'quintessential institution of high mid-twentieth century modernity, 
a practical embodiment of the philosophical and historical project of the modem 
era that began with the Enlightenment' (Rich 1994: 239). 
Such views are present within the IR community amongst 'postmodem' critics 
and in writings on gender (see Bretherton in this volume). However, in general, 
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scholars have avoided theorising on this scale, being more concerned with the 
specific connections between scientific advice and policy. What Boehmer-
Christiansen describes as the 'global research enterprise' represents a novel 
challenge for students of international politics. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) represents the apex of this complex inter- and trans-
national enterprise with its mission to provide consensual scientific advice to the 
framers of the climate-change regime. Boehmer-Christiansen's study of the IPCC 
sets out to demonstrate that the 'global research enterprise has not only become a 
significant political actor promoting the globalisation of information collection 
and ''business as usual" research, but has also done so with reference to specific 
global environmental concerns that were exaggerated for this purpose'. These are 
important and controversial claims, directly relevant to functionalist thinking on 
international cooperation and the supposedly 'benign' influence of epistemic 
communities on the creation of international environmental regimes. 
CONCLUSION 
Whereas, in the hiatus between Stockholm and Rio, the study of the international 
relations of the natural environment may have been the neglected preserve of the 
technical specialist removed from the main axes of contention in the discipline, 
this is clearly no longer the case, as the essays in this volume demonstrate. Many 
of the themes pursued and the theoretical disagreements are clearly part of a 
wider debate within the social sciences - as portrayed by Redclift and Benton 
(1994). Questions of structure and agency, or ofholism or individualism, and the 
assault on positivist orthodoxy all figure, along with the politics of science. 
The international relations of GEC is not isolated, but has it a specific contri-
bution to make within the social sciences? Political and IR research is omitted 
from some schema that outline the convergence between the natural sciences and 
the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, economics and geography.6 Like 
environmental economics, IR exhibits a close connection with policy. As argued 
in the first part of this chapter, much of the intellectual history of the discipline 
can be written in terms of responses to political events, and it is probably 
inevitable that its primary contribution will continue to be in the study of 
policy-making at the international level, and in the engineering of 'solutions'. 
This places a heavy emphasis on the second part of the volume. There was at one 
time a serious discussion amongst participants about the desirability of publish-
ing two separate volumes of papers. The temptation to do this was resisted on the 
grounds that both theoretical argument and 'policy-relevant' empirical work 
ought to inform each other. Otherwise, there is a danger that the consideration of 
theoretical questions will become arid introspection and that policy-related work 
will be unable to rise above institutional politics and the intricacies of framework 
conventions and protocols. Beyond this there is also the point, made by a number 
of contributors, that the study of global environmental change has the potential to 
alter ( or even subvert) the essential elements of IR as an academic pursuit. 
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NOTES 
1 The British International Studies Association Environment Working Group was 
founded in 1990 and received initial financial assistance from the Association. During 
1992 and 1993, it received a grant from the ESRC Global Environmental Change 
Programme which allowed the presentation and discussion of the papers that now 
form the chapters of this volume. We continue to hold meetings, and we gratefully 
ack- nowledge the support of the ESRC and its GEC Programme, of which the Group 
forms a small part. 
2 A survey of citations in the International Political Science Abstracts for the period 
1985-90 yielded the following results. Even though the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference had ended in 1982 without ratification of the Convention, the literature 
was still dominated by maritime issues. Indeed, there were no less than forty citations. 
Political, economic and legal aspects of the Antarctic regime received fourteen 
citations, while the Arctic received eight. The emerging global environmental agenda, 
the Brundtland Report, stratospheric ozone and climate change merited only six 
citations. By the early 1990s, this situation would have changed dramatically. 
3 The United Nations Yearbook 1972 (New York: United Nations, pp. 318-23), pro-
vides the text of the twenty-six Principles and a concise report of the Conference 
issues and participants. 
4 This well-known distinction, highlighted by critical theorists, derives from the work 
of Cox (1981). 
5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, speech to the inaugural session of the Seabed Authority, 
Kingston, Jamaica, 16 November 1994, UN Press Release SG/SM/94/196. 
6 See Figure 1.1, 'Environmental research', in Redclift and Benton 1994, p. 12. 
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2 Environmental security as a 
universal value 
Implications for international theory1 
Hugh C. Dyer 
This chapter explores the theoretical implications of invoking environmental 
security as a universal value. It begins with a discussion of the concept of 
environmental security that draws· on recent literature, proceeds to a treatment of 
the concept in terms of values and interests, and concludes with a consideration 
of the implications of an emerging global norm of environmental security for the 
theory of international relations. 
In presenting environmental security as a norm, the intention is to make out 
the case for value-based theory (characterised here as normative theory) as 
opposed to interest-based theory. For present purposes, and in brief, values are 
taken to be an object of choice, while norms are taken to be socially constructed 
by consensus: that is, norms are social values. The society in this case is the 
broadest possible one, though we shall see that it matters whether this is under-
stood as international society (a society of states) or cosmopolitan society (a 
global civil society). It may be argued that the influence of civil society and 
non-state actors in environmental politics parallels other processes of globalis-
ation such as those found in international financial markets. 
The problems attending the conceptualisation of environmental security will 
be shown to arise from the preoccupation of traditional international theory with 
the categories of state interests and state power. In contrast to values, interests are 
objectified, thus reducing the grounds for choice down to strictly rational assess-
ments of rank priority within the objective structure. The reification of the state 
and its interests is the grounds for accumulating state power for state purposes. 
However, the state itself is a value choice, inasmuch as other forms of social 
organisation and mechanisms of authoritative allocation might be equally 
successful. 
The security of the global environment stands against the state system as 
another, perhaps contradictory, value or set of values. This possibility is not 
readily admitted from the perspective of state-centric interest-based theory, but 
could be addressed from the perspective of a value-based theory. The dichotomy 
of state and environmental values underlies a contradiction between traditional 
definitions of security and environmental security. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 
The principal difficulty in discussing environmental security is the recalcitrance 
of traditional politico-military definitions of security. It has been argued that the 
traditional threat to security, organised violence, is not analytically comparable to 
environmental threats (Deudney 1990: 461). Organised violence is a traditional 
prerogative of nation states, being both a domestic monopoly and (in the 
Clausewitzian sense) a tool of foreign policy. However, the developing logic of 
international environmental relations points to global relations among regional 
and local actors rather than to traditional inter-state relations. Global relations can 
be seen as succeeding what was begun by the phenomenon of transnational 
relations by further conditioning, if not eliminating, the role of nation states. Even 
where the state remains a principal focus, the traditional notion of national 
security 'becomes profoundly confused' when there is internal instability or 
insecurity (as would be the case environmentally, since the environment does not 
recognise political or territorial boundaries), and 'the image of the state as a 
referent object for security fades' (Buzan 1991: 103). 
These developments present an opportunity, as Pirages (1991: 8) says, for 
re-examining 'the meaning of security'. Indeed, the question of redefining security 
is the topic of a broad area of recent literature, much of which specifically 
addresses environmental security.2 
Traditional security discourse is not well equipped to address the pressing 
global issues that a (new) definition of security must cope with. A continuing 
dependence on the troubled concepts of sovereignty, national interest and (state) 
foreign policy, which have historically provided the framework and rationale for 
military threats and actions, suggests that the notion of 'security' does not lend 
itself well to the project of conceptualising a response to emerging global changes 
- not least global environmental change. Military power is the traditional mani-
festation of state power, and is the locus of value investment for notions of 
security attaching to the state and (in these terms, by definition) to populations 
under its jurisdiction. These values are seldom in step with the human environ-
ment, but vast resources have been exhausted in their name. 
It is worth considering the origins of traditional security definitions, in order 
to place definitions of environmental security in context. As Richard Ullman 
notes, 'the tendency of American political leaders to define security problems and 
their solutions in military terms is deeply ingrained', and we 'should not over-
estimate the achievements of . . . nongovernmental organizations in putting 
forward alternative conceptions of national security, such as those involving 
limiting population growth or enhancing environmental quality' (Ullman 1983: 
152-3). This is not perhaps true to the same extent for all countries, but it is to be 
expected that any sea change in the world political order will require the acquies-
cence if not the lead of the USA, and its security agenda will continue to influence 
others. At the level of international security (where one might hope the concept 
of environmental security would find a natural home), the traditional agenda is 
merely an extension of national state preoccupations such that collective security, 
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far from escaping the parochialism of state-centric security, remains a funda-
mentally conservative notion, viewed by Herz as 'an attempt to maintain, and 
render more secure, the "territoriality" or "impermeability" of states upon which 
their "sovereignty" and "independence" had rested since the beginning of the 
modern era' (Herz 1959: 76). 
The idea of international security as an improvement on national defence has 
a long history which includes various and sundry proposals for world govern-
ment, but perhaps most significantly the initiatives leading to the League of 
Nations and the United Nations, both of which include collective security provisions 
in their founding documents. However, collective security is time-bound, and 
Herz, writing in 1959, is concerned with the new conditions of the 'Atomic Age', 
which he characterises in a final chapter entitled 'Universalism as an alternative 
to the Power Dilemma' (instructively, the conditions are also true of global 
environmental change): 
Any discussion of the details of a more integrated world structure ... must of 
necessity remain rather theoretical and detached from present realities .... 
Our task is more basic; it concerns the conclusions to be drawn from the un-
precedented condition that has befallen mankind. And the first thing to realize 
is that the situation confronts for the first time the whole human race as one 
group. 
(Herz 1959: 303) 
Yet this realisation has had little effect on policy in the intervening years, and it 
is the famous 'security dilemma' which continues to dominate conceptions of 
security for the 'units' in international relations: 
a feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, 
compels these units to compete for ever more power in order to find more 
security, an effort which proves self-defeating because complete security 
remains ultimately unobtainable. 
(ibid.: 231) 
It is an open question whether or not concepts of environmental security will 
allow an escape from the essential structure of international relations, but to the 
extent that the present structure remains inadequate, this must surely be an aspir-
ation. Peter F. Drucker, for example, notes that crucial environmental needs such 
as the protection of the atmosphere and of forests 'cannot be addressed as 
adversarial issues' (Drucker 1990: 110--11). Ken Conca has suggested that it is 
not clear whether the existing global structures (and their inequalities) will be 
changed or reinforced by the pursuit of environmental security (Conca 1992, 
1993). If environmental or ecological security means insulation or isolation from 
that which cannot be nationally controlled, there will not be much progress 
beyond traditional forms of isolation based on national sovereignty. It is even 
conceivable that environmental security itself could become militarised, and the 
opportunity for fundamental change lost through the co-option of the environ-
mental agenda by a traditional security agenda. This prospect is enhanced by the 
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complexity and ambiguity of the concept of environmental security, its definition 
being tied to 'insecurity' as a social phenomenon with localised variations in 
perception and valuation as well as a global dimension. 
There are a number of different approaches and perspectives in the literature, 
and the discourse about environmental security is consequently unclear, exhibi-
ting sometimes contradictory mixed metaphors (Conca 1992). Not surprisingly, 
proposals range from attempts at the reform of traditional security conceptions to 
the radical overhaul of world politics. At one end of the spectrum are proposals 
which advocate adding selected parts of the environmental agenda to the list of 
things to be secured militarily - obviously a very conventional approach. At the 
other end of the spectrum are proposals for the restructuring of the entire political 
order in such a way as to allow an effective response to a perceived environmental 
crisis of immense proportions. Neither of these polar positions on the spectrum is 
very convincing. The former position is clearly inadequate or retrograde, and the 
latter position cannot justify panic on the existing fragmentary evidence about 
global environmental change (Broecker 1992: 6-14). 
There are, however, a number of intermediary positions, some recognising the 
profound changes in recent international relations, some ignoring them. Certainly, 
it seems appropriate to acknowledge change, since it is this feature of inter-
national relations which has brought existing concepts into disarray, if not disrepute. 
Any proposal for addressing environmental security must surely take into 
account the challenges that arise from both changes in the global environment and 
changes in the international political system following the end of the Cold War. 
The question is not, then, about changes themselves but rather about what these 
changes mean for our conception of security. 
In some respects, it is not even clear what is being secured: some view the 
environment as a potential source of danger or insecurity to the state, and some 
view the states themselves as the principal threat to the environment, with the 
emphasis on environmental aspects of traditional threats such as military activity, 
migration, famine and drought. If it is populations which are being secured, then 
what is at risk? Existence, says Rowlands (1992: 299); life, ideals, beliefs, 
territorial integrity and well-being, says Pirages (1991: 8). And against what are 
these being secured? War, revolution and civil strife, says Pirages (1991: 8); 
non-military threats, says Rowlands (1992: 299). 
The definition of that which is secured, and of that against which it is secured, 
is of course dependent on the conception of security employed. The case to be 
made is for the broadest possible definition of security, and this should be broad 
enough to 'include' environmental security - indeed, environmental security, 
broadly understood, could be the only, or the overall, conception of security from 
which all other considerations flow. This is not because traditional security 
concerns have vanished, but because they can be better incorporated into a broad 
notion of environmental security than can environmental security be squeezed 
into rigid and outmoded traditional, largely militaristic conceptions of security. 
The influence of traditional (largely Realist) theories of international relations 
has made it very difficult to escape the traditional conceptions of security. 
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Because the dominant discourse is Realist, the most common approach to en-
vironmental security is to couch proposals in terms of the Realist paradigm. 
Pirages notes this phenomenon in pointing to a dominant social paradigm. in the 
cognitive dimension of social evolution, which is characterised by an industrial 
culture, and is also reflected structurally in social institutions - namely, the industrial 
paradigm: 'While individual world-views may differ slightly, there is a general 
set of values, attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions that are shared by most members 
of industrial societies' (Pirages 1991: 9). Under these conditions it is not sur-
prising that proposals and arguments concerning environmental security play to 
the existing dominant discourse of security in an uncritical way, attempting to 
build on it rather than transcend it. Hence there are proposals to 'encompass' 
within the notion of security: resource and environmental threats (Brown 1977, 
1986; Mathews 1989; Renner 1989a, 1989b); and the conflict-generating risks of 
environmental change (Brown 1989; Homer-Dixon 1991; Myers 1989). These 
include orone depletion and global warming (Rowlands 1991), and extend to 
include a further, wide array of threats from earthquakes to demographic dis-
location (Ullman 1983). 
Another approach is to incorporate the environment indirectly by hitching it to 
the economic threats to national security. Sorenson does this by indicating the 
environmental implications of sustainable economic development and economic 
recovery, in the context of US foreign-aid policy (Sorenson 1990). Bu7.an tends 
to link environmental issues to economic security, as a subset within the overall 
topic of security, and refers to Mathews (1989) in agreeing that there is room for 
the environment on the security agenda (Bu7.an 1991: 256--8). The Brundtland 
Commission employs (for good reason, given its mandate) the hybrid tactic of 
connecting environmental stress to conflict, and conflict to unsustainable 
development (Brundtland 1987: 290-304). Although Bruce Rich's discussion of 
environmental reform in the multilateral development banks suggests mixed 
results at best (Rich 1990: 307-29), any of these propositions and activities might 
serve to bring environmental security onto the international agenda. However, 
this 'add-on' approach to environmental security does little to reform the tradi-
tional security discourse. 
Porter and Brown take a broad perspective on security which more directly 
incorporates the environment (even if as only one of several global concerns), 
arguing that the traditional politico-military international security system in fact 
constrains international cooperation: 'the new concept of security in terms of 
common global threats, including threats to the environment, now presents an 
alternative to the traditional definition' (Porter and Brown 1991: 141). The 
interaction of threats to human populations which are of environmental origin ( as 
seen from the anthropocentric perspective) and threats to the environment which 
are of human origin (including industrialisation in general) suggests the obvious 
point, which was implied by the Brundtland Report (1987) , that there must be a 
complete integration of environmental perspectives into our understanding of the 
economic, social and political condition of our species. The Brundtland Report, 
however, is more concerned with the 'redefinition of priorities, nationally and 
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globally', and with 'broader forms of security assessment' (Brundtland 1987: 
302-3), and argues that: 
The whole notion of security as traditionally understood - in terms of political 
and military threats to national sovereignty - must be expanded to include the 
growing impacts of environmental stress - locally, nationally, regionally, and 
globally. There are no military solutions to 'environmental security'. 
(ibid.: 19) 
But arguably, this idea of 'expanding' the security agenda has more in common 
with 'add-on' proposals than it has with the idea of actually redefining the 
concept of security from the intellectual starting point of a global perspective. 
The notion of 'common security' advocated by the Palme Commission (1982) 
('Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security issues') goes some 
way towards capturing the essence of a global approach to security, but inevitably 
it too is caught up in the discourse of the modern state system - as all proposals 
must be if they hope to find a contemporary audience. The real challenge is to find 
sufficiently impelling points of reference in present circumstances to raise sup-
port for a longer-term perspective. Perhaps the speed of technological change and 
the growing awareness of environmental degradation, combined with models of 
globalisation offered by financial markets, the information and communication 
revolution and other transnational activities, will provide the necessary impetus 
for taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the collapse of Cold War 
structures and mind-sets. 
The concept of 'security' has been overstretched, and is in some respects passe 
(Sorenson 1990: 3), since in the traditional discourse of international security the 
notion of 'security' implies a threat or action coming from an assignable agent to 
which a response can be made. Such a threat, either to the security of a state or to 
international security, and the subsequent response generally involve the threat or 
use of armed force (Johnson 1991: 172). Environmental 'threats' may be assign-
able in some cases, but more to the point are those cases where assignability is 
problematic (in the way of public goods), and where 'securing' from such 
generalised states of affairs or 'natural' conditions is not possible or appropriate 
within the traditional meaning of the term 'security'. 
The 'security dilemma' is traditionally managed through the maintenance of 
relative symmetry between the parties (agents) involved, with special character-
istics attaching to asymmetrical relationships. Thus, a 'balance' is sought through 
meeting perceived threats and by closing gaps in capability - paradoxically 
leading to the potential for spiralling arms races (hence the dilemma). The case of 
asymmetry is reflected, for example, in interventions by the more powerful, 
which are often presented as the management of general international security 
interests (not a dilemma for realpolitik). Yet, in the case of threats to the 
environment, where the threat in a given instance is identifiable with a particular 
agent (e.g. another state or non-state actor), asymmetry is more common because 
for any particular given case of environmental degradation the threat will be non-
reciprocal. Consider, for example, the vulnerability of a state which is dependent 
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on river water originating in the territory of another state upstream: while the 
potential environmental threat cannot be reciprocated, a military action may be 
substituted, bringing traditional security concerns back in (Homer-Dixon 1994: 
19). On the other hand, the environment as a whole is an ecosystem in which all 
parties are ultimately implicated, so in a sense asymmetry may only apply in the 
relative short run (or at least not in the long run) given that global change will 
have widespread consequences, either directly or indirectly. Of course, it is well 
to remember that the differential impacts of climate change mean that some 
groups, such as small island states, will be sensitive to their special vulnerability 
over the relatively long time scale of global change. Indeed, asymmetry in 
security relations is rather more commonplace than the simple balancing model 
of the security dilemma suggests. The point here is simply the familiar one that 
international security is of general interest, given the potential for 'spill-over' 
from any localised threat, and this is no less true of environmental threats. A new 
concept (perhaps 'assurance'?) is required to reflect the nuances of both a 
changing security discourse and the particular characteristics of environmental 
degradation which may define security threats. In contrast to the traditional 
concept of security which emphasises short-term military threats to national 
populations and territories, a concept of environmental security should take 
account of both the spatial (universal) and the temporal (intergenerational) scope 
of the threat. 
Finally, the real significance of taking a broad approach to environmental 
security (the security of the human environment) is the potential for employing 
this term as the all-encompassing conception of security, such that all other terms 
are derivative. 
VALUES 
Positing the universal value of environmental security does not suggest that the 
value necessarily manifests itself in the same form everywhere, or even that a 
global norm concerning the environment will be established (Buzan 1991: 172). 
However, the notion of environmental security as a universal value opens up the 
possibility of employing a central problematic factor in international relations as 
the basis of a case for transforming international theory, if it can be concluded 
that value-based theory provides a more appropriate explanation and under-
standing of this aspect of international relations than does interest-based theory. 
Buzan suggests that environmental security is linked to other problematic focal 
points of security - military, political, economic and social: 'Environmental 
security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the 
essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend' (Buzan 
1991: 19-20). The more inclusive the notion of environmental security is taken 
to be, the more persuasive the case for theory based on related values. 
In order to build the case for a normative, value-based approach, it is necessary 
to consider some of the traditional grounds for marginalising values in favour of 
interests. The first of these is the perception that values are subjective while 
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interests are, in some respect, objective - in Morgenthau, this objectivity is 
attained by defining interests in terms of power, which is pursued by all states 
(these being the principal international actors, in the Realist account). Values are 
thought to be relative to states and their societies, and this value-relativism 
marginalises the importance of values as an analytical category in the study of 
relations among states. Of course, this relativism is largely overcome by global 
conceptions of international relations which admit 'reciprocity' within a shared 
framework (Kegley 1992: 21-40), and it vanishes entirely under a fully 
cosmopolitan view. Values are only relative (in exactly the same way as interests) 
in the most uninteresting sense that they have a parochial manifestation, but 
otherwise they are a universal and readily observed feature of human life. The 
pursuit of power does little to add objectivity, since it may always be asked for 
what purpose (and at what cost) it is being pursued, and the answer will always 
betray parochial concerns. The interesting problem is in fact how values are 
individually selected, politically manipulated, and socially entrenched as norms. 
It may be clarifying to refer to the semiotician Greimas, and to note a parallel 
between our problem of values in international relations and his examination of 
ethnic literature where he distinguishes between two different kinds of manipu-
lation of values. The first is the 'circulation of constant values (or equivalent 
ones) between equal subjects in an isotopic and closed universe' (Greimas 1987: 
85-6). We might consider this to be the case in domestic or national societies, 
where the values in circulation are culturally embedded and where alien values 
are not readily admitted. The second, following from the first, involves 'the 
problem of the introduction and removal of these immanent values to and from 
the given universe, and it presupposes the existence of a universe of transcendent 
values that encompasses and encloses the first in such a way that subjects who 
possess the immanent values appear as receivers vis-a-vis the subject-senders of 
the transcendent universe' (ibid.). We might view this latter kind, then, as the 
problem of value exchange in international (global) relations, where the prospect 
of a shared system of values depends on such a shared system being somehow 
related to the various distinct value structures of the (local) participating 
societies. This could possibly, but not necessarily, result in the familiar settlement 
on lowest common denominators, given the difficulty of aggregating conflicting 
values. An important caveat here is that transcendent belief systems (for example, 
those involving a deity) exceed the limits of normative political theory, so any 
universe of transcendent values for international society cannot be a universalised 
reflection of a particular value system. The same may be said of any simplistic 
conclusions about the universal acceptance of liberalism - or any other political 
creed for that matter. Thus, what is required for the adoption of environmental 
security as a universal value is not the imposition of global consensus but rather 
a collective understanding of international political life as that which 
'encompasses and encloses' the particularities of national political life, and for 
which both local environments and the global environment are of salience. 
Invoking environmental security as a universal value allows the theoretical 
possibility that less abstract manifestations of environmental security can be 
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grounded in such a universal value or menu of such values. Particular subjective 
environmental values may be chosen from such a menu as part of the formation 
of social norms concerning the security of the environment - whether these 
norms are global or local in their influence. Whatever their grounding or 
influence, it could still be held that values are insubstantial, whereas interests can 
be empirically identified, and it has already been suggested that traditional 
International Relations theory denies the significance of values, relying instead 
on the identification of material interests. One aspect of this denial of values, 
Greimas suggests, is that 'there is a tendency to confuse the notions of object and 
value; the figurative form of the object guarantees its reality and at this level value 
becomes identified with the desired object' (Greimas 1987: 85--6). 
An apposite example drawn from international relations is that of the value of 
security, which traditionally takes objective defence capability (e.g. weapons) as 
its figurative form. Thus, defence postures become a pretext for the hidden value 
of security, a value which can then remain undifferentiated or assumed since it 
appears to be less than substantial in comparison to a concrete interest in an array 
of weapons, even though its implications are quite broad: security may, for 
example, take constructive economic relations, democratic political structures or 
indeed a clean natural environment as its figurative form, rather than defence 
capability. Built into the notion of 'security' are a range of values, readily ignored 
in an empirical calculation of defence interests, but accounted for in a normative 
approach. In fact, the value connotations of security are defined, and thus limited, 
by the traditional discourse of international security. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The conceptual and normative tensions between the security of the environment 
and the security of states as defining values may be overemphasised, if the main 
features of international relations remain unchanged or only modified (Conca 
1993). Yet the possibility of global social and political change accompanying 
global environmental change is significant enough to warrant a theoretical con-
sideration of the implications. The implications for international theory have two 
aspects: general implications, on the one hand, and those bearing specifically on 
the international relations of the environment on the other. Clearly, they are 
connected. It may be said that the theories of inter-state relations (whether they 
involve state-centric Realism or liberal internationalism) are no longer tenable -
at least for explaining environmental politics in particular, but perhaps also 
generally as well. If so, international theory must become the theory of global 
processes, incorporating multiple actors and considering global, regional and 
local relations as aspects of the whole. It is precisely this aspect of considering 
the world as a whole which characterises the global approach. Globalisation, as a 
central concept, indicates the relative autonomy and distinct logic of the global, 
as opposed to the national or international (Robertson 1990). 
In this respect, a normative approach may prove useful, showing environ-
mental security as a value developing into a socio-political norm in a global 
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context, one which influences both behaviour (as in political regimes) and knowledge 
(as in theoretical paradigms). Environmental security arises in a changing inter-
national context where interdependence is already widely accepted as the baseline 
of international relations, and where shared values such as environmental security 
are more salient than the particularistic interests (such as national politico-
military security) of the individual nation states. This transition coincides with 
the relative decline in the salience of nuclear deterrence and the increasing 
salience of environmental concerns. In this sense, the environment becomes the 
manifestation of new political values and norms as the detritus of the Cold War 
experience and the international system it bolstered is tossed out. Normative 
theory is clearly an appropriate theoretical approach to such changing values and 
emerging norms, in preference to traditional interest-based theories which 
maintain the categories of nationalism and militarism in their accounts of 
security. Furthermore, a normative theory is better able to address processes of 
globalisation. 
The absence of secure and certain knowledge generally (such uncertainty 
being a notable characteristic of global environmental change), and of undisputed 
theoretical foundations for global political life in particular, leaves the possibility 
of a 'correct' world-view an open question. Naturally, when political action is 
necessary, the question cannot be left open. One route to closure, of course, is 
ideological commitment, but there is a distinction between ideology, with its twin 
characteristics of 'an image of society and a political programme' (Eccleshall 
1984: 7), and the role of ideas. In its descriptive mode, a normative theoretical 
account of world-views addresses the formation of an image of society - in this 
case, of international society or the global political condition - and is not 
concerned with political programmes as such. In its prescriptive mode, normative 
theory may nevertheless properly provide guidance with respect to the formation 
of political programmes, since it is not possible to separate political choice from 
the analysis of political life: in separating the wheat from the chaff, it must be 
acknowledged that they first grew as parts of one whole - a whole, in this case, 
which defies the 'is-ought' distinction such that what 'is' (as discovered by 
analysis) results from previous choices made on the grounds of what 'ought to be' 
or what one 'ought to do' (as affirmed by commitment). 
The task at hand, however, is to uncover the origins and foundations of our 
political conceptions, or world-views, as the starting point for claims about 
political knowledge and choice. Such choice clearly involves a form of security 
which reflects the gradual shift of emphasis from politico-military threats to the 
threat of environmental degradation. Specifically, the following discussion will 
address the theoretical implications of invoking, in policy formation, what are 
held to be objective interests as a means of determining 'correct' action. In 
examining interest-based theory and practice, underlying value assumptions will 
be exposed in order to assess the role of values in determining interests. It is 
argued here that values come prior to interests in theoretical significance, and that 
attempts to understand global environmental politics must take into consideration 
the value structures underlying world-views. It is these sructures that are the key 
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to an understanding of what is superficially presented as objective reality, and 
that provide the grounds for rational action based on interest calculations. 
Initially, the problem is the attitude of positivism to the apprehension of 
reality, or to a knowledge of 'what is', since this approach restricts the social 
sciences to falsifiable propositional statements concerning empirically observ-
able facts. A logical-hermeneutic, or interpretive, approach to the same reality 
sees 'what is' as something more than simple empirical factuality. In brief, the 
difference is that between the assumption that there is some independent reality 
'out there', to be discovered by experimentation, and the view that reality is 
socially constructed and can only be 'discovered' through an interpretation of its 
meaning for the participants: 
Social reality is constructed by means of presuppositions (global, all-inclusive 
conceptions of social reality of a religious, ethical, political etc. kind), assump-
tions (epistemological and ontological) and rules (constitutive and regulative) 
... 'what ought to be' and 'what is' belong to the same order of reality. 
(di Bernardo 1988: 152) 
Because traditional positivist views in epistemology, and non-cognitivist 
views in ethics, deny the possibility of knowing reality in this comprehensive 
way, there is naturally a predisposition to explain sociopolitical phenomena in 
terms of objective interests which can be empirically observed. When this 
'reality' of the world is understood in terms of threats to nation states under 
conditions of anarchy, the observed objective interest is likely to be that of 
national security. Yet this view of knowledge clearly restricts 'the conditions of 
possibility for all understanding of the social world'. If the activity of politics is 
to be properly understood (and likewise political objectives like 'security'), it is 
'important to emphasize the decisive importance of the action of the subject as the 
provider of contents which condition his interpretation of reality'. Actions are 
thus comprehensible in the context of a shared system of meaning, or language, 
which nevertheless expresses subjective contents: 
if we employ subjective categories such as intentions, ends, rules, values, 
norms ... [action] may be explained in terms of the contents of the conscious-
ness of the agent which are linked with his vision of the world. The sense of 
his actions depends on these contents, and they contribute to the construction 
of the social world. 
(ibid.: 173) 
It follows that perceptions or interpretations of the world may vary with these 
contents of consciousness, and that knowledge of reality derives not only from a 
sensory experience of it but also from general interpretations, or world-views. A 
further consequence is that values figure prominently in political understanding 
from both an internal and an external perspective, since both the observer and the 
observed are engaged in the valuation of experience. Finally, the significance of 
interests is reduced if these rest ultimately on valuations provided by a normative 
structure. 
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The definition of 'national interest' (where it is defined at all) is dependent on 
prevalent norms, whether these are strictly national or to some degree systemic. 
If these norms arise within the traditional idiom of security, it will be difficult to 
arrive at a global understanding of environmental security. If, on the other hand, 
the consciousness of political agents (individuals, leaders, groups) is oriented 
towards environmental problems (say by the efforts of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs)), the social world need not be constructed in terms of 
traditional national security. The 'objective interest' may then instead be under-
stood in terms of the global environment. 
In the last of eight lectures given at Oxford in 1908, William James concludes 
with a discussion of the 'will to believe' and the 'faith-ladder' used in reaching 
decisions (in this case, about the relationship between pluralism and monism). He 
describes the latter process thus: 
A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no matter how. Is it true or 
not? you ask. It might be true somewhere, you say, for it is not self-
contradictory. 
It may be true, you continue, even here and now. It is fit to be true, it would 
be well if it were true, it ought to be true, you presently feel. It must be true, 
something persuasive in you whispers next; and then - as a final result - it 
shall be held to be true, you decide; it shall be as if true, for you. 
And your acting thus may in certain special cases be a means of making it 
securely true in the end. Not one step in this process is logical, yet it is the way 
in which monists and pluralists alike espouse and hold fast to their visions. It 
is life exceeding logic, it is the practical reason for which the theoretic reason 
finds arguments after the conclusion is once there. In just this way do some of 
us hold to the unfinished pluralistic universe; in just this way do others hold to 
the timeless universe eternally complete. 
(James 1977: 148) 
James' position seems a strong one, and the direction of his thought is suggestive 
of the importance of considering values as an integral part of practical reasoning. 
What is referred to here as a world-view encompasses both theoretical assump-
tions about the essential nature both of international relations and of politics more 
generally and, consequently, assumptions about the 'real world' as well. It is this 
'real world' in which people, groups and organisations (including states) must 
act, and of which theories must provide an account. Perspectives on environ-
mental security form part of any world-view, and the role this part plays in 
theoretical assumptions will determine understandings of environmental security 
in the 'real world' of political action. 
Thus, for understanding what is presented here as a world-view, it is necessary 
to consider the range and character of those theoretical assumptions about inter-
national relations which form the basis of world-views. For example, Hidemi 
Suganami suggests that ideas about world order are 'clustered around five basic 
positions'. The first two are the legal school (internationalist, not cosmopolitan) 
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and the diplomatic school, both of which support the idea of a system of 
sovereign states. The third, democratic confederalism, emphasises repre-
sentation. Federalism, the fourth position, reflects a cosmopolitan view, and the 
fifth position, welfare internationalism, is functionalist. Each of these theoretical 
starting points gives rise to different conceptions of, and hence prescriptions for, 
world order (Suganarni 1989). 
Where there are different national perspectives at work giving rise to different 
institutionalised forms of political life, it will matter which world-view under-
writes institutions. However, a global conception of world-views suggests multiple 
perspectives and thus multiple sources of institutional development (such as 
institutional approaches to the environment). For example, institutions may be 
viewed from an internal or external perspective, and it is only from the internal 
perspective (where the observer 'belongs' to the institution) that constitutive 
rules are both known and accepted, and therefore have prescriptive force. From 
the external perspective, rules may simply be known, being therefore only des-
criptive. The latter perspective may be said to have resonance in a specifically 
international view of the world as a states system, but the former (internal) 
perspective applies when all actors are implicated in global politics by a cosmo-
politan view. In this case, any global value structure is prescriptive as well as 
descriptive, and must be reflected in policy (including environmental policy). 
Where such a value structure can be said to exist, at least to the extent of 
providing grounds for communication, there may still be differences about the 
nature of the values concerned, which can be considered differences in world-
views. Ideas are not always freely transferable in a world comprised of many 
different political systems and cultures. 
To begin with, the experience of political association, and of the values so 
established, is no doubt generally more parochial than what is implied in speaking 
of international relations, yet it must be emphasised again that international 
relations is an integral part of political life as a whole, and that national and local 
politics are equally a part of international relations to the extent that they are a 
source of political values. Second, there may be considerable differences 
concerning human nature, giving rise to different aspirations for political 
community. 
Nevertheless, talking about international relations at all requires some 
universal claims, whether moral or epistemological (note the close relation 
between these two), and hence a central difficulty is that of contending with the 
relativism implied above - which is undeniable in some respects - while at the 
same time locating and characterising those features of global political life which 
are universal. Presumably, the value of a secure environment counts as one such 
universal feature. 
It is argued here that such universals lie in the common objective of human 
betterment, which may be pursued by diverse means (for example, by enhancing 
the quality of the human environment). There is a similarity of form with respect 
to ends, which is represented by the assumption of values (such as the value of 
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environmental security) in the face of ultimate indeterminacy, but a diversity of 
means, which is represented by contingent expressions of value in political life 
and in the pursuit of particular interests. As L.T. Hobhouse says: 'We consider 
laws, customs and institutions in respect of their functions not merely in main-
taining any sort of social life, but in maintaining or promoting a harmonious life' 
(Hobhouse 1958: 27). We all live in different realities, holding different views of 
our world. If there were perfectly shared perceptions of social, political and 
economic reality, the coordinating functions of communication would be redund-
ant, and we would enjoy a common world-view. However, even in the simplest 
(interpersonal) relations, variations in experience make such perfect sharing 
impossible, and communication essential. In international relations, communi-
cation is the principal feature, with other cooperative and coordinated forms of 
activity still less commonplace here than they are in intra-national relations, in 
spite of increasing interdependence among nation states (and other actors). Com-
munication, if effective, may lead to shared perceptions (or at least an awareness 
of differences), but perfect communication, perfect sharing, cannot be achieved. 
Consider, for example, the argument that translation (or rather interpretation) is 
always possible between human languages, but that an understanding of the 
cultural context, the nuances and hidden assumptions of another language 
requires direct experience. The consequence of this argument is that different 
world-views become endemic, and that interactions both positive and negative 
revolve around these different global perspectives. Positive interactions may 
involve coming to terms with differences, while negative interactions may 
involve conflicts as one or another world-view is imposed in order to resolve 
differences. 
To a large degree, conventional or traditional theories of international rela-
tions (principally, versions ofrealism) assume a shared world-view in the form of 
a power-oriented, interest-based, rational technical system susceptible to political 
management - including the management of conflict, in the event of opposing 
interests, by means of the rational application of technical sources of power. In 
the absence of value considerations, the possibility of incommensurable world-
views is not entertained, unless this can be readily translated into conflicts of 
interest (which would allow power to settle the issue). The assumption of a 
unitary reality in which interests are the key factor does not allow the con-
templation of alternative world-views, nor of political options which might arise 
from such contemplation. Thus are excluded both a global world-view drawing 
on universal values, and the possibility of globally based environmental security. 
In this way, the governing assumptions of Western political thought - which 
suggest that politics is to do with power, and that power is to do with mastery -
tend to dictate a particular kind of world-view which then limits the range of 
possible interpretations of international political life: 
Supreme political power thus comes to be viewed - very much in the manner 
of Max Weber - as a capacity to deploy a monopoly of legitimate violence. 
(Skinner 1981: 36) 
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The attending conception of security, then, is bound to considerations of military 
power, whether in terms of an 'external' threat or in terms of 'internal' capability. 
The normative significance of this image of political life is generally lost 
among the deeply imbedded assumptions of traditional theory. 
This is not- in spite of what we sometimes like to think - because we analyze 
our political arrangements in such a hardheaded fashion that the element of 
imagery never intrudes at all. On the contrary, the terms in which we habitu-
ally talk about the powers of the state are densely metaphorical in texture. The 
point is rather that the metaphors we favor all tend to support the idea of 
politics as a realm of domination, subordination, and the exercise of force. 
(Skinner 1981: 36) 
None of these conceptions lend themselves to the global perspective demanded 
by the problem of environmental security. As Weston argues, there are insoluble 
philosophical problems (universals, infinitude, etc.) which are nevertheless solved 
for practical purposes, through politics and culture, in every successful society 
(Weston 1978). Yet it is a common political conceit to universalise practical 
solutions, as a result of an inablity to acknowledge their subjectivity from the 
sheltered position of a given political culture, and such universalisation leads to 
alienation when the grounds for political action require justification from without 
the relevant political culture. 
In international relations, the global political system (however conceived) 
provides an objectifying framework in which the intersubjectivity of particular 
political cultures may be recognised, but it also presents the problem of 
relativistic definitions, not simply of politics in a given society, but also of the 
global political system itself. And here lies the significance of world-views as 
regards explanations or understandings in International Relations. In the absence 
of agreed solutions to insoluble philosophical problems, in the absence of a 
properly developed global political culture, the traditional solution has been a 
pseudo-scientific claim to the empirical reality of power relations; that this 
conception of international politics provides no overall framework of meaning 
has not troubled those who continue to discuss the protection of national interests 
and the maintainance of a stable (imposed) international order. No doubt this 
provides justification for the activities of some state actors, but it does not provide 
a theory of international relations. To pretend either that there is an objective 
political reality (which is revealed by Realist theory), or that there is a universally 
relevant culture (a Western culture of rationality, for example) that provides a 
locus for the resolution of insolubles, is simply to evade the most interesting and 
important political questions - questions which are brought to life in international 
relations precisely because they have no cultural solution there. 
Hence, the problem in international politics is not simply the location of 
objective interests - these are indeterminate. The problem is also that of locating 
those political values that can ascribe meaning to global political life, and can 
provide grounds for selecting practical solutions to insoluble philosophical 
problems. In locating these values, however, contrasting or contradictory national 
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cultures may stand in the way of agreed solutions. However, asserting cultural 
relativism is no answer to this problem, nor does it close the debate: this problem 
of clashing views and opposing wishes is the apogee of all political problems, and 
requires nothing more nor less than a political solution. To abrogate political 
responsibilities just because the traditional boundaries of political organisation 
have been exceeded is to abandon our collective fate to the vagaries of historical 
accident; a dangerous weakness in view of the globalising forces of modernity. 
The place that values hold in political understanding is, nevertheless, often 
ignored since the location of values remains problematic - particularly so in 
International Relations. Because intellectual tastes have tended to favour the 
analysis of quantifiable utilities, the analysis of values has been marginalised in 
social science. However, this situation has changed somewhat in recent years, 
with greater attention given to a values-centred approach to public-policy analysis 
(Aaron, Mann and Taylor 1994: viii, 2), and a growing interest in normative 
International Relations theory (Hoffman 1994; Brown 1992; Smith 1992; Dyer 
1989; Frost 1986). 
On such an account, values are the underlying substance of political systems 
and structures, and the appropriate objects of study. Any comprehension of 
interests or tangible assets in politics depends on a comprehension of the values 
at play, for it is they which endow political meaning. The International Relations 
of global environmental change have brought the traditional meanings of political 
concepts into doubt, and the challenge of making new sense of them has opened 
the way for changes in International Relations theory. This is particularly true for 
the suspicious concept of 'environmental security'. 
Environmental security and national security are alternative values, arising in 
the context of alternative world-views. If the case is made out for adopting a 
global perspective, environmental security could stand as a universal value on 
which more localised environmental policy could be properly founded. If tradi-
tional inter-state perspectives hold sway, there is little chance of environmental 
security becoming any more than an addendum to the traditional politico-military 
security agenda. 
NOTES 
1 The research leading to this article was supported by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) through a Research Fellowship in the Global Environ-
mental Change Programme (Grant No. L320 27 3071). I am also grateful to the 
members of the British International Studies Association Environment Group, which 
is also supported by the ESRC, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
2 For literature which specifically addresses environmental security, see: Bennett 1991; 
Brown 1977, 1986; Brown 1989; Dalby 1992a, 1992b; Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994; 
Lowi 1993; Mathews 1989; Myers 1989; Pirages 1991; Renner 1989a, 1989b; 
Rowlands 1991; Sorenson 1990; Tickner 1989, 1992; Ullman 1983; Vogler 1993. 
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3 International political economy and 
global environmental change 
Marc Williams 
One of the most notable features of world politics in the 1990s is the emphasis 
given to the environment. The recent upsurge of interest in global environmental 
issues reflects changes in world politics; an increasing awareness of environ-
mental degradation; the global nature of many environmental problems; and 
changing attitudes to the relationship between humans and the natural world. In 
the contemporary global system, the nature and dimensions of the ecological 
crisis have become an unavoidable issue for governments, business corporations 
and civic groups. Recently, students of international relations have begun to 
analyse the dynamics of global environmental change. This chapter is an attempt 
to examine the ways in which one particular type of international theory has 
addressed the issue of global environmental change. It will provide a critical 
introduction to international political economy (IPE) analyses of global environ-
mental change. This task is necessarily complicated because it is impossible to 
specify a single approach to international political economy. A central task of this 
chapter, therefore, will be to develop an argument which recognises both the 
unity and the diversity of IPE as a discipline. In doing so it will assess the 
contribution of the different perceptions of and responses to the ecological crisis 
which arise from the differing approaches to IPE. 
International political economy (IPE) as a distinct sub-field of international 
relations is keen to differentiate itself from its parent discipline (Boyle 1994: 
351). Specifically, IPE theorists accuse International Relations scholars of state-
centrism and a failure to recognise the interconnectedness of politics and economics 
(Underhill 1994: 17-44). It can be argued that IPE approaches are more appro-
priate because they are sensitive to questions of values and for the most part begin 
not with the state but with a range of actors in their analyses of world politics. The 
first part of this chapter will therefore provide a brief introduction to, and a 
critique of, the way in which global environmental change has been studied in 
international relations. Given the need to identify the contours of international 
political economy, the second part of this chapter will explore IPE as an academic 
practice. It will distinguish between competing conceptions of IPE in terms of 
their core assumptions and research strategies. The third section of the chapter 
will note those implications for the study of global environmental change which 
arise from these competing IPE perspectives. I will demonstrate that although 
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IPE is presented as a critique of conventional international relations theory, and 
to some degree does extend and improve the analytical power of conventional 
accounts of global politics, orthodox IPE, nevertheless, replicates many of the 
key assumptions and values of conventional international relations theory. The 
conclusion considers briefly the reformulation ofIPE in such a way that analyses 
of global environmental change might be made more central to the discipline. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE 
IPE sets itself up against orthodox IR theory. In examining IPE contributions to 
a subject area, it is therefore helpful to recapitulate the tenets of traditional theory 
and to ask two key questions. First, what are the limitations of traditional 
theorising in this field? And second, how distinctive are the various IPE 
approaches? It is the contention of this chapter that the engagement of the 
discipline of international relations in the issue of global environmental change 
has served to reproduce orthodoxy in the discipline. The 'failure' of international 
relations theory to provide adequate explanations of global environmental change 
thus opens up the possibility that IPE approaches, on the other hand, will be more 
fruitful. But it can also be argued that the close connection between IPE and 
conventional international relations theory prevents IPE from fulfilling this promise. 
In this section I will briefly survey the manner in which the discipline of 
international relations has responded to the urgent international environmental 
crisis. In doing so I am centrally concerned with the ways in which the 'new' field 
of global environmental politics has been incorporated into the discourse of 
international relations. I will be arguing that the theorisation and conceptual-
isation of global environmental politics proceed not from an appreciation of the 
distinctive nature of the subject matter but from the abstractions of a framework 
informed by neorealism and liberal institutionalism. Moreover, it will be my 
contention that this incorporation of environmentalism into orthodox international 
relations theory fails to provide an adequate understanding of global environ-
mental degradation. It is widely agreed that three paradigms or perspectives can 
be discerned in international relations theory. The realist (and neorealist) 
paradigm, the dominant approach, is challenged by the respective pluralist 
(liberal-institutionalist) and radical, or structuralist, perspectives. I am not, of 
course, suggesting that three clearly demarcated perspectives exist such that, for 
example, it is an uncontentious exercise to see into which perspective the work of 
a given writer can be placed. Moreover, each perspective is a complex body of 
thought with specific historical variants. Nevertheless, International Relations is 
widely perceived to be riven by competing perspectives informed by competing 
beliefs, by contrasting sets of values and assumptions about the nature of the 
discipline, and by a focus on different core actors and relationships (Cox 1992: 166). 
Before the 1980s, international relations scholars paid minimal attention to 
environmental issues. The recent reconciliation of international relations theory 
with global environmental change has taken as its starting point the recognition 
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of a wholly new issue, and as a result, the reasons for the previous exclusion of 
the environment have not been investigated. Instead, the failure of international 
theory - along with theory in other branches of the social sciences - to theorise 
the environment is accepted as afait accompli. The misrecognition of environ-
mental concerns is now remedied through an approach which attempts to bring 
the environment into international relations. Such an approach is inherently 
limited, however, because it fails to account for the previous exclusion. Studying 
the political economy of the environment necessitates an attempt to understand 
why environmental issues had been hitherto neglected. That is, a past failure to 
include environmental concerns in the discipline cannot simply be regarded as a 
fact with no implications for the theorisation of the global system. Accelerated 
environmental degradation raises crucial questions concerning humanity's 
relationship with the natural world, and with other species. Analyses of the global 
ecological crisis therefore require a rethinking of fundamental concepts and 
assumptions. Unless international relations theory sets out explicitly to tackle the set 
of questions which arise from the interaction between the economy and the 
ecosystem, it will instead merely find itself co-opting environmental analysis and 
accommodating 'green' issues within the prevailing conception of international 
relations. It is not in fact the case that international relations theory had 
previously ignored environmental issues altogether, but rather that (like all social 
sciences) by internalising environmental issues, it had rendered them invisible. 
International relations theory had traditionally removed from critical view the 
ways in which, historically, environmental issues had been silenced. 
The crucial question now becomes: how is the new-found visibility to be 
articulated? And it is important, indeed, to recognise which approaches will 
provide the best starting point for assessing the politics and economics of global 
environmental degradation. Before examining the contribution of IPE, it is ne-
cessary to look at the manner in which conventional international-relations theory 
has approached this task of assessment. 
Although I do not wish to contest the claim that, in the 1990s, studies of global 
environmental change have developed predominantly from a pluralist perspective 
(Smith 1993: 32), nevertheless, it is not the case that realist premises are entirely 
absent from current accounts of international environmental politics. Traditional 
international relations theory, in its approach to environmental issues, has made 
three crucial assumptions. The first concerns the reasons for renewed interest in 
the environment. In this view, global environmental problems only became issues 
of high politics in the 1980s, largely through the end of superpower competition 
with the collapse of the Cold War (Porter and Brown 1991: 1). It should be 
stressed that two claims are implied here. First, the movement from 'low politics' 
to 'high politics' is presented as an objective and external event. A series of 
changes in the global system. it is argued, produced a changing conception of the 
role of environmental issues in world society. Global environmental change is 
here conceived as a given, as just one more issue on the agenda of states. What 
should be noted here, however, is that our response to environmental degradation 
is invariably conditioned by a given ideologically structured conception of the 
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environment. The notion of an environmental crisis is not self-evident. It is open 
to contestation, and any discussion of global environmental change must be 
recognised as a reflection both of sets of interests and values and of patterns of 
power distribution which need to be radically interrogated. Second, this view 
claims that issues are only worthy of attention in the discipline when they are of 
consequence to state actors. The privileged position accorded to states is thus 
doubly reinforced. 
In responding to the rise of global environmental politics, international-
relations theory has thus continued to privilege the state, and this indeed is its 
second key assumption. Accounts of global environmental politics focus on the 
activities of states and pose questions from the perspectives of states (Hurrell and 
Kingsbury 1992: 1). The problem of environmentalism, in this view, arises from 
the difficulty of regulating independent political actors in the context of an 
anarchical international system. States are the key players in this system, engaged 
in zero-sum, relative-gain power games and required to defend their interests 
against each other. Non-state actors can be included, but their role by definition 
is restricted to that of supporting players. One consequence of the state-centric 
focus of international relations theorising is that although attention is given to the 
role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in studies of environmental 
diplomacy, 'The nature and extent of NGO influence on international environ-
mental policy has not received comprehensive or detailed study' (Caldwell 1988: 
24). When NGO influence is noted, it is seen merely as an additional factor which 
has to be taken into account, and in the end, analysts tend to the conclusion that 
'State actors are still primary determinants of issue outcomes in global environ-
mental politics' (Porter and Brown 1991: 68). 
The third main assumption in the literature of traditional international relations 
theory is that of a narrow concept of environmental security. In line with tradi-
tional security studies, security is defined as the absence or containment of a 
threat. Although the national security problem has been redefined to take account 
of threats arising from environmental degradation (Westing 1991), and although 
various studies have tried to show how environmental threats can be accom-
modated within the existing security paradigm, the debate nonetheless fails either 
to ask whose security is at stake or to question whether traditional security 
approaches give adequate responses to the problems posed by environmental 
degradation. 
Realism's fixation with state power and the possible use of force, its failure to 
recognise the role ofNGOs in regime building, and the inadequacy of its response 
to a problem which, in its manifestation, presents a challenge to sovereignty have 
all made it less helpful as an approach to global environmental politics than the 
pluralist approach, which starts from a recognition oftransnationalism and inter-
dependence. In a continued dialogue with realism, liberal-institutionalist and 
pluralist accounts of global environmental change contest the state-centric biases 
of realist explanations and insist instead on the importance of international 
institutions, international organisations and NGOs in the search for solutions to 
the global environmental crisis. In a similar vein to realism, pluralist approaches 
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stress environmental management and problem-solving solutions. But within the 
contemporary interrogation of the ecological crisis, pluralist analysts focus instead 
on the importance of regimes in structuring expectations and behaviour in the 
international system. The liberal-institutionalist perspective, which recognises 
both the importance of knowledge and ideas and the role played by transnational 
actors, appears to be the more apposite one, given the fact that the ecological 
crisis arises from increased interdependence and increasing globalisation. The 
complexity of the issues which arise from global environmental change demands 
international responses that are sensitive to a complex web of cultural, social, 
political and economic processes. Consequently, any approach fixated on an 
unreconstructed concept of the state will be increasingly unable to provide an 
adequate analysis of the international dimension of the environmental crisis. The 
limitations of state-centrism and the necessity to examine the environmental 
impact of other kinds of actors are both explicitly recognised in the pluralist 
literature. 
Institutionalized sovereignty does not imply that states are the only (or neces-
sarily the most important) agents or institutions responsible for transforming 
(depleting or degrading) social and natural environments .... Many, if not 
most, of the more powerful human impacts on the natural environment are 
exerted by private firms, corporations, and comparable organisations and 
institutions. 
(Choucri 1993: 14-15) 
A number of studies have looked more closely at the role of international 
institutions. In this literature, 'institutions' is given two different meanings. Some 
authors use institutions synonymously with organisations. For example, the 
collection edited by Peter Haas, Robert Keohane and Marc Levy (1993) assesses 
the impact and potential contribution of international organisations (institutions) 
in the promotion of international environmental cooperation. Oran Young (1994 ), 
on the other hand, analyses the role of social institutions in terms of the protection 
of the environment. 
Whether the focus is on formal organisations or on informal institutions, 
liberal-institutionalist analyses challenge the state-centrism of neorealism and 
provide a less rigid approach to the study of global environmental change. 
However, a number of criticisms can be levelled at liberal-institutionalist 
analyses of global environmental politics. First, regime theory can be criticised 
for its tendency to assume that international cooperation is the result of rational 
behaviour on the part of self-interested units, for its propensity to treat regimes as 
if they had an independent and autonomous existence, and for the largely 
ahistorical and static nature of its analysis (Williams 1994: 37). Second, these 
approaches are inherently problem-solving, and as such they reduce politics to a 
mere technical discourse and fail to question existing structures. 
To what extent does IPE provide a better starting point for analyses of global 
environmental change? Before we can examine IPE approaches to global en-
vironmental change, it is necessary to look at IPE as an academic discipline. This 
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is because IPE is an arena of competing and contrasting theoretical positions. An 
understanding of the historical development of IPE and of the conceptual map of 
the terrain will be helpful in understanding the contemporary applications ofIPE 
to the study of global environmental change. 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Political economy as a tradition in social and political thought has a long history. 
The term political economy first emerged in the eighteenth century and signalled 
an increasing focus upon the role of the state in the economy (Caporaso and 
Levine 1992: 1). International political economy, while clearly influenced by the 
history of speculation on the interrelationship between politics and economics, 
did not emerge as a self-defined field of study until the 1970s. Contemporary IPE 
has to be understood in the context of the history of political economy, the 
emergence of IPE within the disciplinary matrix of international relations, and the 
material conditions surrounding the growth of the study of international political 
economy. 
The absence of consensus on the definition or conceptualisation of IPE is a direct 
result of the intellectual antecedents of the IPE approach. The history of political 
economy is one of contrasting theories of politics and economics, and contending 
views on the central questions of political economy. Agreement may exist on the 
assumption that political economy is expressly concerned with authority and market 
relations, but no agreement exists on how the intersections of power and wealth are 
to be studied. International political economy, then, has to be seen as a site of 
contention. Indeed, most analysts perceive IPE as a field in which three distinct 
perspectives or ideologies are battling for control. The specific name given to these 
ideologies may vary, but the crucial distinction made is that between realist, liberal 
and Marxist perspectives (Gilpin 1987: ~). Contemporary IPE can thus be seen 
as a contest between competing perspectives, and one in which the protagonists 
acknowledge the existence of different perspectives. 
It follows from the above that no single precise definition of IPE as a distinct 
discipline is possible (Higgott 1994: 156). IPE has indeed been variously defined, 
with some definitions stressing the subject matter of the discipline (Keohane 
1984: 21; Strange 1988: 18; Stiles andAkaha 1991: xi), some focusing on the sets 
of questions posed (Gilpin 1987: 9), and others concentrating on an interdisci-
plinary approach (Gill and Law, 1988: xviii). Given the existing plethora of 
definitions, it is perhaps unwise to add to the list. Nevertheless, for the purposes 
of this chapter I will define international political economy as the analysis of the 
exchange of goods and services across national boundaries, the institutional 
arrangements which govern these transactions, the policies taken by governments 
and other actors concerning these flows and institutional arrangements, and the 
sets of questions posed by the existence of global production, distribution and 
consumption. 
IPE developed within the discipline of international relations at a time when 
the postwar liberal international economic order was under severe strain (Choucri 
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1980: 103; Jones 1983: 3-4). The 1970s witnessed a period of increased turbu-
lence and uncertainty in the international political economy, brought on by a 
number of developments. These included the end of the long postwar boom 
period of economic expansion; the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates; a rise in protectionism; a (temporary) rise in the economic power 
of the developing countries through the influence exerted by the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the strident clamour of the developing 
countries (through the Group of 77) for a reform of the liberal order of world trade 
and payments, and for greater participation in global economic management; the 
relative decline of American power; and the consequent increased importance of 
the European Community and Japan as centres of economic power. 
Furthermore, the theoretical separation between politics and economics was 
becoming increasingly untenable in the light of events in the world. In eco-
nomics, the dominant neoclassical perspective separated politics from economics 
on the basis of the assumption that the operation of the market existed outside the 
political realm. The market, and market relations, could in this view be analysed 
adequately without recourse to politics. Likewise, in international relations, 
realism, the dominant paradigm, separated economics from politics. Inter-state 
relations were analysed largely in terms of power, understood for the most part as 
military power. The recognition of the limitations of traditional theories of 
international relations led to the establishment of a theoretical space in which 
international politics and international economics were enjoined (Strange 1970: 
304-15). But the three perspectives that were now delineated were not wholly 
divorced from conventional international relations theory. In fact, the three IPE 
perspectives have served to replay and replicate the three paradigms found in 
international relations. 
These three strands of orthodox IPE have not achieved equal prominence in 
the discipline. Neorealism, the dominant paradigm in the study of IPE, is based, 
naturally enough, on the central conceptions and categories of realism, and enjoys 
a superiority which has arisen from the supremacy of realist analyses in the 
discipline of international relations. As a result, the Marxist or radical paradigm, 
which offers an alternative analysis of IPE through its concentration on the 
historical expansion of the capitalist mode of production, has been marginalised 
in favour of the realist, and the liberal, approaches. 
Given the cross-fertilisation of methods and ideas in the contemporary study 
of IPE, clear distinctions between the various perspectives are not always pos-
sible (Crane and Amawi 199 l: 3-33) - especially regarding the realist and liberal 
perspectives. Although the debate between the three perspectives continues to 
dominate much scholarship, a number of writers, including Strange (1988, 1991), 
and Gill and Law (1988), have attempted to produce an eclectic or integrated 
approach which uses insights from all three perspectives. Thus, contemporary 
research in IPE continues to reflect the diversity within each perspective while 
also producing analyses which merge the three schools of thought. 
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ORTHODOX INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
In this section I will examine the ways in which traditional IPE theories have 
approached the problem of global environmental degradation. It can be argued 
that all three perspectives have tended to silence, marginalise and neglect en-
vironmental concerns. In so far as this argument is accepted, it is clear that this 
tendency is not accidental but inscribed in the underlying philosophies of these 
approaches. The peripheralisation of the environment from the central concerns 
of orthodox IPE echoes, for example, the exclusion of gender from IPE theories. 
Environmental concerns are rendered invisible in IPE because the liberal, realist 
and Marxist paradigms treat the environment as an external factor. The environ-
ment merely provides resources for the economic process, rather than being 
important in its own right. 
Underlying the realist, liberal and Marxist perspectives is a technocentric and 
anthropocentric approach to natural resource use (Eckersley 1992: 21--6). Both 
liberalism and Marxism share a belief in material growth and technological 
optimism. And realism, with its emphasis on state interests, is wedded to in-
dustrialisation in the contemporary international political economy. It is of course 
evident that in perspectives with such long histories and internal diversity, not all 
writers will share these underlying assumptions in their totality. Indeed, in both 
liberalism and Marxism, one can find theorists who have introduced qualifi-
cations to the prevailing technocentrism and anthropocentrism (Eckersley 1992: 
23; Dobson 1990: 175-92). Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the intel-
lectual heritage of international political economy bequeaths it a view in which 
economic systems should be designed to satisfy the unlimited wants of human 
beings. The sustainable use of resources was not an important consideration in 
traditional approaches to the economy. Political philosophy supplied the 
principles behind such approaches: 'From Hobbes and Locke through to Marx, 
the notion of human self-realisation through the domination and transformation 
of nature persisted as an unquestioned axiom of political enquiry' (Eckersley 
1992: 25). Recent concern about the threat to both the ecosystem and the future 
of humanity if unfettered economic growth is not curbed has led to attempts to 
modify the conventional paradigms. For example, in Marxist analysis there have 
been attempts to make environmental concerns central to an understanding of 
international political economy - this will be evident in the discussion of the 
radical perspective below. In a similar vein, environmental economics uses the 
tools of neoclassical economics to assess the economic consequences of environ-
mental degradation (Dorfman and Dorfman 1993; Turner, Pearce and Bateman 
1994). 
Notwithstanding this history of neglect, the contemporary social, economic 
and political impact of global environmental change is so extensive that IPE 
cannot ignore environmental concerns. There are two principal aspects to the 
integration of environmental concerns into IPE. First, a number of environmental 
problems have an impact on the global political economy, and some form of 
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international agreement is necessary to cope with these problems. As Hurrell and 
Kingsbury argue: 'international co-operation is required both to manage global 
environmental problems and to deal with domestic environmental problems in 
ways that do not place individual states at a political or competitive disadvantage' 
(Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992: 5). This intersection of environmental concerns 
and the international political economy can be termed the problem of inter-
national or global governance. In the context of international governance, Oran 
Young identifies four environmental problem sets: '(international) commons, 
shared natural resources, transboundary externalities, and linked issues' (Young 
1994: 19). Problems such as ozone depletion, the management of regional seas, 
acid rain and sustainable development may arise in different environmental 
problem sets, but they all require action by international actors. 
Second, global environmental change is intimately linked to national and 
international systems of production, distribution and consumption: 'The ... most 
important aspect of increased globalisation derives from the complex but close 
relationship between the generation of environmental problems and the workings 
of the effectively globalised world economy' (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992: 3). 
This can be characterised as the problem of sustainability. The historical process 
of capital accumulation and the pursuit of economic growth have both contri-
buted to current environmental degradation. Key issues concerning growth and 
development strategies, industrialisation, international trade and North-South 
relations, for example, all require re-examination in the current historical con-
juncture. In this context, it can be argued that modern global environmental 
challenges are characterised by three main features: uncertainty, irreversibility 
and uniqueness (non-substitutability) (Pearce 1990: 366). Uncertainty arises 
from the fact that there is no guarantee that sometime in the future, a finite natural 
resource will be replaceable by technology. Irreversibility can clearly be seen in, 
for example, the extinction of species, but it also pertains to a wider class of 
natural assets which, once destroyed, cannot be replaced. And uniqueness is the 
result of the non-substitutability of some environmental assets by human-made 
assets. 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
IPE approaches to the environment have concentrated on identifying the condi-
tions under which international cooperation will result in the creation of stable 
institutions which promote environmental sustainability. It is not surprising that 
the problem of international cooperation has figured so prominently in IPE 
analyses of global environmental change. Central to both neorealist and neo-
liberal IPE theories has been the issue of the management of the international 
economy. Such management is constructed around the necessity to provide 
international public goods, the creation and maintenance of international regimes 
to facilitate international order, and the role of leadership in the provision of 
public goods. The research agenda of IPE has been dominated in the last decade 
by hegemonic stability theory and regime theory. Both neorealists and liberal 
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institutionalists focus attention on the creation and maintenance of international 
order through formal international organisations and informal institutionalised 
practices. 
It is possible to discern the outlines of a realist IPE critique of global environ-
mental change. Central to the realist and neorealist project are two assumptions. 
First, that states are likely to be constrained from cooperation by the anarchic 
nature of international society. Second, that the state's formal apparatus and 
enduring interests are what shape and transform economic processes. Inter-
national cooperation, from this perspective, only arises in so far as it supports the 
political interests of the state. Within the realist paradigm, with its focus on states 
and its concern for the accretion of state power, any resource use which increases 
the influence of states is held to be valid. Realist analysis stresses the difficulty 
of establishing cooperation on the environment. In this respect, the environment 
is seen as no different from other international 'issue-areas'. Realism, in its 
concentration on states and state power, marginalises the role of international 
organisations. The neorealist version of hegemonic stability theory argues that a 
necessary condition for international cooperation is the existence of a dominant 
or hegemonic state. Regimes are created, in this view, only when a dominant state 
has both the resources for and an interest in providing the necessary leadership to 
foster international cooperation. This realist tendency to assume that international 
cooperation is the result of rational behaviour on the part of self-interested states 
is echoed by economic analyses of international environmental cooperation. 
Richard Blackhurst and Arvind Subramanian (1992) use game theory to examine 
the scope for multilateral cooperation on the environment. In a similar vein, Scott 
Barrett (1993) constructs a formal model to explain why countries will cooperate 
in the face of the free-rider problem. The limitations of these assumptions are well 
known and need not be rehearsed here. A number of studies have shown that 
regimes can be created and maintained in the absence of a hegemon (Keohane 
1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Young 1989). The postulate ofrational action 
is very limiting, and a focus on states misrepresents the complex interplay of 
actors in global environmental politics. And in a complex and changing world, 
the ahistorical approach of neorealist IPE fails to capture the underlying causes 
of environmental degradation, which are 'fundamentally rooted in the process of 
globalisation which has effectively rendered the territorial state incapable of 
fulfilling its traditional functions' (Thomas 1993: 3). 
The liberal-institutionalist approach extends the neorealist analysis on a 
number of levels, and provides different answers to questions concerning the 
definition of the international system. World politics, in this view, cannot be 
encapsulated through a focus on the most powerful states. The international 
system is perceived as a series of networks and transactions which involve a 
number of actors, and as one in which cooperation is more than just a coincidence 
of short-term interests. In other words, states are enmeshed in a network of 
transactions and interdependencies which limit and constrain their authority. In 
the liberal-institutionalist approach to IPE, institutions are crucial determinants of 
behaviour (Young 1994: 1-8; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993). 
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From the perspective of liberal IPE, ecological degradation arises from the 
interconnectedness of national societies. Environmental degradation is therefore 
one result of the growth of interdependence. Since global environmental change 
does not respect national borders, multilateral cooperation and the identification 
of common or shared interests across territorial units are required if it is to be 
successfully addressed. Regimes may reflect the preponderant power of one state 
actor, but they need not do so. As already established, regimes are sometimes 
formed in the absence of a hegemonic state and can continue to function when 
leadership is absent. Collective action in pursuit of environmental stability and 
environmental sustainability is thus seen as involving a number of different 
actors, and the state-centric focus of realist IPE is thus relaxed to allow for the 
contribution of non-state actors. Klinger, in an analysis of debt-for-nature swaps, 
argues that 'the anarchy of international politics is not always incompatible with 
cooperation, but that cooperation wiHnot always come from the efforts of states' 
(Klinger 1994: 243). Developing the transnational relations perspective of IPE, 
Klinger demonstrates that the diffusion of science and technology, and the 
activities ofNGOs are crucial determinants of international cooperation on behalf 
of the environment. Extending further this argument concerning the diffusion of 
science and technology, Peter Haas (1990a, 1990b) argues that significant inter-
national environmental cooperation is the result of the influence of ecological 
epistemic communities. Epistemic communities are defined as 'transnational 
networks of knowledge based communities that are both politically empowered 
through their claims to exercise authoritative knowledge and motivated by shared 
causal and principled beliefs' (Haas 1990a: 349). These studies focus on elite 
dynamics, and thus tend to have little to say about non-elite social movements. 
However, the role of transnational social movements in the analysis of global 
environmental politics cannot be reduced to the activities of elite groups 
(Laferriere 1994). And moreover, although liberal IPE examines power relations 
in the context of the institutions it describes, it neglects the role of power in 
shaping those institutions in the first place. In other words, considerations of 
structural inequalities are not given sufficient prominence. 
The radical approach to international governance begins from a critique of 
realist and liberal approaches. Radicals argue that environmental degradation 
arises from the capitalist mode of development. In contrast to liberal theories, the 
radical approach does not regard environmental degradation as an accidental 
outcome of development which can be easily rectified through market-led or 
command and control solutions. On the contrary, environmental degradation is 
seen as the direct result of the processes of accumulation, production and repro-
duction central to capitalism. In discussing the problems of global governance, 
radical analyses urge a shift in focus from the deliberations of multilateral 
organisations and their outcomes to a concentration on the underlying structural 
conditions which give rise to environmental degradation (Woodhouse 1992). 
Global environmental management as exemplified by the UNCED process is 
likely to fail. Far from tackling the root causes of the ecological crisis, such 
multilateral management organisations merely reinforce existing power structures 
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(Doran 1993: 61; Chatterjee and Finger 1994). Furthermore, radical and neo-Marxist 
writers tend to argue that in a hierarchical international power structure, the 
developed countries of the North dominate international decision-making. The 
exploitation of the Third World countries, established in colonial times and 
continued through a variety of neocolonialist practices, will be replicated, it is 
claimed, in the debates on international environmental issues (Haas 1990b: 
47-52). International organisations are not, however, mere epiphenomena with a 
negligible impact on international relations, and in underestimating the salience 
of institutional bargaining, radical writers present a static picture of the dynamics 
of the international political economy. Their depiction of the countries of the 
South as mere pawns of the North both misrepresents the exercise of power and 
is politically disabling. 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
In this section, the differing approaches of the liberal and radical perspectives 
only will be considered. This is not because realist writers have nothing to say on 
these issues but rather because, in terms of economic analysis, any distinctively 
realist approach will share a similar foundation to that of the liberal paradigm. 
(The major difference, however, lies in the role given to the state and to state 
interests. Whereas liberals emphasise the role of individual actors and the 
potential harmony of interests, realists stress the importance of the state and the 
possibility of conflict.) In what follows, a realist argument can be extrapolated 
from the economic analysis of liberal economics. 
Within contemporary IPE, the politics of sustainability generates a debate on 
various issues. Conflicts arising from international trade, pollution control, the 
preservation of biodiversity and sustainable development have all figured pro-
minently on the international agenda. Of the many issues debated in the field of 
the political economy of global environmental change, sustainable development 
is perhaps the most urgent. Sustainable development has become, within a very 
short time, a term to which all subscribe, but to which all attach different 
meanings. The Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable development 
as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs' ('World Commission on 
Environment and Development' 1987: 43) has become, if not the standard defini-
tion, the point from which other contestations flow. A number of common themes 
emerge in the debate on sustainable development. First, there is general 
agreement on the principle of intergenerational equity. In other words, 
sustainable development policies should ensure that the welfare of future genera-
tions is no lower than our own. Second, proponents of sustainable development 
focus on efficiency of resource use. After a closer look at the use of natural 
resources, and at the pollution created as a result of economic production, 
efficiency is defined in such a way that the full social costs of goods and services 
are reflected in the price of production inputs and consumer goods. Third, the 
literature on sustainable development has been concerned with the inter-country 
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and intra-country effects of changes in economic policies. In the context of the 
global political economy, North-South relations are a prime site for discussions 
of equity. The advanced industrial states achieved their current living standards 
through a process of industrialisation which resulted in untold environmental 
degradation. This industrialisation option is now closed to the developing countries. 
However, the adoption of sustainable policies will be costly, and unless the 
advanced industrial countries are willing to effect major transfers of resources, 
the necessary policies are unlikely to be implemented. 
Liberal theorists locate the problem of sustainability within the context of a 
global economy of mutually interdependent actors. They regard nature as a 
commodity which can be subject to property rights, and believe that market 
mechanisms create the most efficient use of resources. Sustainable development 
policies can be pursued through the creation of economic incentives to retard, 
stop or reverse the processes of environmental degradation. In this analysis, 
economic growth per se is not challenged. Indeed, economic development, here 
seen principally as growth-oriented, is regarded as a vital component of a sound 
environmental strategy. In this context it is argued that a symbiotic relationship 
exists between development and environmental protection. Far from being 
oppositional, development and environmental protection are, in this view, 
compatible. The crucial link between environmental sustainability and economic 
development arises from the interactions between poverty and environmental 
management. Economic growth is necessary for poverty reduction, but such 
growth can also cause serious environmental degradation. On the other hand, 
poverty, too, is a significant contributor to environmental damage. It is only 
through the possibilities of alternative policies introduced by sustained growth 
that sound environmental policies can be instituted. Sustainable development is 
therefore both a desirable goal and a feasible outcome. Economic growth can 
cause environmental degradation, and it is only through the more efficient use of 
resources and through technological innovation that sound environmental protec-
tion will be guaranteed. In the words of the World Bank: 
rising incomes combined with sound environmental policies and institutions 
can form the basis for tackling both environmental and development problems. 
The key to growing sustainably is not to produce less but to produce differently. 
(World Bank 1992: 36) 
One of the key areas of conflict in the debate over sustainable development 
concerns the merits of free trade. Liberal theorists argue that no inherent conflict 
exists between trade liberalisation and sustainable development. Indeed, in-
creased protectionism to safeguard the environment will, according to this 
perspective, lead to a reduction in welfare (Williams 1993: 88-90). The case for 
free trade is based on the view that where external costs exist, they are better dealt 
with by non-trade policy instruments. Developing the argument further, liberal 
theorists stress the additional benefits of maintaining an open trading environ-
ment (World Bank 1992: 67). Doing so, they argue, would contribute to conflict 
resolution, because in the contemporary international economic system of 
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mutually interdependent actors, the failure on the part of the developing countries 
to implement environmentally friendly technologies will eventually result in 
adverse impacts on Northern lifestyles. And therefore, the developed countries 
will come to recognise their own self-interest in providing substantial assistance 
to the developing countries so that the latter can afford the new technologies 
necessary for sustainable development. 
Radical approaches to sustainability locate environmental degradation in the 
dynamics of capitalist industrialisation and development. As Carolyn Merchant 
argues, 'The patterns of uneven development and their differential economic and 
ecological effects are the products of a global market economy that has been 
emerging since the sixteenth century' (Merchant 1992: 23). The quest for sustain-
able development consequently has to confront the values, interests and power 
behind the capitalist international division of labour. The ecological crisis is the 
result of a specific pattern of economic growth, i.e. capitalism, and embodies the 
contradictions inherent in that economic and social system. Unsustainable de-
velopment in the South is a direct consequence of the incorporation of developing 
countries into an asymmetrical international division-of-labour system. Southern 
dependence and unsustainable agricultural and industrial policies are maintained 
through the prevalent patterns of trade, finance and investment, and unless these 
structures are overturned, sustainable development will remain an aspiration 
rather than a practical goal (Ekins 1993: 91-103). Moreover, radical critics allege 
that a contradiction exists between the goals of sustainability, on the one hand, 
and development as defined in the conventional paradigm on the other. The 
relationship between economic growth, development and sustainability is com-
plex and problematic. Redclift argues that 'The concentration on "growth" has 
served to obscure the fact that resource depletion and unsustainable development 
are a direct consequence of growth itself (Redclift 1987: 56). Sustainable de-
velopment will only be achieved through a radical rethinking of both the postwar 
concept of development and the traditional resource use paradigm. It will be 
impossible to implement the desired changes under existing structures of political 
and economic power. 
The liberal case for free trade is rejected by radical writers, who argue that 
international trade is a major mechanism in the creation and maintenance of 
environmental degradation. Lang and Hines assert: 'To free trade further now 
would be to add insult to environmental injury. Trade already directly damages 
the environment and further deregulation would be an incentive to greater harm' 
(Lang and Hines 1993: 61). The case for environmental protection rests on a 
number of claims. First, it is alleged that international trade reinforces inequality 
and thereby results in environmental damage. Producing raw materials for export 
rather than growing food for internal consumption is one mechanism whereby 
existing inequalities within a country are reinforced through participation in 
international trade (Ropke 1994). Second, specialisation through trade, it is 
argued, can result in reduced incomes and environmental degradation for primary 
producers. Trade liberalisation and existing patterns of North-South specialisation 
maintain the South's impoverished position. Falling terms of trade lead to declin-
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ing export receipts and to patterns of land use which exacerbate environmental 
degradation (Arden-Clarke 1992). Third, some writers claim that the liberal trade 
regime encourages transnational corporations to transplant pollution-intensive 
industries from the industrialised countries, where environmental regulations are 
strict, to the developing world where environmental controls are relatively lax 
(El-Hinnawi and Hashmi 1982: 10-11). 
The debate between the liberal and radical views will remain unresolved, 
given the competing methodologies and value preferences of the various writers. 
Neither perspective provides convincing explanations of the international political 
economy of global environmental change. Liberal theories are deficient because 
they fail to deal adequately with power and power relations - specifically, they 
are unable to represent structural forms of power. Neo-Marxist analysis, with its 
emphasis on the structural relationship between labour and capital, and its loca-
tion of environmental degradation in the political and economic structures of 
capitalist societies, does appear to represent an advance. However, the historical 
evidence clearly shows that both capitalist and socialist regimes have failed to 
protect the environment The failure to implicate socialist development strategies 
in environmental degradation arises from a continued attachment to economic 
growth and a failure to recognise the ecological limits to growth. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the extensive nature of the social, economic and political impact of 
environmental degradation, ecological concerns should form a central role in IPE. 
The connections between economics and the environment, combined with the 
necessity of collective action to counter common resource problems, place con-
temporary environmental concerns at the centre of international relations. To 
date, however, global ecology has been only of marginal concern to IPE. The 
continued marginalisation of the environment in IPE reflects the close connection 
between the production of knowledge in international relations and the produc-
tion of knowledge in IPE. 
The causes of environmental degradation are complex and require a careful 
understanding of the ways in which economic systems interact with the eco-
system. The expanded terrain of IPE provides at first sight a more appropriate 
starting point for the analysis of global environmental change than conventional 
international relations theory. However, although IPE analyses of global 
environmental change include the activities of transnational corporations and 
international organisations, the roles of social movements, the influence of ideas 
and ideology, and the impact of debt and trading patterns in structuring outcomes, 
to date, these analyses have failed to provide convincing explanations of the 
political economy of global environmental change. 
The constraints of space prohibit an extended critique of the limitations of 
orthodox IPE. Contemporary analyses of the political economy of global environ-
mental change can be challenged on two broad grounds. First, much of the current 
theorising is constructed within a positivist epistemology (Murphy and Tooze 
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1991). This commitment to positivism and empiricism limits the explanatory 
power of orthodox IPE. Positivism separates subject from object, 'facts' from 
values, and presents a view of knowledge constructed around the concept of a 
knowable and objective external reality. But 'facts' do not exist independently of 
the observer. Positivist approaches prohibit critical self-reflexive theory. 
Analysis of the complex interplay between social theory and social practice is an 
interpretative process, and it is impossible to produce critical theory without a 
recognition of the subjectivity of knowledge production. The so-called new IPE 
(Murphy and Tooze 1991), involving a critique of the epistemological and 
methodological bases of orthodox IPE, provides a departure point for analyses of 
globalisation and environmental change. The linkages between globalisation and 
ecological degradation are more usefully addressed through an approach which 
explores the interactions between transnational ideologies, transnational social 
movements and states. The neo-Gramscian analysis of historical blocs and social 
forces (Cox 1981) provides a useful site from which to analyse the problem of 
governance in global environmental politics, since a reformulated version ofIPE 
will need to develop a complex understanding of the linkages between knowl-
edge, power and interests. We need to assess those structures of the global 
political economy which gave rise to environmental degradation. This will only 
be possible through a critical self-reflexive approach. 
The second main challenge to conventional IPE is that it has failed to incor-
porate the ecological perspective on political economy, a perspective which starts 
from the assumption that economics and the environment are inseparable. 
Ecological economics is based on the premiss that a reciprocal and dynamic 
process exists wherein the economy is in continuous exchange with the environ-
ment. The economy alters the environment, and the environment in turn affects 
the economy (Georgescu-Roegen 1976: 4). The environment is part of the econ-
omy because the biosphere performs three key functions for economic systems: 
it provides both renewable and non-renewable resources for the production 
process; it assimilates the resulting waste products; and it provides amenities and 
life-support mechanisms for consumption (Jacobs 1991: 3-5). Similarly, the 
economy is also part of the environment: 'It is constrained by the same physical 
laws and its processes mirror those of the biosphere' (Jacobs 1991: 15). 
Ecological economics stands in sharp contrast to environmental economics which 
believes that no insoluble conflict exists between economic growth and environ-
mental conservation. Ecological economics is based on the premiss that the earth 
has natural limitations which restrict an unbridled growth in productive and 
technological capacities. It starts from the assumption that economic activity is 
subject both to the constraints of the biosphere and to the laws of thermodynamics 
(Daly and Cobb 1990). These constraints limit the growth of production and 
consumption - in other words, the carrying capacity of the earth represents a 
barrier to the pursuit of unlimited growth in GNP. IPE should explore the 
prevailing assumptions concerning the relationship between humans and the 
natural world. This critical task will not be accomplished if ecological economics 
remains invisible in IPE. 
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4 IR theory 
Neorealism, neoinstitutionalism and the Climate 
Change Convention 1 
Matthew Paterson 
This chapter is the product of an investigation on the one hand into some strands 
of IR theory,2 and on the other into the process of international cooperation on 
global warming that led up to the signing of the framework convention in June 
1992. It engages in the (possibly overambitious) task of simultaneously trying to 
say something both about the politics of global warming and about international 
relations theory. 
The chapter takes as a background two developments. First are the develop-
ments during the 1980s within IR theory. During this period, IR theory could be 
characterised as having involved a 'great' debate between neorealism and neo-
liberal institutionalism. Certainly, with regard to the phenomenon of international 
cooperation, this debate has been prominent, with both schools offering differing 
accounts of the phenomenon of cooperation and the likelihood of its endurance. 
However, the 1980s, particularly the later part of that decade, also witnessed a 
rise in theories which came from thoroughly different traditions from those 
underlying the essentially neopositivist approaches of both neorealism and neo-
liberal institutionalism. Critical ttieory, Gramscian thought, post-structuralist 
theories and feminism all started to generate a literature, specifically on inter-
national relations, which focused on a critique of the epistemological presumptions 
of much mainstream IR theory, and called into question many of the latter's 
central assumptions. 
The second development is the emergence of environmental issues, and more 
specifically of global warming, as focuses of international attention. A brief 
account is given below of international cooperation on global warming as 
achieved through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
then the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (INC) and the Framework Convention.3 This development 
remains severely undertheorised. Most of the literature on the international 
politics of global warming either simply makes prescriptions for international 
action in one form or another, or, where theoretical material is used, rather 
crudely presses such material into service in order to support one or another 
normative position. There remains an analytical gap in the understanding of 
processes of international cooperation with regard to the issue of global warming. 
Most of the literature which has expressed the problem in either of the above two 
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ways has assumed that international cooperation is a phenomenon which can be 
theorised in the abstract, and therefore that 'truths' learned, say, over arms-
control agreements can also be applied to global warming. For example, Sebenius 
(1991) simply applies existing theory normatively to global warming, assuming 
both that the model holds for other areas of international cooperation (without 
demonstrating this belief) and that 'lessons' learnt in other areas of international 
politics can be applied to global warming. 
These prescriptive uses ofIR theory fail to recognise the specificity of climate 
change as a political phenomenon. It seems plausible, after all, that specific areas 
of international politics will exhibit different patterns and processes of cooper-
ation, since they will have different underlying problem structures. Some may 
have a very highly technical component; others may not. Some may be about 
securing the physical territory of a state; others about securing collective goods. 
Some may require the compliance of recalcitrant states; others may exist in a 
situation of relative harmony. Thus, it is justifiable to study IR theory, in the light 
of international cooperation over global warming, more deeply before pronoun-
cing judgement with respect to prescriptions. The aim then of this chapter is to try 
to see how the differing theoretical approaches to international relations would 
account for the process of cooperation on global warming; to evaluate the 
adequacy of these accounts; and to offer some thoughts on what this says both 
about IR theory and about the international politics of global warming.4 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
Climate change hit the international political agenda in 1988. There were a 
number of reasons for this. In the background was the development of a scientific 
consensus that some warming was likely if current trends in emissions of the 
gases involved (primarily carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) and nitrous oxide) continued. Second, climate change arrived on the back 
of a series of other environmental issues which rose onto the political agenda in 
the West during the 1980s, such as acid rain, ozone depletion and tropical 
deforestation. Third, it also arrived during an economic boom in most Western 
countries, meaning that the usual economic objections to action on environmental 
issues were not at the forefront of public consciousness. And fourth, there was a 
series of freak weather conditions, of which the most important politically were 
the US drought in 1988 and the empirical observation that the 1980s provided the 
six hottest years on record. These four main factors combined to make claims by 
scientists about climate change increasingly plausible both to the general public 
and to policy-makers.5 
In response to this rise in public and scientific concern, politicians instituted 
three main initiatives. First was the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) in late 1988, to provide a full report for policy-makers 
about the state of the scientific consensus about climate change and its possible 
impacts, as well as ideas about possible response strategies (see Boehmer-
Christiansen, this volume). Second was a series of international conferences at 
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which high-level politicians made pronouncements on desirable responses. And 
third was a series of unilateral targets which states set in 1988-91 to limit their 
emissions of CO2, the main greenhouse gas.6 Most of these latter targets com-
mitted the state concerned to stabilising its CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by the 
year 2000, although some (such as Germany's) involved commitments to actual 
reductions in emissions. 
These three responses kept climate change on the political agenda, so that by 
1990, the momentum had built up sufficiently to lead to international negotiations 
towards an international convention on the subject. Negotiations towards this end 
started in February 1991 in Chantilly, near Washington, DC, within the Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committee (INC). They were intended to lead to the 
signing of a treaty at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992. 
The negotiations in question can be characterised by two main conflicts. The 
first of these was between the USA and other industrialised countries concerning 
the nature of their commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. The USA, 
informed by a scepticism about the nature of the scientific knowledge on climate 
change, and more than aware of the economic costs of action, refused to set a 
quantified target. The European countries and Japan tried repeatedly to persuade 
the USA of the necessity of such an approach, suggesting an agreement based on 
the wording they had already set out in their unilateral targets. Occasionally, they 
made implicit threats to the effect that they would go ahead with a Convention 
without the USA if the USA did not agree to such approach, but in the end, 
however, they were not prepared to carry these through. Eventually, a compro-
mise wording was reached which included mention of dates but was sufficiently 
ambiguous to make claims that it was a binding commitment implausible (United 
Nations 1992: Article 4.2 (a) and (b)). 
The second conflict was a North-South one. This primarily concerned the 
resources which industrialised countries would commit themselves to giving in 
order to enable developing countries to meet any commitments they would have 
under the Convention. The argument for these transfers was that since it was the 
industrialised countries that were primarily responsible for causing climate change, 
and since it was they who had the financial and technological resources to enable 
developing countries to limit the growth of their own emissions in the future, such 
transfers should be organised by the North. However, while in principle 
industrialised countries accepted this (more or less), they committed few re-
sources, and as a result the commitments undertaken by developing countries in 
the Convention were correspondingly minimal (limited to compiling inventories 
of their greenhouse-gas sources and sinks).7 
The Convention was signed in 1992, as anticipated, and came into force in 
March 1994, following the required 50 signatures.8 However, although the nego-
tiations continued beyond UNCED, extending up to the first Conference of the 
Parties in Spring 1995 in Berlin, political pressure for action on climate change 
waned in the West in the early 1990s, and the pace of negotiations 
correspondingly declined. 
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NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
However contested by the recent development of critical approaches, mainstream 
contemporary IR theory is still dominated by the neorealism associated with 
Waltz and Gilpin, and with the neoliberal institutionalism associated with 
Keohane, Young and most 'regime analysts'. These writers generally share a 
particular conception of what it involves to engage in theorising. Specifically, 
they share a neopositivist epistemology, with Waltz appealing to 'philosophy of 
science' values (apparently unaware of the divergences between various philo-
sophies of science) and Keohane relying heavily on Lakatos (c.f. Keohane 1983). 
The role of theory in this schema is to generate hypotheses which can be tested, 
and even if (as in Waltz) it is suggested that strict falsification tests cannot be 
applied, or that generalisations are necessarily conditional and limited in scope 
(as in Keohane), the intention is nonetheless to be able to infer validity for the 
theory according roughly to the standards of the natural sciences. 
The problems involved with this form of epistemological position are well 
known. Of particular note here are two factors. One is the 'theory-ladenness of 
fact' problem; that the theory will generate hypotheses which, instead of simply 
being applied to pre-existing 'facts', will themselves generate lines of enquiry 
which produce and at least partially constitute the 'facts' to be used in analysis. 
Another problem with this position is that by creating a strict distinction 
between facts and values, it creates an equivalent distinction between analytical, 
or empirical, theory and normative theory. Not only this, but it also explicitly 
privileges the analytical, 'value-free' theory. Thus, one ends up trying to theorise 
either about the way the world is or about how the world ought to be, and these 
activities are held to be irredeemably separate (see Dyer in this volume).9 
The point of this discussion of epistemological questions is that it affects the 
discussion of some of the substantive analytical points made by both neorealists 
and neoliberal institutionalists. Many of the critiques of those theories made 
elsewhere (e.g. Ashley 1986; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) and below are 
grounded in objections to the epistemological position of these writers, and in 
particular to their insistence on a strict fact-value, or analytical-normative 
distinction. This point will be followed up below. 
What follows is a brief account of the neorealist and neoliberal-institutionalist 
theories. The following section will involve a description of how they could 
account for the international politics of global warming. Neorealism is a school 
of thought largely associated with Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin and Joseph 
Grieco. While some (including Grieco and Gilpin themselves) would object to 
this group being separated off from 'classical' Realists, Keohane gives a useful 
account of how they differ; particularly through neorealism's emphasis on the 
importance of the structure of anarchy (Keohane 1983: especially 38-44). 10 
Neorealism., essentially an ontological account, embodies a set of basic theo-
retical assumptions which it suggests give a reasonably accurate account of the 
way the world is. First, the world is composed primarily of sovereign states, 
which can be treated as unitary actors. Second, these states exist in a condition of 
Neorealism and neoinstitutionalism 63 
anarchy; that is, there is no government holding power over them. Third, as a 
consequence of this anarchy, the states must always be on guard against their 
neighbours since they are always in potential danger of invasion. And fourth, as 
a consequence of this, states behave in such a way as to maximise their power 
relative to others. 11 Thus, neorealism' s account of how outcomes in international 
politics are produced is simply that they are generated by the distribution of 
power capabilities in the system. 
Neorealism came to draw on another theory which had grown across various 
areas of the social sciences during the previous ten to twenty years, namely game 
theory. Some of the insights of game-theoretical constructs, particularly those of 
non-cooperative games such as Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Chicken, were seen 
to be applicable to various areas of international politics, in order to explain, for 
example, arms races. Frequently, they were held to uphold central Realist assess-
ments of the conflicmal namre of international politics. 
What in fact was the case, however, was that theoretical developments within 
game theory tended to undermine these realist assessments. In particular, Taylor 
(1976) and Axelrod (1984) showed how when games such as PD are iterated, 
there is no necessary reason why non-cooperative outcomes will prevail. Thus, 
on the basis of game theory, which relied on an essentially Realist account of the 
nature of international politics (Axelrod 1984: 190-1), a theory developed which 
suggested how enduring cooperation could emerge which would alter the nature 
of international politics.12 
This theoretical development was mainly responsible for generating the theo-
retical position largely associated with Keohane, which he (following Grieco's 
original (1988) characterisation) termed neoliberal instimtionalism (Keohane 
1989). Only one different assumption is then necessary to tum neorealism into 
neoliberal institutionalism. That is the assumption about state rationality and 
motivation. Neorealists assume, as stated above, that states act in order to maxim-
ise their relative gains. Neoliberals, on the other hand, assume that states act 
merely in order to maximise their absolute gains; they do not care about the gains 
of other states except in so far as these gains interact ( or interfere) with their own. 
This assumption relies on the assumption that for most international interactions, 
'states' margins of survival' are not small; i.e. states can act in most areas of 
international relations without worrying whether a particular outcome is going to 
increase the likelihood of their being invaded. As a further consequence of this, 
the gains states are assumed to be maximising have not necessarily to do with 
power, but are more reliant on an ecopomic measure of welfare. And within a 
game-theoretic framework, absolute-gains-maximising behaviour makes cooper-
ation even more likely, since each actor is not concerned to 'win' each play of the 
game.13 
Thus, neoliberal instimtionalism posits the following central assumptions, 
counter to those of neorealism. Although states remain the' primary actors in 
international relations, and remain treated as unitary actors, it is assumed now 
that they merely act to maximise absolute gains rather than relative gains. Thus, 
it is cooperation that becomes a more endemic feamre of international relations. 
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This leads to what are called institutions, defined as 'persistent sets of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and 
shape expectations' (Keohane 1989: 3), and regarded as a prevalent and import-
ant feature of international political life, influencing and constraining, and even 
generating, state behaviour. It is clear from this definition that institutions are 
understood as much more than organisations. As Oran Young puts it, in contrast 
to institutions (of which he gives a definition similar to Keohane's given above), 
organisations are 'material entities possessing physical locations (or seats), offices, 
personnel, equipment, and budgets' as well as a 'legal personality' (Young 1989: 32). 
NEOREALISM, NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBAL 
WARMING 
Of these basic perspectives on world politics, neoliberal institutionalism pro-
duces the more satisfactory explanatory account of the international politics of 
global warming. The account of neorealism, that outcomes are generated as a 
product of the distribution of power capabilities, is simply inadequate, as shown 
below. Neoliberal institutionalism's focus on institutions allows us more space to 
explain many of the developments which ultimately produced the framework 
convention. 
Before developing this argument, it seems worth elaborating on two distinct 
processes that need to be examined in order to explain the 'outcome' in this case. 
One is the formal inter-state negotiations which occurred between February 1991 
and May 1992. What forces drove these negotiations? And with regard to neo-
realism in particular, were the most powerful states able to get their own way? 
But there is a second process which was very important for global warming: the 
development of global warming as first a scientific and then a political issue. In 
order to explain the final outcome, it seems inadequate to take the situation in 
early 1991 as a given, as if no politics had occurred before then. Neorealism 
would indeed preclude such a prior interest almost by definition, by treating 
states' interests as given. 
As outlined above, neoliberal institutionalism takes a broad conception of 
what a social institution is. While some of its analysis follows this through 
logically, many of its analyses conflate this usage of institutions with inter-
national organisations, presumably because it is simpler to investigate the latter 
than the former. We can illustrate the importance of institutions through investi-
gating both these forms of analysis. 
Looking at the role of international organisations, we can see that they were 
crucial in the period up until the start of negotiations, after which they became 
relatively unimportant (except in the sense of the UN providing a forum for 
negotiation - which probably speeded up the process). Their role can be des-
cribed in terms of two factors: cognitive development and agenda-setting. 14 
The role of international organisations in the cognitive development of the 
global-warming issue can be traced primarily through the role of the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO), previously the International Meteorological 
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Organization (IMO). The IMO was established in 1873, and, even early on, 
engaged in some coordination of research projects, notably the Internatiomil 
Polar Year of 1882-3. A general importance can be ascribed to this coordination 
of meteorological research, since it provided the cognitive base on which later, 
more climatic-change-oriented research developed. However, in addition to this 
general function, the WMO (after it became a world organisation following the 
establishment of the UN) was involved directly in many important events and 
developments. Of note in these is the International Geophysical Year (1957-8), 
which among other things produced the first continuous measurements of atmos-
pheric CO2• The WMO was later highly involved in organising the collection of 
data on, for example, CO2, temperature changes, etc., specifically in the light of 
the greenhouse theory. 
The WMO also actively fostered a scientific consensus on climate change 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Ofnote here were the Stockholm Conference of 
1974 (on climate modelling), the Norwich meeting in 1975 which ended 
speculation about possible global cooling because of other industrial pollutants, 
the World Climate Conference of 1979, the establishment of the World Climate 
Programme in 1979 - which itself led to the Villach Conference which proved to 
be the turning point in the politicisation of climate change as an issue - and finally 
the establishment of the above-mentioned IPCC, which consolidated the 
consensus originally reached at Villach. 15 
The fact that the IPCC was heavily politicised (see Boehmer-Christiansen in 
this volume) illustrates how successful the international organisations and the 
international climatological community had been in setting a political agenda, 
and it demonstrates, moreover, that global warming was a potentially severe 
problem which states needed to address. An initially organisational role, in 
coordinating research, etc., led directly to the setting of a political agenda. What 
is potentially politically more important is that they were able to set this agenda 
in such a way that certain political solutions became ideologically privileged. The 
presentation of scientific and technical information is never purely that: it always 
has a political character also. Thus, while the IPCC consolidated the scientific 
consensus on global warming and set an agenda for policy-makers, they were also 
framing the problem in a specific political mould. 
In particular, the political prescription put out by those organisations came 
largely from a perspective which explicitly dealt with problems of North-South 
inequality, and which delegitimised any potential Northern attempts to construct 
the problem differently. Many Northern states, for example, refused to organise 
significant North-South transfers. However, they were prevented from being able 
to frame the problem as one where all states had equal obligations, which some 
of them clearly would have liked to have done. This would have produced 
significantly different negotiating conditions, had they been able to do this. 
The international organisations (in particular the scientists within Working 
Group I of the IPCC) were crucial in this process, in their role as agenda-setters. 
They were in a position to influence strongly the way in which information was 
presented. In particular, they highlighted the disparities in per capita emissions 
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across countries, and they took sides explicitly in the debates over 'eco-
imperialism' which raged throughout that period. 16 Examinations of the IPCC' s 
Policy-makers Summaries, or of the Scientific and Technical Declaration of the 
Second World Climate Conference (SWCC), amply illustrate the political nature 
of those statements (Houghton, Jenkins and Ephraums 1990; McTegart, Sheldon 
and Griffith 1990; IPCC 1990; SWCC 1990; see also Boehmer-Christiansen in 
this volume). For example, the SWCC Declaration stated that 'In order to 
stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases while allowing for 
growth in emissions from developing countries, industrialized countries must 
implement reductions even greater than those required, on average, for the globe 
as a whole' (SWCC 1990: 501; italics mine), and added that 'industrialized 
countries and developing countries have a common but differentiated respon-
sibility for dealing with the problems of climate change. The problem is largely 
the consequence of past patterns of economic growth in the industrial countries' 
(ibid.: 502). 
Thus, international institutions, even when defined merely as organisations, 
can be shown to have had an important role in climate politics. Neoliberal 
institutionalists have the capacity here, however, to undermine the criticism, 
levelled against them by the neorealists, that they ignore the influence of anarchy. 
As shown above, institutionalists have demonstrated how institutions can become 
important even when the background condition is one of anarchy. Cooperation 
does not become easy to achieve, but institutions help facilitate it. 
Most institutionalists would seek, however, to define institutions in a broader 
manner, as outlined above. One process involved in the international politics of 
global warming can be identified as the development of such institutions, and that 
indeed is the norm-generating process which occurred in the case of the global-
warming issue during 1988-91 through the spate of unilateral declarations of 
targets to limit emissions by industrialised countries. It seems plausible to claim 
that in this 'unilateral targets' process, an international institution (in the sense 
given by Young above) was emerging. This institution developed around the 
'easily recognized roles' of the industrialised states involved, and took as its 
primary rule the adoption of a target - along the lines of 'stabilisation at 1990 
levels by the year 2000' .17 
This 'unilateral targets' process is difficult, on the other hand, to explain in 
Realist terms. A Realist could argue for one of two positions (at least). First of all, 
he or she could argue that states were simply behaving in bad faith; and that the 
targets were established purely for ideological reasons, and were ones either that 
the states had no intention of meeting or that were in reality very easy to meet. 
There is a certain amount of plausibility in this approach, especially in the latter 
claim, since the history of energy-forecasting clearly shows a tendency to 
overproject energy demand (and hence CO2 emissions) for political purposes 
(Baumgartner and Midttun 1987). 
The second line of argument a Realist could use is that states were 'testing the 
waters' (Ward 1989); engaging in a tit-for-tat strategy, cooperating in order to 
elicit cooperation in tum. However, this remains a problematic interpretation in 
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the face of persistent 'defection' by the USA throughout 1991-2, since, if this 
interpretation were correct, other industrialised states ought to have reneged on 
their commitments .18 Such a Realist interpretation leads us into an institutionalist 
conclusion, namely that what institutions could have done (and to an extent, 
however imperfectly, did do) was create 'stable expectations' about what pre-
cisely constituted cooperation and defection. 
However, this conclusion seems at the same time to undermine any game-
theoretic-institutionalist accounts. These accounts could interpret the 1988-91 
'unilateral targets' process in the same way as does Keohane, in his discussion of 
reciprocity (Keohane 1989a). But such analyses assume a predefined notion of 
what constitutes cooperation and defection - notions which clearly didn't exist 
for CO2 targets in that period. It is a misleading interpretation to say that the states 
which set targets were cooperating in order to elicit cooperation, since those 
states which refused (e.g. the USA) cannot properly be called defectors (or, in 
terms of collective-goods provision, free-riders). 19 States still had to negotiate 
and define what precisely was involved in cooperating and defecting, as well as 
the nature of the collective good they would be trying to provide. This version of 
institutionalist theory relies on being able to interpret behaviour as involving 
cooperation or defection in the context of a political process which is essentially 
about the very definition of what constitutes cooperation and defection. 
It seems more plausible to interpret this 'unilateral targets' process in the 
following way: instead of engaging in strategies to meet a predefined end (CO2 
abatement), states were (are) in a process of redefining that end (i.e. redefining 
CO2 abatement as a collective good). The establishment of targets is then seen 
less as a strategy for eliciting like behaviour from other actors, and more as a 
signal to other actors as to what initial steps are involved in acting on the new 
norm. This interpretation is more in line with Young's suggestion that states act 
more as role-players than as utility maximisers (Young 1989: 209-13), or with 
the analyses of what Keohane refers to as the 'reflective school' (Keohane 
1989b). 
CRITIQUES 
This discussion of the international politics of global warming in the light of 
dominant strands of IR theory leads to several conclusions, critical of those 
strands. These are not ones uniquely drawn from an examination of global 
warming - they have been made elsewhere - but global warming can be used to 
highlight them. Four particular lines of objection are pursued here. The first of 
these is the commonly made point about the false division between international 
and domestic politics, a point amply illustrated by global warming; the second 
focuses on the opposition between structuralist and historicist theoretical posi-
tions; the third looks at the ontological bases of the positions adopted particularly 
by neorealists; and the last looks at the question of what ( and whom) theory is for. 
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The domestic-international split 
An often-made criticism of much international thought (not only, but most 
commonly, of Realist thought) is that it erroneously tries to draw a clear dividing 
line between the domestic and the international. Waltz's position is most explicit 
in his attempt to construct international political theory as a 'bounded subject-
matter', and in his rejection of looking at the internal characteristics of states in 
terms of 'unit-level theory' or 'reductionism' (Waltz 1979). This tendency is 
widespread and general. Within both neorealist and neoliberal-institutionalist 
theory, it expresses itself through the state-as-(unitary)-actor assumption, which 
precludes any consideration of domestic politics. 
An analysis of the politics of global warming reveals the poverty of this 
position. Domestic politics clearly intrudes importantly into the picture. A simple 
look at its effect in one country - the USA - is sufficient to illustrate the point. 
Internal politics in the USA, through the politically important 1988 drought, was 
crucial in making the Toronto Conference of that year an important political event 
which spurred on the global-warming debate at the international level. The 
exceptional influence of the coal and oil lobbies in the USA, combined both with 
Bush's having an oil background and with the scientific hostility of his Chief of 
Staff, served to produce the intransigent position of the USA in international 
negotiations. More broadly, the influence of the world recession on the political 
feasibility of aggressive abatement programmes has helped the development of 
many countries' climate strategies to stagnate since 1990 (Paterson 1993; Tanzer 
1992). 
These interactions between domestic and international politics can be put into 
two categories. The first is that of the general historically constituted structural 
situations which influence states' positions. In relation to climate politics, useful 
categories could be divisions over wealth-poverty (the North-South split), over 
dependence on fossil fuels ( either on exports or on large indigenous supplies), 
over vulnerability to potential climate-change impacts, and over historically 
generated attitudes to the state of uncertainty associated with environmental 
problems more generally (see Paterson and Grubb 1992 for an elaboration of 
these groupings). The other category concerns those specific developments 
within domestic politics which interact with and influence international political 
possibilities, of which Clinton's election is the most obvious example. Others, 
however, could also be cited; for example, even though those who saw the 
departure of John Sununu in December 1991 as a likely precursor to a change in 
the US position were largely wrong, that episode still revealed how specific 
domestic political events could be important in influencing international outcomes. 
Structure vs history 
Lines of analysis from two differing positions have grown during the 1980s 
which draw a distinction between historicist and structuralist theories.20 These 
arguments have come in the main from the Gramscian analyses associated with 
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Robert Cox and Stephen Gill in particular (Gill 1993), and from the post-
structuralist writers, of whom those who focus on this question include Rob 
Walker and Richard Ashley (Walker 1993: Ch. 4; Ashley 1986). While there are 
significant divergences between these positions, for the purpose of this section 
they provide similar critiques. 
The focus of these critiques is on how structuralist theories tend to reify the 
status quo and provide static accounts of social life. Gill (1993) suggests that 
structuralist accounts are more adequate in times of relative stability, since these 
situations are more amenable both to its assumptions about the stable preferences 
of actors and to an analysis of events in terms of limited numbers of variables 
which can be (more or less) isolated and 'controlled for'. But he and others insist 
that historically based accounts are in fact able to give more convincing and 
adequate accounts of events than structuralist ones even in these times, since they 
give an account of the emergence of those preferences which structuralist writers 
(at least of the neorealist variety) would treat as given. And he suggests that in 
times of rapid change, structuralist theories give us no ability to account for such 
change. This is because, in Ashley's words, structuralist theories 'tend to accentuate 
the one-way dependence of diachrony (dynamics) upon synchrony (statics)', thus 
producing a model of change which presumes that the structure itself is somehow 
immutable (Ashley 1986: 265-6). As these writers point out, this is to engage in 
a reification of the status quo (Walker 1993: 116; Griffiths 1992: Ch. 6). 
The weaknesses of a static, structural model can be seen in the working-
through of the implications of the neoliberal institutionalist account of global 
warming given above. While such an account arguably provides a more adequate 
explanation of developments to date on global warming than the theory of 
neorealism, it can also be seen to undermine some of the rationalistic assumptions 
of that theory. A rationalistic theory in this context would begin by evaluating the 
preferences of the relevant actors and relating these, along with assessments of 
both the power of each actor and the underlying structure of the situation, to the 
various outcomes. It is an essentially static way of looking at the world, which it 
views as a sequence of isolatable snapshots. However, in order to demonstrate the 
importance of institutional arrangements in international affairs, it is necessary to 
engage in an essentially historical enquiry into the origins of the institutions 
concerned and their evolution over time, in such a way as to preclude (or at the 
very least severely limit the usefulness of) such a 'snapshot' approach. The 
politics of global warming can only be adequately understood in terms of (among 
other things) the historical development of scientific knowledge, international 
institutional development, the politics of environmental problems in general in 
'advanced' capitalist states during the 1980s, and the interaction between these 
factors, all of which require a historicist analytical approach. 
Ontology 
As suggested at the start of this chapter, the assumptions used by neorealists and 
neoliberal institutionalists are best understood as ontological positions; that is, as 
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basic understandings about the way the world is which guide and are constitutive 
of their analyses. Thus, any evaluation of the contribution these theories can 
make to our understanding of world politics must take their ontological character 
into account; our critique cannot simply be based on an evaluation of the 'facts' 
out there, since the ontological positions of these theories at least partly constitute 
those facts.21 
On the one hand, this line of enquiry can lead us to question the positions of 
those theories, either by laying them bare as ontologies and evaluating them as 
such, or by reflecting on whether they provide adequate accounts of the world.22 
Neither of these theories, we fmd, provide such an account. On the other hand, it 
can lead to an investigation as to why particular positions have historically been 
privileged over others; for example, why has Realism been traditionally 
privileged over Idealism? Moreover, the very naming of each as such reveals the 
depth of the privileging process. This privileging must be understood not simply 
in terms of the 'failure' of the application of the analyses of Idealism in the 
inter-war years, but also in terms both of the way in which the Realist assessment 
of the implications of anarchy logically privileges assumptions both that the 
world will not be a very cooperative place and that prudential, if not aggressive, 
foreign policies will therefore be desirable, and of the use of these assumptions 
by foreign policy and military elites in the 1930s, 1940s and early 1980s (see, for 
example, Gill 1993: 46). Such privileged ontologies can be criticised on a number 
of grounds, from the game-theoretic a la Axelrod to the feminist critiques of the 
heavily gendered nature of the assumptions Realists derive about human moti-
vation and behaviour from, among others, Hobbes (see, for example, Grant 1991; 
also, Bretherton in this volume). But it remains the case that they have for a 
variety of reasons remained privileged within policy-making circles. 
Who is theory for? 
This question leads into a discussion of the purpose of theory. This is so since if 
different theories are clearly of use to different social groups, and if the possi-
bility of 'value-free' theory is denied, then the question of who is privileged by a 
theory becomes an integral part of the theory's formulation. Two competing 
accounts (at least) of this problem are present within the critical literature. On the 
one hand, Cox makes a distinction between 'problem-solving' and 'critical' 
theory. The former category involves the solution of problems within the context 
of given political arrangements; it corresponds to the 'management of inter-
national affairs' referred to in Waltz's last chapter of Theory of International 
Politics, and it is one which Waltz explicitly accepts (Waltz 1986). This would 
fall into the positivist mode of trying to generate 'If A then B'-type statements. 
The latter category of theory is designed to analyse existing situations with an 
explicit view towards the transformation of the existing system. Cox's account, 
however, is in conflict with Gill's account (1993: 21) which describes social 
science as investigating a 'second order' reality, pre-ordered by its investigators, 
in contrast to natural science which analyses a 'first order reality' .23 According to 
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this view, indeed, problem-solving would become an impossible activity. All 
theory is imbued with the value systems and ontologies of the theorist, as a result, 
and the question of who the theory privileges becomes all the more important. 
With regard to global warming, and many other environmental problems, our 
accounts of the prospects for, and the forms of, cooperation at the international 
level will thus have to include a consideration of who gains and loses from such 
accounts of social life. For instance, with regard to global warming, neorealist 
theory would, in its applications, lead to an underplaying of any cooperative 
potential, and to the extent that it informs policy-makers, this theory would neces-
sarily benefit the already powerful. 
An example of how the Realist assumption of the non-cooperative nature of 
international politics could be argued to have influenced the US position on 
global warming and benefited the already powerful can be seen in the following. 
The USA frequently made the argument, during the negotiations and in other 
fora, that it would be irrelevant for it to take substantial action on global warming 
if developing countries would not also undertake commitments to reduce the rate 
of growth of their emissions. Developing countries claimed they were willing to 
undertake these commitments provided they would be financed by the North. The 
US argument (as well as being based on the political unfeasibility of facilitating 
North-South transfers at that point) was clearly based on assumptions about 
potential 'free-riding' on the provision of a collective good such as (relative) 
climate stability. The USA was unprepared to cooperate unless it had cast-iron 
guarantees that other countries would also cooperate, and it assumed (being 
historically informed by realists) that such a level of cooperation would not be 
forthcoming. The theory thus becomes self-fulfilling. The discussion on the 
game-theoretic aspects of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism above showed, 
however, that such a situation is non-determinate. Mutual cooperation cannot be 
presumed, but it certainly cannot theoretically be precluded. Thus, since the USA 
is likely to be hit less severely by the potential impacts of global warming (if only 
because it has the financial resources to cope with adaptation) than, for example, 
Bangladesh or most of the Small Island States, Realism (if only unintentionally) 
here benefits the already privileged by giving them theoretically reasonable 
grounds for not cooperating. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has tried to illustrate how differing strands of IR theory might 
account for the international politics of global warming that led up to the signing 
of the Framework Convention. It has suggested that the neoliberal institution-
alism of Keohane and others provides a more adequate account than does the 
neorealism of Waltz or Gilpin, but that an analysis of global warming on the 
former's terms reveals weaknesses in both theories. These weaknesses have to do 
on the one hand with their epistemological positions, which assume simple 
subject-object and fact-value distinctions which cannot be strictly maintained, 
and which privilege stasis and structure over change, and on the other hand with 
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their ontological positions, which preclude a discussion of significant portions of 
relevant material (e.g. domestic politics). It has not tried significantly to build 
these critiques into an alternative account; such a task is one for the future. 
This chapter has ended up saying more about IR theory than about the politics 
of global warming, but hopefully so~ implications are reasonably clear. One 
obvious one is that the present analysis would support claims that have been 
made, by many writing on UNCED, about the importance of institutions (e.g. 
Gardner 1992; Imber 1993; French 1992). However, much of the policy debate 
on these institutions has tended to associate institutions with organisations per se, 
and is still concerned with 'strength' of the Commission on Sustainable Develop-
ment (CSD). The institutionalist analysis above, and that outlined by Keohane, 
Young and others, suggests a different conclusion with regard to institutions. In 
this analysis, what matters is the way in which institutions are inserted into, and 
relate to, those states that will be implementing any agreements - the way in 
which they confer roles onto states. 
Three points are worth making by way of conclusion. First, institutions serve 
to stabilise expectations about others' actions so that all involved know that their 
cooperation will be reciprocated. This stabilisation process involves both build-
ing ongoing negotiations to develop trust and mutual learning, and a carrying-out 
of monitoring or 'verification' functions (on this, see Greene and Salt 1992; see 
also, Greene in this volume). Second, ongoing scientific and technoeconomic 
consensus processes will be crucial in developing the cognitive base for future 
negotiations. Third, and possibly most important, the above analysis highlights 
how important the informal development, and the intersubjective development, 
of norms will be (see Dyer in this volume). States will not enact policies or sign 
up to commitments without greater mutual understandings of why it is they are 
acting, and without those norms being internalised by the decision-makers. With 
respect to these conclusions, the bodies set up by the Climate Convention are 
likely to be of significantly greater importance than the CSD. 
NOTES 
1 I am grateful to John Barry, Mark Imber, Mick Smith, John Vogler and Hugh Ward 
for reading earlier versions of this paper and commenting on them, as well as to 
members of the British International Studies Association Environment Group who were at 
a meeting where this paper was presented. 
2 This follows to an extent a distinction made by James Der Derian between inter-
national relations theory and international theory. The former he associates with 
contemporary North American theory, which he suggests is less speculative, less 
philosophical and less historical than the former, which he associates with the British 
tradition identified with Wight and Bull. The focus here is largely on the former of 
these two groupings (see Der Derian 1993: 12, Note 1). 
3 For fuller accounts, see Paterson (1992, 1993), or Bodansk.y (1993). The fullest, but 
unpublished, account is in Paterson (1994: Chs 2, 3 and 4). 
4 Since it is reasonable to assume on a priori grounds - and we know it is in fact the case 
- that inter-state negotiations, and politics more generally, will continue in the 
foreseeable future on global warming, it is also reasonable to try to draw some of these 
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conclusions. However, hopefully, what follows is a more thorough treatment of 
theoretical assumptions and positions than many of those already offered. 
5 See Paterson (1994: Ch. 4), for details on these. 
6 See the IEA (1992) on the details of these. 
7 For an extended analysis of this weakness in the Convention, see Paterson (1992a). 
8 For commentaries on the Convention focusing on its adequacy, see for example 
Berreen and Meyer (1992); Bodansky (1993); Grubb (1992); Pachauri (1992); and 
Paterson (1992a). 
9 This can be seen most clearly with Keohane. He accepts explicitly that the reasons for 
which he studies world politics are normative ones, but operates as if the only effect 
this has is to guide what questions he asks of some reality 'out there' (see Keohane 
1989c). 
10 Previous Realists, such as Morgenthau, did make some mention of anarchy, but much 
more emphasis was placed on the power-maximising behaviour of humans and states, 
derived from an account of human nature rather than from the logic of anarchy. Thus, 
in this earlier view, power-maximising becomes an absolute activity - there is no 
theoretical limit to power - whereas with neorealism, states are satisfied simply with 
enough power to survive. 
11 This is what is variously called, in neorealist terminology, 'status-maximising' be-
haviour, 'relative-gains-maximising' behaviour or behaviour based on the motivation 
of 'interest defined as power', although the latter formulation comes strictly from 
Morgenthau. 
12 Keohane was influenced by other literatures related to game theory, such as micro-
economics and public choice theory (see especially Keohane 1984). However, the 
game-theoretic logic is sufficient to account for how neorealism became neoliberal 
institutionalism. 
13 Axelrod' s computer tournament for iterated PD games showed that, against a range of 
strategies, the one which ended up with the best score overall ('Tit for Tat') never beat 
any other individual strategy. It simply worked well by eliciting cooperation from the 
other strategies. See, throughout, Axelrod (1984). 
14 It is the function of cognitive development which is clearly involved in the resolution 
of most environmental issues, and which has led to Peter Haas's 'epistemic com-
munities' theory (Haas 1989). However, this theory should properly be regarded as a 
subset of a broader institutionalist theory, with a focus on cognitive factors as 
generators of institutional influence. The point which needs emphasising here is that 
the epistemic networks rely on international organisations in order to operate, and that 
many of these organisations already existed prior to the establishment of such net-
works. Thus, while in a narrow sense it was climate scientists who developed knowl-
edge about climate change, it was the organisations, importantly, that provided the 
framework within which research operated and was disseminated (both to other 
scientists and to policy-makers), and that, in some cases, directed the research questions 
which scientists asked. A convergence of Haas's views with neoliberal insti-
tutionalism can be seen in the recent joint Keohane-Haas (with Marc Levy) book 
(Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993). 
15 See Lunde (1991) on many of these meetings. 
16 For a discussion of the acrimonious debate over the World Resources lnstitute's 
'Greenhouse Index', see Agarwal and Narain 1990; and the World Resources Institute 
1991. 
17 Note again that this is a use of the term institution which does not explicitly involve 
any formal organisations (see also Imber in this volume). 
18 This remains so whether the presumed game structure is that of iterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma or that of Assurance (Stag Hunt). It would not be the case if the structure 
were that of Chicken, which Ward (1993) suggests is the game structure for global 
warming. 
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19 Some might object here that those states which refuse, for example, to accept limits 
on their CO2 emissions while other states do acccept these limits are free-riding on the 
climatic benefits provided by others' actions. However, it is not possible to call 
something like 'climatic benefits' a collective good (on the provision of which one 
actor could 'free-ride') until states have intersubjectively agreed that it is a collective 
good. Public goods do not objectively exist; they are constructed through discourse. I am 
grateful for the objection by Roderick Ogley which clarified this point in my own mind. 
20 The tenninological distinction is difficult to make clear here, since the different 
writers use these two terms in differing, and overlapping, fashions. The use of 
structuralism here, as in Gill (1993 ), is one which Popper associated with historicism, 
and which is taken up by Ashley (1986: 289). In broad terms, structuralism is used 
here to connote theories which frame their analyses in terms of those general sets of 
structures (linguistic, economic, political) which constitute social life and which 
determine events, outcomes, identities and even human agency - theories of 
which neorealism is a prime example. Historicist theories, on the other hand, are ones 
which place emphasis on the historical formation of structures, and thus on human 
agency, when considering the potential for their transfonnation. In addition to Gill and 
Ashley, see Walker (1993: Chs 4 and 5); Conca (1993), for an elaboration with respect 
to environmental problems; and Wendt (1987), from a structurationist position. 
21 As an aside, it may be interesting to note that, to date, post-structuralist writers on 
international relations have tended, in my view, to reify that Realist ontological 
position which regards the problematical war-peace state of affairs as fundamentally 
constitutive of the subject matter of IR. For example, James Der Derian, in his 
excellent bookAntidiplomacy (1993), criticises a traditional security studies analyst 
(Stephen Walt) for denying the utility of broadening the concept of security to include 
global environmental problems (Der Derian 1993: 11). But his critique nonetheless 
reinforces the notion that the war-peace security question is constitutive of IR, and 
that therefore its analyses (although Der Derian posits a greatly different form for 
these than Walt) can be applied across the field. Walt's point is, in fact, important in 
that it implicitly precludes the notion of one fixed vision of reality, and at least in 
principle denies the privileging of military-security relations within IR, which Der 
Derian reifies. Other books, in this vein, which in my view engage in a similar 
reification include Der Derian and Shapiro (1989) and Walker (1993). This is not to 
deny that these writings are intensely useful, but simply to point out that these writers 
seem to share a limited concept of what is involved in IR in much the same way as do 
the neorealists. 
22 It is important to note that this need not necessarily imply relativism. It is not 
necessary to hold the position (although some post-structuralists would) that since the 
'facts out there' are constituted in various discourses and theories, these discourses are 
incommensurable and cannot be compared or evaluated. Even though reality is 
constituted through discourse, different theories may still constitute overlapping 
versions of reality, and there is therefore a potential for the evaluation of these 
respective theories through debate. Were this not the case, the evaluation made above 
of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism with regard to explaining the politics of 
global warming would have been impossible. 
23 Much of this criticism would be shared by post-structuralists and many feminists (e.g. 
Harding 1986). However, they would in general go further and deny the 'first order' 
reality status to the natural sciences also. 
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5 International relations, social ecology 
and the globalisation of environmental 
change1 
Julian Saurin 
The conservative and conventional thinking of international relations (IR) has it 
that environmental problems are yet another set of pressing 'issues' to be 
addressed by students of international relations, whilst at the same time available 
for relegation to a tokenistic subset of concerns alongside questions of gender and 
racism (Smith 1993). The irreducible and timeless fundamentals of war, security 
and 'national' self-interest remain, in this portrayal, relatively undisturbed by the 
marginal, if endearing, frettings voiced by restless greenies around the world in 
general, and by some in the IR academic community in particular. Thus, the 
rejection of environmentalism arises from the conviction that environmental 
degradation does not undermine any of the foundations of the orthodox practice 
and theorisation of IR. 
The prevailing approach of IR scholars to the environment remains 
state-centric. That is to say that the whole range of environmental concerns is 
theoretically and practically subordinated to, and dependent upon, the predeter-
mined 'character' and 'interests' of the state. This predisposition is singularly 
pronounced in Brenton's The Greening of Machiavelli (1994), wherein the title 
alone makes it clear that the environment is contingent upon the Machiavellian 
tum, and not vice versa. However, it is also identifiable in the much more 
thoughtful work of Hurrell and Kingsbury (1992a, 1992b) and in the Chatham 
House-tempered volume by Thomas (1992), where it is made explicit in the 
former and implicit in the latter that the proper remit of an international relations 
of global environmental change is to be found in the manner in which states, 
through multilateral or other official arrangements - including the co-option of 
non-state actors - attempt to mediate and manage the global environment 
between states or through formally recognised international organisations.2 
There remains a latent assumption that the rise of a worldwide environmental 
consciousness or the actuality of global environmental crises does not warrant a 
basic re-theorisation of international relations, but rather invites a modest means 
of accommodating such challenges within the existing preconceptions of 
orthodox IR. Contrary to this view, and the argument developed here is that the 
processes of global environmental change (GEC) are subversive of both the 
theory and the practice of orthodox international relations, if by 'international 
relations' is understood the conduct, regulation and management of relations 
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between states across the world. The appearance of theoretical stability and 
security afforded to orthodox IR by the ascription of sovereignty to the politic-al 
formation known as the modern state is radically undermined by the scale, spread, 
dynamics and complexity of global environmental degradation.3 In this chapter, 
a case is made that is unequivocally against the arriviste theoretical complacency 
(Smith 1993) which suggests that GEC is yet another issue which, by design or 
default, may be added to the optional list of IR ephemera. For Smith, the evidence 
of the seriousness with which environmental 'issues' are taken is provided by the 
attention paid by political leaders or orthodox academia (Smith 1993: 44); from 
this line of reasoning, Smith derives an IR research agenda. However, this 
approach is far removed from the daily environmental concerns which inform the 
lives of the mass of humanity - from the radioactively poisoned residents (and 
their children, and their children's children, and their children's children's 
children) of Chernobyl and the Ukraine, to the tens of millions of children who 
die under the age of 5 from water-borne and preventable diseases, to the suffer-
ings of malnutrition resulting from the normal operations of global food markets, 
to the racially biased daily deposition of toxic waste, to the forced marriages of 
male transmigrants to female tribals in Indonesia, or to the farmers whose 
sustainable agricultural practices have been subverted by the growing global 
intellectual-property-rights order. The analysis of these types of empirical and 
historical experiences, and the attempt to explain their global manufacture, distri-
bution and remedy are, I argue below, where international theory should be 
developed and put into use. 
Smith is entangled in a contradiction of his own making.4 Whilst pretending to 
avoid a derailing of so-called 'low' politics by 'high' politics, he achieves this 
very derangement with great rhetoric effect. Thus, the concerns of many scholars 
of environmental change who wish to explain and account for the mundane and 
daily process of environmental degradation across the world, scholars who com-
prise the principal informants of the social, political and economic conditions of 
life across the world, are rendered as marginal and peripheral because they do not 
deal - allegedly- with the fundamental of the state system and its transcendence. 
Smith contends that 'the environment shares with gender and race the dubious 
privilege of being an issue in political and academic circles,' and that he 
'wonder[s] whether that means anything more than that it is impossible not to pay 
lip-service to it'. That he can only pay lip service to it is a consequence of Smith's 
own problematisation of the environment, and of his own method of enquiry. 
To avoid the theoretical and practical impasse which Smith establishes, an 
explicit attempt to problematise global environmental change in a global soci-
ology is required. This means drawing up accounts of the global structures of 
power, articulations of capitalism and distribution of consumption, and not the a 
priori privileging of the 'high' politics of the state. Indeed, I share the point of 
departure which informs Redclift and Benton's Social Theory and the Global 
Environment, in which they argue that 'the social sciences are not equipped to 
play [an] enlarged imaginative and practical role without a radical rethink of their 
own inherited assumptions', and that this ill-preparedness continues to stand 
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because 'serious attempts to come to terms with the issues posed by our 
environmental crisis expose to critical examination some very basic "settled" 
assumptions of the "mainstream" traditions of the social sciences' (Redclift and 
Benton 1994: 2). Thus, in part, what follows reflects the growing criticism of the 
fragmenting and reductionist traditions of social scientific enquiry in general, as 
well as the parochialism of IR in particular, which are so clearly revealed when 
global environmental change is analysed. 
The root question which needs to be asked and responded to is: what is the 
principal object of enquiry in the IR of global environmental change? Is it the 
self-declared activities of states in the ambiguously, or at least contestedly, 
defined field of environmental affairs? Is it the inter-state management of issues 
which, by one history or another, have now been labelled environmental? Is it the 
examination of the practices of those organisations, be they state or non-state 
organisations, which declare themselves to be 'environmentalist' or environ-
mentally concerned? Is it the analysis of environmental change in the light of a 
presupposed anarchical international society of states? Hurrell and Kingsbury 
pose the basic problem as follows: 
Underlying this analysis is a central question: Can a fragmented and often 
highly conflictual political system made up of over 170 sovereign states and 
numerous other actors achieve the high . . . levels of cooperation and policy 
coordination needed to manage environmental problems on a global scale? 
( emphasis added) 
(Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992b: 1) 
Whilst these questions are of interest and may ultimately gain importance, 
managerialism can never be the purpose of critical academic enquiry. It is 
noticeable too that in Hurrell and Kingsbury's problematising of the environ-
ment, questions of causation and resolution are conspicuously absent from the 
remit of enquiry. The argument developed below is that an enquiry which seeks 
to establish whether any universal processes and practices have come about 
which obtain across the world (irrespective of the particularistic powers and 
characteristics of identifiable international actors) is indispensable. Whereas the 
greater part of the IR of global environmental change has focused upon 
the manner in which formal organisations, and notably states, have responded to 
the impact of environmental change - where the change is taken as given and 
relatively unproblematic - a thorough analysis of causes and of the diffused 
processes which engender environmental change should be regarded as the sine 
qua non of this field of enquiry. 5 
In the orthodoxy of IR, the primary object of enquiry is the manner in which 
states deal with and mediate amongst themselves the outcome of pre-given 
processes organised according to a distinction between internal and external, and 
between domestic and foreign, processes.6 Thus, these processes, whatever they 
may be - trade, manufacturing, tourism, arms manufacturing, unemployment, 
migration, social upheaval, gender subordination - are typically brought into 
consideration if, and only if, they appear to disturb or impinge on the relations 
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between states. One is left in no doubt that all is contingent upon the state. And 
one is reminded of Ralph Miliband's warning as to the distorting longevity of 
such essentialist views of politics when he wrote that 
The strength of this current orthodoxy has helped to turn these claims (for they 
are no more than claims) into solid articles of political wisdom; and the 
ideological and political climate engendered by the Cold War has tended to 
make subscription to that wisdom a test not only of political intelligence but 
of political morality as well. 
(Miliband 1973: 6) 
Though the Cold War may be over, and though the Rio Conference was portrayed 
as the symbolic crowning of the new world order of cooperation and enlighten-
ment, the empirical and intellectual legacy of statism remains well entrenched 
and resistant to any new wisdom and morality. 
Atkinson similarly attributes the general inadequacy of our dominant intel-
lectual tradition at accounting for social ecological change when he writes that 
Compartmentalised disciplining specialisms had grown out of the relatively 
stable set of post-war social and political arrangements and adopted a set of 
inter-related methodological approaches to knowledge - empiricism, behavi-
ourism and pluralism - that could not easily come to terms with this new 
phenomenon [of global environmental crisis]. 
(Atkinson 1991: 21) 
The principal casualty, in IR, of an unreconstructed statism, empiricism, 
behaviourism and pluralism is the denial both of globalisation and of environ-
mental crisis. Against this a priori privileging of the state, I want to argue for an 
empty slate which attempts not to prejudge an 'authentic' and 'proper' object of 
enquiry with its attendant reductionist and atomistic consequences, but rather to 
navigate through the social-economic-political-ecological web in which 
numerous and overlapping processes, communities and distributive criteria are 
embedded. In this, the terrain of enquiry is composed of the ideological repre-
sentation and articulation of actual and historical material changes, and of the 
processes of material changes themselves. As Caroline Thomas unequivo- cally 
identifies, the environmental crisis is 'rooted in the process of globalisation under 
way' (Thomas 1994: 1), and she forcefully exhorts scholars in IR to focus on 'the 
underlying structure in which this process is played out' (ibid.: 2). 
In responding to such a call, I will set out three interrelated areas of enquiry 
which seek both to identify those underlying structures and to suggest how the 
embedded process is played out. After first discussing (i) the processes by which 
the 'environment' is defined and come to be 'known', I will then focus attention 
on (ii) the relationship between the processes of global capitalist development 
and global environmental degradation, and (iii) on the processes by which 
environmental change (and degradation especially) has become global in 
character (where 'global' is not simply a trendy synonym for 'international'). 
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THE MEANING OF 'ENVIRONMENT' 
Teasing out why and under what circumstances, and with what effect, contending 
conceptions of the environment are produced is of key importance for the IR of 
global environmental change. As Wolfgang Sachs aptly remarked 
After nearly everybody- heads of state and heads of corporations, believers in 
technology and believers in growth - has turned environmentalist, the con-
flicts in the future will not centre on who or who is not an environmentalist, 
but on who stands for what kind of environmentalism. 
(Sachs 1993: xvi) 
Environmental degradation is not new, although the production and organisation 
of the global environmental crisis itself may be novel. What certainly is new is 
the rise of a particular form of ideological consciousness which carries the label 
'environmental consciousness'. That this consciousness has arisen primarily in 
the West, in a particular set of forms and at a given historical moment, requires 
explanation. Environmental degradation is not, in this account, principally a 
consequence of accidents, errors or misunderstandings. Rather it is produced as a 
consequence of the structured and systematic usage of sources and sinks which is 
intimately bound up with the mode of production. In this sense, one can speak, 
without any hint of contradiction, of the production of environmental degra-
dation. It is clearly not the case that degradation is new: it is the changed and 
changing production of that degradation - especially in its systematic and glo-
balised character - and, crucially, the social responses to that degradation that 
must be central to any enquiry. 
The debate over environmental change is in large part a battle in the social 
construction of knowledge and meaning which is fought out in a global arena. 
Whilst one can give immediate recognition to the 'environment' as an essentially 
contested concept, the question of which conceptions gain dominance in political 
and social discourse remains to be addressed. There is a large, fascinating and 
growing literature on environmentalism and political thought which need not be 
rehearsed here (see, for example, Pepper 1986; Dobson 1990; Atkinson 1991; 
Merchant 1992; Eckersley 1992; O'Neill 1993), but almost all of it is written as 
if there were no international world, nor even a globalised social world. Rather 
than reviewing these contributions, it is appropriate here to identify the more 
salient problems involved in establishing the meaning and significance of the 
environment. Establishing the meaning of 'environment' is necessary for two 
linked reasons: first, in order to move away from essentially quantitative assess-
ments of environmental change - which deal with both the scale and rate of 
change - and towards qualitative assessments which address questions of value 
and valuation, identity, appropriation and distribution; and second, in order to 
distance oneself methodologically and politically from the crass neo-
Malthusianism which constitutes the subtext of the prevailing IR of global 
environmental change. This neo-Malthusian hegemony manifests itself in the 
uncritical - and indeed profoundly anti-social and anti-historical - acceptance of 
82 Julian Saurin 
the estimation of environmental impacts from the aggregation of individual 
impacts, quite regardless of the highly differentiated social origins of that 
change. In this second respect, we must avoid the seduction of the dangerous 
platitudes which grew out of the UNCED process and which abounded at Rio, 
such as appeals to 'our common future' or to 'save the planet', which imply an 
equality of responsibility both in causing environmental degradation and in 
facing the consequences of that global degradation. References to shared 'global' 
responsibility or to a common fate rely almost wholly on quasi-mystical appeals 
to some worldwide imagined community which does not and could not have 
any substantive historical presence. (As argued later, the very concept of 
'global' removes in significant ways the possibility of shared agency and res-
ponsibility, but has therefore led to the increasing invocation of 'lifeboat 
ethics', authoritarianism, corporatism and centralisation.) 
The meaning of the 'environment' in social sciences in general and IR in 
particular has been insufficiently theorised. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any 
IR scholars who have explicitly dealt with the theoretical implications of environ-
mental change for the discipline of IR in the manner which is evident amongst 
other social scientists, including those in that equally conservative discipline, 
economics (see, for example, the journal Ecological &onomics as well as the 
innovative work found in the interdisciplinary journal Global Environmental 
Change). Indeed, the prevailing linguistic practice of referring to 'environmental 
issues' performs the same function of subordination as that achieved by reference 
to gender as 'women's issues'. At one and the same time, the hoped-for recog-
nition of its centrality in social analysis is casually dropped in favour of some 
unspecified yet assumed object of enquiry which lies deeper in the hierarchy of 
social determinisms. Implicit in this vernacular is the methodological premiss 
that one can take these issues or leave them depending on one's interests. Thus, a 
variety of apparently discrete environmental issues have been studied, for 
example, acid rain, climate change or environmental degradation in Eastern 
Europe or some other region. The origins of their separation invariably derive 
from their disparate physical, not social, characteristics. The categorisation of 
environmental issues seems to have occurred through an identification of final 
outcomes as the defining features. It has been built upon a scientific taxonomy 
which may defy critical analysis from social theory. Whilst this may make good 
research sense for natural scientists, it is erroneous and quite misleading for 
social scientists in general and IR students in particular to follow the research 
prescriptions implied by the transfer and inheritance of such a process of categor-
isation. In short, when it comes to the IR of global environmental change, one has 
to be suspicious of 'specialisation in an individual field where an account of 
[one's] position, [is] sustainable only by the very delimitation of its reference' 
(Young 1990: 156). What has occurred, in effect, is the nationalisation of in-
herited environmental issues so that they can be comfortably pressed into the 
service of statist interests and analysis.7 Rather than accepting the science as 
'given' - where science becomes the arbiter of social action over environmental 
concerns, and which, incidentally, is a licence for government inaction until 
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'scientific certainty' is confirmed - the scientific assessment of environmental 
change needs to be critically understood as part of a sociology of knowledge. 
This questioning of the status of science reflects the need to overturn the 
working assumption that the environment amounts simply to a set of external 
data, a body of resources, or a range of sources or sinks. It is true to say that there 
are very few, if any, natural places left in the world, if, by this, is meant pristine 
habitats which have not been subject to some anthropogenic change. Our con-
ception of nature and of what is natural is socially constructed, and is therefore 
socially, temporally and spatially contingent. Sayer reminds us that 'Non-social 
phenomena are impervious to the meanings we attach to them. Although one 
could say that such objects are "socially defined", they are not socially-produced' 
(Sayer 1992: 26). Nature in and of itself possesses no value or meaning; value and 
meaning are constituted through human interaction. Rather than counterpose 
nature against humanity, or dichotomise into the natural and the social, we should 
regard humanity as constitutive of nature. Cooper provides a useful distinction 
between two conceptions of the environment. The first is of the environment as 
simply the spatial surroundings of a being; the second is of the environment as 
the immediate milieu which a being inhabits and which is constituted through a 
field of significance comprising a 'referential totality' - i.e. all the objects and 
symbols which together constitute meaning for a person or social actor. It is this 
second, tighter social conception, wherein the environment, as a field of sig-
nificance, is formed by 'the items within it [which] signify or point to one 
another, thereby forming a network of meanings' (Cooper 1992: 170), which 
needs to be explained. Therefore, when we analyse GEC, the environment should 
not be regarded as some objective external datum but as an ordered and manu-
factured set of meanings and values. The 'environment', then, is a complex of 
intersubjective, contingent but not arbitrary set of meanings. The crucial question 
is the manner in which we attribute value to the constituents and processes 
characteristic of the biosphere. As Benton and Redclift argue, 'Nature commands 
attention, and the "natural" has an ideological force, which takes us to the heart 
of the paradox of development itself (Benton and Redclift 1994: xi). What needs 
explanation is how and with what consequence networks of meaning are 
produced; which meanings gain ascendancy and which are subjugated; what 
economic, cultural and social forms are constituted by contending networks of 
meanings; and how these material and ideological relations are articulated both 
globally and locally. (To pre-empt the discussion in the final section, in a 
globalised society, what comes to constitute the referential totality becomes 
extremely ill-defined and mercurial in character.) An international, actor-focused 
enquiry does not even begin to scratch the surface of these matters, because 
meaning is a question of social, and not individual, constitution. 
A dispute over the range, content and significance of these networks of 
meanings lies at the heart of the environmental and developmental question. The 
task is to unearth the deeply embedded but differentiated understandings and 
practices about social development which are organised and articulated globally. 
A number of authors (Smil 1993; McCormick 1989; Pepper 1986; O'Riordan 
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1981) have traced the rise of 'environmentalism' over recent decades, and a 
dominant strand has been the neo-Malthusian conservationism whose principal 
ideological appeal is to a romantic signification of a fragile, innocent and vulner-
able 'nature' (see Merchant 1980, and Jackson 1994, for feminist critiques of 
these portrayals) subject to the inexorable depredations of the human world. In 
this conception of the environment, humanity stands outside of nature with the 
resulting appeal to 'save', 'preserve', 'protect' or 'conserve' that which has been 
unsullied. This tradition, arising in the North, has been the principal ideological 
informant of the international environmental discourse, and may be characterised 
as one of enclosure and appropriation. 
Against this tradition, and reflecting a much longer and heterogeneous, but 
subordinated, critique, have been the largely socialist, anarchist and anti-imperial 
strands which arose out of struggles for economic and political self-
determination. This second critical tradition regarded 'environmental' concerns 
as part and parcel of the struggle for the control of resource use and resource 
distribution (see Redclift 1984, 1987; Pepper 1986; Merchant 1980, 1992; 
Bookchin 1990, 1991; Eckersley 1992; Third World Resurgence). In these views, 
environmental change was crucially determined by - in the currently unjusti-
fiably unfashionable phrase - the ownership of the means of production and 
control over the criteria of exchange. By extension, what constituted the refer-
ential totality for this second tradition was not the rather arbitrary selection of 
environmental issues - involving say, the aesthetic and charismatic appeal of blue 
whales, the alarmism of population control or the chauvinist discourse con-
cerning acid rain (all of which, ironically, are not immediately and directly 
experienced) - but the entirety of that which informed the systematically pro-
duced human condition - e.g. poverty, malnutrition, dispossession, proximity to 
toxic waste, a hazardous working environment, exposure to contaminated foods, 
etc. (all of which, by contrast, tended to be unavoidable and immediate). In short, 
the material transformation of the world necessarily entailed a corresponding 
social transformation of the world. The 'environment' in this second tradition 
was inseparable from the broader question of development. Thus, part of any 
rigorous social enquiry into environmentalism must include a deconstruction of 
how particular dominant conceptions of the environment arose and came to be 
naturalised, and why and in what ways such conceptions mask the socio-
economic distribution of environmental benefits and degradations. Indeed, what 
is of interest are not the changed physical properties but the changed set of social 
relations - relations which carry with them new significations of environmental 
meaning and value. 
What we consider to be 'environmental', as well as the very reference to 
'environmental issues', are themselves social constructions. Lash and Urry 
rightly remind us that 'there are a variety of forms assumed by the nature/society 
relationship. This varies both historically and geographically' (Lash and Urry 
1994: 294), and students of IR should resist the temptation of abstraction and of 
universalising what are actually historically contingent expressions. What students 
of IR consider worthy of enquiry, as well as the manner and the purpose to which 
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this enquiry is put, are part of the material production of ideas, and not the neutral, 
value-free consequences of positivist scientific enquiry. The meaning of the 
environment is part and parcel of the production of degradation, and what counts 
as degradation needs to be clarified. 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND THE GLOBAL 
CAPITALIST ECONOMY 
The ideological meanings and significance given to the environment are em-
bedded in the social expression of capitalism. The historical coincidence between 
the rise and spread of capitalism and industrialism and the generation of global 
environmental crises needs explanation. Whereas the IR of global environmental 
change has hitherto given primary causal explanation to actors and policy, I want 
to argue that environmental change - for which we can read 'the transformation 
and use of sources, sinks and resources' - on the scale which we have witnessed 
is not primarily the outcome of human agency (where agency means wilfulness, 
or purposive or intentional action), but is the cumulative or systemic consequence 
of a set of structured practices and processes. Attention paid to globalised 
reiterated practices reveals incomparably more about the organisation and ad-
ministration of degradation than does a focus on the ad hoe and tangential 
responses witnessed in inter-state environmental negotiations. Bluntly stated, a 
focus on inter-state relations is largely irrelevant to the explanation of global 
environmental degradation, nor is an elaboration of inter-state relations likely to 
lead to any reversal of such degradation. 
The approach and range of enquiry proposed here echo Bookchin's advocacy 
of social ecology (1990, 1991) which regards 'ecological degradation ... in great 
part, [as] a product of the degradation of human beings by hunger, material 
insecurity, class rule, hierarchical domination, patriarchy, ethnic discrimination 
and competition' (Bookchin 1994: 17). There is, in Bookchin's view, an in-
separability of social problems from ecological problems, and he thus proposes 
the term 'social ecology' as the remit of a proper environmental enquiry, or as the 
referential totality. Hitherto, accounts in the IR of global environmental change 
have privileged descriptions of what has happened in GEC in terms both of 
aggregated physical outcomes and of international institutional responses over 
why they happened - or even why they should be of any significance at all. 
Furthermore, the multitude of social relations associated with degradation have 
been lost to the singular concern of the state. A social-ecological account allows 
us to address the reasons for and the causes of change, along with the multiple 
manifestations and meanings of change, and in so doing broadens and enriches 
the account of what actually happened. 
In this section I want to outline the socioeconomic principles which underlie 
environmental change in a capitalist world system, · and from which we can 
thereby discern a social ecology. As Redclift neatly summarises, 'Capitalist 
development transforms nature and the environment within a logic which needs 
to be understood in global terms' (Redclift 1987: 46). Furthermore, he argues that 
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the environment should be 'looked upon as process rather than form, as a result 
of a set of relationships between physical spaces, natural resources and a con-
stantly changing pattern of economic forces' (ibid.: 79). Broadly speaking, 
capitalist ownership and capitalist allocative and distributive criteria have per-
meated the entire social world across the globe, although the extent to which these 
criteria are mediated, resisted and rearticulated remains highly differentiated. In 
other words, while capitalism is global in character, its character is not globally 
uniform (and there is, therefore, no substitute for detailed historical and empirical 
research). Nevertheless, a set of crucial constituents can be identified which 
illuminate that the key determinant of the dynamics of ecological degradation in 
a global capitalist economy is the relationship between capitalist expansion and 
the regulation of capitalism. 
A central constituent of capitalism is the commodification of resources, be they 
material or ideational (including labour), and hence their privatisation. In broad 
terms, the process of capitalist expansion entails the displacing of myriad forms of 
use rights and property rights into private property rights (see Mandel 1990; The 
Ecologist 1992). The main ideal-typical characteristic of private property rights are 
exclusive rights to the use and alienation of the property in question, free from any 
other sociocultural constraints. For our purposes of environmental resource analysis, 
we can depict the twin pillars of capitalism as being generalised commodity produc-
tion and commodity exchange, in which the constant accumulation of commodities 
is a necessary end in itself, one made possible through the social division of labour. 
The historical fact of multiple and competing capitals ensures the vitality and 
dynamism of this system of constant commodity expansion. Ecological tolerances 
are irrelevant to the capitalist logic of expansion. 
Capital accumulation is a global structure, and not simply an aggregation of 
national capitals. Given this fact, it makes no sense to speak of the historical stage 
of national capitalism, nor to engage in a comparative analysis of the relative 
advancement or 'backwardness' of each unit (see Wallerstein 1991, and Saurin 
1995). (It would, however, continue to make sense to analyse the mode of 
regulation by states of capitalist accumulation: this does not presuppose either the 
existence of national capitals or its organisation on national lines.) Similarly, it 
makes no sense to speak of national environmental conditions, since the specific 
form of degradation to which one is referring is a function on the one hand of the 
ecosystems or biophysical systems through which the physical transformation 
occurs ( and which are not coincident with state jurisdictional boundaries), and on 
the other hand of the current expressions and articulations of global capitalism. 
By way of example, the environmental, social and economic degradation 
consequent upon the introduction both of 'scientific forestry' 8 to Northern India 
in the first decades of the twentieth century under British imperial rule (Guba 
1990) and of Green Revolution agriculture from the 1970s onwards (Shiva 1993) 
arose out of the commodification of production and labour and the modernisation 
of agriculture-based capital accumulation, as well as the wholesale privatisation 
of knowledge. The logic of accumulation was not national in character or mani-
festation, and nor were the principal beneficiaries of that modernisation. Instead, 
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emergent global logics were evident, and are now much clearer. The development 
of the global agri-food complex, involving strong corporate vertical integration, 
grew in tandem with the commodification of agricultural labour and the 
privatisation of land and agricultural technologies, as well as with a process of 
incorporation into a parallel global chemical and biotechnology complex. The 
incorporation of people, local economies and environments into the global agri-
food complex has much more to do with an unintentional process of incorporation 
into dominating logics of accumulation than with any wilful national policy. 
The first point to make about the capitalist mode of production is that it is 
based upon the appropriation of profit (surplus value) from labour, wherein direct 
labour transforms the actual physical properties of the world whilst the economic 
value of that transformation is transferred or conveyed through the exchange 
process to other beneficiaries. This process of exchange results in the accumul-
ation of capital which, by definition, is not under the control of direct labour. The 
strategic asset of accumulated and concentrated capital allows capitalists to 
determine the shape, content and direction of future investments irrespective of 
the needs or conditions of direct labour. Thus, whilst direct producers appear to 
be the immediate agents of environmental change (in which case, they generate a 
distinct and localised referential totality), as well as of a corresponding set of 
social relations of production, their autonomy is structured by principles of 
appropriation and exchange which they are not at liberty to overturn. At the same 
time, capitalists make investment decisions based on criteria generated through 
an entirely different referential totality. Thus, any capital investment, based on 
criteria which are of benefit to capitalists, involves the exploitation of sources, 
sinks and labour. The immediate and degrading consequences of that exploitation 
do not fall on the capitalist. They fall, instead, systematically and dispropor-
tionately heavily on direct producers, i.e. labour, and on 'displaced' labour or the 
reserve army of unemployed. In brief, the capitalist process of structured ine-
quality in production produces continuous, but differentiated, social relations. 
Second, the capitalist mode of production serves to commodify labour - into 
increasingly atomised and privatised forms - and therefore to permanently 
reconstitute labour into a structured and unequal market. The apparent disorgan-
isation and fragmentation of labour (into 'free' labourers) mask the structured 
unity of the capitalist appropriation of wealth and the strategic concentration of 
decision-making powers amongst monopoly capitalists. This means that there is 
a global and social unequal distribution in the quality, composition and con-
centration of capital, from which particular degrading practices arise. 
Capitalism is a global structure of material accumulation which simultane-
ously concentrates wealth and energy both in certain locales and at certain social 
levels by extracting and dispossessing from other locales and social levels. Eco-
and biophysical systems act as material sources and sinks. As sources, these 
systems contain or provide raw materials as well as energy-synthesising services. 
As sinks, these systems absorb anthropogenically produced waste and re-
assimilate materials and energy into these systems. To the extent that the rates of 
use of sources exceed the rates of assimilation of sinks, then environmental 
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degradation is under way. Clearly, however, the location of sources, of trans-
formative capacity (labour and technology) ancl of sinks need not coincide. The 
increasing lack of coincidence in this respect entails the redistribution of the 
externalised costs of production and consumption. 
Furthermore, the historical separation of use value from exchange value, in 
large part through a monetised economy (see Sayer 1991; Lash and Urry 1994), 
has facilitated - indeed has been a precondition of - the rupturing of the material 
basis of economic growth away from local ecological and biophysical systems to 
global ecological and biophysical sources. The sphere of circulation increasingly 
integrates the world into a unitary capitalist market, whilst simultaneously 
alienating direct producers from control over production. Because commodity 
exchange and accumulation reflects exchange value and not use value, and 
because the process of capital accumulation entails the removal of investment and 
employment decisions away from direct producers, there is no imperative on 
capitalists to attend to either labour needs or local ecological propriety. For 
example, the destruction of Ogoni lands in Southern Nigeria by oil companies 
including, allegedly, Royal Dutch Shell satisfies the covetous and distanced 
shareholders and investors who derive huge financial benefit from the 
exploitation of these lands and people. At the same time, the Ogoni pay the 
permanent costs of ecological degradation and repression, whilst relinquishing 
control over what happens to their land, to the oil or to the product of their labour. 
Exchange value, as manifested increasingly in the world capitalist economy, is 
divorced from any capacity to reflect basic human needs and requirements. 
Instead, it compounds the possibility of market criteria, and of monopolies in 
particular, in such a way as to set the terms in which nature and labour are 
exploited. Such a process would involve the internalisation of otherwise 
socialised or externalised costs. In other words, with the expansion in the scale of 
capitalism, there has been an inexorable transferring of environmental control 
from the direct producer over to the monopoly capitalist. 
The significance of this argument is that it cautions against identifying the direct 
agent of degradation - the colono, the woodfuel gatherer, the cattle herder, the 
fisherfolk, and so on - as the social cause of degradation. A given expression of 
degradation should not be mistaken for its cause. In the title words of a Friends of the 
Earth publication on deforestation, Whose Hand on the Chainsaw?, the global 
expressions of environmental degradation are the taken-for-granted conditions of 
conventional IR analysis. However, these socially generated and historically 
contingent conditions are precisely what need to be explained As Marx, in his 
preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, lucidly observed 
In studying such transformation it is always necessary to distinguish between 
the material transformation of the economic conditions of production ... and 
... the ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight 
it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so 
one cannot judge such a period of transfonnation by its consciousness. 
(Marx 1970: 20) 
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The distance between the site of degradation and the location of the benefit of that 
degradation leads to its own production of environmental understanding. As the 
net beneficiaries of distanciated environmental degradation, academic comment-
ators on the international relations of GEC should not confuse our environmental 
understanding with the production of that understanding. 
One is led, in the words of Sklair, to '[t]he hypothesis that there is a 
contradiction between capitalist development and global survival', and that this 
hypothesis has ' ... prima facie plausibility' (Sklair 1994: 220). Exploring this 
contradiction is a prequisite of the IR of global environmental change. But in 
what ways, if any, do explicitly environmental concerns shape the analysis of 
capitalism? In many ways, environmental concerns have simply drawn into the 
frame of analysis ecological and biophysical dynamics which were previously 
regarded as external to the explanation of material production and ideational 
production. However, one can now trace the lineage of capital accumulation - or 
global development - through shadow ecological costs. It is now evidently 
consistent to identify 'ecological debt' and 'ecological footprints' as necessary 
attributes of capitalist growth. The cumulative effect, and the growing structural 
consequence of capitalism, is the evolution of a globalised energy subsidy which 
relies on 'free' sources. And parallel to this energy subsidy is a global material 
subsidy, similarly relying on 'free' sources. 
Whereas classical political economists recognised that such sources were 
'free', there was no such recognition in respect of sinks. The belated recognition 
that has followed is, if anything, the novelty of environmental concern for 
economists and social theorists. In broad historical terms, the process of the 
extraction of energy for the transformation of materials has moved from local and 
relatively concentrated sources over to global and diffused sources. Evidently, 
these changes have been uneven and unequal, and necessarily so. All production 
therefore carries with it an ecological shadow - or, to repeat the above-mentioned 
metaphor, an ecological 'footprint'. This 'footprint' is social as well as physical 
in character, and must be understood as part of the analysis of the social relations 
of production. 
The recent and important work of Richard Norgaard is clear on this matter. His 
development of the 'co-evolutionary paradigm' is one in which 'Nothing is 
exogenous' and 'everything is symmetrically related to everything else' 
(Norgaard 1994: 35), and in which 'Environmental subsystems are treated 
symmetrically with the subsystems of values, knowledge, social organisation, 
and technology in this co-evolutionary explanation of history' (ibid.: 36). The 
consequence of Norgaard's central thesis is that with the establishment of the 
hydrocarbon economy through the Industrial Revolution, there appeared to be an 
escape from the eco- and biophysical constraints of a primarily agricultural 
economy. Thus, the transformation of nature - previously achieved through 
low-energy technologies in which consumption rates roughly equalled regener-
ation and assimilation rates - was accelerated by the use of hydrocarbon-based 
high-energy technologies. As a general rule, energy-intensive technologies act as 
substitutes for labour-intensive processes, but as high-energy sources are de-
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pleted in the locality, so sources must be sought further afield. Thus, the form of 
possession and the control of labour are intimately related to the choice of. 
technologies used (Norgaard 1994), to the manner in which the natural world is 
transformed and to the distribution of environmental goods and bads. Benton 
rightly advises that '[w]hat is required is the recognition that each form of 
social/economic life has its own specific mode and dynamic of interrelation with 
its own specific contextual conditions, resource materials, energy sources and 
naturally mediated unintended consequences' (Benton 1989: 77). 
This enquiry into global environmental change could equally lead to simply 
repeating again the incisive and inspired criticism contained in Marx's preface to 
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in which he was led to 
conclude 'that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended 
whether by themselves or on the basis of so-called general development of the 
human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of 
life' (Marx 1970: 21). Thus, before we look at institutional responses, we must 
look at the global manufacture or production of degradation. Marx elaborates, 
furthermore, that 
in the social production of their existence men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the eco-
nomic structure of society ... and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. 
(Marx 1970: 21) 
The systematic alienation entailed in capitalist accumulation involves the 
removal of the self-determination of the direct producers of material change. To 
the extent that production technologies and transformative practices are estab-
lished by criteria determined by the effective demand on the part of global 
markets for the satisfaction of wants and desires (as against the provision for 
human need), so local practices which would otherwise ensure that the pace of 
development falls within eco- and biophysical tolerances are subverted.9 Axio-
matic to the argument made here is that people do not engage in environmentally 
degrading practices unless they are obliged to do so. (In contrast to the subtext 
evident in the nascent IR of global environmental change, I do not assume that 
the principal problematic factor for IR is that of the abuse of the so-called 'global 
commons' - which are, in fact, not commons at all but rather open-access regimes 
(this crucial difference is often ignored). Instead, I take the mundane and normal 
practices of degradation as being the object of critical enquiry.) If degrading 
practices occur as a matter of routine, how do we account for this? 
GLOBALISATION AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
Contrary to the assumption of anarchy which pervades orthodox IR, and from 
which the emergent sub-discipline of the IR of global environmental change 
Social ecology and environmental change 91 
inherits its principal intellectual baggage, I have argued that there are very 
powerful global ordering processes and sets of ordering principles which are 
intrinsic to the environmental debate. The use of the terms 'global' and 
'globalisation' is problematic and needs explanation, as does their relationship to 
international relations. Having just argued that capitalism is a global historical 
process with peculiar environmental consequences, I want to tum briefly to the 
analysis of the significance of the globalisation of environmental degradation, 
and to a consideration of how orthodox IR fails to address these key problematics. 
It is not self-evident what is meant in much of the literature when the terms 
'global environmental change' or 'global environmental degradation' are used. 10 
And an added confusion is to employ the term 'the international relations of 
global environmental change'. What we can, however, extract from these terms 
is that at least two logics and explanatory narratives are being invoked, but that 
these narratives are incommensurable. The first term - 'global environmental 
change' - most often refers to some rather vague or ill-defined but widespread 
change in environmental conditions, in its ambiguous characterisation of which 
it fails to draw upon any specific or explicit definition of a sociopolitical com-
munity. There is no self-evident sociopolitical identity carried in the term 'global 
environmental change', and thereby no such identity appears to be available for 
specification. Against this, on the other hand, the second term - 'the international 
relations of global environmental change' - invokes a readily identifiable set of 
political communities, namely sovereign states. However, the argument 
developed thus far is that the radical disjuncture between the dynamics and 
processes of environmental change and development and the territorially based 
authority of the state ensures the inappropriateness of looking at the state both as 
a basic causal unit of environmental change and as the most competent unit for 
the mediation of environmental change. 
Globalisation should be understood as an analytical concept, and not as a 
descriptive term. It does not simply mean that behaviour is replicated around the 
world. It refers, instead, to the form in terms of which the world is ordered (see 
Robertson 1992). It suggests a causal relationship between distanciated social 
agents, that is, between agents who not only may never come into physical 
contact with each other but are unlikely even to know of each other, and who are 
furthermore not subject to the same jurisdictional powers. Nevertheless, in an 
important sense, the life of a distanciated social agent may be intimately 
entangled in the lives of all other social agents. Globalisation entails the restruc-
turing of the locality through globalised relations of power over which no central, 
let alone jurisdictional, authority has control. 
Globalisation means that social ordering is under way, not as a consequence 
of the presence of either a singular global authority or an inter-state authority, but 
as a consequence of the 'fostering [ of] relations between "absent" others' 
(Giddens 1990: 18) and of the growing reliance upon the coordination of time and 
space. This capacity for global coordination is predicated upon a capitalist world 
economy in which the principles of commodification and exchange are firmly 
embedded across the world. Thus, capitalists are able to exploit the abstract 
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labour and abstract economic relations quite regardless of local social, cultural, 
economic or environmental conditions. The relative security of capitalist 
economic relations globally may be contrasted with the growing insecurity of 
localised customs and practices - which would otherwise value more highly 
ecological or environmental integrity. As Giddens reminds us, upon this bedrock 
of globalised capitalist relations, ' ... coordination serves to open up manifold 
possibilities of change by breaking free from the restraints of local habits and 
practices' (ibid.: 20). 'Breaking free' also means breaking free of local source, 
transformation and sink capacities, through the utilisation of globally spread 
source, transformation and sink capacities instead. Thus, the abuse or collapse of 
local ecosystems poses little threat to production since globalised sources and 
sinks can be used in their place. 
When Raymond Williams observed that contemporary states are too large to 
deal with the local problems of modern life and too small to deal with the global 
problems of modernity (Williams 1983), he was primarily referring to the non-
correspondence between the causes of socioeconomic change and the regulatory 
mechanisms that are meant to be applied to those changes. The process of 
globalisation, more than any other factor, has ensured the non-correspondence 
between state and inter-state regulation and global environmental integrity. It is 
as meaningless to speak of national economies as it is to speak of national 
environmental problems. Just as 'it was a characteristic of organised capitalism 
that a whole range of economic and social problems was thought to be soluble at 
the level of the nation-state', so, in an increasingly globalised socioeconomic 
order, ' [ d]isorganised capitalism disorganizes such national strategies' (Lash and 
Urry 1994: 293). The social and spatial distribution of benefits differs consider-
ably from the social and spatial distribution of costs. What is clear is that the 
distributive principles or allocative criteria of a globalised capitalist system cut 
across state boundaries and are, in many respects, only marginally affected by 
state regulatory authority. For example, it is the scale, quality and dynamics of 
beef production and consumption on a global market that determine the patterns 
of environmental and socioeconomic degradation, and not the particular admini-
strative authority or jurisdiction (though the administrative authority will give a 
particular set of incentives to that market). Two issues are at stake here. The first 
is the extent or spread of jurisdictional powers - that is, over what territorial space 
do administrative authorities have competence? The second is: what is the actual 
effectiveness of the administrative authority in question? I would contend not 
only that jurisdictional authority is subverted by globalisation but also that, in any 
case, the capacity and effectiveness of jursidictional authorities are typically 
weak or severely compromised (see Gill and Law 1988; O'Brien 1992; Dunning 
1993; Sklair 1991). 
Still, the portrayal of problems as being global, and of their putative solutions, 
also, as being global, is of key ideological significance. It is worth noting Buttel 
and Taylor's argument that the appeal to the 'global' has two principal facets: 
first, that 'in so far as environmental goods tend to be public goods, "saving" the 
environment is in everyone's interest, and hence no-one's in particular, leading 
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to a very difficult collective mobilisation problem'; and second, that 'Global 
formulations permit "packaging" of multiple environmental problems and con-
cerns within a common overarching rubric, at the same time they convey the 
legitimacy and persuasiveness afforded by their being rooted in science' (Buttel 
and Taylor 1994: 242). The history of international relations encourages the 
belief that so-called 'public goods' are essentially problems of a political nature, 
i.e. of state concern, and therefore incorporated into the debate about state 
regulation. The aggregate effect of all states attempting to regulate such public 
goods is to transfer the worldwide management of environmental public goods 
into a problem of inter-state environmental regulation (q.v. Hurrell and Kings-
bury 1992a; Young 1989, 1994). Thus, for example, when Bush made his 
boastful assertion at Rio that the strictest environmental laws in the world applied 
in the USA, he could only do so by entirely ignoring the globalised nature of the 
world economy. Reference to the United Nations Environment Programme 
Register of International Treaties confirms that of the 152 multilateral environ-
mental agreements, 102 were concluded between 1970 and 1990. However, it is 
much more difficult to confirm the effectiveness of these agreements, and con-
siderable scepticism remains as to their substantive contribution to reducing 
environmental damage. Thus, in brief, despite the rapid increase in formal state 
involvement in environmental questions, the formal and discrete contribution of 
the state to controlling global environmental damage remains at best marginal 
and at worst irrelevant (Chatterjee and Finger 1994). Strict territorially based 
environmental laws usually have the effect of simply shifting the production or 
disposal of the offending product or process into another jurisdictional area. This 
calls into question what constitutes effective environmental laws or regulation: 
effective for what, or for whom? And at what price to what, or to whom? An 
analysis of inter-state environmental relations tells us virtually nothing about the 
mechanisms and processes by which environmental use and environmental risks 
are routinely distributed. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Any examination of social change must involve at least two fundamental en-
quiries: first, an identification of the causes of social change, and second, an 
analysis of the understanding of and the response to that change. The broad claim 
of the argument developed above can be sketched out as follows: the scale, spread 
and dynamics of contemporary environmental degradation are historically unique 
and global in nature. The characteristics of global environmental degradation are 
such that their attempted incorporation into unreconstructed theories of social 
change, including those implied in IR, reflects a grave misunderstanding both of 
environmental change and, more especially, of the environment-society nexus. 
Once again, rather than start the analysis with a study of how states respond to 
environmental change, we need to start our examination with a study of how 
social, economic, cultural and political practices across the world generate en-
vironmental change through the transformation and disposal of matter and energy. 
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The foregoing argument has not been one of ignoring actors in general and 
states in particular. It has been argued that a global sociology can remove the false 
promises of an analysis of 'high' politics, in which the IR of global environmental 
change is narrowly interpreted as a concern with the ad hoe responses of 
officialdom to environmental change. Rather, a global sociology must be able to 
explain how mundane and structured practices create environmental change, and 
how such changes are understood and reflected upon. Hence, it is with a deter-
mination of the principles and criteria by which social life is organised, and 
nature transformed and redistributed, that the enquiry must commence. 
All actors are agents of environmental change, whether or not they declare this 
to be their intention. To accept the self-description of actors as 'environmentalist' 
and to disregard, on the other hand, all so-called 'non-environmental' actors is to 
misidentify the sources and consequences of environmental change. Marx's 
proposed method of enquiry is worth further consideration. To repeat: 
Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so 
one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on 
the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of 
material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production 
and the relations of production. 
(Marx 1970: 20) 
However, the focus on actors arises, in large part, due to the inheritance of the 
realist predisposition of making 'actor' equivalent to 'agent', and 'policy' equiva-
lent to 'agency'. Rosenberg correctly observes that 'Historical agency is almost 
always reducible in Realist writings to policy' (Rosenberg 1990: 286; italics in 
the original). In this way, the transformation of the social world is predominantly 
interpreted as a matter of intent, and not as a consequence of unintentional action 
or behaviour. The current rejection of the traditional focus on actors results, 
however, from the contention that unless one understands the mundane and 
routine processes of global economic and social change which make up environ-
mental degradation, then the milieu out of which actors arise, upon which they 
act, and by which they are transformed, will be discounted. 
The approach advocated here is one which pays attention to the actual 
historical material change and the socioeconomic process which together allow 
the accumulation and concentration oftransformative power. It is difficult to see 
an analytical case for paying greater attention to those already-constituted actors 
in IR who shout the loudest about environmental change. Unlike Moliere's 
bourgeois gentilhomme who was shocked to find that he had indeed been speak-
ing prose throughout his life, students of IR should not be surprised to find that 
all social life constitutes environmental change, and that all social agents are 
environmental agents. 
To adopt a method of analysis which presupposes that a particular set of 
administrative, bureaucratic and expert scientific organisations lies at the centre 
of environmental regulation, and will be manifested predominantly through the 
state system, is to ignore the realities of diverse and complex social, economic 
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and cultural processes across the world. A latent assumption behind these top-
down approaches is that, in the end, the 'environment' is an external problem 
which simply has to be investigated technically, and appropriated and managed 
by a standard set of bureaucratic and legal resolutions. The history of both 
developmental change and environmentalism has been one where, in the words 
of Norgaard, 'Agencies ... were established under the pretence that they merely 
had to uncover the facts, rationally determine solutions, and efficiently imple-
ment projects and programmes (Norgaard 1994: 4). The fact that it is in the 
underlying processes of production and accumulation that the roots of degra-
dation are to be found has been ignored in favour of ephemeral and reactive 
attempts at the regulation of that degradation. 
The central problem with traditional IR approaches to environmental change 
is that they elevate an ignorance of the vast range of social, cultural and economic 
processes at work into an essential methodological precondition. The latent 
universalist claims which have come to characterise IR seem to run contrary to 
the complexity, diversity and particularism which mark out environmental con-
ditions. Complexity and diversity are marginalised in order to press standard 
generalised procedures into the service of official state regulation. As Panario and 
Prieto insist, 'We ... have to resist the attempt to reduce the environmental 
problem to a new package of techno-bureaucratic rules and strategies, in the 
hands of the same structures of power' (Panario and Prieto 1992: 175). The 
critique of traditional IR in this chapter stems from two concerns: first, that 
traditional IR fails fundamentally to deal with environmental change because, by 
persisting with its traditional focus on the state and on related organisations, it 
ignores the socioeconomic processes involved in that change; and second, that in 
searching for solutions to that environmental crisis by continuing to focus on 
those institutional practices of modernity which have caused the environmental 
crisis in the first place, prevailing scholarship misses the opportunity to step 
outside the premisses of its own entrapment. Despite his protestations to the 
contrary (Smith 1993: 29), Smith invokes the usual realist techniques of mar-
ginalisation by suggesting that the environmentalists and gender analysts can 
maintain their critique because they do not 'pay sufficient attention ... to the 
"realities" of political and economic power' (Smith 1994: 29). To paraphrase 
Rosenberg's (1990: 291) compelling critique of Realism, whilst Smith is busy 
watching these 'realities' being played out, the global struggles over the environ-
ment, patriarchy, accumulation and distribution are mediating wholesale trans-
formations of the form and conditions of social power in the world. 
NOTES 
1 In addition to thanking participants of the British International Studies Association 
Global Environmental Change seminars, I would particularly like to acknowledge the 
useful discussions with Dr Marc Williams. This chapter was completed whilst the 
author was an ESRC GEC Programme Research Fellow, and this support is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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2 It is worth reminding ourselves that whilst Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
have had a growing input into the process of advising on and formulating international 
environmental policy - especially through contributions to 'technical' or 'scientific' 
issues - it remains the case that only states formally deal with each other as sovereign 
and equal parties to international agreements. 
3 I would also argue that orthodox IR has been extremely reluctant to address inter-
national, or rather 'global', political economic processes, despite facing criticism, on 
this point, that ranges from the modest objections of, for example, Susan Strange to 
the stronger objections raised by Stephen Gill and David Law or Robert Cox. 
4 Unfortunately, a close critique cannot be entered into here of the contradictions, the 
misinformation and the cursory and mistaken analysis which characterise the ten 
factors which Smith claims consign 'environmental politics' to the periphery. This 
must be the subject of another work. 
5 The atomistic, methodological individualism of orthodox social science and tradi-
tional IR needs to be contrasted with the concern with structures, systems and 
processes which informs much of environmental and ecological studies. 
6 See Justin Rosenberg's (1990) sharp and neat rejection of Realism in 'What's the 
matter with Realism?' (Review of International Studies). A number of the methodo-
logical and historical objections he raises are pertinent to the current criticism. They 
are more fully developed in his (1994) The Empire of Civil Society. 
7 By 'the nationalisation of environmental issues' I mean problematising environmental 
issues as if they could be articulated as national interests and subjected to nationalist 
interpretation. For a critique of intellectual nationalism in international theory, see 
Saurin 1995. I am not arguing here that the scientific debate is settled and given, but 
that science itself is pressed into national service, and that a nationalist scientific 
agenda can still be pursued pending the 'definitive' conclusions of scientific enquiry. 
8 'Scientific forestry' involved the application of standardised models of forestry man-
agement that were based on North European - especially German - forestry practice. 
This method derived from ecological conditions characterised by relatively low 
biodiversity and limited tree species, and from economic relations characterised by 
private property, commodification and the specialisation of labour, but it was subse-
quently transferred to ecological conditions marked by relatively high biodiversity 
and by complex and non-standardised economic arrangements. See Shiva (1993) for 
related commentaries on biodiversity and biotechnology. 
9 This is a major claim which cannot be properly addressed in the space available. 
Central issues of economic democracy and self-determination are at stake here. 
10 See Turner et aL 1990 for useful definitional distinctions for the term 'environmental 
change'. 
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6 Gender and environmental change 
Are women the key to safeguarding the planet? 
Charlotte Bretherton 
If there must be a war, let the weapons be your healing hands, the hands of the 
world's women in defence of the environment. Let your call to battle be a song 
for the earth. 
(Mostafa Tolba, Director, United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), addressing the 'Women Nurture the World' workshop, 
Nairobi, 1985) 
Mostafa Tolba' swords are amongst many thousands which claim some particular 
relationship between women and the environment. Frequently, such words evoke 
an image of women which accords with traditional gender stereotypes; hence 
implying specific roles, responsibilities and expectations. In consequence, the 
imputation of links between women and the environment, and the conceptualis-
ation of women as playing a central environmental role, raise fundamental gender 
issues which have implications for theory, policy and action- in relation both to 
women and to the environment. 
Gender analysis provides fruitful insights into the causes of environmental 
change and degradation. By re-examining the evolution of Western cultural 
values, it exposes the essentially masculine bias of our thinking about the natural 
world, and about the exploitation of its resources, which underlies contemporary, 
dominant models of economic development. Similarly, gender analysis high-
lights the gendered nature of the assumptions which have underlain the development 
of social and political institutions and which inform the policy-making of 
organisations at all levels, from the local community to the United Nations. In 
consequence, it is argued, successful implementation of environmental policy 
will depend upon the extent to which its formulation reflects an analysis both of 
the social construction of gender and of the ascription of gender roles; and 
attempts not only to redress the gender imbalance of decision-making fora but 
also to challenge the gendered assumptions which underlie the policy-making 
process. 
This chapter, before addressing these issues, charts briefly the emergence of 
women-environment links as an aspect of the global political agenda, and 
outlines three distinct approaches which attach particular significance to such 
links. 
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EVOLUTION OF WOMEN-ENVIRONMENT LINKS 
During the 1970s, feminists, primarily from the West, began to theorise about 
gender-environment relationships. A variety of ecofeminist approaches devel-
oped which posited a special affinity between women and the natural world. 
Meanwhile, the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-85), in stimulating 
contact between Western and Third World women, widened this debate to include 
the special concerns and the activism of Third World women. Of particular 
significance was the negative impact of environmental degradation and pollution 
upon large numbers of Third World women. Consequently, the closing confer-
ence of the Decade placed particular emphasis upon the significance, globally, of 
links between women and the environment. 
The impact of feminist perspectives articulated during the Decade for Women 
is evident from the sharp contrast between the respective treatments of gender 
issues in the proceedings and Declarations of the two United Nations Confer-
ences on the Environment in 1972 and 1992. The final Declaration of the 1972 
Conference on the Human Environment referred only to men, the first of its 
twenty-six Principles asserting: 
Man had the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions 
of life, in an environment of a quality that permitted a life of dignity and 
well-being, and he bore a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the 
environment for present and future generations. 
By the time of the 1992 Conference on the Environment and Development 
(UNCED), women had been acknowledged as part of the human race. Indeed 
Principle 20 of the Rio Declaration maintained that 
Women have a vital role in environmental management and development. 
Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable development. 
In addition to this statement of principle, Agenda 21 (the Conference's broad 
statement of policy) included a chapter on 'Global action for women towards 
sustainable and equitable development' (Chapter 24) which demands that UN 
agencies involved in implementing Agenda 21 'ensure that gender considerations 
are fully integrated into all policies, programmes and activities'. Furthermore, 
specific reference is made to the special position of women in no less than 147 
other clauses of the Agenda. 
This comprehensive incorporation of women and environment links into 
Agenda 21 attests to the success of women's activism since the end of the UN 
Decade in 1985, which culminated in a period of intense activity in preparation 
for and during the Rio Earth Summit.1 Perhaps it demonstrates, also, a recog-
nition of the relevance of gender issues to global environmental politics. 
THE NA TORE OF WOMEN-ENVIRONMENT LINKS 
An emphasis on the significance of women's environmental role is shared by 
feminists and environmentalists alike. Nevertheless, assessments of the nature 
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and value of women-environment links vary. Feminist activists and theorists 
tend to place positive emphasis upon women's links with the natural world, and 
upon their practical contribution to environmental management and protection. 
Other commentators, however, have tended to emphasise women's role as con-
sumers, or, more particularly, to problematise women's reproductive role. 
Clearly, these divergent approaches to women and the environment derive 
from different approaches to social analysis. They involve, also, rather different 
policy implications. In order to assess these implications, both for women and for 
the environment, the assumptions underlying the interconnection of women and 
the environment require examination. These fall broadly into three categories: 
women as the problem; women as victims; and women as saviours. 
Women as the problem 
Discussion of the potential for a global environmental crisis associated with 
increasing pollution and resource depletion identifies two broad causal problems: 
excessive consumption in the developed world and population increase in the 
South. In both these 'problem' areas, women may be identified as bearing 
particular responsibility. 
Attempts to address the problem of consumption in the developed world have 
focused around the notion of green consumerism, which has both attracted the 
support of and targeted women. This approach, with the apparent aim of environ-
mental protection, has the effect of reducing women to the role of consumers, 
objects of influence whose genuine concerns about environmental issues are 
manipulated in order to change their purchasing habits. Recommendations in 
green consumer guides for environmentally friendly products promoted else-
where by explicitly sexist advertising are cited as evidence of this manipulation 
(Hynes 1991: 475-8). 
Green consumerism has been successful in that the demand for environ-
mentally friendly products has increased considerably. In supplying this demand, 
however, changes in marketing, involving much 'green' labelling and packaging 
of products, have tended to substitute for changes in production. Thus, for a 
variety of reasons, green consumerism seems unlikely to succeed in reversing or 
even reducing the rate of environmental decline. It is a reductionist, market-
oriented approach which seeks to change consumer preferences rather than 
reduce levels of consumption. 
Despite the evidence that overconsumption in the developed world is currently 
the principal factor contributing to environmental change, this factor has not been 
the principal concern of researchers or environmentalists. Attention has focused, 
rather, upon the issue of population growth, in particular estimates of potential 
growth in the developing world. The work of biologists Ann and Paul Ehrlich 
exemplifies an approach which identifies population growth as the source of all 
environmental ills: 
Global warming, acid rain, depletion of the ozone layer, vulnerability to 
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epidemics and exhaustion of soils and groundwater are all related to popul-
ation size .... We shouldn't delude ourselves: the population explosion will 
come to an end before very long. The only remaining question is whether it 
will be halted by the humane method of birth control or by nature wiping out 
the surplus. 
(Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990: 17) 
The Ehrlichs' preferred solution to the population problem involves targeting 
Third World women through literacy programmes. The principal aim of this 
policy is to promote the acceptance and use (by women) of artificial birth-control 
methods. This approach is also favoured by the World Bank, whose 1992 World 
Development Report advocated 'Expanding educational programs for girls to 
promote demand for smaller families'. Apparently, 'Investments in female edu-
cation have some of the highest returns for development and the environment' 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1992: 25-7). 
In this approach, women are again objectified. As the least developed members 
of less developed societies, they are now to be 'developed' - to facilitate 
manipulation of their reproductive choices in the interests of the environment. 
Their designation in Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) reports as 
'acceptors' or 'rejectors' of family planning demonstrates this. Moreover, Third 
World women continue to be subjected to contraceptives, such as Depoprovera, 
which have been banned in the USA for their carcinogenic qualities. 
Severinghaus, in his study of Nepal (1990), found Depoprovera to be the most 
used non-permanent birth-control method. Permanent population control in the 
form of sterilisation similarly involves women to a disproportionate extent. Thus, 
despite the relative safety and low cost of vasectomies, International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) reports indicate that tubectomies remain ten times 
more common. Traditional rewards (coconuts and steel utensils) are apparently 
available to women who undergo sterilisation (Rao 1991: 7-8). In these circum-
stances it is unsurprising that, in India, poor women are reluctant to approach 
official health providers, believing that 'all health care messages are family 
planning messages in disguise, and that family planning only means steriliz-
ation' (Sharma 1994: 23). 
The emphasis on population control has further negative implications for 
women. Cultural norms and socioeconomic factors, particularly in traditional, 
rural societies, have generated a preference for male children. In such circum-
stances women may be obliged to continue child-bearing until at least two male 
infants seem assured of survival. In circumstances where this pressure conflicts 
with strong external pressure to reduce family size, as in China and India, the 
result has been widespread female infanticide or, more recently, foeticide.2 
Meanwhile new 'advances' in reproductive technology have made possible the 
option of sex preselection or 'breeding male', a solution to the population 
problem originally advocated by biologists some twenty years ago, when it was 
argued that 'Countless millions of people would leap at the opportunity to breed 
male (particularly in the third world) and no compulsion or even propaganda 
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would be needed to encourage its use, only evidence of success by example' 
(Mies 1986: 124). This scenario both underlines the centrality of women to the 
environmental debate and demonstrates the urgent need for a comprehensive, 
women-centred approach to the issue of population growth. Such an approach 
was strongly urged at the September 1994 United Nations International Confer-
ence on Population and Development in Cairo. Sadly, however, women's voices 
were eclipsed by the publicity afforded an unprecedented alliance between the 
Roman Catholic Church and militant Islamists. Indeed, seven of the Conference's 
nine days were dominated by the efforts of these organisations to reverse or dilute 
the proposals contained in the draft Programme painstakingly formulated during 
the pre-conference process. 3 
The developments at the Cairo Conference demonstrate, once again, the 
manner in which women, whether in their reproductive or their consumption 
roles, or both, continue to be treated as objects of policy, and as a problem to be 
addressed. 
Women as victims 
The relationship between poverty on the one hand and exposure to environmental 
pollution or degradation (or both) on the other has been well documented, both 
for developed and for less developed countries. According to statistics produced 
by USAID, the majority of the world's poor are women, and female-headed 
households constitute the poorest group in every country (Dankelman and 
Davison 1991: 18). 
Residents of the inner cities of the developed world are subjected to various 
forms of environmental hazard. In the USA, for example, the urban poor are 
substantially more likely to live near a toxic waste dump than their more affluent, 
suburban neighbours (Hynes 1989: 73). The majority of the adult urban poor are 
women who, in addition to suffering increased exposure to hazards, are respon-
sible for caring for other victims of pollution, particularly children. This combination 
of poverty and domestic responsibilities considerably reduces physical mobility, 
thus denying access to more healthy environments. In addition, women are 
victimised in their reproductive role through their being identified as the principal 
cause of foetal contamination. The risk that pregnant women may be exposed in 
the workplace to ionising radiation and a range of chemical substances is already 
resulting in job discrimination against those of child-bearing age. Evidence that 
foetuses are particularly vulnerable in the early stage of pregnancy, when 
awareness of the pregnancy is likely to be low, has resulted in attempts by large 
chemical producers in the USA to exclude women of child-bearing age from the 
workplace, or to require their prior sterilisation. In the European Union, also, this 
issue has been the subject of debate during the formulation of health and safety 
policy. At present, the indications are that foetal protection rather than equality of 
opportunity will be the major emphasis of any EU directive on this issue (Conroy 
Jackson 1990: 63). 
It is in the context of the Third World, however, that the relationship between 
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women, poverty and environmental degradation has been most fully documented. 
Much of the research in this area is associated with the Women in Development 
movement, and concentrates largely, but not exclusively, on women in rural 
areas. Here, despite the considerable diversity of women's experience both across 
and within the various Third World countries, women's domestic/reproductive 
roles are somewhat broadly conceived. Thus, in addition to family health care, 
women typically bear responsibility for the collection of fuel and water (and for 
attendant water-purification and water-sanitation measures) and the production 
as well as the preparation of food. Indeed, it is estimated that women produce 
more than 80 per cent of food for sub-Saharan Africa and between 50 and 60 per 
cent of Asia's food, forming the majority of the world's subsistence farmers, but 
owning only 1 per cent of the world's land. Moreover, this contribution to food 
production is believed to be systematically underestimated, both because it is 
unpaid work deemed to constitute part of women's reproductive role and because 
the survey evidence is gathered from male heads of households or village elders, 
who fail to recognise or choose to obscure the contribution made by women 
(Charlton 1984: 38-43). 
Women's overwhelming responsibility for the provision of fuel, water and 
food indicates a close relationship with, and dependence upon, the local environ-
ment - and hence a particular vulnerability to environmental change. This has 
proved to be the case. Deforestation, desertification and the diminution/pollution 
of water supplies have had devastating effects. Forests, in addition to fuel, have 
traditionally provided women with food, medicinal plants and materials for 
shelter, and their loss has greatly affected women's subsistence needs. Moreover, 
as forests diminish and water supplies dry up, women are obliged to make 
increasingly longer journeys to fetch water and fuel, and this renders their already 
heavy work burden intolerable. Desertification, in reducing the quality and avail-
ability of cultivable land, has also affected women disproportionately; their 
exclusion from land ownership has ensured that they are increasingly relegated to 
marginal plots, or denied access to land altogether. 
Land and water shortages are also associated with increased male migration 
from the countryside (sometimes referred to as drought migration), which leaves 
women with the sole responsibility for providing for their children. Indeed, there 
has been a dramatic rise in female-headed households throughout the Third 
World (as high as 50 per cent in Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Botswana), 
whilst in some regions the extent of the male exodus has produced serious 
social-destabilisation effects (Monimart 1991). 
In the Third World, women's suffering as victims of environmental degra-
dation has been experienced not only in terms of increased hardship but also in 
terms of diminished social status, as women's expertise in land, water and forest 
conservation has been marginalised and devalued. In the context of India, 
Vandana Shiva maintains that environmental degradation and the associated 
diminution in the status of women are closely linked to the increasing violence 
and deprivation suffered by women and girls. Additional work burdens and 
lowered food entitlement damage women's health and reduce life expectancy, 
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while forms of direct violence against women include dowry murders, the selec-
tive abortion of female foetuses and female infanticide. Indeed, it has been 
estimated that, in the absence of the systematic decline in the sex ratio resulting 
from the murder or neglect of female infants and the ill treatment of women, there 
would have been almost 30 million more women alive in India than actually live 
today (Shiva 1988: 118-20). Further evidence that women suffer disproportion-
ately as victims of environmental degradation would be gratuitous. 
Feminist explanations (whilst varying considerably in emphasis) have 
explicitly identified both women and the environment as victims, focusing upon 
the interconnection between economic exploitation and political oppression that 
is inherent in the concept of patriarchy. Thus, it is argued, contemporary models 
of economic growth and development are founded upon the domination and 
exploitation both of the natural world and of women, whilst the contribution of 
each to human well-being has been undervalued precisely because it is without a 
price (recent efforts by economists to 'price' them both notwithstanding). 
In the context of the developed world, Patricia Hynes, a former official of the 
US Environmental Protection Agency, has stated simply, but vividly, her views 
concerning the cause of environmental pollution: 
Almost exclusively, all polluters and environmental criminals are men; 
women don't hold positions of power to make and carry out those decisions 
. . . hazardous waste exists because men never learned to clean up after 
themselves. 
(Hynes 1989: 73) 
Writing in the context of the Third World, Vandana Shiva has emphasised the 
impact, on women and on the environment, of externally generated development 
policies, in particular the increase of intensive, commercial agriculture and the 
so-called Green Revolution. For Shiva, such policies constitute a model of 
'maldevelopment' based on W estem, patriarchal thought which emphasises the 
virtue of technological and scientific intervention and assesses traditional agri-
culture as 'unproductive'(Shiva 1988: 73). In consequence, traditional, sustain-
able agriculture is being supplanted by resource-depleting, market-oriented pro-
duction which has marginalised the small producer in general and women in 
particular. 
The identification of women (and children) as the principal victims of environ-
mental degradation has clear policy implications. Attention tends to focus upon 
the plight of the women rather than upon the causes of that plight, so that the 
problems emanating from the disruption of women's traditional relationship with 
the natural world are neither identified nor addressed. Rather, women are objecti-
fied as passive recipients of welfare, and provided with alternative means of 
subsistence for themselves and their families. This 'welfare' approach, in conse-
quence, reinforces the imposition of a narrow, Western interpretation of women's 
reproductive role. Additionally, the targeting of women for support has tended to 
encourage male migration, since the responsibility for families' survival is seen 
to rest with women and aid agencies. 
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Clearly, the 'women as victims' approach fails to generate any kind of policy 
which recognises and enhances women's role in environmental conservation. 
Nevertheless, despite the persistence of a welfare orientation in many aid pro-
grammes, considerable attention has focused upon women's practical, day-to-day 
contribution to environmental management. Attempts have been made to involve 
women in schemes aiming to protect or repair the environment, and to the extent 
that such schemes stress a utilisation of the special knowledge and skills poss-
essed by women, this approach accords with the notion of women as saviours of 
the environment. 
Women as saviours 
Feminists' concern for environmental issues is frequently expressed through a 
'women as saviours' approach. This shares certain assumptions with, but 
develops upon, the 'women as victims' approach. Thus, it is argued that there 
exist fundamental links, indeed a certain equivalence, between women and the 
natural world; and that this equivalence represents a primary source of the 
domination and exploitation of both. Marilyn French's assertion exemplifies this 
view: 
The primary manifestation of the relationship between humans and nature is 
the way a society sees men and women. Most cultures associate women with 
nature ... and men with humanness, which is seen as a condition permitting 
transcendence - superiority over, freedom from, control of nature. 
(French 1985: xvi) 
Moreover, it is argued that the status differentiation between women and men, 
seen as the source of all other forms of social stratification, was considerably 
reinforced as a consequence of the development of Western industrial civilis-
ation. This analysis forms part of the broader critique of those ideas and modes of 
thought associated with the Enlightenment and with the scientific revolution. 
Men's enhanced ability to control and exploit the earth's natural resources was 
contemporaneous with women's subordination and domestication as the social 
(and sexual) division of labour became entrenched. The mythology of the 
separate spheres, and associated stereotypical representations of femininity and 
masculinity, served to legitimise this process of division, and became both deeply 
embedded in social institutions and formalised within the legal and political 
systems. 
While much contemporary feminist analysis identifies gender as the funda-
mental social division, there is considerable divergence between feminists in their 
treatment of gender difference. Thus, feminist approaches range from those 
which seek to minimise or transcend gender differences to those which emphasise 
such differences but seek to revalorise feminine and masculine characteristics. In 
relation to the environmental debate, ecofeminism tends to exemplify this latter 
approach. Women's identification with the natural world arises, it is argued, from 
shared experience of exploitation, exploitation which will end only when social 
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esteem is attributed to the feminine values of cooperation and nurturance rather 
than to the masculine values of competition and dominance. 
The work of the historian of science Carolyn Merchant exemplifies eco-
feminist approaches. Merchant has carefully documented changing attitudes 
towards the natural world and towards women from the sixteenthth century 
onwards, illustrating the gradual rejection of a holistic world-view in favour of a 
dualistic separation of nature and culture. In this evolving system of thought, 
women were identified with nature, with wilfulness, passion and traditional 
knowledge ('witchcraft'); whilst culture - involving rationality, science and 
progress - was the domain of men. Merchant's work abounds with evidence that 
this separation of nature and culture involved the systematic domination and 
exploitation of women and nature. An early example, from Francis Bacon's 'The 
masculine birth of time', is colourful but by no means untypical: 'I am come in 
very truth leading to you nature with all her children to bind her to your service 
and make her your slave' (Merchant 1982: 170). Merchant's work examines the 
development and application of science, the industrialisation process and the rise 
of capitalism, tracing their impacts upon women and upon the natural world. 
These include the expropriation by men of the qualities of creativity and produc-
tivity - which had formerly been associated with women and nature, and the 
assignment to both women and nature of a passive role as objects of exploitation. 
The result has been a suppression of the talents of half the world's population and 
environmental crisis. She concludes: 'Perhaps the ultimate irony in these trans-
formations was the new name given them: rationality' (Merchant 1992: 170). 
Ecofeminism, then, shares with other contemporary radical perspectives a 
fundamental critique of traditions of thought and notions of progress deriving 
from the Enlightenment. Two aspects of this critique - feminist approaches to the 
concept of rationality and the feminist rejection of dualistic modes of thought -
will be examined further, and their implications for women's action as 'saviours' 
explored. 
COMMUNAL RATIONALITY 
Many feminists reject the liberal view of individual, instrumental rationality on 
the grounds that it is a gendered conceptualisation which universalises essen-
tially male, market-oriented behaviour. Women's unpaid work in the provision of 
basic needs, in households and in the subsistence sector of the Third World does 
not conform to this model; nor can the concentration of women in low-paid, 
caring professions be explained by reference to profit maximisation. A feminist 
reconceptualisation of rationality in order to embrace women's lived experience, 
would emphasise interdependence and the need for mutually supportive, co-
operative behaviour - that is, communal rationality. 
This interpretation, in relation to global environmental issues, has consider-
able implications for the much-rehearsed debate concerning the 'tragedy of the 
commons'. Hardin's (1968) apocalyptic metaphor of the profit-maximising 
herdsmen overgrazing and inevitably destroying the medieval commons has been 
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criticised for both its historical inaccuracy and its lack of contemporary relevance 
(Cox 1985; Reader 1988). Additionally, feminists would point out that Hardin's 
interpretation of his herdsmen's conduct is based upon a gendered and highly 
tendentious approach to rationality. Had the communal values of herdswomen 
prevailed, the global commons would not now be so imperilled. 
V andana Shiva has explored the issue of the commons in the context of India, 
tracing the process of appropriation and privatisation back to the colonial period. 
The classification of uncultivated common land as unproductive 'wasteland', 
irrespective of its value to and use by local communities (and particularly women), 
ensured its availability land grants to colonists. Subsequently, the 'wasteland' 
designation facilitated the development of the forest commons for private com-
mercial forestry, a process culminating in the activities of the World Bank-funded 
Wasteland Development Board, established in 1985. The Board's projects 
involve the extensive (5,000,000 hectares) privatisation of village commons for 
commercial development- particularly the cultivation of eucalyptus for the wood 
and fibre industries. This replaces, in many cases, indigenous, mixed forested or 
semi-forested areas which have for centuries provided women with sources of 
food, medicine, fuel and shelter and grazing land (Shiva 1988: 86-9). Shiva 
maintains that the designation of the commons as wasteland has been, and 
remains, associated with a failure to recognise its contribution both to ecological 
balance and to the needs of village communities. Far from women's activities 
having depleted the commons, their close relationship with and understanding of 
the natural world ensured both the successful management of the village com-
mons and the maintenance of local ecosystems. In contrast, 'wastelands 
development' through eucalyptus cultivation has been ecologically disastrous, 
resulting in soil exhaustion and the depletion of water resources; indeed, it is 
better named a programme of 'wasteland creation', one which has reflected 
masculine values and individual instrumental rationality rather than feminine 
values and communal rationality. 
HOLISTIC VS DUALISTIC MODES OF THOUGHT 
Equally central to feminist critiques of dominant modes of thought is the 
rejection, particularly emphasised by ecofeminists, of philosophical dualism. 
Ecofeminists reject as essentially masculine the dualistic and hierarchical 
assumptions inherent both in the separation of nature and culture, of human and 
non-human species, and in the construction of gender stereotypes. Such separa-
tion makes possible the creation and objectification of the 'other' which becomes, 
according to the tenets of patriarchal rationality, worthy of consider- ation only 
in so far as it can benefit the subject. 
Ecofeminists adopt a holistic approach emphasising the essential inter-
connection, and equal value, of all life forms. Such an approach, which was 
exemplified by the work (see Carson 1963) of Rachel Carson (who was not 
writing from an explicitly feminist perspective) typifies much subsequent ecological 
thought. Nevertheless, ecofeminists also stress the particular insights that derive 
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from women's experience - shared by the natural world - of exploitation and 
oppression. This common suffering, deriving from a common source, places 
upon women a special responsibility to oppose and undermine dualism in all its 
forms, and to promote in its stead the feminine principle of ecological holism -
in the interests both of the natural world and of women. Typical of this approach 
is Judith Plant's assertion: 
We know that when we resist the rape of the earth, we are fighting the same 
mentality that allows the rape of women. 
(Plant 1989: 49) 
Ecofeminists, then, in linking feminist and ecological thought, explicitly place 
upon women the role of saviour and the burden of safeguarding the planet. 
Examples abound of women, from many parts of the world, who have appeared 
willing to shoulder this burden. 
WOMEN'S ACTION IN DEFENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
There is no doubt that women have contributed significantly to environmental 
activism. In addition, women's environmental movements can be shown to have 
reflected the principles of communal rationality and ecological holism; and to 
have clearly embraced the notion of women's particular responsibility in relation 
to the environment. 
In the developed world, women have been prominent in instigating campaigns 
on a wide range of issues, including the dumping of hazardous wastes and the use 
both of toxic chemicals in agriculture and of chlorine in sanitary products and 
nappies. All of these issues directly link the health of the environment with 
human health, drawing particular attention to contradictions between production 
and reproduction. As the Director of the Medical Research Council Reproductive 
Biology Unit reminds us, somewhat laconically, these contradictions may be 
fundamental: 
Much interest centres on the 50 per cent fall in the human sperm count in the 
developed world. This has little consequence as yet for fertility, but it does 
focus our attention on the vulnerability of the human foetus to environmental 
toxicants ... some of which are found in the modern kitchen. 
(Lincoln 1993: 2) 
Whether or not such arguments will be used to deny women access to the kitchen 
(as they have been in relation to the workplace) remains a matter for conjecture. 
While Professor Lincoln's research may demonstrate that ecofeminist calls for 
action to sustain life on earth are not untimely, it is in the less developed world 
that links between environmental and human health are most immediately evident 
and, as has been demonstrated, impinge most specifically upon the lives of 
women. It is in the less developed world, also, that some of the most effective 
women's environmental movements have emerged. 
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In India, women's activism has been particularly apparent, and is specifically 
linked to a non-Western, holistic world-view 'in which nature is Prakriti, a living 
and creative process, the feminine principle from which all life arises' (Shiva 
1989: xviii). The best-known example of Indian women's activism is undoubt-
edly the Chipko Andolan (the hug-the-trees movement) involving the revival, in 
contemporary form, of an ancient link between women and their sacred trees. 
Thus, in Uttar Pradesh (UP) in 1973 a group of women physically prevented the 
felling of three hundred ash trees, a protest mirrored throughout the UP state 
during the next two years, sometimes in direct opposition to the preferences of 
male members of the community. Following an official enquiry, the UP govern-
ment banned tree-felling in the Reni forest area for ten years. The Chipko 
movement has survived as a grass-roots women's movement, repeating its modest 
successes and spreading to several other parts of India (Philipose 1989: 67-75). 
Indian women are also active in the Manna Rakshana Koota (the movement 
for saving the soil), a popular resistance movement dedicated to the protection of 
the village commons from the wasteland development programme. Action here 
has involved the uprooting of newly planted eucalyptus seedlings and successful 
demands for their replacement with more appropriate varieties. The regenerated 
commons in these cases have been managed exclusively by women (Shiva 1989: 94). 
A further example of non-violent direct action led by Indian women is the 
Narmada Bachao Andalan (the save-Narmada movement) which is protesting 
against the construction of a series of dams on the Narmada River. In addition to 
wide-scale disruption of sensitive ecosystems, this would cause an inundation of 
farmland in three states. In August 1993, four hundred activists were arrested to 
prevent them carrying out a threatened mass drowning in the Narmada River, and 
the leaders of the movement were driven underground (The Guardian, 6 August 
1993). 
The Green Belt Movement of Kenya provides an example from a different 
context of successful action by women on behalf of women and the environment. 
Developed under the auspices of the National Council of Women of Kenya, the 
movement espouses a self-consciously holistic philosophy which aims to reunite 
individuals with their cultural roots and with nature, whilst encouraging the 
movement's own spread beyond Kenya and linking Kenyan experience with 
wider issues, including the prospect of global environmental change. Based on 
tree-planting as a focus for active popular participation, with the aim of stimu-
lating broadly based environmental consciousness, the movement has established 
more than a thousand tree nurseries, tended by approximately 50,000 women, and 
has issued millions of tree seedlings for planting by small-scale farmers and 
voluntary organisations (National Council of Women of Kenya, undated). 
Relatively large-scale movements in India and Kenya provide important ex-
amples of women's role in environmental issues. However, there are, in addition, 
numerous examples of community groups and indigenous NGOs which work at 
the local level, both iri the developed and developing worlds. Many of these 
women's environmental groups can claim successes; indeed, UNEP has pub-
lished a compendium of some 200 success stories (UNEP 1991). Nevertheless, 
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the record is mixed - in Malaysia, for example, women's protests at continuing 
deforestation have been met with repression - whilst any assessment of the 
achievements of women activists must acknowledge a failure to reverse the 
overall trends concerning the non-sustainable exploitation of natural resources in 
the interest of export-led economic growth. 
These broad issues of women/environment/development have been addressed 
by women's NGOs over the past several years, and analysis has increasingly 
focused upon the manner in which they are linked. This was reflected in the 
women's agenda at the 1992 Earth Summit, which included panels on debt and 
trade, and on militarisation. Indeed, the final Declaration (of 10 June 1992) on 
behalf of Planeta Femea demonstrated the inclusive nature of the women's 
analysis through its explicit reference to the environmental implications of the 
GA TI Uruguay Round, and to the problems of militarism and nuclear testing, all 
of which were excluded from the Earth Summit's official agenda. The 
Declaration emphasised, also, the necessity of recognising 'the centrality of 
women's roles, needs, values and wisdom to decision-making on the fate of the 
Earth and the urgent need to involve women at all levels of policy-making, 
planning and implementation on an equal basis with men' (Planeta Femea: 
Declaration, Article 1). 
At all levels, then, from local grass-roots action to policy formulation at the 
global level, women are demonstrating their concern over environmental issues, 
and are adopting a position which emphasises the centrality of gender analysis to 
our understanding of these issues. In relation to policy and action, this position 
consistently reflects the values of communal rationality and a holistic approach, 
whilst assigning to women a key role as saviours of the environment. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF STRESSING WOMEN-ENVIRONMENT 
LINKS 
The implications of stressing women-environment links will tend to be reflected 
in the interests and policy agendas associated with the three broad approaches 
outlined above. 
The 'women as the problem' approach emphasises the significance both of 
women as consumers and of women in their reproductive roles. Women are 
specifically targeted as the objects of policy, formulated in the interests of the 
environment rather than of women. The principal emphasis is upon changing 
women's behaviour rather than actively involving women in policy-making and 
policy implementation. This approach is not based upon gender analysis, and in 
consequence it isolates women from their social context. There is no appreciation 
of the complexity and variety of factors determining the different roles, responsi-
bilities and activities of women and men in any given society. Without such an 
appreciation, attempts to influence attitudes and behaviour cannot succeed, 
particularly in sensitive areas such as reproductive behaviour. As the Third World 
women's network Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) 
has stated: 
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Women know that childbearing is a social not purely personal phenomenon: 
nor do we deny that world population trends are likely to exert considerable 
pressure on resources and institutions by the end of the century. But our bodies 
have become a pawn in the struggles among states, religions, male heads of 
households, and private corporations. Programs that do not take the interests 
of women into account are unlikely to succeed. 
(DAWN 1985) 
In contrast with the 'women as the problem' approach, the 'women as victims' 
approach focuses upon the needs and interests of women, particularly in the Third 
World. Emphasising women's disproportionate suffering as victims of environ-
mental change, this approach is associated with policies aiming to provide 
assistance and support for women. Such policies have typified the responses of 
NGOs and United Nations agencies. They can be divided into two broad cate-
gories: welfare provision and Women in Development (WID). 
A welfare orientation, involving a prioritisation of the immediate practical 
needs of women and their families, has been the traditional approach, and remains 
a common feature of agency programmes. This approach is associated with a 
narrow conception of women's reproductive and domestic responsibilities which 
again reflects an inadequate gender analysis. Hence, there has been a failure to 
recognise the extensive agricultural and commercial roles fulfilled by women in 
many societies, or to examine the structures of political and economic power 
which determine land-ownership patterns. In consequence, the negative effects of 
environmental degradation upon women's social status and economic independ-
ence have been overlooked; indeed the situation has been exacerbated by the 
creation of welfare dependence. Women have, once again, been marginalised; 
identified as objects of policy rather than agents of change. 
The deficiencies of the welfare approach were highlighted during the UN 
Decade for Women, when the WID approach became widely accepted in 
principle and, to a somewhat more limited extent, applied in practice. This 
approach has extended to environmental policy, and involves a conscious effort 
to include women in environmental programmes, with varying results. 
Patricia Thomas, in her consultancy report on the IUCN' s (International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources) Women and 
Natural Resources Management Programme, provided a broad assessment of the 
WID approach. She found that, whilst women had become more visible in 
programme planning, they were rarely targeted for mainstream activities with 
large budgets. Typically, 'women's components' were peripheral to the major 
projects, which allocated subordinate (and frequently unpaid) roles to women. As 
a consequence, women's already substantial workloads were further increased, 
with a concomitant reduction in their ability to participate in income-generating 
activities. In addition, there was a failure to recognise women's important tradi-
tional role as environmental managers in the subsistence sector, which again 
indicates the inadequacy of the gender analysis involved in the project designs. 
Thus, whilst women were included in environmental programmes, the opportunity 
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was lost to utilise their special knowledge and expertise and, as a result, to begin 
to address their status and independence needs (Thomas, September 1991-June 
1992). 
Once again, despite the explicit aim of the WID approach, women have largely 
remained objects rather than initiators of policy, an outcome likely to prove 
disadvantageous both to women and to the environment. A response from Third 
World women has, again, been articulated by the DAWN network: 
Our capacity to sustain our livelihoods and care for our families, our link with 
our communities and the earth is being destroyed. Our knowledge of the earth 
and its care is being undermined and we are now told that we have to be taught 
about the environment. 
(Wiltshire 1992: 4) 
The gender blindness of these approaches is not shared by perspectives which 
emphasise women's potential as saviours of the environment. Here, in contrast, 
analysis of gender provides the basis both of theorisation and of action. Far from 
marginalising women as passive objects of environmental policy, ecofeminist 
approaches accord to women and to feminine principles a central role in safe-
guarding the environment. Essentially, this involves action to promote funda-
mental changes in the way stereotypical gender characteristics are perceived and 
evaluated; with the aim of promoting life-enhancing, feminine values of nurtur-
ance and community, and a feminine, holistic world-view. Ecofeminism, in 
linking feminist and ecological thought, identifies women as agents of change but 
prioritises the natural world in terms of policy and action. Thus, whilst the 
interests of women and of the environment are regarded as complementary, 
ecological concerns may vie for attention with, and indeed take precedence over, 
the interests of women. In consequence, despite its apparently positive ecological 
implications, this approach has provoked rather unhelpful divisions between 
ecofeminists, on the one hand, and on the other, feminists, whose concern for the 
environment comes secondary to their commitment to furthering the interests of 
women. These divisions focus around two broad areas: eco- feminists' alleged 
failure adequately to prioritise the interests of women, and the potential conse-
quences for women of assuming a central role as saviours of the environment. 
The first division between feminists, then, arises as a consequence of equating 
women and the natural world. Thus, for example, ecofeminists apply to dis-
cussion of environmental pollution/degradation the language and imagery of 
male violence against women. The frequent references to the 'rape' of nature are, 
however, seen by many feminists as deeply insulting to women victims of male 
sexual violence. As Patricia Hynes has argued, 'ecofeminism is braver, more 
explicit, angrier, and more effective about the threat of nuclear winter than the 
fact of an epidemic in male violence against women' (Hynes 1990: 170). 
The rejection of 'speciesism' by ecofeminists has also angered Third World 
women, who have seen their children's hunger less highly prioritised than the 
needs of unnamed endangered species (Wiltshire 1992). A particularly divisive 
issue has been the relationship between population and the environment, which 
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was the subject of controversy at Planeta Femea during the 1992 Earth Summit. 
Here, ecofeminists' concern for the survival of non-human species has led them 
to be identified with the population lobby, and hence distanced from feminists 
who support the principle of women's right to reproductive self-determination. 
The second broad issue dividing feminists again concerns the implications for 
women of ecofeminist perspectives. Whilst stressing the need to reassert and 
revalorise feminine principles, ecofeminists tend to emphasise the differences 
between female and male gender characteristics and roles. The consequences of 
this are twofold, and are epitomised by the slogan 'Women Nurture the World': 
traditional gender stereotypes are reinforced, whilst women appear to stand alone 
in the fight to save the planet. Having suffered jointly with the natural world at 
the hands of men, women are deemed to have privileged insights into ecological 
imperatives, and are accorded a special, potentially onerous, responsibility for 
pursuing them. 
This interpretation of women's environmental role appears to have much 
support - for example, in the words of Mostafa Tolba at the start of this dis-
cussion. Women, too, have accepted with apparent enthusiasm the responsibility 
for saving the planet: 
We have the capacity to give life and light. We can take our brooms and sweep 
the earth .... We can seal up the hole in the ozone layer. The environment is 
life and women must struggle for life with our feet on the ground and our eyes 
toward the heavens. We must do the impossible. 
(Merchant 1992: 205) 
This statement by Chilean activist Isabelle Letelier reflects the ecofeminist view 
of women as life force. It does not address the problem of how women, who are 
everywhere amongst the poorest and least powerful members of society, are to 
combat the structures of political and economic power and the associated ide-
ologies which continue to legitimise their oppression and exploitation - as well 
as the degradation and pollution of the environment. In the absence of a solution 
to this problem, women's struggles to safeguard the planet will remain confined 
to clearing up men's messes. 
CONCLUSION 
That there are significant links between women and the environment is evident 
from all three approaches discussed above. Women's traditional domestic roles 
encompass both consumption and reproduction, behaviours which can be shown 
to have negative environmental impacts. At the same time, women in all parts of 
the world suffer disproportionately from environmental degradation. Finally, 
women and the natural world do suffer under a common mode of domination and 
exploitation developed from and legitimated by masculine systems of thought. 
The implications of these links are also significant, both for women and for 
environmental policy. Women will be considerably disadvantaged if they assume 
environmental responsibilities in circumstances of disempowerment. At the same 
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time, environmental policy cannot succeed unless the interconnections between 
women and the environment are understood and acknowledged, and the active 
support of women secured. Attempts to change women's consumption habits, to 
alter their reproductive behaviour or to preserve and utilise their traditional 
knowledge and skills in environmental management will fail if these behaviours 
are addressed in isolation from the social context in which they occur. 
It is evident, then, that social gender analysis must precede the formulation of 
environmental policy. This would involve a consideration of the different but 
interdependent and overlapping roles and responsibilities of women and men; of 
their different life experiences, knowledge and skills; and of the power and status 
differences which separate them. An understanding of these factors facilitates the 
identification of supports for, and impediments to, policy implementation - in 
particular the processes by which women's contributions and expertise have been 
marginalised or obscured. These processes operate at all levels and are not 
confined to state or corporate decision-making. Indeed they have been 
encountered by women with a WID brief working with development NGOs 
(Ashworth 1988), and amongst the larger, well-funded environment groups, or 
'eco-establishment', which increasingly set the environmental agenda (Seager 
1993). 
Women's NGOs and women activists within international agencies have 
recognised both the need for gender analysis in environmental policy formulation 
and the links between gender and the political marginalisation of women. Indeed, 
the inclusion of these issues in Agenda 21 of the Rio Earth Summit is the outcome 
of extensive and sustained networking and lobbying by women. The women's 
NGO networks now face the major challenge of monitoring compliance by UN 
agencies with the provisions of Agenda 21, in an attempt to ensure that the 
rhetorical statements of Chapter 24 are translated into policy. Similarly, the plan 
of action emanating from the 1994 Conference on Population and Development 
provides only the starting point of a broadly based strategy for the inclusion and 
empowerment of women, in the interests of women and the environment (see 
Note 3). 
At the UN level, the appointment in 1992 of Elizabeth Dowdeswell to succeed 
Mostafa Tolba as Executive Director of UNEP represents a welcome departure 
from the male domination of senior UN positions, but it is unlikely to present a 
major challenge to the patriarchal culture of the organisation. Meanwhile, UNEP 
and Unifem are jointly convening an 'International Consultation to Promote 
Cooperation, Coordination and Strategic Planning' to support the implement-
ation of Chapter 24, and, together with the NGOs, are utilising the preparatory 
stages of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women to maintain the impetus 
of activism on gender-environment links (Martin-Brown, undated). 
Clearly, then, women's activism on environmental issues will continue, as will 
women's disproportionate suffering as victims of environmental change. Because 
of their distinct life experiences, women do bring a different perspective to the 
environmental debate, and the interests of the environment and of women will be 
served if their voices are heard. A stress upon women's special insights into 
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environmental problems should not, however, lead to any assumption of a par-
ticular responsibility for addressing them. This is both unfair and unrealistic in a 
situation where women are everywhere underrepresented in decision-making 
processes. Ecofeminists are not alone in rejecting the instrumental rationality of 
'economic man', nor in embracing a holistic world-view; it is not in the interest 
of women to assume singular or disproportionate responsibility for safeguarding 
the planet. But it is in the interest of us all to challenge those gendered assump-
tions which underlie social attitudes and behaviour, which legitimise structures 
of economic and political power, and which persuade us that the natural world is 
a resource to be exploited rather than a living system of which we are a part. 
NOTES 
1 Since 1985, gencier issues have received at least formal recognition on the agenda of 
global environmental politics, and have been widely reflected in international fora. 
Examples include: 
• The appointment by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) of a 
Senior Women's Advisory Group on Sustainable Development in 1985. 
• The promotion by Unifem (United Nations Development Fund for Women) of the 
Women, Environment and Development Programme, which includes a series of 
women's 'Summits'. 
• An emphasis on women-environment links by a wide range of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs); for example: the International Planned Parenthood Feder-
ation (IPPF); the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN); the Asian and Pacific Development Centre. 
• The establishment of a range of 'dedicated' NGOs - for example, the Women and 
Environment Education and Development (WEED) Foundation and lhe Women's 
F.nvironmental Network (WEN)). Also, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Conference on Women and the Environment, Paris, 1989. 
• The Global Assembly of Women and the Environment, held in November 1991 
and coordinated by UNEP's Senior Women's Advisory Committee. The shared 
information concerning women's roles in environmental management and sustain-
able development formed part of women's input to the 1992 Earth Summit 
• The formation of the Women's International Policy Action Committee (IPAC) to 
coordinate women's participation both in the UNCED preparatory process and at 
the Earth Summit itself, and whose actions included the organisation of Planeta 
Femea, the women's forum attended daily by more than 1,200 women throughout 
the period of the Summit. 
• The comprehensive inclusion of women/environment/sustainable-development 
links on the agenda of the UN International Conference on Population and 
Development in September 1994. See also Note 3 below. 
2 The development of amniocentesis, a procedure intended to assist in the early detec-
tion of certain foetal abnormalities, has also provided lhe ability to ascertain the sex 
of the foetus. Jn countries where male children are particularly highly valued, such as 
India and China, the availability of amniocentesis has led to lhe large-scale abortions 
of female foetuses solely on lhe grounds of their sex. This foeticide, in consequence, 
might also be referred to asfemicide. 
3 This determined 'religious filibuster' succeeded in removing a number of important 
provisions from the Programme, including those on 'sexual rights', on an 'alternative 
to early marriage' and on equal inheritance rights for women. Nevertheless, lhe 
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replacement of 'family planning' by the concept of 'reproductive health' (defined as 
'complete physical, mental and social well-being ... in all matters relating to the 
reproductive system and to its functions and processes') was maintained. Included, 
also, were a number of general statements linking improvements in women's political, 
social and economic status with strategies for sustainable development (Hooper 
1994). For a discussion of the issues raised during the pre-conference process, see 
UNEP's (1994) Our Planet: passim. 
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7 Who cares about the environment? 
Peter Willetts 
A study of the politics of global environmental change invites us to revisit and 
rethink the three 'Great Debates' of international relations. In the 1940s, the 
debate between Idealism and Realism forced us to ask whether we should plan for 
a better world of international peace and cooperation or reluctantly accept that 
conflict was inevitable. In the 1960s the choice was between attempting to study 
the social sciences by using the epistemology and methodology of the natural 
sciences or remaining rooted in the disciplines of history, law and philosophy. In 
the 1970s and 1980s we faced a wide-ranging debate between Realism and 
globalism ( or pluralism) about the nature of the international system. In global 
environmental politics, we immediately confront the following questions that 
comprise the three main debates: what is our idea of a better world, and can we 
hope to achieve progress through international cooperation? What is the politics 
of science, and what is the science of politics? And do states and inter-state 
relations determine outcomes, or do companies and pressure groups have an 
independent influence? In each of these debates, the current concern for distinct 
environmental values contributes to the argument that the analysis of differing 
contentions over values should be central to our study of global politics. 
IDEALISM, INTERESTS AND V ALOES 
Many people care passionately about the environment, and few people would 
deny that they have some concern. A multitude of pressure groups, or Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as they are referred to in UN diplomacy, 
have sprouted throughout the world both to articulate ordinary people's desires 
and to challenge current policies and practices. The failures of the natural 
scientists, the technologists and the economists have to be overcome by a new 
discourse that gives priority to environmental values. Surely it is self-evident that 
a new spirit of idealism is putting values on the agenda again? This argument is 
false. Values have never been absent from politics; indeed, the most useful and 
all-encompassing approach is to define politics, as Easton does, in terms of the 
authoritative allocation of values (Easton 1965: 50). 
For the classic realist, Morgenthau, value questions were superficial in relation 
to the analysis of politics. States pursue their interests, and these are defined in 
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terms of power (Morgenthau 1960: especially 4-11 and 233-71 ). A few academic 
writers continued during the Cold War to maintain the idealist position of earlier 
years (Clark and Sohn 1966; Falk 1971 ). Their approach is now being echoed in 
the current calls to democratise the United Nations, by forming a directly elected 
assembly, to make the UN more responsive to ordinary people's environmental 
concerns (Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz 1991; Heinrich 1992; Childers 1994). In a 
less radical form, the environmental idealists want UN diplomacy to be more 
open to NGO participation (UN, Agenda 21, paras 23.1, 23.2 and 38.43). 
A recent textbook on environmental politics could almost be quoting 
Morgenthau in saying that one of its themes was 'the nature and significance for 
international environmental protection of the conflicts between states over power, 
over the distribution of the costs of environmental management, and over 
questions bearing upon state sovereignty and freedom of action' (Hurrell and 
Kingsbury 1992: 11). The main change that contemporary state-centric power 
theorists have made to traditional realism is to broaden the concept of 'national 
interest', from a central focus on military security, to cover economic interests as 
well. However, the same assumptions are made that rational state actors are 
pursuing objective interests, and the same problem of promoting inter-state 
cooperation in an anarchic world is addressed (ibid.: 5). 
Both sides to this debate misunderstand the nature of their own arguments: 
there is no dichotomy between 'interests' and 'values'. Although there is no 
well-developed theory of values, 'some of those which have been identified and 
sought through time and across space are wealth, physical security, order, freedom/ 
autonomy, peace, status, health, equality, justice, knowledge, beauty, honesty and 
love' (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 58). Assertions that an objective 'national 
interest' in the pursuit of power cannot be affected by subjective values are in 
reality assertions that the value of security should be given higher priority than 
other values such as equality and beauty. If interests are defined in economic 
terms, then the pursuit of these interests is the result of deciding to give priority 
to the material value of wealth. Alternatively, the defence of sovereignty involves 
making autonomy and status the highest values. Interests are not objective. They 
are simply a particular subset of values that are often maximised by the control of 
concrete stakes such as territory and physical resources. 
It is true that the pursuit of security and wealth regularly conflicts with the 
realisation of environmental values. (The discussion of what is meant by 'en-
vironmental values' is left until the next section.) It would be naive idealism to 
say that environmental values should always override interests, because that 
would imply that security, wealth, autonomy and status should never have any 
consideration. Equally, most political actors would say that it is only in the most 
severe life-threatening situations, such as war or famine, that environmental 
values can be ignored. Given the complexity of human nature and of human value 
systems, the pursuit of interests has to be analysed in the context of other values 
that are relevant to the political actors in a particular situation. There can be no 
rational pursuit of an objective national interest. The selection of what values are 
to be pursued is a matter of subjective choice, not of rational choice, and different 
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sectors of society usually differ on which values should be given priority. It 
would be possible to define the 'national interest' as covering all values that a 
government endorses, including environmental values. However, the statement 
that governments pursue the national interest would then become a tautology. 
It is clear that many environmental questions, such as those about the ozone 
layer, climate change, resource depletion, marine pollution and species conser-
vation, are seen as global questions. In as much as common interests are asserted, 
it is not 'the national interest' but the importance of the 'global commons', or 'the 
common heritage of mankind', that is invoked. Such a value then generates 
the presumption that the proper locus of authority lies at the global level and not 
the country level. There is such a range of international regimes covering global 
environmental questions that it would be nonsense to start research with an 
unchallengeable axiom that all authority lies with governments pursuing security 
and wealth. Such an assumption would prevent an investigation of the nature of 
these regimes. It would rule out the possibility that new phenomena are arising in 
global politics. Two of the most important questions raised by environmental 
politics are: when do environmental values assume higher priority than security 
or wealth? And under what conditions is authority transferred to the global level? 
VALUES, SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
The behavioural revolution encompassed several distinct challenges to traditional 
epistemology. The most important was a move away from detailed, supposedly 
atheoretical, historical studies. Instead, there was an explicit attempt to formulate 
general theory. Overall, this goal is not controversial in the discipline. Authors as 
diverse as Hedley Bull and John Burton have been identified as being highly 
hostile to behaviouralism (Bull 1966; Burton et al. 1974), but nevertheless they 
themselves have produced general theory (Bull 1977; Burton 1965, etc.). The 
second challenge offered by behaviouralism was for theory to become more 
formal, with concepts being defined precisely and the relationships between them 
being specified in a manner that could be subject to verification or falsification. 
On the model of the natural sciences, this was seen as requiring sophisticated 
quantitative measures and complex statistical techniques, though in fact neither 
is essential for hypothesis-testing. 
The strongest reaction against behaviouralism was, and still is, against its 
positivist epistemology. If we can only study objective reality, how can we study 
political processes that are perceived in a subjective manner by different people 
who make different evaluations of these processes? If the core of politics is 
contention over values, how can we be objective about the study of them? Those 
who ask such questions tend to conclude that there can be no value-free study of 
politics in the same way as there is a value-free study of physics. As Humphreys 
has pointed out in this volume, the anti-positivist position takes an even more 
radical form in contemporary ecologism. It is argued that environmental values 
cannot be measured and cannot be compared with economic values. Scientific 
claims to universal knowledge are a form of ideological imperialism, while 
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knowledge and understanding are only derived from the local community's 
experience of its own environment. This epistemology seems to base knowledge 
on a mystical communion with nature. (For the broader debate about ecology and 
epistemology, see both Atkinson 1991 and Sachs 1992.) 
In the chapter on climate change in this volume, Paterson follows Cox and 
engages in a rather different attack. He argues that positivism is associated with 
the analysis of stability and hence privileges the values that uphold the status quo. 
Both links in this argument are merely asserted by Paterson, but neither point is 
self-evident. There is no reason to deny the possibility of a positivist analysis of 
dynamic change, nor does the attempt to understand stability preclude the desire 
to promote destabilising political change. 
The various anti-positivist positions are based on a misinterpretation of the 
fact-value distinction. Clearly it is correct that political scientists must study 
values. However, the empirical data on the values of political actors is not 
subjective: it is part of the objective reality of politics. (This is adopting the 
ontological realist position, but this phrase will not be used, to avoid confusion 
with analytical realism in the study of international relations.) The values of the 
analyst and the values of those who sustain the analyst will enter our study of 
environmental politics, as with any study of politics, when the decision is made 
to allocate time, money and effort to that study. The values of the analyst and of 
other political actors will also determine the use of the results. Research that 
concludes with a challenge to the conventional wisdom on how we perceive the 
world can have a significant political impact. How large are the reserves of a 
non-renewable resource? Is a renewable alternative available? Is a species 
endangered? Does the electorate endorse an environmental policy? Do the tax-
payers accept the costs of a policy? These questions in principle have objective 
answers, but the answers can have consequences that lead to a re-evaluation of 
social and political relationships. 
The arguments are easy to appreciate in the natural sciences. The nuclear 
physicists who developed the first atomic bomb were part of a massive political 
enterprise: the defeat of German and Japanese fascism. The political conse-
quences were profound, and the existence of nuclear weapons was one of the 
defining features of the Cold War. Many people have taken the position that the 
design, the production and the maintenance of such horrific weapons were totally 
unjustifiable. Einstein himself regretted that his pioneering work had made the 
existence of these weapons possible. Nevertheless, whatever position one takes 
on the politics, and the morality, of the origins and consequences of these 
weapons, it is sensible to take it as an unquestionable objective reality that the 
weapons do cause a massive explosion. 
Neither the motives for undertaking research on global environmental politics 
nor the consequences of that research can be separated from the political process 
itself. Nevertheless, the identification both of what values people use to take 
positions on environmental questions and of how they mobilise support for those 
values can be studied by a value-free methodology. The resulting knowledge can 
be expressed in a manner that has the same meaning for anybody who reads it, 
124 Peter Willetts 
whatever their own values. The question is not whether scientists can avoid the 
study of values, nor whether they can become value-free individuals, nor whether 
the research has a political impact. Instead, we must ask whether it is a feasible 
goal for a social science to achieve a value-free study of values, as a collective 
enterprise. The positivist claim is solely that the validity of knowledge is assessed 
in terms of the researcher's methods, not the researcher's values. 
By the mid-1970s the debate on behaviouralism had come to an end in a 
stalemate, with only a minority maintaining the positivist position (see par-
ticularly Nicholson 1983 and 1989). The publication of the second edition of 
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was taken as a refutation of 
Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery. In fact, the two approaches were not 
contradictory, and were reconciled by Lakatos. He argued that theories can 
accommodate a limited range of empirical anomalies. The choice of which of two 
or more competing research programmes survives is determined by 'sophi-
sticated methodological falsification'. The crucial question is whether the 
accommodation of anomalies expands the explanatory power of the theory or 
causes it to degenerate to a lower level of utility (Lakatos 1970). 
A decade later, the debate resumed under different labels: postmodernism and 
critical theory. (For a discussion of the literature, see Brown 1994, and for a 
selection of readings, see Hoffman and Rengger 1995.) Brown distinguishes the 
two approaches by arguing that postmodernists have abandoned the 'Enlighten-
ment Project' with its search for explanation and theory through rationality and 
science, while critical theorists only wish to integrate normative and explanatory 
theory. Hoffman and Rengger make the same distinction, but as two approaches 
within critical theory. Their wording will be used below. Unlike the debate in the 
1960s, little attention is given to quantification and methodology. However, 
positivism is again an explicit target, but with more emphasis now on denying its 
ontology than on denying its epistemology. 
The major insight of all critical theorists is that we cannot be assured of any 
direct knowledge of empirical reality. Such theorists restate the philosophers' old 
'argument from illusion': all we can perceive is the information from our senses. 
In its most radical form, this argument becomes a denial of any reality outside the 
observer: therefore all knowledge is subjective (Flood 1990). The statement that 
we only have sensory perceptions is an obvious truism. The deduction that we 
cannot know that there is any reality might be logically valid, but it is pushing 
logic to the point of absurdity. 
In the less radical versions of critical theory, the communication of knowledge 
from one observer to another is seen as being problematic, because this is done 
via language and language is socially constructed. This too is an obvious truism, 
but one of profound importance that an empiricist should never forget. For this 
reason, scientific theorists, aspiring to achieve intersubjective communicability, 
must be formal in their approach, with a rigid adherence to verbal and operational 
definitions of concepts. The social sciences have difficulty in separating their 
statements from many of the subjective cultural assumptions contained in the 
language in which social science is expressed. Nevertheless, the difficulties 
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involved in using language should not lead to the conclusion that value-free 
theory cannot be attempted. A deconstruction of orthodox theory by critical 
theorists can help us to expose an inadequate social science, but it does not 
substantiate their axiom that positivism is impossible. 
Indeed, the challenge posed by critical theorists gives us an empirical basis for 
recognising fundamental political change. Something significant is happening in 
a political system when the language of political debate changes. This can be seen 
in global environmental politics. The United Nations Charter was written in 1945, 
and it contains no mention of the environment nor any form of words covering 
the subject. When the first consideration of environmental issues arose in the 
postwar years, it was done as 'conservation of nature' under the heading of 
'science' in either the UN or UNESCO. In December 1972 the UN established 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and in February 1993 it 
established the Commission on Sustainable Development. No doubt, the vocab-
ulary of the news media and of academic journals would also show the same 
change from non-consideration to conservation, to environment, to sustainable 
development. These shifts in the language of environmental politics do embody 
a widespread cultural shift in the perception of the problems faced by humankind. 
Both the physical conditions that we perceive and the changing perceptions have 
been an empirical reality. 
REALISM, GLOBALISM AND VALUES 
The argument so far leads to the conclusion that we need an empirical theory of 
values. From that simple conclusion many difficult questions follow. What are 
the major values that humans pursue? How may they be classified? How do 
values become salient to different types of actors? How do value-preference 
schedules become or established? And what are the dynamics of changes in the 
values of individuals and groups? These questions cannot be answered within the 
confines of this short essay, but it is clear that we will not understand environ-
mental politics until we do address such questions. To do this effectively, it 
becomes necessary to take a position in the third 'Great Debate' in favour of a 
pluralist global political approach and against a realist approach (Willetts 1990). 
As a starting point, we can assume that concerns for beauty, human health, the 
conservation of biodiversity and the avoidance of suffering among animals are 
basic, abstract values that are frequently invoked and contested in environmental 
politics. They are not the only values in environmental politics, however, as the 
pursuit of wealth is also often involved. Nonetheless, there are several important 
features to these first four values. First, with the exception of health, they are 
relatively new to politics at the global (as opposed to the country) level. Second, 
they are particularly central to environmental issues: it is difficult to imagine any 
issue being considered environmental without one or more of these values being 
invoked; and those who give high priority to one of these values will tend to give 
high priority to the others, and also to be opposed to those political actors who 
give the highest priority to materialism. And third, realists do not address the 
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politics of these values. For them, the 'high politics' of security and diplomacy is 
assumed to dominate the 'low politics' of environmental issues. 
A deconstruction of realism shows that it is based on a view of human nature 
that takes aggression, conflict and 'masculine' values for granted (Elshtain 1985). 
It takes as axiomatic that 'states' are coherent actors, but that world politics is 
incoherent. Both these axioms help to maintain the status quo by maintaining the 
authority of governments. By the distinction between high politics and low 
politics, the concerns of governmental actors are given priority over the concerns 
of non-governmental actors. Clearly, a range of conservative values is embedded 
in realism. Rather than jumping to the conclusion that the only alternative is to 
adopt a theory that sustains liberal or socialist values, it is possible to reject 
realism on empirical grounds and to construct a better representation of reality. 
The concept of 'states' is useful for the purposes of international law, but 
political science cannot progress by a reification of this abstract concept. Two 
different meanings are given to 'the state' - namely, the country as a supposedly 
unified 'nation state', and the government in its broadest sense as a holistic entity 
- but neither concept is useful. The idea that political systems of individual 
countries are sufficiently coherent to be considered as unitary actors is em-
pirically false in anything but the most extreme circumstances. Countries must be 
disaggregated into governments and civil societies. The concrete empirical refer-
ents for the world of diplomacy are governments and not states. This shift in 
terminology provides for open systems rather than closed systems, and helps to 
analyse change rather than emphasising continuity. On the other hand, inter-
national organisations are empirical realities that act as a focus for decision-making 
and do give some coherence to global systems. There is an ontological incon-
sistency, therefore, in taking it as axiomatic that states are holistic entities while 
inter-state relations are anarchic. There is ontological consistency, on the other 
hand, in regarding governments, companies, NGOs, countries, international 
organisations and global politics as all being constituted as open systems that are 
interconnected and analysable at different levels of resolution. 
Instead of simplifying human nature, one can draw on the disciplines of 
psychology and sociology to demonstrate that human nature is complex. As has 
already been argued, humans seek much more than just security and wealth. The 
various arguments about values are so central to politics that the alternative 
paradigm that is now offered in certain areas of contemporary literature could 
reasonably be called a values paradigm. The realist paradigm is of states pursuing 
security and economic interests, and the heirs of Marxism entertain a structuralist 
paradigm of capitalist interests being pursued within a global system. Both of 
these can be subsumed and refined within a paradigm of diverse political actors 
pursuing any value that is salient to them. Other writers have focused on the 
different elements of such an approach under a variety of headings: a world 
politics paradigm (Keohane and Nye 1972), a pluralist perspective (Smith, Little 
and Shackleton 1981), an issue paradigm (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981), a global 
politics paradigm (Willetts 1982, 1990) and an interdependence and trans-
nationalism perspective (Little and Smith 1991). The Eastonian definition of 
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politics, as the authoritative allocation of values, was only intended to cover 
politics within countries. To adopt a value-based paradigm for international 
relations is thus to automatically deny the axiom that domestic politics and 
international relations are fundamentally different. Using the label Global 
Politics (in capitals as the proper name of what Lakatos would call a research 
programme) helps to remind us that this analytical barrier is being broken down. 
It also seems appropriate for analysing what is commonly called global environ-
mental politics. 
As with so many aspects of the Global Politics paradigm, Rosenau was the 
pioneer, years ahead of other academics, in considering values and issues. He 
suggested that political behaviour would vary from one 'issue area' to another. 
This term was purely an abstract, analytical concept used to divide issues into 
four categories, according to whether the actors used tangible or intangible means 
to mobilise support, and according to whether they sought to allocate tangible or 
intangible values (Rosenau 1966). Unfortunately, Rosenau's scheme does not 
work because actors do not restrict themselves to one or another method of 
mobilising support, nor do they concentrate their behaviour on a single type of 
value. 
Mansbach and Vasquez were the first authors to make the pursuit of values the 
basis of a Global Politics 'issue paradigm'. Actors were seen as trying to gain 
control over stakes in order to realise their values. Stakes may be concrete, as with 
territory or economic resources, or they may be abstract, as with diplomatic 
recognition or support for political statements. Day-to-day politics is concerned 
with the multitude of decisions taken on the allocation of specific stakes. In this 
paradigm, an 'issue' is a central simplifying concept: 'an issue consists of con-
tention among actors over proposals for the disposition of stakes among them' 
(Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 59). Other authors before and since, including 
Rosenau, have tended to take the concept of an issue for granted, but generally 
one may assume that they would accept the definition offered by Mansbach and 
Vasquez. It is now commonplace to use the term 'issue area' to cover a cluster of 
related issues. It should be emphasised that this is totally different from 
Rosenau' s categorisation of issues. The current usage is firmly rooted in political 
behaviour: 'When the governments active on a set of issues see them as closely 
interdependent and deal with them collectively, we call that set of issues an issue 
area' (Keohane and Nye 1977: 65). 
All these authors have made major contributions to an issue-based paradigm. 
It should be noted that they have in common the idea of aggregating the details of 
day-to-day politics. Stakes aggregate into issues, and issues aggregate into issue 
areas. And one might add that issue areas aggregate into the totality of global 
politics. However, the various authors have caused confusion by failing to 
analyse actors' perceptions of issues separately from the analysis of actors' 
interactions on issues. This distinction is recognised by Rosenau in his use of 
types of values and types of actions as the basis of his four categories. It is also 
recognised by Mansbach and Vasquez (1981: 60) when they argue that percep-
tions of stakes and competition between actors provide alternative bases for 
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constituting an issue. In the case of Keohane and Nye, they have simply interpreted 
different actors' perceptions of issues as being interdependent, such actors dealing 
with issues collectively. It is necessary to follow Rosenau in recognising percep-
tions and behaviour as two different dimensions that apply simultaneously, but 
independently, to issues. This distinction is so important that it would be useful 
to abandon the concept of an issue area in favour of two separate concepts, issue 
systems and policy systems. 
A pattern of contention over the degree of support that should be given to a 
particular value determines the existence of an issue system. Anything to do with 
the conservation of African elephants, whenever and wherever it occurs, con-
stitutes part of a single-issue system. Similarly, there is an Amazonian-parrots 
issue system and a polar-bears issue system. The habitat, the food and the 
wildlife, provide the concrete stakes for these conservation issue systems. The 
ability to conrol these stakes reflects one underlying abstract environmental 
value, the conservation of biodiversity. Through this value, the various more 
specific issues can be perceived as being linked together in a wider issue system, 
a biodiversity issue system. At this higher level of aggregation, the stakes may 
become more abstract - examples may include the endorsement of biodiversity 
or the ratification of CITES (the Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora). At each level, however, there is 
coherence in two ways: both the political actors and the outside analyst perceive 
that a common value is invoked. At the lower level, however, there is not 
necessarily any behavioural connection. In principle, one could imagine that none 
of the participants in the politics of African elephants, Amazonian parrots or polar 
bears are active in more than one of those issue systems. In practice, however, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), for example, has worked on all these 
issues. Not all actors in these specific issue systems will regard biodiversity as 
important. Traders in ivory or in tropical birds are giving priority to wealth 
creation for themselves, but even they can be presumed to recognise that bio-
diversity is at issue. 
In saying this, one must not allow the analysis to become subjective. The 
analyst's presumptions about what values are invoked by a set of political choices 
must not create any ex cathedra analytical system. It might be logical to assert 
that the elimination of the smallpox virus and the elimination of anopheles mos-
quitoes are biodiversity issues. In practice, however, they have to be classified 
instead as health issues. Indeed, they cannot be classified by a positivist as 
biodiversity issues unless political actors are observed to be invoking the value of 
biodiversity. Even if some 'deep Greens' do wish to conserve the smallpox virus 
in the name of maintaining biodiversity, their argument has not been taken up 
sufficiently for the World Health Organisation to feel the need to address it. An 
issue system based on contention over a value has to be grounded in empirical 
reality. · 
In behavioural terms, an issue system is an analytical abstraction that does not 
encompass all the complexities of real world events. The aggregation of be-
haviour on the basis of the perceptions that a common value is invoked yields an 
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issue system. In a particular time and place, politics is often about 'What is to be 
done?', i.e. the formulation of policy. The definition by Mansbach and Vasquez 
of an issue, quoted above, is best seen as the definition of a policy system rather 
than that of an issue system. The disposition of stakes constitutes policy-making. 
The aggregation of interactions designed to determine decision-making and the 
actual decision-making process itself constitute a policy system. It will be argued 
below that four different processes can link different issues and affect how 
decisions are taken. As a result, policy systems normally lie at the intersection of 
several issue systems. 
The crucial interactions may often be specified as taking place in the meetings 
of an organisation on a certain day in a certain room. In a domestic system, this 
may be, for example, a bureaucratic committee, a political party, the cabinet or 
the legislature. In a global system, it may involve a meeting of international civil 
servants, diplomatic working groups, caucuses, UN meetings or specialised 
international regimes. However, we ought here to follow the literature on 
domestic politics in particular, with its concept of 'policy networks' (Marsh and 
Rhodes 1992). It would be too narrow to restrict our definition of a policy system 
to that of a system in which the final decisions are taken. A policy system consists 
of all those actors' interactions, occurring in a formal or an informal manner, that 
are designed to affect the final policy. 
The complexity of politics is due to the fact that different actors support 
different values and give them different priorities. When policy is to be made, 
these differences will become evident. The possibility exists that a particular 
policy will only invoke one value, but this is unlikely to occur. Issue systems and 
policy systems are not necessarily co-terminal. At the extreme, a single simple 
yes-or-no policy decision may invoke a large number of values. Whether or not 
to build the Channel Tunnel between Britain and France was an environmental 
issue, concerning how to dispose of the spoilage from digging the tunnel and 
where to route the rail-link; it was a health issue, with respect to the fear of 
wildlife spreading rabies; it was an identity issue, in providing a symbolic link 
between Britain and Europe; and it was an economic issue for both the con-
struction industry and traders. Thus, the one policy involved at least four different 
issues. 
Having separated perceptions from behaviour, we must now ask what links 
together the millions of discrete events each year around the globe, and what links 
perceptions to behaviour. There are four different linkage processes. 
1 Value linkages have already been mentioned. These occur when we perceive 
different events to be part of the same issue, because the same value is 
invoked. 
2 Functional linkages arise when one action inevitably has a variety of 
consequences that cannot be separated. In some cases the link may even be a 
physical one, totally devoid of any political cause; the example has been given 
of the Channel Tunnel: the act of digging a large hole linked environmental, 
health and economic issues. 
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3 Actor linkages will occur when one and the same set of actors is involved in 
different issues and positions are taken in response to the status of the actors. 
We might expect virtually all policy in the Antarctic Treaty system to concern 
environmental and economic values. However, the participation of the South 
African government as a consultative party ineluctably placed the issues 
invoked by apartheid within the Antarctic policy system. 
4 Finally, the process of political interaction will lead to bargaining linkages by 
which various actors agree to form coalitions to support each other's goals. 
One major example, in which environmental issues have been linked to other 
very diverse issues, is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. None of the 
gains negotiated can be realised unless the whole package is implemented, so 
none of the linkages can be broken by individual actors. (For a more detailed 
discussion of issue linkages, see Willetts 1994.) 
All four types of linkage may serve to create a policy system. Value linkages, 
by definition, only operate within a single-issue system, whereas the other three 
processes are more likely to create linkages between a number of different issues. 
These three latter processes are still, nonetheless, subjective. Responses to other 
actors and to bargaining processes are obviously themselves determined on the 
basis of value preferences, though the different participants in a policy system are 
probably not all responding to the same values. Both by definition and in terms 
of the actual effects of a policy, functional linkages are clearly objective in nature. 
However, these kinds of linkage will not affect politics, nor will they link 
different issues together in a policy system, until their objective features are 
subjectively perceived. For example, nobody in the 1960s was linking the health 
issue of skin cancer to the economic issue of producing refrigerants. Until the 
objective process of the erosion of the ozone layer was perceived to exist and the 
subjective evaluation was made that action should be taken to reduce CFCs in 
order to reduce deaths, there could be no political linkage. 
The traditional Realist approach can easily accommodate the idea that politics 
consists of various issues that are related to each other through actor linkages and 
bargaining linkages. This appears to be a restatement of their concern with 
military and economic power. Functional linkages would here just be seen as 
physical constraints on the exercise of power. The major departure from Realism 
made by a value-based paradigm is the idea that an independent subjective 
process exists in which actors choose values to support, pursue stakes to realise 
those values and mobilise other actors to support those values. The Global 
Politics approach is to assume that the pursuit of values is the reason for attaining 
power, rather than that the pursuit of power is the reason for adopting value 
positions. The idea that value preferences determine action is not compatible with 
the idea of politics being reducible to no more than the pursuit of power. To 
separate value linkages from actor linkages and bargaining linkages is to claim 
that one central process, the process of perceiving the world, is not determined by 
power. A Realist cannot accept 'the power of ideas', nor can he or she accept that 
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an actor without military or economic capabilities can have communication 
resources and communication skills and hence can influence outcomes. 
Through asking what values create issues and what issues are salient in policy 
systems, we can approach a general theory of global politics that can easily 
handle environmental values and conform to the positions taken above in the 
three 'Great Debates'. Policy systems can be seen as the focus for resolving 
conflicts between environmental values and security or economic values. Neither 
the Idealist presumption that international cooperation can and should occur nor 
the Realist presumption that security and economic conflicts will limit such 
cooperation has to be adopted. The outcome will depend on the priority accorded 
by political actors to the values that can best be maximised through cooperation. 
It is not necessary to reject a positivist approach to the study of actors mobilising 
support for their values. It is possible to assert that the processes by which we 
perceive reality are central to the way in which policy problems are socially 
constructed, and to the way in which these problems embody different issues, but 
this does not require an acceptance of the ontology of critical theorists. Finally, 
by putting both values themselves and our changing perceptions of the linkages 
between those values at the centre of politics, we are denying the realist's static 
approach. The rise of environmental politics was possible because there is no 
static objective national interest, and because there is no constant ranking of 
values into issues that involve either 'high politics' or 'low politics'. 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES AND ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs 
At the country level of analysis, governments are of great importance because 
they are the focus for nearly all collective decision-making. Environmental 
outcomes may be significantly determined by market processes, involving the 
aggregation of many separate decisions, but governments are expected to set the 
framework within which these markets themselves operate. Most values are 
salient to governmental actors, in one way or another. Furthermore, other 
political actors may demand that governments take a fnm position on a certain 
issue. It is only when an issue is of low salience to most members of society, or 
at least of low salience to the constituencies on which the government relies for 
support, that that government can avoid adopting a position in relation to the 
values invoked by an issue. Conventional political science tends to emphasise 
that governments have legislative authority and can exercise coercion, and tends 
to forget that both authority and coercion have first to be legitimised, at least 
within the government itself. An alternative emphasis is on governments as the 
institutions created for the purpose of the collective allocation of values. It is this 
feature of governments, that they may be involved in all issues, rather than just 
that of 'power', which distinguishes them from other actors. 
At the other extreme, specialist non-governmental organisations (NGOs) may be 
devoted primarily to the pursuit of a single value. The WWF promotes the conser-
vation of biodiversity; Amnesty International promotes freedom of expression; 
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companies strive to promote wealth creation; the International Federation for 
Animal Welfare seeks to alleviate animal suffering; and Health Action International 
promotes human health. It is not, however, a defining feature of NGOs that they 
promote a single value. The Red Cross, motivated by the desire to minimise the 
human suffering caused by war, has the two values of health and peace central to all 
its work; and when the health of refugees is threatened by famine, this organisation 
then has to make a major effort to pursue a third value, wealth, to mobilise economic 
resources in order to provide food and medicines. (This is a functional linkage.) As 
NGOs gain experience, various linkages become more apparent to them and they 
then expand their values or activities, or both, accordingly. With its campaigns 
against torture and the death penalty, Amnesty moved to include freedom from 
suffering, alongside freedom of expression, as a value to pursue. And the Red Cross 
similarly moved from a concern for the health of the victims of war to include support 
for the victims of natural disasters. 
Some NGOs are engaged in tasks which have such complex ramifications that 
a wide range of values are promoted as a result. The International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF), in promoting family planning, is also promoting 
the health of women, the health of children, equality for women, wealth accumu-
lation for the Federation's own activities, wealth accumulation to improve 
general living standards, knowledge to improve standards of education, freedom 
of expression, knowledge of sexuality and freedom of choice with respect to 
child-bearing. Not only are these values diverse, but most of them generate issues 
in more than one policy system. Through multiple linkages, the IPPF is effec-
tively concerned with women's rights, development and many environ- mental 
issues, and it collaborates on a regular basis with the World Conservation Union 
and the WWF. Its concerns are not much less extensive than those of developing-
country governments. 
Despite the range of issues involved, an NGO such as the IPPF remains 
different from a government because it can choose how wide or narrow the range 
of its activities should be. It does not have to make an authoritative allocation of 
resources or non-material values within the wider political system, and it does not 
have to make any of its opponents implement its decisions. An NGO, as a body 
with voluntary membership, remains highly cohesive, compared to society as a 
whole. Its main asset is the commitment of its members to its values. When 
members do dispute the NGO's values, they may seek to change the NGO or they 
may cease to be members, but even a severe crisis may be resolved by the NGO 
splitting into factions that form new NGOs, a process that is not uncommon. 
The normal response to a situation where governments act as the focus for 
decision-making is to concentrate on governmental behaviour as the core of 
international politics. Most studies of environmental politics that are empirically 
based have to acknowledge the growth in the numbers of NGOs, the strong 
popular base of the largest ones and the range of their different types of inter-
actions with governments. However, as a recent book has pointed out, 'there has 
been little conceptualisation of the NGO phenomenon as a political development 
in its own right' (Princen and Finger 1994: x). Generally, the implicit response 
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has been that NGOs are only important in as much as they influence governments. 
One could respond that governments are only important in as much as they 
influence NGOs. (Effective governance must mean having an impact on society 
and hence an impact upon NGOs.) The Global Politics paradigm, with its em-
phasis on values and issues, gives a sound theoretical basis for the instinctive 
feeling, on the part of environmental researchers, that NGOs really are important 
in a more fundamental way. 
When NGOs select the values they will advocate, they are doing something 
that governments cannot do. They are setting a clear schedule of value prefer-
ences, so that, in principle, they always know what are their priorities. (This is an 
analytical description. Some NGOs do not explicitly agonise over their values, 
and are 'action' orientated. Nevertheless, the choice of what activities to 
undertake is, indirectly, determined by the set of values chosen.) As a direct 
consequence, NGOs commit themselves generally and on a long-term basis to 
those particular issue systems in which they will be active. At the same time, 
however, they remain free to decide, as a matter of short-term tactics, what policy 
systems they will target. NGOs can select the ground on which their opponents 
are weakest and seek to achieve change there. Governments do not have this 
freedom. Most governments, most of the time, have to respond to the full range 
of issues and policy problems on the global agenda. 
The effects of these differences are self-reinforcing. NGOs have clear 
priorities, can limit their activities and therefore can set their own agendas and 
continually keep their priorities in focus. Governments may have clear priorities 
when they assume office, but usually they have to respond to a domestic and 
global agenda over which they have little control. They thus suffer from agenda 
overload and lose direction, unless they have a remarkably clear ideology and 
strong leadership. (For a while, in the late 1980s, Mrs Thatcher had the ability to 
set her own agenda, but that was exceptional.) In particular, NGOs are free 
to consider new problems, develop new perspectives and promote new policies to 
attain their values. On the other hand, governments have to focus on current 
problems, work within current perspectives to maintain the support of their 
constituencies and work within current bureaucratic structures that are generally 
only modifying the status quo (Rose 1994). 
As a result, NGOs are more likely to be the source of new ideas, and where 
they have their own operational programmes, they can be the test-bed for new 
policies. At a more fundamental level, if values start to change in society, it will 
be NGOs that have the greatest freedom to adopt the new value-preference 
schedules. If existing NGOs do not change, then new ones can form to articulate 
the new priorities. A value-based theory gives a basis for asserting that NGOs are 
important, and are not just an interesting quirk of some case studies in environ-
mental politics. NGOs are important because they set the agenda for change: they 
provide the dynamics of global politics. 
From this Global Politics paradigm one can re-evaluate the major changes of 
recent decades. The process of decolonisation, the increased attention given to 
human rights, the changing status of women, the redefinition of development -
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from GNP growth to human development - and the collapse of apartheid are all 
policy processes that, like the rise in environmental concerns, have made the 
contemporary world unrecognisable from the world of 1945. (Two of these 
processes, the rise of human rights and the rise of environmental concerns, were 
central to the delegitimisation of communism and the end of the Cold War.) In 
each of these policy systems, governments have taken part in a diplomatic debate 
and produced decisions at the United Nations reflecting a massive shift in 
generally endorsed values. But, prior to the diplomatic debate, the shift in values 
was in each case initiated by NGOs. Because value changes are so slow, the world 
may seem relatively static on a month-by-month basis. When we consider change 
over the decades, however, it is clear that global politics has been highly dynamic, 
and that NGOs have been at the centre of this dynamic process. 
Thus, the traditional emphasis on an 'inter-state system' in which sovereignty 
has not given way to supranational authority is misplaced. Governments are still 
the focus of policy-making, but the systems of interaction have fundamentally 
changed, not only in terms of the values that are dominant but also structurally. 
Governments have new bureaucracies and new responsibilities; they interact in a 
more dense system of communications; and they are members of new global 
organisations, some of which act as regimes. The empirical content of the concept 
of a 'state' in the mid-1990s has little similarity to a 'state' of fifty years ago. 
Structural changes and the ability of NGOs to change governmental agendas 
mean that the concept of sovereignty is a distortion of the current empirical 
content of statehood. We are not living in coherent, relatively autonomous, 
hierarchical systems. Governments are nodes of communication and decision-
making, interacting with domestic NGOs, international NGOs, local and 
transnational companies, other governments and intergovernmental organisations. 
It is important that global communications are not only dense but also very cheap. 
This factor gives any two people who have some minimum resources, wherever they 
may be on the globe, the ability to speak to each other, to exchange documents and 
funds rapidly, to travel to meet face to face and, hence, to work together in 
transnational structures. Environmental NGOs have been at the forefront of the 
communications revolution, networking both through simple organisations, 
producing newsletters, and through the use of the Internet. Overall, the number of 
NGOs has expanded rapidly (Willetts 1993, 1995; Princen and Finger 1994). 
State-centric researchers are able to recognise that 'The activities of environ-
mental NGOs have assumed an important place in issue identification, 
agenda-setting, policy formation, normative development, institution building, 
monitoring and implementation' (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992: 10). What they do 
not seem to recognise is that such processes are not meaningful either within the 
realist paradigm or within any modifications of realism. The acceptance of the 
global nature of environmental problems in a 'seamless web of ecological inter-
dependence' (ibid.: 4); the addition of NGOs as significant actors; the focus on 
decision-making in regimes; and the consideration of the interplay between 
economic, security and status values on the one hand and environmental values 
on the other hand - these analytical shifts together constitute a paradigm shift. 
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Global environmental politics, in relation to any specific problem, is readily 
described and understood in terms of a variety of governmental actors, com-
panies, non-governmental actors and international organisations, all interacting 
to mobilise support for a diverse range of values. The international policy systems 
are complex because they have to handle a variety of issues. Descriptions of the 
politics of ozone depletion, tropical-forest utilisation, atmospheric pollution and 
various threats to biodiversity can be generalised into a common theoretical 
paradigm. Global policy-making in the fields of human rights or development 
politics would demonstrate the same empirical patterns. Many problems such as 
East-West disarmament negotiations or Palestinian-Israeli relations are not normally 
described in these terms, but a generalisation from global environmental politics 
would also suggest a very different research programme for the investigation of 
these policy systems. 
CONCLUSION 
From revisiting the idealist-realist debate, we can conclude that politics involves 
both the pursuit of economic, security and status values (not objective interests) 
and the pursuit of other values, including internationalism and environmental 
concerns. Revisiting behaviouralism, in the light of the study on the part of 
natural scientists and social scientists of different aspects of humankind's inter-
action with the environment, leads to the conclusion that both the data on 
ecosystems and the data on environmental values can be studied in a value-free 
manner. And a consideration of critical theory makes us aware that some theory 
may privilege the values of those who do not care about the environment. Theory, 
and the language by which it is expressed, is a distortion of reality rather than a 
representation of reality if it does not allow us to study the actions of those who 
wish to promote change. 
We can start from the presumption that political actors do seek both concrete 
material values and more abstract values. Some values are maximised by en-
gaging in conflict, but other values are realised through cooperation. Value 
preferences are not identifiable, through rationality, as an objective feature of an 
actor's situation. They are the subjective choice of that actor. Values are socially 
constructed: as society changes, so values change. Nevertheless, they are also an 
empirical reality. A focus on the resolution of issues in policy systems offers a 
positivist approach for an alternative Global Politics paradigm. 
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8 The environment and the 
United Nations 
Mark F. Imber 
This chapter does not offer a complete institutional review of the UN' s activities 
in the field of environmental protection. Such works exist elsewhere, and the 
issue deserves fuller treatment than can be afforded in one chapter.1 The purpose 
of this chapter is to explore the conceptual and institutional limitations of global, 
intergovernmental cooperation on environmental questions. Thereafter, its pur-
pose is to identify the larger picture of continuing negotiations and institutional 
reforms which have followed from the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) - the so-called 'Earth Summit'. These 
conceptual and institutional issues will be combined in a discussion of the attempt 
to develop both definitions and measures of sustainable development. 
UNCED, and more particularly the follow-up process, represented an attempt 
to invest the United Nations with major responsibilities in the promotion of 
sustainable development. First, the post-Cold War UN is able to address the 
environmental agenda more thoroughly than at any time since the Stockholm 
Conference of 1972. Second, both Third World political pressure groups and the 
scientific community now acknowledge the explicit connections between en-
vironmental degradation and patterns of economic development (between mass 
poverty in the South and unsustainable patterns of consumption in the North). 
Third, and most ambitiously, sustainable development may come to acquire the 
status of a new normative campaign within the UN (one comparable to decol-
onisation in the 1960s and anti-apartheid in the 1980s), and this will create a 
definitive post-Cold War purpose for the organisation. This may also be a 
typically liberal-institutional objective. Elsewhere in this volume, Humphreys 
refers to sustainable development as a 'rescue hypothesis'. Others are still more 
dismissive of the inattention both to the structural dimension (Smith 1993) and to 
the co-option of private-sector interests which sustainability implies (Doran 
1993). There is indeed something both millenarian and functionalist about the 
recasting of the organs of global governance around a new organising principle. 
There is also something deeply nostalgic and reminiscent of Bretton Woods 1944 
about such proposals, except that the process of reforming, as opposed to in-
venting, the machinery of the United Nations has to overcome a half-century of 
barnacle-encrusted practice and precedent. Precedent is not always encouraging. 
Despite the apparent novelty of UNCED, and the unreal level of expectations 
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which surrounded it, two important precedents do exist for this attempt to shift 
the normative basis of the UN towards a more environmental, if not ecologist, 
perspective. These precedents show the need to think in terms of decades as 
regards the evolution of a normative consensus into legal standards. Rio 1992 was 
the second such global conference on environmental issues to be convened by the 
UN. Stockholm 1972 had focused on a narrower agenda, but even then the 
immutable connections to Third World development were apparent, especially in 
the explicit connections that were made in Principles 8-11 of the Stockholm 
Declaration (UN 1972). The second precedent is the common-heritage-of-
mankind principle, now widely recognised as an appropriate regulatory 
mechanism for the protection of global 'life-support systems' such as the 
ozone layer and the climate system. It is over twenty-five years since the 
common-heritage idea was first mooted in the United Nations, although it was 
then applied to a different context, namely the exploitation of the deep-sea bed 
(Imber 1994: 48-54; Sanger 1986: 70-89). Arvid Pardo's 1967 General 
Assembly speech set in motion twelve years of negotiation, which was concluded 
by the adoption of the United Nation's Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982. 
A further twelve years were to elapse before the Convention secured the sixty acts 
of ratification necessary for it to enter into force in November 1994. During the 
time that common-heritage ideas in relation to the Law of the Sea remained in 
abeyance (with consequent harm to high seas, straddling and pelagic fish stocks), 
an elaborate regime for the protection of the ozone layer and the first Framework 
Convention on Climate Change were successfully implemented under UN auspices. 
(See chapters in this volume by Ogley, Paterson and Owen.) Both rested upon the 
common-heritage proposition that global environmental systems cannot either be 
annexed by states or be left res nullius (without the law), for they would then be 
liable to destruction by unregulated overexploitation - the so-called 'tragedy of 
the commons' (Hardin 1968: 1243-8). 
Sustainable development, derived from the 1987 Brundtland Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland 1987: 8), was the 
central ideology of UNCED. The Rio Declaration, adopted at the close of the 
Conference, confmned this commitment. The two-part definition maintained that: 
• The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet develop-
mental and environmental needs of present and future generations (UN 1993: 
Principle 2). 
• In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the developmental process and cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from it (UN 1993: Principle 3). 
Twenty years after the Stockholm Conference had addressed the human 
environment, UNCED attempted to deploy a grand linkage strategy combining 
environmental protection and economic development, two factors thought by 
some from the 1970s limits-to-growth school to be irreconcilable (Meadows et al. 
1983; Martell 1994: 24-40). The Northern interest in a number of global environ-
mental issues was unavoidably linked to the Third World's determination to 
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resurrect the agenda of development after the frustrations of the 1980s. Not only 
was the imperative political, in that the consensus procedures of the UN system 
would not allow the two issues to be debated separately, it also reflected scientific 
evidence that a number of so-called environmental issues such as climate change, 
ozone-layer depletion, deforestation and toxic-waste pollution were intimately 
associated with unsustainable patterns of development; namely fossil-fuel and 
CFC use, land tenure, indebtedness and the relocation of polluting industrial 
processes in Third World countries. The last (the Bhopal Syndrome) reflected the 
risk inherent in the globalisation of the world economy. 
Two perspectives are dominant in assessing the role of the UN in any 
multilateral venture: the forum/actor perspective and the instrument/executor 
perspective (Archer 1983: 130--41). First, the UN may be perceived as an arena 
or forum for global bargaining between governments. It is only in a public and 
universal forum of this kind that sovereign actors may be persuaded to endorse 
cooperative ventures, and so relinquish the temptations to play the 'free-rider', to 
pass on 'external costs' and to play the persistently uncooperative role in the 
many 'prisoner's dilemma' scenarios that characterise global environmental 
change.2 Second, the UN may be characterised as an instrument for implementing 
or executing the policies of its members. These two limited schemes deliberately 
sidestep the cosmopolitan aspiration that the UN can somehow operate as an 
autonomous actor beyond the ken of its creators. When operational autonomy 
does arise, such as in the immediate response of a peace-keeping force under fire, 
or with the decisions inevitably devolved upon aid and refugee workers 
delivering humanitarian relief, it occurs in strictly limited circumstances. The UN 
does not have its own tax base to fmance peace-keeping and humanitarian 
programmes. The organisation is international, not supranational, and as such the 
UN depends upon the policy decisions and funding of its members. As will be 
shown, particular difficulties arise when those members decline to finance what 
in previous resolutions they have committed themselves to support. The UN is 
not a leviathan. Its separate legal corporate existence is a deceptive piece of 
flattery. It does not make policy, nor does it enforce the agreements made by its 
members and adopted in its name. This fact applies to sustainable development 
as much as it applies to other pretended competencies such as collective security. 
Central to an understanding of the limited UN role in global environmental 
management are two propositions so basic as to be cliches. However, cliches 
derive their influence from their tested status. The first, concerning the arena 
perspective, is that the United Nations is literally the only place where global 
negotiations on environmental protection can be conducted. The second cliche 
concerns the UN's status as an instrument. The UN machinery, its funding and its 
organisational culture are, as currently constituted, inadequate to undertake the 
tasks it has been assigned by the outcome of the 1992 UNCED. The UN, in other 
words, has been set up to fail. These assertions will be substantiated by detailed 
reference to the UNCED mandate later on. It is first necessary, however, to 
establish the conceptual framework in which the UN exists and operates, as an 
arena and as an instrument of its member's creation. 
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THE CONCEPTUAL RATIONALE 
The UN' s role in the environmental field derives from the clearly transboundary 
and sometimes global nature of many threats to the environmental security of the 
state. The boundaries of sovereign states do not coincide with the boundaries of 
the ecological systems which sustain them. Therefore, any attempt by a sovereign 
state to regulate ecological systems is bound to have only limited success. This 
creates a crisis of legitimacy for the state, because it cannot deliver complete 
security. One solution to this dilemma has been the functional approach to 
international organisations, an approach latterly restyled by some as 'liberal 
institutionalist' .3 Even the most apparently isolated island republic, such as the 
Maldives or Tuvalu, depends upon external climate systems and oceanic currents 
to create and sustain its variety of fauna and flora, and indeed its pattern of human 
migration and settlement. Furthermore, these small island states are, more than 
any other countries, threatened by the global environmental change caused by 
processes and events that occur literally half a world away, such as North 
American, Japanese and European fossil-fuel use. Some environmental threats to 
the security of the state are completely beyond the capacity of any one state to 
resist or to alter. No one country can legislate for the protection of the ozone layer 
above it, or command the obedience of the level of the sea lapping at its shores. 
Countries that do legislate for sustainable-development policies will be subject to 
pressures caused by transboundary flows originating abroad. Some countries are 
likely to be more sinned against than sinning in this particular balance of trans-
boundary pollution (Saetevik 1988). Air quality in the Netherlands is clearly 
affected by discharges from the German Ruhr basin. Similarly, water quality in 
the Rhine-Maas river system is determined, for downstream riparians, by the 
behaviour of upstream riparians, namely Germany, Belgium, France and 
Switzerland. 
Functional organisations have, since the creation of the Rhine Commission in 
1815, attempted to reconcile the imperfect fit between jurisdictional boundaries 
and so-called natural or functional boundaries. Some of the earliest examples of 
functional cooperation were associated with the international river commissions 
for the Rhine, Scheidt and Danube. These can be described as 'natural', in the 
sense of being hydrological systems defined by geographical rather than political 
boundaries. These nineteenth-century projects were a successful precedent for the 
global application of the functional approach to fields of human cooperation such 
as the Universal Postal Union, the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation, in which standard-setting and 
economies of scale suggested a rational basis for intergovernmental cooperation. 
Attempts to apply the vocabulary of 'natural functions' or 'technical self-
determination' to other social and economic aspects of international cooperation 
- for example, the World Bank - have invited criticism that functionalism is 
either teleological (Haas 1964) or hegemonic (Keohane 1984). However, some 
dimensions of contemporary global environmental change, such as climate 
change, ozone-layer depletion and the control of oceanic pollution, fit well with 
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the functionalist logic, invoking the case for global regulation by organisations of 
global reach. 
Functional cooperation can only operate under the conditions of complex 
interdependence identified by Keohane and Nye (1977). UNCED addressed a 
complex agenda: Agenda 21 itself extended over forty substantive chapters. 
Pre-conference positions were well established. The North promoted climate 
change, forestry conservation and the preservation of biological diversity as its 
priorities. The South approached Rio keener to promote pledges on conces-
sionary finance and technology transfer, trade reform, action on desertification 
and protection from waste-dumping, and sought to avoid stigmatisation on 
forestry and demographic questions. The UNCED process recognised the crucial 
role of numerous stakeholders and parties in the implementation of, and the 
follow-up to, the agreements which were made. Agenda 21 also recognised the 
role of numerous so-called 'major groups', mostly obviously local authorities, 
women, indigenous peoples, youth, the corporate sector, trade unions and the 
scientific community (though despite this, these groups were poorly represented 
in the state-centric decision-making structures of the Conference). UNCED was 
(like all similar global conferences) predicated on the parties' recognising the 
near irrelevance of military power in resolving the disputes that arose in ad-
dressing the agenda. 
Although typically associated with relations of mutual dependence, the above 
conditions need not imply symmetrical relations. On the contrary, in UNCED, as 
in many North-South arenas, the parties were configured in a profoundly asym-
metrical relationship of power. Despite a substantial rhetorical investment in both 
environmentalism and globalism, the Northern countries maintained their control 
of global financial resources. The South's need for concessionary finance, debt 
relief, trade liberalisation and technology transfers was considerably more pressing 
than the North's need for Southern signatures on measures to limit those global 
environmental changes which were, anyway, overwhelmingly Northern in their 
industrial causation (changes such as ozone-layer damage and climate change). 
In this situation, the South was compelled to recognise not only that half a loaf 
was better than none but also that crumbs (like the Global Environmental Facility 
- GEF) were better than none. The South maintained its dignity, nonetheless: it 
left some crumbs on the table when threatened with scapegoating on the issues of 
forestry and population. 
It is possible to make three broad predictions concerning the conduct of 
multilateral diplomacy under such conditions as the above. 
• Package deals. The complexity of the agenda will lead the parties to strike 
compromises based upon complex 'package deals'. Interests and priorities 
will be traded off against each other. No party will take the risk of making 
concessions on one item of the agenda without making gains elsewhere. 
• Consensus. Package deals in turn create the need to proceed by consensus 
rather than by votes. Voting creates winners and losers, issue by issue. A 
climate-change treaty without US, Russian, Chinese and Indian consent and 
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support would omit those countries responsible for nearly 50 per cent of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Their absence, furthermore, would under-
mine the incentive for other responsible parties to join. The complete break-
down of negotiations for a forestry convention at Rio illustrates this thesis. 
The nature of a global conference is such that nothing is agreed until every-
thing is agreed, because every individual agenda item remains a potential 
bargaining chip until the whole deal is agreed. 
• Intransigence. Proceeding by consensus to an overall package deal creates the 
third characteristic of the UN conference method. Both preceding character-
istics tend to reward intransigence in negotiation. In a vote, the minority of one 
is an exposed loser. When assembling a package by consensus, however, the 
minority of one can attract disproportionate concessions from the other parties 
to achieve a final deal. Since all can behave likewise, this tends to reward the 
dogmatist, the insomniac and the plain bloody-minded. It is a characteristic of 
UN life which punishes the pragmatist, the tired and the gullible. 
These aspects of conduct are not peculiar to the UN system. Something very 
similar characterises bargaining within the EU Council. The scale is, however, 
proportionately larger when encompassing over 190 governments within a 
consensus framework on an agenda which is divisive. When the rapidity of 
international agreement on the Montreal Protocol is contrasted with the more 
contentious climate-change issue (or with the even more contentious forestry or 
demographic issues), the characteristics which encourage or discourage agree-
ment become relatively predictable (see Figure 8.1). 
In addition to the well-established impulse to cheat in the matters of free-
riding and external costs, more complex compulsions to cause environmental 
damage also exist. Deudney (1990) has shown the difficulty of confronting 
environmental damage when to a greater or lesser extent 'we are the enemy', in 
other words when our actions harm ourselves as well as others. This is recognised 
in the game-theory construct of the prisoner's dilemma. Individual acts of self-
interest, such as commuting by car and watering the lawn in a drought, do not 
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Figure 8.1 The incentives to negotiate multilateral agreements 
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work to the individual's advantage because every other member of society makes 
the same individually rational (i.e. selfish) decision. As a result, we get stuck in 
traffic jams and reservoirs run dry, because the 'hidden hand' of the market does 
not always yield optimal results. List and Rittberger have pointed out other 
categories which mix self-harm and social harm. 'Victims' are damaged by others 
but do not inflict harm on others. The case of receiving transboundary pollution 
flows, such as with acid rain or downstream river pollution, illustrates this category. 
'Hara-kiri' is self-harming behaviour, as in the case of a local land-fill of toxic 
wastes involving no leakage into the water table of other jurisdictions but creating 
a fearsome middle-range problem for the sustainable re-use of that particular 
land. This could be said to be primarily harming other generations, but it is also 
self-harm in the sense that the political community affected is that of the perpetrator. 
'Kamikaze' behaviour consists of that which harms others and destroys the 
perpetrator. An example would be a spectacular nuclear accident (Hurrell and 
Kingsbury 1992: 101). 
Although, as mentioned, the UN is not a leviathan, it could be said to be an 
imperfect analogue of a civil society in which the member states consent to be 
bound by rules which they have freely negotiated between themselves. In the UN, 
as a global forum, each state is confronted with the costs of failing to agree to 
collective solutions to shared problems. Each is also provided with a glimpse of 
the freely negotiated alternative, namely treaties, binding on each party, that 
create mutual obligations. Like a military alliance or a mutual insurance fund, 
such treaties spread the risks and costs of environmental protection among a 
larger number of subscribers. 
The language of globalism can sometimes be revealed as rhetoric rather than 
analysis. In one sense, the environmental factors which cause the death of over 12 
million Third World children every year are parochial (Imber 1994: 1-2). Water-
borne diseases, open sewers and inadequate access to paediatric medicine and 
family planning do to an extent constitute self-contained disasters. However, a 
structuralist analysis of international relations would locate the responsibility for 
this new holocaust (32,000 preventable child deaths per day) within the world-
system of neocolonialism. In the structuralist view, the plight of these countries 
has been created by a 400-year process of Western capital accumulation, the 
expropriation of raw materials, the distortion of primary product markets and, 
now, by 'reverse aid' in which Third World debt servicing massively outstrips 
Overseas Development Aid (ODA) (Vallely 1990; Miller 1991; George 1992). 
However, so far as the political mainstream is concerned (including the liberal 
roots of functionalism and institutionalism), errors of omission such as the 
shortfall in promised ODA are always regarded as less culpable than acts of 
commission. Furthermore, the causal links between, say, protectionism and infant 
mortality are indirect and tenuous when set beside the more direct health impacts 
of ozone depletion, climate change and tropical deforestation. Despite the 
South's participation in UNCED, and its implied recognition of the agenda of 
interdependence, UNCED could be represented as a confrontation between the 
structuralist and the pluralist paradigms of international relations. 
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The poorest of Third World delegations presented the environmental crisis in 
terms of massive and contemporary human disadvantage. The South's priorities 
were in the fields of health, life expectancy and poverty, with the appropriate 
policy emphases on concessionary finance, debt relief and technology transfers, 
using a vocabulary of rights and equity. In contrast, the Northern governments, 
and the Northern-dominated media, were inclined to promote an agenda which 
emphasised climate change, biological diversity and forestry primarily as a crisis 
for the 'environment', as if somehow disconnected from human tragedy. Media 
interest appeared to be more concerned with the fate of telegenic (i.e. cute) 
animals than with the fate of children. When the Northern countries admitted the 
connection between the environment and development, the mechanisms which 
they favoured to reconcile the two were pluralist - that is, market-led - and 
consistent both with the emerging consensus of the Uruguay round of trade 
negotiations and with the promotion of private capital flows to augment the 
OECD's clearly indifferent performance in ODA finance over the past decade 
(Middleton, O'Keefe and Moyo 1994; see also Saurin in this volume). 
The conceptual approaches to explaining the UN' s role are therefore contested. 
Something of this is shown in the follow-up to UNCED, and in subsequent 
attempts to define and implement the concept of sustainable development. 
UN TASKS 1: DEFINING SUSTAINABILITY 
The work of the whole UN system must, logically, rest upon implementing an 
agreed definition of sustainable development. This is not so straightforward as it 
might appear. The parallel to the UN's collective-security mandate of 1945 is 
instructive. Despite the explicit textual definition contained in the Charter, the 
implementation of collective security was rendered unworkable by the tensions 
of the Cold War and by the procedural wrangles that accompanied the Korean 
decisions in 1950. These served to emasculate collective security, from which 
there emerged the valid but altogether more limited genre of peace-keeping. 
Without consistent political and intellectual attention to the meaning of 
sustainable development, a similar fate will overtake this new post-Cold War 
imperative. 
The debate over 'sustainable development indicators' (SDls) is one such 
attempt to define sustainable development in a consensual way that will allow 
meaningful international comparisons. It combines conceptual and empirical 
elements in providing national governments, the EC and the UN with the means 
to measure sustainability. And it seeks to identify in a rigorous and systematic 
way which indicators of economic and social activity could be used to measure 
progress towards sustainability and (the corollary) which present indicators (such 
as GDP) are poor or misleading indicators of sustainability. 
Certain economic activities, counted as growth, are destructive of environ-
mental quality (for example, increased expenditure on commuter-mileage petrol). 
Other activities, regarded as a cost to the public purse, may nonetheless support 
sustainable development, such as subsidies to more fuel-efficient mass-transit 
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systems. Furthermore, certain consumer decisions may be recorded as involving 
a reduction in economic activity (such as walking to work rather than driving), 
and these are desirable contributions to sustainability. Sustainability indicators 
seek to record activities, inputs or outcomes that more reliably indicate those 
changes in development which affect environmental quality, both adversely and 
favourably. 
The UN first addressed these issues in the preparatory committee (or 
'Prepcom') of the Rio Conference, and they may be traced to a UN General 
Assembly resolution of 1989 (UNGA 44/228: para. 15). This exercise sought to 
combine economic and environmental-quality indicators into the concept of 
integrated economic-environmental accounting (IEEA). Two particular concerns 
were to establish numerical and financial values for the role of the environment 
both as a source of natural capital and as a sink for by-products. In particular, the 
UN efforts confronted the dilemma that 
traditional systems of national accounts, focussing on market transactions do 
not record changes in the quality of the natural environment and the depletion 
of natural resources. These effects are particularly relevant for the measure-
ment of an adjusted concept of value added in production, which is compatible 
with long term environmentally sound and sustained economic growth, and of 
an adjusted concept of net income, which takes into account the welfare 
aspects of environmental depletion and degradation. 
(UN A. CONF. 151: para 7) 
Agenda 21 mandated both the UN Stati11tical Office (UNSTAT) to pursue this 
question (Agenda 21: 40, 6) and the relevant organs to thereafter use SDis 
(Agenda 21: 40, 7). The task has in fact been tackled, more or less simultane-
ously, not only by UNSTAT but also by the OECD, the Economic Commission 
for Africa (UNECA), leading NGOs such as the New Economics Foundation 
(NEF) and a small number of concerned national governments (NEF 1994). 
UNSTAT and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) collaborated in a 
consultative process initiated in December 1993. Bedrich Moldan, the Vice-
Chairman of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), promoted a 
paper which sought agreement around a number of indicators measuring both 
environmental quality and changes in the following clusters: the atmosphere, 
fresh water, marine water, sanitation, land/soil use, biological resources, mineral 
resources, human settlements, population and health care, natural disasters, eco-
nomic policy, education and international cooperation. The great majority of 
measures proposed comprised hard statistics potentially embarrassing but not 
arguable, e.g. green-house gas emissions in tonnes per year, industrial waste 
discharge to coastal waters (tonnes per m3), fertiliser use (tonnes per km2), etc. 
Other proposals were more controversial and involved qualitative judgements, 
e.g. the projected lifetime of non-renewable energy resources at given rates of 
exploitation, flows of environmental refugees and the percentage of the popu-
lation living in absolute poverty. 
A related aspect of the indicators debate which is central to international 
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relations concerns imported sustainability or the 'international footprint' of a 
particular society or sovereignty. Some societies might achieve a commendable 
performance under a system of 'sustainability indicators' by first importing 
energy-intensive or pollution-intensive goods and then performing higher-value-
added stages of production which are less energy- and pollution-intensive. 
Assembling automobiles using steel components manufactured elsewhere would 
be an example. The energy-use, ore-extraction and air-pollution aspects of the 
steel industry are recorded as having occurred in the original steel-milling country. 
Only the 'clean' stages of final assembly are recorded in the country of nominal 
manufacture. Imported sustainability has radical implications. Sustainable de-
velopment is unavoidably predicated upon the redistribution of income. The 
current gulf in living standards between rich and poor is an acute reflection of 
profound inequalities in environmental quality. Variations between North and 
South - such as the per capita consumption of fossil fuels, twenty-four times 
higher in the USA compared to India (Paterson and Grubb 1992: 298), and the net 
transfer of wealth created by a debt-servicing flow that exceeds ODA - are both 
aspects of imported sustainability in the North. This issue also forces advocates 
of sustainability to consider the regressive implications of carbon taxes such as 
VAT on fuel. Policies to encourage sustainability can be distributionally neutral 
or even progressive; take, for example, the transfer of resources from road con-
struction over to public transport, which better assists the mobility of the car-less 
poor (von Weizsacker 1994: 129-40). In these ways, the significance of Agenda 
21 can be appreciated. It requires the holistic treatment of sustainable develop-
ment at all levels of the policy process - local, national and international. 
UN TASKS 2: ORGANISING SUSTAINABILITY 
The institutional reforms of the UN machinery set in motion by the 1992 UNCED 
were contained in the recommendations of Chapter 38 of Agenda 21. In brief, the 
governments participating in UNCED reaffirmed a hierarchy of political account-
ability, with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) obliged to cooperate with each other (Agenda 21: 38, 32). 
Both are explicitly accountable to the newly created Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD), itself a subcommission of the well-established Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), which is in turn an organ of the General 
Assembly. Within this hierarchy, Agenda 21 enlarged the competence ofUNEP, 
whilst assigning a particular leadership role to the UNDP in capacity-building 
and finance, and also agreed to continue funding the newly created tri-agency, 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF). 
The mandate granted to UNEP was not surprising. By 1992 the programme 
had established a reputation for conducting its small programmes in an efficient 
manner. Donor confidence was high, especially amongst the more sceptical 
American and British governments which regarded UNEP (by UN standards at 
least) as a paragon of focused activities and tight budgetary restraint (USGAO 
1989). The dilemma facing advocates of an expanded role for UNEP was how to 
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encourage the so-called 'catalytic' role pioneered by the programme whilst 
releasing UNEP from the Sisyphean task of 'coordinating' UN environmental 
activities on a system-wide basis (Imber 1994: 82-3). The original 1972 Resolu-
tion of the General Assembly which created UNEP also burdened it with a dual 
mandate. The Governing Council was directed to 'promote international cooperation 
in the field of the environment and to recommend, as appropriate, policies to this 
end; to provide general policy guidance for the direction and coordination of 
environmental programmes within the UN system' (UNGA Res. 2997 (XXVII)). 
The constraints upon a small secretariat based in Nairobi with only 250 pro-
fessional staff and a budget of approximately $60 million per annum are obvious. 
With its scientific staff matching that of a middle-sized British university, it 
would have been quite unreasonable to expect UNEP to operate at the cutting 
edge of basic science as ranked by global criteria of excellence. Hence the 
development of Mostapha Tolba' s incumbency of the niche role in unique func-
tions such as Global Earth Monitoring (GEMS), INF01ERRA and the management 
of the secretariats of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) and the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals 
(IRPTC). These represented genuinely global functions appropriate to the 
Programme and mindful of its limitations. Equally clearly, UNEP could not be 
expected to coordinate a variety of autonomous UN programmes. UNEP, as 
noted, is formally subordinate to ECOSOC and the General Assembly. Mean-
while, the UNDP operates a budget approximately thirty times larger than UNEP 
(over $900 million), and the World Bank disperses funds measured annually at 
over $10 billion. The degree of 'greenness', or otherwise, of these two autono-
mous organisations therefore largely determines the environmental impact of the 
UN's system-wide efforts. Encouraging the UNDP and the World Bank towards 
sustainable-development policies is therefore a more important task than tinker-
ing with the pretence ofUNEP 'coordination'. Agenda 21 promotes UNEP's role 
as 'strengthening its catalytic role in stimulating and promoting environmental 
activities and considerations throughout the United Nations system' (Agenda 21: 
38, 22 (a)). This 'think tank' role is compatible both with the modesty ofUNEP's 
place in the organisational structure of the UN and with its level of funding. 
UNEP is also assigned other responsibilities: the development of natural-
resource accounting systems, the dissemination of global data and 'the coordination 
and promotion of relevant scientific research' (Agenda 21: 38, 22(e)). 
In a wide-ranging reform of the UN headquarters' secretariat initiated in 1992, 
staff numbers were actually reduced and reorganised into a smaller number of 
departments. The Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Develop-
ment was created under the direction of Under-Secretary General Desai. This 
department provides the full-time staff which services the CSD. The UN General 
Assembly has also asserted its pre-eminence in this field, a move it is entitled to 
make since all structures not accountable to the Security Council are ultimately 
accountable to UNGA. Agenda 21 specifically cites the Assembly as 'the highest 
level intergovernmental mechanism . . . the principal policy-making and appraisal 
organ on matters relating to the follow-up to the conference' (Agenda 21: 38, 9). 
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A recognition of the need to impose system-wide coordination in the pursuit 
of sustainable development persuaded the otherwise reluctant Anglo-Saxon dele-
gations to endorse the creation of the aforementioned Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD). Charged with the role of following up the Rio Conference, 
both in the general sense of coordinating the UN' s own organs and agencies' 
programmes for sustainable development and in a more formal, institutional 
sense, the CSD is thus responsible for organising the 1997 Review Conference 
for UNCED (Roddick and Dodds 1993). 
The system-wide coordination of UN activities is both a long-standing and a 
frequently cited problem. It is in part a consequence of the illusion that the UN is 
an actor. In truth, only the members can coordinate their own activities - within 
organs which they have created. And the UN is, in fact, quite crowded with 
organs created for this purpose. The Administrative Committee on Coordination 
(ACC), the Committee of International Development Institutions on the Environ-
ment (CIDIE), the Designated Officers on Environmental Matters (DOEM) and 
(as already seen) both ECOSOC and UNEP were all originally mandated to 
undertake greater or lesser burdens of coordination (Bertrand 1988: 193-219; 
Taylor 1988: 220-36; Imber 1994: 107-8). Now these mechanisms have been 
joined by the CSD. 
The fifty-three-member CSD was brought into being during 1993, and holds 
annual sessions each Spring. These sessions extend over two weeks, concluding 
with the so-called High Level Segment, conducted at a ministerial level prior to 
ECOSOC sessions. The CSD has adopted a programme of work which, over the 
five years remaining until the 1997 Review Conference, will review the member 
states' progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 (Imber 1994: 104--9). The 
CSD's programme has, like that of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
adopted the practice of receiving national reports from the members as well as 
instigating cross-sectoral reviews of the Agenda 21 chapters. 
Roddick has demonstrated that the CSD's prospects have been blunted by the 
indifference of two major constituencies. The large Southern states, such as 
China, Brazil and India, remain suspicious of the implications of national re-
porting, and generally fearful of 'anti-growth' environmentalism. Among the 
developed countries, the 'dirty old men', viz the USA, Russia and, some might 
add, France and the UK with their rhetorically supportive but practically hypo-
critical positions, have combined to deprive the CSD debates of major sponsors. 
The CSD's proponents, on the other hand, are the middle-sized and small Third 
World countries, and the committed 'green' developed countries such as Canada, 
the Netherlands, Germany and the Nordic countries - all aided by NGOs and the 
academic community (Roddick 1993: 13-14). 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
The UN is both the best and the worst place in which to conduct environmental 
diplomacy. It is the best place because, it is the only global forum or arena in 
which norms and laws for the management of global environmental change can 
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be negotiated. The UN is constituted as a global forum, it expressly recognises 
the legitimacy of the smallest and most vulnerable states and it has, over a half 
century of piecemeal reform, created machinery, such as ECOSOC, the CSD, 
UNEP and the UNDP, explicitly structured to promote and monitor the 
implementation of 'development' - redefined since 1992 in the language of 
'sustainable development'. It is at the same time, however, the worst place in 
which to advance this essential project. Precisely because it is an organisation of 
member states, it does not include all of the stakeholders in the process of 
sustainable development. Despite elaborate provision for consultation and 
observer rights, the NGOs are not party to binding international conventions. 
Meanwhile, the fact that indigenous peoples, national minorities, women and 
youth are cited in Agenda 21 is a backhanded compliment only, one which 
recognises and institutionalises their marginalisation. 
The UN' s structure, comprising over thirty organs and sixteen autonomous 
specialised agencies, each responsible for programmes in fields as diverse as 
food, agriculture, labour, telecommunications, nuclear energy and industrial de-
velopment, tends to encourage a sectoral approach to development. This inhibits 
the transition to sustainability. A sober appraisal of the restructuring that has been 
put in hand by the creation of the CSD would be, at best, sanguine. The UN 
structure is essentially feudal. It is more reminiscent of the weak authority of the 
sixteenth-century Scottish Stuart kings than it is of that of their English Tudor 
contemporaries, whose successful centralisation the UN only appears to mimic. 
In the UN, the centre (the king) is weak, while the agencies (the barons) are 
strong. Some barons, such as the World Bank, marshal ten times the resources of 
the centre. 
Indeed, the entire United Nations system rests upon an inadequate financial 
base. The centrepiece funding proposal that emerged from Rio, namely the GEF, 
extends to barely $2 billion, at a time when post-Cold War military spending fell 
(in constant 1985 prices) from a 1985 peak of $770 billion to $582 billion in 1991 
(IISS 1993: 218-21). The 1992 total of ODA extended by the OECD countries, 
namely $68 billion, is barely half of the target figure agreed two years ago in 
Agenda 21, namely $125 billion. (The South was required to contribute $475 
billion of the $600-billion-per-annum budget of Agenda 21 (Agenda 21: 33, 18)). 
In 1992, Third World debt servicing ran at $148 billion, making a mockery of all 
attempts to fund sustainable development (OECD 1994: 62-4). Set against the 
ODA flow, the difference between aid payments to the South and debt repay-
ments to the North ran at $80.8 billion in that year. Only by adding private 
investment flows and export credits totalling $91.9 billion did a positive transfer 
emerge. These statistics go some way to substantiating the assertion that the UN 
is an institutional bandage applied to a structural haemorrhage. 
The political message that these figures convey is revealing. During the 
second Cold War (1979-89), the UN was denounced in certain quarters as 
politicised, overbudgeted and profligate (Moynihan 1979; Pines 1984). In the 
post-Cold War environment, the opportunity for the UN to be revived as an arena 
for North-South negotiation is in imminent danger of conceding to the alternative 
The environment and the United Nations 151 
of its co-option as an instrument of those who would promote the marketised, 
globalised 'end of history'. The OECD countries, with notable Scandinavian and 
Dutch exceptions, will prove unwilling to fund the transition to sustainability, or 
to support the modest mechanisms of global governance which would assist that 
task. 
Does this actually matter? In the UN's fiftieth-anniversary year, should we 
come to praise it or to bury it? Whilst it is true that the rhetoric of 'only one earth' 
suggests a need for the global governance of global environmental change, the 
cosmopolitan project of converting the UN into a supranational government is 
hardly credible, either now or in the foreseeable future. The imperfect prospect of 
an inter-national organisation of states, driven by 190 national administrations 
with varying levels of rhetorical commitment to sustainable development, does 
not set the heather on fire. Some environmental issues can be more readily 
managed on a regional level. Acid rain in North America and in Europe, inter-
national river systems such as the Zambezi, Nile and Niger systems in Africa, and 
water management in the Middle East are all examples of genuinely discreet, if 
not hermetically sealed, environmental problems. Despite the appeal of global-
ism, the obstacles to global consensus-building discussed above may actually 
cause delay and excuse inaction. This argument does not reduce the importance 
of pursuing UN mechanisms for the negotiation of genuinely global issues. 
Rather, it frees the UN from a bogus globalism which, anyway, is not consistent 
with the green imperative to 'think global, act local'. It would restore something 
of the flexibility formerly associated with the functionalist approach - 'binding 
together those interests which are common, where they are common and to the 
extent that they are common' (Mitrany 1966: 115-16). And it would free the UN 
to do what it can, as an arena or forum, to advance the normative and legal case 
for sustainable development. Rather than either vacuous praise or the cynical 
burial of the UN, the only politically realistic path is that of constant agitation for 
reform. There is no shortage of proposals for the democratisation of the UN, for 
the enlargement of the Security Council and for schemes to provide sources of 
independent finance (by levies on defence expenditure and international airline 
travel, by the taxation of transnational corporations, etc.). Toe test for the UN 
(and indeed for the functional or institutional paradigm) is whether any liberal 
project can overcome the arithmetic of the structural disadvantage revealed by the 
continuing impact of Third World poverty and debt. That cannot occur until 
the protection of the global commons and the large-scale relief of debt, funded by 
the scope for defence conversion that has already been shown to exist, are both 
recognised by the OECD countries as integral elements, rather than optional 
extras, in the definition of sustainable development. 
NOTES 
1 The reader is directed to M. Thacher in Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992, and to Birnie in 
Roberts and Kingsbury 1993, for a comprehensive treatment of the UN's full 
institutional activities. A more comprehensive treatment of UNEP is contained in 
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McCormick 1989 and in Imber 1993a, 1993b and 1994. For more detailed reviews of 
the post-UNCED issues, see also Grubb et aL 1994, and Thomas 1992 and 1994. 
2 For a more elaborate explanation of the prisoner's dilemma, see Axelrod 1990; and 
for 'free-riding' and externalities, see Imber 1992, 1994: 13-15. Both areas provide 
examples of conditions in which individually rational behaviour can create negative 
outcomes not just for society at large but also ultimately for those individuals whose 
anti-social actions create the problem. They are central to understanding the problems 
faced both by the public sector and by market forces in providing adequate levels of 
environmental protection. Public-sector provision will always tend to fall short of the 
level of service that voters claim to desire because actors (whether individual tax-
payers, corporations or sovereign states) will seek to avoid bearing their full share of 
costs and regulation. On the other hand, by definition, the market can only detect and 
respond to changes in prices. As environmental quality (e.g. clean air) and the global 
commons (e.g. the climate system) and both mostly zero-priced, and many internal 
costs can be externalised (e.g. by pollution discharge), 'the market', in its Thatcherite 
form, is largely incapable of assigning prices and hence controlling environmental 
damage. This has led to many attempts to adapt taxation, permits and other devices in 
such a way as to allow the assignment of 'market values' to environmental quality. 
(See Pearce et al. 1989: passim; Grubb 1990: 67-89; Beckerman 1990.) 
3 Functionalism is usually attributed to the writings of David Mitrany (1948, 1966 and 
1975), but see also Taylor and Groom 1975, Claude 1964 and Imber 1984 and 1989. 
For an extensive criticism of Mitrany's scheme, see McLaren 1985. On the preferred 
vocabulary of 'institutionalism' and the case for the hegemonic origins of functional 
cooperation, see Keohane 1984: 8-9. See also chapters by Williams and by Paterson 
in this volume. 
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9 Between the devil and the law 
of the sea 
The generation of global environmental norms 
Roderick Ogley 
Global environmental norms can be defined as changes made and constraints 
accepted in the behaviour, habits and practices of human actors - states, firms, 
individuals or others - as a result of beliefs as to the disadvantages that would 
otherwise follow for the (global) environment. We can think of such norms as 
commodities - abstract, invisible commodities like insurance. The likelihood of 
a given norm arising - being 'produced' - will, as with other commodities, 
depend on the interaction of supply and demand. The demand side is concerned 
with such questions as: what environmental consequences are we threatened 
with, and what changes or constraints are needed to avert them, either wholly or 
to any specified degree? And on the supply side, we ask: how are such norms 
generated - in other words, what circumstances, arrangements, etc., are con-
ducive to the adoption, worldwide, of such behavioural restraints? This chapter 
concentrates on the analysis of the 'supply side'. 
We are, then, concerned with how norms are produced. Given a willingness on 
the part of the relevant actor( s) to devote resources - money, attention, personnel 
- to the creation of norms in a certain field, and given that this has a cost, in that 
resources so devoted become unavailable for other uses to which they might have 
been put, we can delineate the choices that have to be made in the process of 
norm-generation, attempt to assess the productivity of each and ask whether there 
are critical points at which a small additional commitment of resources could 
have a major impact, either on whether a norm is generated at all or on how 
scrupulously this norm is observed. 
Of course, every process of norm-generation is unique. The threat with which 
it purports to deal is likely to be in some respects different from any preceding 
threat. Again, and particularly at the global level, any given episode of attempted 
norm-generation will be approached with some awareness, differing for different 
actors, of the fate of previous attempts at norm generation, whether in the same 
or in different fields. Such actors' responses will be affected by what they have 
learnt, or think they have learnt, from these earlier instances, which again will 
differ for different actors. 
All this creates formidable obstacles to the development of a solidly based 
discipline, let alone a science, of 'supply-side diplomatics', or norm-generation, 
particularly when we remember that, logically, the productivity we are concerned 
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with is to be measured not in terms of legal commitments incurred but in terms of 
behaviour modifications - how much less 'polluting' of any given kind we 
actually do, in comparison with what we would have done. We also need to bear 
in mind how great a transformation may have occurred in the ease with which 
agreements might now be reached as a result of changes in the international 
political system such as the disintegration both of the USSR and of communism 
within its constituent, now independent, republics. Technical developments, too, 
like the invention of the fax, may be pertinent to comparisons over time in respect 
of the effectiveness of norm-generation, since agreements ought to be easier to 
reach when delegates can transmit proposals and other documents immediately, 
in full, to foreign offices. 
Nevertheless, these considerations should not rule out an attempt both to 
understand the other options open to would-be norm-generators and to examine 
the assumptions on which each of these rests. Tentative though any conclusions 
will have to be, they may still be useful if they lead to a critical scrutiny of the 
rationale by which decision-makers tend to choose between these different 
options. 
We shall begin by looking at some of the main options set out by scholars in 
the field. We will then briefly speculate about the processes involved in negoti-
ations, applying a crucial distinction prompted by conflict theory. Next, we will 
speculate about some of the major factors in norm production, and see if we can 
trace their influence in recent attempts at the generation of global environmental 
norms. Finally, we will focus on the most conspicuous of these attempts, the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio 
in 1992, and assess how well it was designed for its purpose. 
THE OPl'IONS: FRAMEWORK CONVENTIONS OR PACKAGE 
DEALS? 
Hurrell and Kingsbury, in their introduction (1992: 18), sharply contrast the 
'framework convention and protocols' format with the 'single package deal 
approach' by which, at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UN CLOS III), the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention came to be adopted. The 
advantage, they clearly imply, lies with the former, and they invoke Elliot 
Richardson's chapter on climate change as supporting that judgement. Since 
Richardson led the US delegation to UNCLOS III throughout the Carter Admini-
stration, when US policy was at its most accommodating towards the developing 
countries, his opinion carries much weight, but on closer examination of his 
article it seems rather less clear-cut than the editors suggest, and, as they go on to 
remind us, one of the other contributions, by Lawrence Susskind and Connie 
Ozawa, emphasises some of the 'potential drawbacks to the convention-protocol 
approach', as currently practised. Relying on a study, not easily obtainable in the 
UK, of nine cases of international environmental negotiations, it offers nine 
recommendations for improving on that approach as it has been practised 
(Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 155-64). 
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In some contrast, another scholar, Douglas Johnston, argues that, at least 
within the field of marine pollution, the legislative side of norm-generation, 
though it has yielded forty separate 'clusters' of conventions and associated 
instruments, has been disappointing in its long-term results. Global agreements 
have proved particularly difficult, and 'the economic and technological assump-
tions underlying them are not infrequently open to question, if not clearly invalid' 
by the time they come into force. In his view, the 'success' of such diplomacy 
depends, above all, on the 'political skills of the relevant technical elites - los 
tecnicos', and what is now needed is not more agreements (except in one or two 
areas such as hazardous substances) but the integration of existing treaty-based 
arrangements at the regional level (Johnston 1988: 205) - a plea for a depoli-
ticisation of issues in accordance with the best traditions of functionalism! These 
comments are valuable in reminding us that legislation is not the only important 
part of the process of norm-generation. 
Nevertheless, global law-making (including the development of 'soft' law) is 
important in the environmental field, and the arguments of Hurrell and Kingsbury 
need to be understood and addressed. In proclaiming the superiority of the 
'framework convention-protocol' approach over that of the 'package deal', they 
adduce UN CLOS ill as the classic case of the latter and both the Geneva Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution ('acid rain') of 1979 and- 'with certain 
improvements' - the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
as exemplifying the former (Hurrell and Kingsbury 1992: 16-17). 
Reviewing the account given of the ozone-layer negotiations by the chief US 
delegate (Benedick 1991), Fiona McConnell, who led the UK delegation, agrees 
that they were remarkable in the speed with which they produced a ratified treaty 
'setting out concrete and legally-binding targets for reducing ozone-depleting 
chemicals'. In addition, the treaty enabled these targets to be made more stringent 
by subsequent 'meetings of the parties', allowed developing countries to be 
brought in on easy terms and with the prospect of financial compensation, and 
permitted sanctions to be taken by the parties to deter trade in the relevant 
substances with outsiders. It is now, McConnell says, 'being hailed as a model for 
new environmental treaties' (McConnell 1991: 320). Even allowing for parental 
pride, their enthusiasm seems well founded, although the problem it addresses is 
reportedly worse than was first thought - a 'demand-side' development outside 
the scope of this chapter. 
Nor is it easy to dispute the implied characterisation of UNCLOS III as a 
diplomatic horror story. Far from being a model for subsequent global confer-
ences, it led one commentator, generally sympathetic to its purposes, to assert: 
The General Assembly should never again convene a conference of the size 
and complexity of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. As a decision 
mechanism it is absurd and in its size and complexity imposes demands on 
delegates which in their totality are quite beyond the competence of human 
beings to manage. 
(Miles 1975: 40) 
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That comment came after only the first substantive session of UNCLOS ill, at 
Caracas in 1974. It took ten such sessions to adopt a treaty, absorbing in all 
ninety-three weeks of diplomatic time, not counting a series of important, though 
informal, 'inter-sessionals'. There had, moreover, been six years of deliberations 
in the General Assembly, and its Sea-Bed Committee, between the inscription of 
the item that gave rise to the treaty on the Assembly's agenda in 1967 and the 
opening ofUNCLOS m, formally in 1973 and substantively in 1974. 
In the end, the Convention it produced was not accepted by three of the states 
whose support was most critical to the success of its most innovative and 
controversial feature, the regime to govern sea-bed mining. The three recalcitrant 
states were the USA, the UK and Germany. Though it eventually, on 16 
November 1993, received the sixtieth ratification, that of Guyana, needed to bring 
it into force one year later, no states with sea-bed mining capacity were among its 
parties, and, after an initiative taken by the UN' s then Secretary-General, Javier 
Perez de Cuellar, in 1990, involving 'informal consultations with key persons in 
both developed and developing countries' (Birnie 1994: 1), the UN General 
Assembly, on 28 July 1994, adopted, by 121 votes to none with seven abstentions 
including Russia, an Agreement whose effect was to transform the sea-bed 
mining provisions of the Convention virtually beyond recognition.1 
If such 'informal consultations' in the early 1990s can produce workable 
agreement on all these issues, where UN CLOS ill, with all its protracted sessions 
and procedural ingenuity, could not, the latter's futility, with respect to the 
creation of a regime to govern sea-bed mining in the interests of mankind- which 
was the purpose for which the whole process was ostensibly launched in 1967 -
becomes even less disputable. 
Susskind and Ozawa do not mention UNCLOS ill. Their focus is on the 
'convention-protocol' approach. They concede that this approach can create 
momentum. Governments initially unwilling or unable to commit themselves to 
specific pollution-reducing targets might be encouraged to 'sign on' if the initial 
commitment is only to monitoring and research, and might later be ready ( or be 
persuaded by domestic opinion) to take such remedial action as the research 
suggests may be required. The two authors also allow that the very signing of a 
convention can boost the campaigns of the relevant environment-protection 
groups in the country (Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 146). 
What, then, is wrong with this approach? It is, they say, a 'time-consuming 
process' (but so was UNCLOS ill!). They also claim that it tends to be dominated 
by the most powerful states, and that, as a result, the conventions that flow from 
it are weakened to satisfy those most opposed to effective action, instancing, in 
this case more persuasively, the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes. They also point to the danger that, 
at the 'framework' or 'convention' stage, decisions may be made on political 
grounds which are technically untenable, such as the exclusion of Romania and 
Bulgaria from the Barcelona Convention on the Mediterranean. They see flaws, 
too, in the Ozone Layer Convention of 1985, both because 'firm limits' (for 
reductions) were not set until the first of its protocols was adopted at Montreal in 
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1987 (which was perhaps not a defect at all but good diplomatic strategy!) and 
because of the inadequate incentives which even the Montreal Protocol offered 
large developing states, and particularly India and China, to induce them to 
associate themselves with the system, a defect they admit, however, to have been 
remedied by the London Amendments of 1990 (Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 
148-52). 
Their nine recommendations for improving on the convention-protocol 
approach were: first, 'empowering non-traditional clusters of countries' to caucus 
well ahead of formal negotiations; second, helping poorer countries to prepare for 
negotiations; third, encouraging the devising of multiple alternative proposals, 
not involving any official commitment, before getting down to treaty-drafting; 
fourth, expanding the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs); fifth, 
recategorising countries to enhance the perception of fairness by not prescribing 
the same obligations for all (they do not explain the ends-means link here); sixth, 
ensuring the continued input of scientific research not tied to national purposes, 
and allowing for a variety of commitments, each predicated on a different future, 
so that the correction of policy appropriate to new knowledge can be built into the 
system; seventh, encouraging 'appropriate' linkages - for instance between 
subsidies on energy-efficient technologies and commitments to COremission 
reductions; eighth, encouraging unilateral actions by setting a baseline year from 
the beginning and agreeing to 'count' all action taken after that baseline towards 
whatever targets may in the end be negotiated; and finally, involving the mass 
media in negotiations, making data banks available to them, and honouring those 
journalists that make outstanding contributions to public enlightenment on the 
issues in question (Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 155--63). 
Several of these recommendations have a whiff of UNCLOS ill about them. 
That conference certainly fostered the spawning of 'non-traditional clusters of 
countries' (Recommendation 1 ), whose only point of unity was the common 
interest they had in some issue or set of issues before the conference. Among 
these were the groups of Land-Locked and Geographically-Disadvantaged States, of 
Archipelagic States, of Broad Shelf States and of Straits States. The building-in 
of sets of alternative responses to alternative futures (Recommendation 6) is 
found in at least two features of the sea-bed mining regime of the Law of the Sea 
Convention as adopted in 1982, one being the financial terms of contracts, 
mentioned earlier, and the other the criteria governing the imposition of a limit on 
sea-bed production. Both have now gone, so, sensible though this recommend-
ation is, the case for it is not strengthened by the experience of UNCLOS ill. The 
latter's leisurely, some would say glacial, pace also afforded plenty of scope for 
suggestions to be put to the conference ( or to informal cross-cutting groupings 
within it, such as the Evensen Group) as suggestions only, rather than as proposed 
treaty clauses (Recommendation 3). 
UNCLOS m may not be the only conference exhibiting these features. What 
makes the resemblance particularly striking - uncannily so ifUNCLOS m is not 
one of the nine cases examined in their fuller study - is Recommendation 7, 
advocating linkages between different issues. Linkage in the example cited 
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earlier would be logical, but a linkage between environmental negotiations and 
'other international issues such as debt, trade and security', which they also 
advocate at one point (Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 153), must amount to some-
thing very like an UNCLOS III-style 'package deal'. 
At UNCLOS III, it was agreed at the outset that only one convention would 
emerge from the conference, and that it would be comprehensive. Thus each party 
insisted ad nauseam that if it agreed to anything at all on any item or sub-item of 
the agenda, that was conditional on the convention that would eventually emerge 
being, as a whole, acceptable to it. So, supposedly, the overall package was 
absolutely indispensable if UN CLOS III were to yield any fruits at all. 
The implicit overall package was this: maritime powers - those, broadly, that 
tended to use the seas adjacent to other states' coasts - faced with a revolutionary 
trend, initiated by the Latin Americans, to deny them almost all their traditional 
rights for at least 200 miles from land, sought a modus vivendi, a way of 
preserving their right to use these newly coastal seas, if not to fish in them. In 
return, in their capacity as potential sea-bed-mining states - a category which 
almost coincided, in its membership, with that of 'maritime powers' - they 
agreed in principle that, were they to be assured of access to sites of their choice, 
they would conduct their sea-bed-mining operations under global management, 
in such a way as to yield revenues for the global community, and even enable the 
proposed international sea bed authority to go into the mining business itself, on 
suitable sites and with appropriate technology afforded by private (and state) 
sea-bed miners. They acknowledged, in other words, that the minerals of the 
international area of the sea bed belonged to 'mankind' as a whole; they were not 
just free for anyone to take without payment in any manner they chose. 
Regulation, inspection and taxation by the international sea-bed authority were 
seen as the price to be paid for the benefits that the parties involved would reap 
from the more orderly world that a generally accepted convention would tend to 
promote. 
As UNCLOS III went on, however, some mini-packages began to emerge. In 
theory, their acceptability depended on that of the convention in which they were 
embodied; in practice, however, it did not, and, as it was controversially claimed, 
they became 'instant customary law'. In this way the USA, though rejecting the 
convention, was not thereby inhibited from claiming rights it would have enjoyed 
under it. UNCLOS III, even before it came into force, may thus be said to have 
generated effective norms; but the unacknowledged nature of this process not 
only helped to protract the conference into the inhospitality of the Reagan era but 
also left a legacy of frustration and resentment in those whose valiant attempts to 
reach consensus on the comprehensive convention to which it was officially 
dedicated were thus seemingly nullified. 
Susskind and Ozawa, therefore, seem to be arguing, it appears unconsciously, 
for a rehabilitation of UN CLOS III as a model for global norm-generation. Elliot 
Richardson, too, is far less dismissive than his editors imply of the conference in 
which he was so heavily involved, acknowledging that it 'pioneered negotiating 
procedures that will serve the environment no less well than they served the 
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oceans', and mentioning both the 'single negotiating text' procedure that it 'so 
successfully' employed and the provisions of the convention that obliges parties 
to observe 'generally-accepted international environmental rules, regulations and 
standards adopted through the competent international organisation' (Richardson 
1992: 169-72).2 
To summarise, UNCLOS III differed from the framework convention-
protocol approach, exemplified by the ozone-layer negotiations, in at least eight 
ways. It was launched by the UN General Assembly, not by a technical body like 
UNEP; it had an extremely broad agenda; it was committed to arriving at a single 
comprehensive convention; it included, from its inception as a conference,3 
practically every state in the world; among its many tasks was the complicated 
and recalcitrant one of setting up a new and innovative global body, the inter-
national sea-bed authority; it punctuated its 'informal' sessions with fairly regular 
public debates; it contained elaborate provisions, never as such used, to ensure 
that no votes were taken before every effort had been made to achieve consensus; 
and it relied, for the drafting of compromise texts, on committee chairmen, 
appointed on political and geographical grounds, rather than on international civil 
servants. 
NEGOTIATIONS - GAMES OR DEBATES? 
It is at this point that conflict theory can contribute to the analysis. In an earlier 
book (Ogley 1991), the author elaborated on Rapoport's distinction between 
'games' and 'debates' (Rapoport 1960). In a 'game', each party is trying to 
maximise its own payoff in terms of its interests and preferences, and does not 
expect the other party's interests or preferences to change. In a 'debate', each 
party believes its policy to be based on some important truth which it must make 
others see and act on, because it is, or should be, a truth for them as well as for 
itself. In a game, the question is: what incentives - carrots and sticks - can you 
devise for others so that it becomes rational for them, in terms of their original 
preferences, to do what you want them to do? In a debate, it is: how can you 
induce others to see the world as you see it? 
Susskind and Ozawa tend to talk about international environmental diplomacy 
as if it were essentially a debate, except when they discuss 'linkages'. Linkages 
imply bargains, and thus games. If you agree to my getting X, which I want and 
you would rather not concede to me but are prepared to if necessary, I will agree 
to your getting Y, which you want and which I am prepared to let you have, 
though I would have preferred not to. In negotiations conceived of as games, it 
makes no sense to provide assistance for other parties with whom one expects to 
be bargaining, since it will merely help them to drive a harder bargain; in those 
conceived of as debates, however, this would be useful, because it would help 
other parties to understand the truths that you have discovered. Also, like legal 
aid for a defendant, it would ensure that, by presenting aspects both of the 
situation and of the needs of the other party that might not have come out had it 
not been properly advised, the body that has to decide the issue is in a better 
162 Roderick Ogley 
position to reach an appropriate conclusion. In contrast, Susskind and Ozawa 
claim: 
Convention writing and protocol writing are usually treated as zero-sum 
games. By the time countries come together to negotiate treaty language, they 
have usually locked into certain fixed positions. Little if any creative problem-
solving is possible. When agreements do emerge, they are usually the result of 
compromise by the most powerful parties rather than the result of the creative 
resolution of differences. 
(Susskind and Ozawa 1992: 151) 
The term 'zero-sum game' is here, as so often, used inaccurately. In a truly 
zero-sum game, there could be no point in negotiations. What they mean is that 
the parties are usually assumed to be on the 'contract curve', that is, in a situation 
where there is no way that the proposals under discussion could be improved for 
all parties. Each party, they allege, imagines that any amendment to its own 
proposal which would benefit some other party must impose some cost, or 
reduction of benefit, to itself - a very closed-minded stance, which seems un-
likely to hold literally for any category of genuine negotiations. Certainly, in 
negotiations about aspects of the environment, where the facts are often novel and 
not easy to appraise, one would expect to find a 'debate' element. But can such 
negotiations ever be pure debate? Is there not always also an element of 'game', 
because at least some countries' interests are opposed to those of other countries? 
Can one really believe that, if environmental negotiations are treated as debates, 
the game element will go away? 
The 'acid rain' negotiations would provide a good test of this. Game theory 
would lead one to expect that, since some states allegedly 'export' acid rain, 
while others suffer from 'importing' it, effective norm-creation would be unlikely 
since the former, who need to act on it, would have no incentive to. Regarded as 
a 'debate', and bearing in mind that, for the most part, 'victim' countries are 
democracies with outlooks and values similar to those of the allegedly emitting 
countries, the acid-rain issue ought to be relatively easy to resolve. It is surely 
possible to determine whether such transboundary pollution does occur; and if it 
does, how could there be any serious objection to stopping it? 
Assessments of the current state of play on this issue differ. Porter and Brown 
report an unsatisfactory situation where the chief alleged emitters, the USA in 
North America and the UK in Europe, have successfully resisted the adoption of 
effective remedies (Porter and Brown 1991). Nigel Haigh, on the other hand, 
commends the outcome of the process initiated by the change in German policy 
in 1982 (itself a subject worthy of further study in the context of this chapter), 
reporting that differentiated percentage reductions have been agreed for different 
members which will, by 2003, reduce aggregate emissions from EC countries by 
58 per cent, and claiming that this agreement on a differentiated reduction could 
be 'a better model for the global warming issue across the world than the uniform 
reduction agreed for ozone-depleting substances', thus echoing Susskind and 
Ozawa's Recommendation 5 (Haigh 1992: 238).4 Another case of a change of 
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heart, where interests were sharply opposed, occurred on the question of mining 
Antarctica. Susskind and Ozawa seem to be saying that the convention-protocol 
approach is less conducive than others to the transcendence of 'games' and the 
flowering of the 'debate' element. a contention which needs more support. both 
in theory and in historical observation, than they give it in their Hurrell and 
Kingsbury chapter. 
FACTORS IN THE GENERATION OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
NORMS 
Let us now list what seem to be the 'factors of production' involved both in the 
global norm-producing industry and, in particular, in the generation of environ-
mental norms. 
One is generality of participation. Those whose policies or behaviour the norm 
is to change or at least constrain must have their say - not necessarily a veto - in 
the process of articulating it. 
A second is external legitimacy: the extent to which a proposed norm can be 
seen as governed by some internationally accepted principle such as 'the common 
heritage of mankind' (in the case of the sea-bed negotiations) or the 'pre-
cautionary principle' (in the case of serious but as yet only hypothetical climatic 
or atmospheric hazards). 
Third, there is internal legitimacy: the extent to which conformity with the norm 
is likely to be reinforced - or resisted - by the pressures of domestic opinion groups. 
Fourth, there is flexibility, including responsiveness to feedback. Norms 
whose precise content can be adjusted in the light of new knowledge and new 
situations will tend to command more respect. 
Finally, specificity seems important. since the actors concerned must, surely, 
know what their obligations are before they can meet them, but this is not always 
either sufficient or necessary. There could hardly be a more specific (indirect) 
norm than that set out in Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, obliging all 
members to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council; but who 
could claim that it has been effective? By contrast, the vaguely sub-Keynesian, 
but market-oriented, norms developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in its early years, and by its predecessor the 
OEEC, buttressed by expert critiques - coming from inside the organisation and 
from other members - of each state's policies, seem to have acquired con-
siderable influence and effectiveness. We should not rule out a role for Johnston's 
los tecnicos in the development of environmental norms. 
These factors may often point in opposing directions. For instance, if (in the 
tradition of Woodrow Wilson) we are to rely on public opinion to put the brakes 
on norm violations by governments, citizens need to be able to identify with the 
norm in question and to be able to see when it is being broken. We need simple, 
appealing and lasting norms. Scientific advances, however, may require norms to 
be complicated and to change rapidly. There is a parallel here with the dilemmas 
posed by global norms in the field of health. 
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There do indeed, then, seem to be two fairly distinct formulae for norm-
generation in the realm of the environment. One operates through networks of los 
tecnicos, aiming at technically workable agreements, responsiveness (which need 
not be uncritical!) to new scientific findings, effective monitoring and only a 
minimum degree of inclusiveness (since the smaller the number of participants, 
the smoother these processes will operate). The other works through quasi-
universal political commitment, induced by well-publicised global conferences 
like UNCLOS ill and UNCED; however, it may be that what gives a given 
deliberation salience is neither its venue nor the institution promoting it but the 
issue with which it deals. 
Among recent cases, the two most notable successes for environmental norm-
generation, other than that concerned with the ozone layer, appear to have been 
the adoption of a fifty-year moratorium on mining in Antarctica in 1991 and the 
transformation of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) from an associ-
ation of whaling states supposedly dedicated to determining and sharing out the 
sustainable catch into one attempting to institute a complete ban on the activity. 
The first of these developments seems attributable to the persistence with which 
Australia opposed American proposals to open up the continent for mining. Since 
the agreement of all the Consultative Parties is required before any decision can 
be taken under the Antarctica Treaty, each has a veto. Australia's use of hers, 
combined with the success of America's environmental groups in alerting 
American public opinion to what was being proposed in their name, managed to 
bring about what amounted to virtually a total reversal of the latter country's 
policy. The second followed the simple device of an influx of non-whaling states, 
under US leadership, into the International Whaling Commission, until its policy, 
determined by a majority vote, became anti-whaling instead of the opposite. In 
both cases, as well as in that of aerosols within the ozone-layer negotiations, the 
state leading the campaign to ban an activity first unilaterally renounced it for 
itself. In the case of whaling, the USA backed up this ban by unilaterally 
imposing trade sanctions on states that objected to the IWC' s ban on commercial 
whaling, at a time when such objections were perfectly legal (Birnie 1992: 74).5 
Another feature of both the Antarctica and the whaling cases is what might be 
called institutional opportunism. Here, the existing procedures of an organisation 
are used in ways not contemplated at its initiation. The joint World Health 
Organisation/United Nations Children's Fund (WHO/UNICEF) code of conduct 
on baby milk of 1981, though hardly qualifying as an environmental issue, 
exhibits a similar pattern. After three years unavailing resistance to powerful 
consumer pressure, Nestle, its main target, agreed to comply with the code 
(Sikkink 1986: 815). This potent norm-generating decision was adopted by WHO 
as a 'recommendation', with no legal force. At the International Health 
Conference of 1946 which set up WHO, although considerable time was spent on 
debating by what modes, and in what fields, WHO could make regulations that 
could become legally binding on members, the seemingly innocuous capacity to 
make 'recommendations' went through practically on the nod. These three cases 
Global environmental norms 165 
remind us that organisations, including the very rudimentary 'consultations' and 
'meetings of the parties' associated with some treaties like that for Antarctica, are 
liable to have a life of their own. UNEP, as we have seen, also played a part in the 
ozone-layer negotiations that was probably critical, though more straightforward 
than in the three preceding cases. The fact that UNEP's Executive Director, 
Mostafa Tolba, seems to have been able to present the negotiators with texts that 
made good scientific sense as well as being attuned to the diplomatic possibilities 
of the moment, is one reason why these negotiations were more productive than 
those in UNCLOS ill, where the need to allocate committee chairmanships 
among the regional groups in the name of 'equitable geographical representation' 
produced at least one chairman seemingly incapable of performing this in-
novative role reliably and uncontroversially (Ogley 1984: 72--4). 
Are we, then, left between the devil and the law of the sea in seeking to 
generate global norms? Not quite. The major international conference might 
work, provided that it is not organised on the principle of a package deal - not 
committed, that is, to arriving at a single convention whose benefits are sup-
posedly confined to its parties. In any case, constructing a convention whose 
benefits are reserved only for those party to it is quite hard for environmental 
questions, since environmental improvement tends to be a 'public good'. 
RIO-AN ASSESSMENT 
The Rio 'Earth Summit' of June 1992 at least avoided the 'package deal' hazard. 
Stanley Johnson describes the 'global bargain' which it 'failed, some would say 
failed dismally, to strike' as 'certainly one of [its] underlying objectives', though 
an unrealistic one which was far from 'ever being on the table at Rio' (Johnson 
1993: 5). If the 'global bargain' was such an objective, at least the failure to 
achieve it did not condemn Rio's other fruits to the fate of either withering or 
being plucked illegally. The Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 
Biodiversity Convention, the Rio Declaration, the Authoritative Statement of 
Forest Principles and Agenda 21 are not linked extraneously in the sense that a 
state that supports one is required to support the others. One striking feature of 
UNCED, indeed, was the fact that these fruits, such as they were, had grown on 
three different trees: the Climate Change Convention emerged from the Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committee (INC) which was appointed by the General 
Assembly in 1990 and whose work was grafted onto the work of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change created, with US support, at the insistence of the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) rather than UNEP, although with 
input from the latter - and from the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU); the Biodiversity Convention sprang from another Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee (INC), this time set up by UNEP originally as an 'Ad Hoe 
Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts' following a US call, in 1987, for 
a comprehensive convention on the subject (Grubb et al. 1993: 75). The Rio 
Declaration, Agenda 21 and the Forest Principles came out of UNCED itself and 
166 Roderick Ogley 
its Preparatory Committee, both created by the UN General Assembly's Reso-
lution 44/228 of 22 December 1989. This diplomatic biodiversity perhaps in itself 
merits conservation. 
Four desiderata might be posited for any major international conference 
designed to generate global environmental norms. 
First, the lead time between the commitment to such a conference and its 
actually being held should be carefully calculated. It should be long enough to 
permit the negotiation of such conventions and other statements of global policy 
as the major states can be induced to agree to; and while the fruits of these 
negotiations would need to be subjected to public scrutiny at the conference itself, 
and while all states would need to be able to have their say in them, it should 
allow the negotiations themselves to be pursued away from the limelight. On the 
other hand, the lead time should not be so great that such initial enthusiasm for 
agreement as there may be is dissipated or diverted into appealing side-issues.6 
For all three sets of negotiations, UNCED provided a deadline. The allegedly 
'extremely bad-tempered and confused' final Nairobi meeting of the Biodiversity 
INC (Brenton 1994: 203), denied the bromides of barbecues and square-dancing 
with which any potential for excitability in the ozone-layer negotiations was 
sedated (Benedick 1991: 49), suggests that in this case the timing was about right. 
At any rate, an agreed text was adopted, in time for the conference, on 22 May 
1992. The Climate Change Convention negotiations, on the other hand, seem to 
have gone backwards. The first session of its INC, in February 1991, met in 
Washington - the fact that it had been invited there being itself an indicator of 
American support - and heard the US delegate, Michael Deland, promise that his 
country would stabilise 'greenhouse-gas' emissions (which include, but of course 
are not confined to, carbon-dioxide emissions) at or below 1987 levels by 2000. 
At Rio, the USA made it a condition of signing the Climate Change Convention 
that no target dates were set for the stabilisation of carbon-dioxide emissions. 
Here, the lead time may well have been too long. 
Second, the conference should attract the attention, however briefly, of the 
world's political leaders. That might help to give 'external legitimacy' to its 
proceedings. Their actual attendance would make it possible, if not likely, that 
something they see or hear there, informally or formally, would sow the seeds in 
some of them of an enhanced hospitality towards environmental considerations. 
Third, there should be some institutional follow-up, to monitor the extent to 
which the conference's conventions and other declarations of intent have been 
translated into changes in habits and practices. In this respect, UNCED itself must 
be judged in terms of the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC), but it 
should also be borne in mind that the two conventions each provide a conference 
for the parties to meet regularly. These conferences, among other things, are 
given the power to adopt amendments to the convention, or to any protocol 
agreed in connection with it, by consensus if possible, but 'in the last resort' by a 
majority - three-quarters in the case of the Climate Change Convention, two-
thirds in the case of the Biodiversity one. This is a significant power - or could 
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be - but the parties to the original convention or protocol are not bound by such 
amendments unless they go on to deposit instruments of approval. 
Fourth, the conference should foster a global network of non-governmental 
organisations. The existence of a meeting point for such NGOs can have at least 
three functions: NGOs can influence the decisions of the conference; the confer-
ence can assist them in their domestic task of enhancing the internal legitimacy 
of such norms as flow from those decisions; and it can also facilitate the domestic 
pressure for commitments that go beyond those decisions. 
Judged by these standards, UNCED looks to have been well designed. Both its 
conventions have now received the ratifications needed to bring them into force. 
Though the Climate Change Convention was ratified under the Bush 
Administration, Clinton has gone further than his predecessor and committed the 
USA to reducing carbon-dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. He has also 
signed the Biodiversity Convention, though ratification has not so far followed 
(Brenton 1994: 193). This more favourable attitude no doubt in part reflects the 
substantial differences in political philosophy between Bush and Clinton, but that 
is by no means the whole story. As is noted by the authors of a House of 
Commons Library Research Paper, 'The Earth Summit: one year on', other 
nations as well as the USA, such as India and Malaysia 'which refused in Rio to 
have the ecological friendliness of their policies judged by the international 
community have now conceded to do this, and provide progress reports to the 
SDC' (Hughes and Lea 1993: 4). This trend must at least in part be attributed to 
the existence of high-profile international norms and instruments to which a 
favourably inclined leader could affiliate. 
Effective norm-generation is about changing human behaviour, practices, 
operations. How far the UNCED process has contributed to that remains to be 
seen. It is difficult to resist the impression that the world is gradually becoming 
more conscious of the hazards facing its environment, for which UNCED des-
erves a share of the credit. Translating that consciousness into the necessary 
global constraints on how we live (whatever these may in the end turn out to be) 
is another matter. The techniques by which such a translation can be accom-
plished will be diverse. We should not expect to discover a single, universally 
applicable formula. It does seem, though, that the world has learnt to avoid some 
of the more glaring procedural misjudgements of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
NOTES 
1 The original Convention had given applicants (states, companies or combinations of 
both) assured access to sites subject to specific conditions in a number of areas, of 
which three, where the text represented arduously negotiated solutions to seemingly 
intractable problems, were particularly important. 
The first such area was that of the 'system of exploitation' which was to facilitate 
the development of a 'parallel system' in which an arm of the International Sea-bed 
Authority, the Enterprise, would also engage in mining. Applicants would offer the 
Authority two sites of equal value, one of which it would 'reserve' on behalf of the 
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Enterprise which could then, subject to the Authority's general rules, exploit it as it 
thought best. It would be helped in this by being provided from the start with enough 
funds to exploit one site, and by being authorised, for an initial period, to buy from 
private and state contractors, at internationally arbitrated prices, technology that it 
needed and could not obtain elsewhere. Under the new Agreement, the Enterprise 
loses these rights both to initial funding and to the compulsory purchase of technology 
(Article 5.2), and is confined, in its initial operations, to joint ventures, with the 
applicant who had originally submitted the reserved site in question having the right 
of first refusal (Article 5). 
Another key area where the Convention's sea-bed-mining regime was the fruit of 
protracted haggling was that of the protection of land-based producers of the same 
minerals. The Convention imposed, for an initial period, a limit on sea-bed pro-
duction, and a compensation scheme to assist developing countries adversely affected 
by such production (Article 151). It is now agreed that Article 151 will not apply, and 
all that is left of the protection it offered is a vague obligation on the part of the 
Authority to help developing countries whose exports have been hit. 
Third, the specific financial obligations of contractors (Annex ITL Article 13), based 
either wholly on percentage 'production charges' (i.e. royalties) or partly on these and 
partly on a progressive tax on profits ranging from 35 to 70 per cent, were scrapped. 
They had been a rare feature of the 1980 draft on which (with the aid of computer 
models) so persuasive a consensus had been reached that even the 'Reagan Review' 
of 1982, whose brusque demands for wholesale changes had wrecked hopes that 
UNCLOS III might achieve unanimity in adopting its convention, had left it un-
disturbed. By the Agreement, contractors are to pay something, but exactly what has 
been left quite vague. 
Further changes made by the Agreement include the dropping of the requirement 
that a Review Conference be held not more than fifteen years after commercial 
production has begun, and considerable modification of the Authority's structure and 
voting rules. 
The process by which this Agreement has been negotiated has been kept secret, but 
the outcome looks very much like dictation by the rich, potential sea-bed-mining 
states. By early December 1984, the Agreement had received seventy signatures but 
only seven ratifications or expressions of intentions to be bound by it. Others, 
including the UK, had also indicated their intention to ratify. 
2 In other words, to accept the substance of conventions adopted by the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) even if they had not otherwise acceded to them, and 
indeed even if they were not members of the IMO. This is indeed a far-reaching 
commitment. 
3 Its predecessor, the Sea-Bed Committee, had only thirty-five members initially, 
growing eventually to ninety-one, but since it reported annually to the General 
Assembly, its selective character had less impact. 
4 In fairness to the ozone-layer agreements, though, it should be remembered that under 
it, developing-country parties are exempted from this uniform percentage reduction 
requirement. 
5 Apparently, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1978 provides for a ban on the import or export of fish or fish 
products, or a denial of access to the USA's Exclusive Economic Zone, in respect of 
states which the US Secretary of State determines and certifies to have undermined 
those conservation treaties to which the USA is a party. 
6 The delay in launching UNCLOS III allowed coastal states to effect a drastic exten-
sion of the limits of their jurisdiction, and thus correspondingly diminish the 
dimensions of the 'common heritage of mankind' whose definition, preservation and 
management were, supposedly, the raison d'etre of the process from which the 
conference had sprung. 
Global environmental norms 169 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Benedick, R. (1991) Ozone Diplomacy, London: Harvard U.P. 
Birnie, P. (1992) 'International environmental law: its adequacy for present and future 
needs', in Hurrell, A. and Kingsbury, B. (eds) The International Politics of the Environ-
ment, Oxford: Clarendon. 
-- (1994) 'Law of the Sea to come into force', New World April-June 1994: 1. 
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (1994a) 'Global climate protection policy: the limits of 
scientific advice - Part 1', Global Environmental Change 4(2): 140-59. 
--(1994b) 'Global climate protection policy: the limits of scientific advice - Part 2', 
Global Environmental Change 4(3): 185-200. 
Brenton, T. (1994) The Greening of Machiavelli, London: Eartbscan/Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
Choucri, N. (1993) Global Accords, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Gardner, R. (1993) Negotiating Survival: Four Priorities after Rio, New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations Press. 
Grubb, M., Koch, M., Munson, A., Sullivan, F. and Thomson, K. (1993) The Earth 
Summit Agreements: a Guide and Assessment, London: Eartbscan/Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
Haigh, N. (1992) 'The European Community and international environmental policy', in 
Hurrell, A. and Kingsbury, B. (eds) The International Politics of the Environ- ment, 
Oxford: Clarendon. 
Hughes, P. and Lea, W. (1993) 'The Earth Summit: one year on', London: House of 
Commons (Library Research Paper 93nl). 
Hurrell, A. and Kingsbury, B. (eds) (1992) The International Politics of the Environment, 
Oxford: Clarendon. 
Johnson, S.P. (1993) The Earth Summit: the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), London: Graham & Trotman. 
Johnston, D.M. (1988) 'Marine pollution agreements: successes and problems', in Carroll, 
J.E. (ed.) International Environmental Diplomacy, Cambridge: C.U.P. 
McConnell, F. (1991) Review of Benedick, International Environmental Affairs 3(4): 
318-20. 
Miles, E. (1975) 'An interpretation of the Caracas proceedings', in Christy, F .T ., Clingan, 
T.A., Gamble, J.K., Knight, G.H. and Miles, E. (eds) Law of the Sea: Caracas and 
Beyond, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 
Ogley, R.C. (1984) Internationalizing the Seabed, Aldershot: Gower. 
--(1991) Conflict Under the Microscope, Aldershot: Avebury. 
Paterson, M. (1993) 'The politics of climate change after UNCED', in Thomas, C. (ed.) 
Rio: Unravelling the Consequences, London: Frank Cass. 
Porter, G. and Brown, J.W. (1991) Global Environmental Politics, Boulder, Col.: 
Westview. 
Rapoport, A. (1960) Fights, Games and Debates, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Richardson, E.L. (1992) 'Climate change: problems of law-making', in Hurrell, A. and 
Kingsbury, B. (eds) The International Politics of the Environment, Oxford: Clarendon. 
Roddick, J. (1992) 'The results of the Rio Earth Summit', Science, Technology and 
Development 10(3): 347-63. 
Sachs, W. (1993) Global Ecology, London: Zed Books. 
Sands, P. (ed.) (1993) Greening International Law, London: Earthscan. 
Sikkink, K. (1986) 'Codes of conduct for TNCs - the case of the WHO/UNICEF code', 
International Organization 40(4): 815-40. 
Skjaerseth, J.B. (1992) 'The "successful" ozone-layer negotiations', Global Environ-
mental Change 2(4): 292-300. 
170 Roderick Ogley 
Susskind, L. and Ozawa, C. ( 1992) 'Negotiating more effective international agreements', 
in Hurrell, A. and Kingsbury, B. (eds) The International Politics of the Environ- ment, 
Oxford: Clarendon. 
Thacher, P .S. ( 1992) 'The Earth Summit - an institutional perspective', Security Diawgue 
23(3): 117-26. 
Thomas, C. (1992) The Environment in International Relations, London: Royal Institute 
of International Affairs. 
Woods, L.T. (1993) 'Nongovemmental organizations and the United Nations system: 
reflecting upon the Earth Summit experience', International Studies Notes 18(1): 9-15. 
10 The international research enterprise 
and global environmental change 
Climate-change policy as a research process 
Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen 
The question addressed here is how the scientific community, described as the 
global research enterprise, raised the issue of global environmental change and 
shaped political responses to it, in particular the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC).1 Research in the natural sciences related to climate, 
energy and ecology are all considered parts of the same enterprise because they 
rely on the same global data sets and modelling capacities and are well organised 
internationally (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a). Did this enterprise by the 
scientific community (as it likes to describe itself) effectively influence inter-
national policy on global environmental change, as is widely assumed and even 
predicted (Haas, P. 1990)? Or did it primarily act to create both future markets for 
its products and new findings using new space and information technologies? 
Another way of posing the question is to enquire to what extent international 
agreements commit governments to do more than engage in further research and 
data collection, especially more than they would have done anyway. If it is likely 
that they did not do so, then doubts may be raised both about the benign role of 
epistemic communities and about the impact and function of international environ-
mental regimes (Young 1989). Attention is drawn to wider problems which may 
arise for environmental policy and society if purely science-based international 
environmental agreements are adopted. 
A tacit alliance between scientific institutions, intergovernmental bureau-
cracies, Northern environmentalists and assorted commercial interests took the 
issue of global warming to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, but apart from issuing 
many exhortations, it could persuade governments to do little more than make 
commitments to further research and data collection in order to learn more about 
global environmental change (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a, b).This served the 
interests of the research enterprise, and it may well be rational international 
politics were it not for its impacts on national research priorities (Boehmer-
Christiansen 1995). Scientific institutions as one home of the 'epistemic 
community' are widely seen as a benign influence on environmental regimes and 
policy formulation. However, as the scientific community and its allies in inter-
national bureaucracies are primarily concerned with the solution of scientific and 
technological problems as defined by themselves, their advice cannot but reflect 
these priorities which, once turned into policy advice, tend to be impossible to 
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implement because of their limited perspectives, narrow knowledge base and 
simplistic theories of government and human behaviour. 
Once researchable uncertainties become objectives of international treaties, 
existing problems, including environmental ones, may be ignored and power 
differentials widened further as global information is collected, stored and made 
accessible to only a very few countries. Even worse, if non-environmental prob-
lems (such as poverty or lack of 'development') are disguised as environmental 
issues, then the failure of science to provide 'proof, so easily achieved at the 
frontiers of knowledge, may undermine worthwhile responses. It is therefore 
argued that in the current world political context, the global research enterprise 
has not only become a significant political actor, promoting the globalisation of 
information collection and 'business-as-usual' research, but has also done so with 
reference to specific global environmental concerns that were exaggerated (not 
necessarily by all scientists but certainly by many users of their ambiguous 
scientific advice) for this purpose. This hypothesis will be developed with refer-
ence to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the scientific 
body formally appointed by a small number of countries at the advice of the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in 1988. 
IN SEARCH OF ENERGY AND INFORMATION MARKETS: 
THE CONTEXT OF IPCC ADVICE 
The efforts of the International Panel on Climate Change and its predecessors in 
shaping climate policy need to be analysed, and to do this, the role of these panels 
not only as providers of knowledge but also as political actors with deliberate 
policy goals - including the advancement of research agendas - needs to be 
considered. Such strategic behaviour on the part of these panels is necessary 
because knowledge is now a commodity which must be marketed to users and 
must attract public funding in highly competitive conditions. The IPCC reflects 
this requirement by primarily serving two global programmes, the 'private' 
International Geosphere Biosphere Programme (IGBP),2 coordinated by the 
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) based in Sweden, and the 
'public' World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), coordinated by the WMO 
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) but largely imple-
mented by the research sections of national meteorological offices. In the end, of 
course, most of this research is paid for by taxes. In 1994/5, the USA alone will 
spend $1.6 billion on global change, and Europe probably more (see Figure 10.1 ). 
The 'mission' of these research programmes is the full understanding -
already dreamt ofby American scientists in the 1950s - of the physical systems 
of the planet Earth (including their complete visibility via remote sensing by 
satellites) as increasingly affected by the human species. To the scientific un-
certainties which so clearly afflict the human understanding of the natural system 
(in spite of growing attention to 'biotic feedbacks' and advances in modelling 
capacity), additional 'socioeconomic' uncertainties are added. The global-
warming threat was in fact produced by a combination of these two sets of 
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factors: changes in the energy balance brought about by past changes in the 
chemical composition of the atmosphere (which have produced very little 
warming), and rapid increases in future emissions based on socioeconomic 
assumptions and predicted, by mathematical models, to lead to rapid warming in 
the next century. 
Behind this mission are a small number of governments with strong 
atmospheric-science/climatology research capacities and space lobbies: the USA, 
the UK, Sweden, Canada, Japan, Germany and Australia, all major actors in the 
IPCC process.3 This Panel and its predecessor, the Advisory Group on Green-
house Gases (AGGG), stressed the need for more knowledge, and advocated 
changes in energy use and technology requiring vast investments. This created a 
major debate of which demands for more science were the major outcome. Once 
the scientists and scientific institutions involved had begun to disseminate their 
message both to the general public and to industries and governments, world-
wide political processes were set in motion - and were also studied, in as far as 
they impinged upon energy-policy debates. Scientific advice did indeed become 
an independent policy influence, but it did so through its interpretation and use 
by other major stakeholders: the scientific institutions themselves withdrew into 
neutrality. 
The Panel's motivation, fate and impacts were examined with the help of 
internal files, official reports, a questionnaire returned by over 100 IPCC partici-
pants and more than sixty interviews with scientists, users and observers. To 
contextualise the argument, a brief explanation is needed of why the 'Rio' 
alliance failed to achieve its apparent 1990 global goal of initiating the rapid 
reduction of carbon-dioxide emissions (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994c; Boehmer-
Christiansen and Skea 1991). 
The analysis of this material from national, international and scientific - as 
well as business - sources allowed some testing of the anti-Realist vision of 
international relations so fashionable in the study of environmental issues, and 
especially as understood by supporters both of the concept of 'epistemic com-
munities' (Haas, P. 1990, 1993) and of the view that changing knowledge leads 
to a redefinition of interest (Haas, E.B. 1990). Both approaches tend to view the 
international political process as involving 'social learning', and both use models 
of international relations which assume a shared interest among all nations in 
keeping 'the environment' in a scientifically defined condition of 'health' .4 The 
action of such communities, defined as involving operationalised scientific 
knowledge or transnational networks of specialists, is seen to lead to managed 
interdependence 'where new threats or problems are identified and collective 
understanding evolves and is mobilised to respond to and collectively manage the 
newly apparent risks' (Haas, P. 1993: 1). While rightly emphasising that 
knowledge and ideas play an innovative role here by shaping perceptions and 
expectations, and therefore contribute to definitions of 'preferences' or interest, 
the research reported also suggests that the epistemic approach tends seriously to 
exaggerate the independence of expert communities from the political process. 
Indeed, such communities in fact emerge as interested parties in the regime-
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building process in a quite unexpected manner. However, overconfident of their 
influence, epistemic communities may actually be able to achieve little more than 
a protection of their own interests in the genuine belief that 'more knowledge' 
will automatically benefit all mankind. Indeed, it is argued that the creation of 
consensual, problem-solving knowledge is alien to science and tends to be a 
strategy which does not serve the interests of research communities. Scientific 
consensus, as marketed by epistemic communities, may well be fundamentally 
unreliable for policy purposes. Rather than knowledge redefining interest and 
power, it is suggested that power and interest select areas of new knowledge -
that is, define research agendas in collaboration with 'apolitical' epistemic com-
munities, in other words, with areas of expertise which do not challenge but 
confirm existing patterns of power. The epistemic approach is therefore question-
able in that it is likely both to raise unrealistic expectations and to undervalue the 
role of informed politicians and administrators; and it is also dangerously elitist. 
The innovative capacity attributed to international organisations as trans-
national actors may suffer from the same fault: rather than being able to create 
consensual, cooperative, problem-solving environmental 'regimes', epistemic 
communities may instead capture these regimes and use them to serve the 
research enterprise. The exaggeration of the benign role of both expert networks 
and certain intergovernmental organisations may in turn mislead other inter-
governmental organisations who may be persuaded by theory to allocate their 
own scarce political resources to the least effectual level of governance and 
innovative action. While empirical research does not question the claim that 
international negotiations may be an effective process for reducing uncertainty 
(Winham 1977), the very definition of epistemic communities 'as networks of 
knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge' raises questions, if the implication is that experts are, or should be, 
above politics. Research networks, or rather the global-knowledge-producing 
enterprise itself, may have been given dangerous advice by the epistemic model. 
The very persistence of their influence at the domestic level, believed by Peter 
Haas to be due to their capture of important bureaucratic positions (and hence of 
future funding), is 'subject to their ability to avoid widespread internal dis-
agreement' (Haas, P. 1993: 9). (See Figure 10.2 for international research enter-
prise list of acronyms.) 
The political forces at work behind the scenes and, de facto, acting as implicit 
allies of research can be identified from responses to the FCCC. Fossil-fuel 
interests are fairly content with the treaty, while recognising that the battle is not 
yet won. Bureaucracies are also content, as they are extremely busy drafting 
reports to international bodies and preparing, inter alia, national emission plans, 
while also engaging in interdepartmental battles over new competencies. Major 
interventions in national energy and land-use policies remain a possibility, but 
little has as yet happened, as more scientific verdicts are awaited. The imple-
mentation of global research programmes linked to the IPCC, on the other hand, 
is prospering well (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 1994: IGBP 
newsletters). Coordinated by the WMO, UNEP and the ICSU, these programmes 
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completed their planning stage during the mid-1980s (ICSU/IGBP 1992). They 
are the major market for data gathered from remote sensing, that is, for the 
increasingly privatised earth-observation industry, an industry characterised by 
rapid innovation and limited competition but in need of public subsidies (Mansell 
and Paltridge 1993). 
Less directly, but more significantly, the energy industries, also, were deeply 
involved - though not united. While the FCCC, as finally negotiated, made no 
commitments against coal and cheap energy, these two areas of industry felt most 
threatened, for much was made in the late 1980s of the alleged IPCC advice that 
a 60-per-cent reduction in carbon-dioxide emissions was needed soon in order to 
prevent catastrophe. Official responses by believers were strong: as recently as 
1988, a division of the UK Department of the Environment (DoE) believed that a 
hierarchy of energy-policy responses (including increasing the price of coal, 
expanding nuclear energy, improving energy efficiency and eventually removing 
carbon dioxide from flue gases) could not be defined in accordance with the 
timetable of expected findings from government-financed research over the next 
five to twenty-five years (a timetable which also made use of reliable regional 
predictions). Energy-policy goals would be defined by scientific progress, and 
research would directly serve policy. Other governments felt much less able to 
transform their energy economies (Grubb 1991), and were relieved when the 
FCCC remained as vague as the USA (with UK Treasury support) wanted. The 
US and UK governments were by far the best informed on the status of climate 
science, a subject that they were and still are funding generously. 
In its 1990 report and advice, the IPCC had indeed confirmed the concern of 
'independent' scientists. After the assumption had been made of a doubling of 
carbon-dioxide (CO2) concentrations in the atmosphere at certain prescribed 
dates early next century, energy-policy scenarios, at the request of the USA and 
the Netherlands, were adjusted to suit these dates and then fed into equilibrium 
models which, as expected, predicted rapid and disturbing increases in the average 
global temperature. This emission-scenario methodology and type of model have 
since been improved upon, and a greater range of scenarios has now been 
produced. These are highly speculative experiments and even their creators still 
consider them to be improper policy tools. However, the assumptions built into 
the 1990 climate models - and hence their predictions also - were not widely 
debated at the time. This was intentional. The 'climate community' had also 
advocated, from the very beginning, technical solutions directed against the 
burning of coal, a very expensive fuel in Europe (but not elsewhere). Alternatives 
would divide the believers, however, between support for nuclear expansion and 
a switch to natural gas, on the one hand, and the advocacy of 'soft' energies 
(wind, waves, solar) and energy saving on the other hand. As most of these 
solutions were a long way off commercially or less attractive to governments 
since fossil-fuel prices were falling (oil prices collapsed in 1986 and have 
recovered but little), government subsidisation was called for in the name of 
preventing global warming. The 'new' technologies that had been developed in 
response to the oil-price shocks of the 1970s are thus in need of markets. 
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The market and the oil companies (as the owners) were ready for one change 
only, and had been waiting for it for some time: the use of gas as a replacement 
for coal or uranium - or both - in electricity generation. Both the UK and US 
plans for stabilising emissions under the FCCC rely on fuel-switching from coal 
to oil, something which would have happened any way in the UK if only for 
reasons of competition. Not all countries could or would avail themselves of this 
opportunity, but in Europe, Siberian and Norwegian gas was beckoning, and the 
nuclear industry remained hopeful for a while. The inability of the global - as 
distinct from European - energy system to stabilise emissions was well known. 
The International Energy Agency (IBA) warned in 1990 that for the whole world 
economy, stabilisation, let alone a 60-per-cent reduction, within two decades 
would require impossible efforts. The World Bank argued in 1992 that global 
energy use and production could only be changed at the margin over the next 
thirty years because of weak administrative and institutional structures (WEC 
1993: 20). In 1993, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) could 
not agree on the proposed joint implementation strategy which would allow 
companies to reduce CO2 anywhere in the world because it would mean outflows 
of investments and loss of jobs. The European Community's efforts to introduce 
a European carbon/energy tax will almost certainly experience the same fate. 
Coal, the world's cheapest, most widely distributed and most labour-intensive 
fuel, will not be wiped out globally, though this was the British Government's 
aim quite irrespective of global warming - an issue which merely served to 
green-wash its unpopular policy. Coal's competitors, however, after Chernobyl 
and the collapse of oil prices, had supported the perception of a strong warming 
threat. When Bolin (the IPCC's Chairman) and Houghton (the Chairman of the 
IPCC's Working Group I (WG I)) addressed the World Energy Congress in 1993, 
both spoke to the World Energy Council, a Non-Governmental Organisation and 
a major funder of environmental-energy research, in support of higher energy 
prices, energy efficiency and renewables (World Energy Council 1993). Bolin 
has been a vocal advocate of changes in energy-policy technologies for over a 
decade (Bolin 1977). 
A BRIEF IHSTORY OF SCIENTIFIC ADVICE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
The threat of global warming was constructed in research institutions a decade or 
so ago and widely disseminated with the help of environmentalists and inter-
national bureaucracies. It gained world political salience in the second half of the 
1980s shortly after scientific institutions began to seek active involvement in 
policy-making. This development is attributed less to the influence of new 
knowledge than to the combination of a powerful threat image and the open 
advocacy of anti-fossil-fuel policies at a time when this was welcome to a number 
of energy interests. The dissemination of the threat was achieved most effectively 
by the UN system with the assistance of Northern environmental networks, each 
soon to use the IPCC as a mouthpiece for diverging policy goals. The intellectual 
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debate on which subsequent politics was based, and which resulted in the FCCC, 
can be traced back much further. 
In 1827 Fourier raised the global-warming issue on the basis of a number of 
calculations, in 1896 Arrhenius predicted an increase in air temperature of 
between 4 °C and 6°C on the basis of laboratory tests, and in 1938 a British steam 
technologist, Callendar, also calculated that the planet was getting warmer be-
cause of carbon-dioxide emissions. The latter added, however, that there was no 
need for concern as this meant that another ice age would be prevented. Forecasting 
weather and climatology remained little-respected sciences for several more 
decades as the splitting of the nucleus and nuclear technology rather than the 
complexity of nature occupied the brightest minds (Weart 1992). The climate-
change research debate began in earnest in the late 1950s with reference to 
weather modification, with the USA, Germany and Sweden most deeply 
involved. In 1957 two American scientists pointed out that human beings were 
carrying out a large-scale geophysical experiment which might yield far-reaching 
insights into the processes determining weather and climate. In 1961 Charles 
Keeling proved the increase in carbon-dioxide concentration in the atmosphere 
by measurement, and warnings in the media began shortly afterwards. 
The study of man's potential influence on the climate then advanced rapidly 
during the 1970s as research institutions learned to relate their search for know-
ledge to human concerns like the fears associated both with the limits-to-growth 
debate and with the idea of a 'nuclear winter' (Hart and Victor 1993). Climate 
modelling was now making rapid progress, and the US President's Science 
Advisory Council argued in 1965 that supercomputers would allow useful predic-
tions, down to the regional level, to be made within two or three years. Almost 
thirty years later, no such detail is possible, and there is some doubt that it ever 
will be (McCracken 1992: 13). In 1970 the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, always at the forefront of research, convened a 'Study of Critical 
Environmental Problems' which concluded that global warming was a serious 
possibility. It advocated the aggressive expansion of climate research, combined 
with population control and protection of the food system - science was ready to 
solve a new problem with the help of the pill and the Green Revolution. 
The 1972 Stockholm Conference recommended more climate-change 
research, as suggested by the First International Conference on Environmental 
Futures. This had proposed a UN institute for planetary survival, and in a keynote 
paper on 'Climatic modification by air pollution', the American climatologist 
Bryson discussed the matter of aerosols and the ozone layer. Atmospheric dust 
was feared to be the causal agent, though Bryson, in discussion, admitted to a 
'sneaking' suspicion that the demands for more monitoring were 'mostly for the 
care and feeding of big computers' rather than for the welfare of man (Bryson 
1972). Others argued that the development of numerical general-circulation 
models which successfully simulate both the present climate and the behaviour of 
the atmosphere in long time runs was the first step in attempts to predict what 
happens to the atmosphere as a result of man's activities, then considered to be 
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the ultimate goal of the Global Atmospheric Research Programme (GARP), the 
project managed by Bert Bolin when he was a young man (Polunin 1972: 168). 
GARP is the predecessor to IGBP, and was never fully completed. 
The executive of the WMO began to include climate change into its research 
portfolio, and the environmental lobby, growing in strength, would be on the 
look-out for new problems. By the end of the 1970s, UNEP, still a rather weak 
intergovernmental body in search of a function, had made climate both a research 
and a development issue, sharing the former interest with the WMO. UNEP's 
Executive Director had mentioned both energy and the need for better climate 
forecasting in 1974 without any reference to global warming, but when ad-
dressing the First World Climate Conference in 1979, he referred to climate 
change as the process of carrying out an uncontrolled experiment on the earth's 
atmosphere, and assured his audience that UNEP was ready to assess the environ-
mental impacts of increased levels of carbon dioxide (Tolba 1982). The worlds of 
politics and energy remained unimpressed. Energy-demand forecasters, on the 
other hand, became interested in the subject as American, German, Canadian, 
Swedish and British research groups began collaborating on integrating energy 
forecasting and environmental futures. The nuclear lobby in particular was 
attracted to the subject. The more specific threat of global warming was now 
firmly tied to an advocacy of new energy technologies and to the frightening 
'predictions' of energy-demand forecasters. 
The estimated temperature changes put forward in the late 1970s in relation to 
the doubling of carbon-dioxide concentration differed surprisingly little from 
those put forward a decade later by the IPCC (Kellogg and Schware 1981).5 The 
number of academic books on the subject soared, but the global political system 
still took no notice. The energy industries, still either largely in public hands or 
well supported by public R&D expenditure - or both - provided for the develop-
ment and use of technologies and fuels which were generating, or promised to 
generate, less rather than more carbon dioxide. Climatic variability as a cause of 
damage to food production became the issue which justified the World Climate 
Research Programme (WCRP) which the WMO initiated in 1979 at the First 
World Climate Conference, but which remained poorly funded. The Paris-based 
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU}, among them its Scientific 
Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), had already shown a 
growing interest in environmental subjects and global atmospheric modelling 
(ICSU/IGBP 1992). SCOPE had been set up in 1970 to assess environmental 
problems, and in the early 1980s contributed to the study of nuclear winter. The 
ICSU and UNEP were as concerned as the WMO about the growing inability of 
developing countries to contribute to data collection and monitoring. They eventu-
ally pooled their efforts and organised the 1985 Villach Conference, the second 
conference on the subject of the carbon cycle and climatic change, held in 
Austria. 
The international research enterprise 181 
THE ADVISORY GROUP ON GREENHOUSE GASES AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE IPCC 
A small group of environmental scientists and research managers working on 
energy and the climate was set up in 1985 at a UNEP/WMO/ICSU-sponsored 
meeting with an agenda revealingly described as 'the second joint UNEP/ICSU/ 
WMO international assessment of the role of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases in climate variations and associated impacts'. This group called 
itself the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG), and held its first 
meeting in 1986. It was to become astonishingly active and influential until 1990 
As an advisor to governments, it was replaced by the IPCC. 
The Villach Conference was organised both by the Swedish International 
Meteorological Institute (IMI) (the home of Bert Bolin) and by the Beijer 
Institute (now the Stockholm Environment Institute - SEI) which has close 
research links with British institutions. The Conference concluded that 'it is now 
believed that in the first half of the next century a rise of global mean temperature 
could occur which is greater than any in man's history', and recommended that 
science-based emission or concentration targets should be worked out to limit the 
rate of change in the global mean temperature to a maximum of 0.1 °C (WMO 
1986). The meeting was attended mainly by non-governmental researchers, in-
cluding three researchers from the Climate Research Unit at the University of 
East Anglia, one from the UK Meteorological Office (UKMO), and one scientist 
from the US Department of Energy's Carbon Dioxide Research Division. The 
proceedings were dominated by participants from Harvard University and 
the Vienna International Institute for System Analysis (IIASA), who already saw 
the responses to the climate threat as part of 'sustainable development'. 
The Villach meeting was more cautious about science than the IPCC appeared 
to be in 1990. Another ten-to-twenty years of observation would be needed before 
the detection of global warming was likely, and the ecologist William Clark from 
Harvard stated that uncertainties dominated the greenhouse-gas question, from 
emission rates through environmental consequences to socioeconomic impacts 
(WMO 1986: 24). The Conference felt that refining estimates was 'a matter of 
urgency', and recommended a list of actions which remained vague with respect 
to policy but were very specific for research. The analysis of decision-making 
rules under specific kinds of risks, the determination of damage costs resulting 
from greenhouse warming and the analysis of the behaviour of policy-makers 
were all to be researched - an agenda for rational, technocratic decision-making. 
The Conference went beyond advocating more research but suggested that a 
small task force should be set up jointly by the ICSU, UNEP and the WMO to 
ensure that periodic assessments both of the current state of scientific under-
standing and of its practical applications would be undertaken. A global con-
vention was to be considered, and a small group of advisors was to be set up that 
would suggest what needed to be done at the national and international levels. 
The small group, in fact, already existed - it had organised the Conference and 
provided the backbone of the AGGG. There was no need for consensus-
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generating procedures as only those in agreement with the aims of the group had 
been asked to join in the first place. The Conference largely approved the broader, 
political brief urged by Tolba for UNEP under an 'agenda of action'. A non-
governmental International Greenhouse-Gas Coordinating Committee was to: 
- promote and coordinate research, monitoring and assessment; 
- promote the exchange of information related to climate warming; 
- prepare and disseminate educational material; and 
- approve the possible advantages of an intergovernmental agreement on global 
convention. 
While the AGGG succeeded in taking the policy debate into the world of politics, 
its institutional base proved too poor to keep the issue out of the hands of big, 
responsible institutions, governments and the WMO, which all had the ability to 
fund the global-change experiment. Its publications, all the same, would be more 
influential. The scientific papers read at Villach and commissioned and peer-
reviewed by its organisers were published jointly by the WMO/ICSU and UNEP 
(Bolin et al. 1988). In a 1992 interview, a British coordinator of the IPCC WG I 
called this Scope 29 report 'the IPCC bible'. AGGG members subsequently 
organised the 1988 Toronto NGO Conference on the Changing Atmosphere 
Implications for Global Security which called for a 20-per-cent reduction in CO2 
emissions and caused considerable unease among governments, industry and 
government scientists. They also organised the Second World Climate 
Conference in 1990. This Conference failed to agree on CO2-reduction targets, 
but its results were disseminated nonetheless (Jager and Ferguson 1991: 473). 
The AGGG had drafted a recommendation which not only reflected a degree of 
policy ambition which was subsequently disputed but also added to the pressures 
for the setting-up of an intergovernmental group. The AGGG also prepared the 
Meeting of Legal and Policy Experts held in February 1989 in Ottawa which 
recommended an 'umbrella' consortium, to protect the atmosphere, which was to 
be implemented through subsequent protocols. And it further proposed both a 
World Atmosphere Trust Fund and a Convention that should be served by a panel 
of independent experts (Churchill and Freestone 1992: 375). There was therefore 
considerable bitterness when the AGGG was replaced by the IPCC under pres-
sure from the US State Department exerted through the Executive Committee of 
the WMO. The IPCC was also supported by many developing countries who felt 
excluded from the whole process. The US State Department, presumably with the 
support of the US Department of Energy (a major sponsor of carbon-dioxide 
research), wanted the scientific assessment to stay in governmental hands, not in 
those 'of free-wheeling academics' (a WMO source). 
By 1985, therefore, a community of scientists had formed which included 
people deeply involved in energy and policy research and was determined to 
initiate a dialogue with 'policy-makers', a selected few of whom they invited to 
a 1986 meeting. The IPCC is best understood as a response both to this initiative 
and to the policy advocacy which emerged from Villach. Governmental scientific 
interests closer to meteorological offices and the hearts of governments would 
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take over the research agenda. By the absorption and rejection of groups and 
individuals, this led, in 1988, to a gathering of individuals that would form the 
IPCC. The overlap of individuals and institutions attending the Villach Confer-
ence and later supporting the IPCC and IGBP is considerable, and provides 
evidence for the ability of the research enterprise to attract attention to its 
programmes by making its problems those of mankind (Boehmer-Christiansen 
1993, 1994c). The links between the IPCC and IGBP are strong. The US 
Committee on Global Change and the US National Committee for the IGBP of 
the Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources of the National 
Research Council have stated that the IGBP was developed as a step in the 
evolving process of defining the scientific needs involved in understanding those 
changes in the global environment which are of great concern. One chapter out of 
nine in this report deals with humanity (US National Research Council 1990), and 
a small section of the Global Change research agenda is also now devoted to the 
human dimension, primarily because of the impacts of land-use changes on 
physical variables (Price 1992). This, too, primarily reflects US research needs.6 
The importance of 'Global Change' to the US research community is enormous, 
as is the need to ensure policy relevance. Neither science nor vested energy 
interests had much to gain from a global advisory body that would hurry along 
the policy process by recommending action rather than further decades of 
research. IGBP representatives addressed the eighth plenary session of the IPCC 
in connection with the IGBP's START (System for Analysis, Research and 
Training) programme, which works closely with the International Group of 
Funding Agencies for Global Change Research (IGBP 1994). START aims to 
strengthen the scientific capacity of developing countries (an interest it shares 
with the IPCC), and it is already being funded by the Global Environment 
Facility.7 START's secretariat is in Washington, and is guided by the IGBP 
Standing Committee - at which the WCRP is also represented. The November-
1992 START workshop in Niger was attended by the Chairman of the 1985 
Villach Conference who now chairs the new IPCC WG ill. Space science and 
technology are deeply involved in all these bodies.8 
THE INSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF THE IPCC 
By the time the WMO and UNEP had been invited by the General Assembly 
(UNGA) in 1988 to jointly prepare a Framework Convention on Climate Change 
which was to contain commitments for actions, to combat climate change, 'taking 
into account the most up-to-date sound scientific knowledge and any existing 
uncertainties' (Churchill and Freestone 1992: 249), the IPCC had already been 
set up. The sound knowledge (what is unsound knowledge?) and uncertainties in 
question were both to be supplied by a group of research managers, science-
policy leaders and government officials that had formally been set up a few 
months earlier in response to statements and claims, about the approaching risk 
of global warming, made by 'independent' scientists under the auspices of the 
ICSU, the WMO and UNEP. Such claims had been made for decades, but had 
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been rejected by the WMO as too speculative until 1986 when the task of 
scientific assessment passed into the more responsible hands (with deeper pockets) 
of government laboratories and meteorological offices in the UK, the USA, 
Canada and Australia. The independent research sector was not excluded, but it 
would now work as funded and instructed. The IGBP, in preparation since the 
early 1980s, was also adopted by the ICSU in 1986. 
As had happened for the protection of the ozone layer, UNEP expected the 
climate convention to be negotiated under its own auspices, but in late 1990 
UNGA decided otherwise. Too many agendas, fears and doubts had by then 
attached themselves to the climate threat for the issue to be left to environmental 
scientists alone. Negotiations would be undertaken not by the IPCC but by the 
International Negotiating Committee (INC). Politicians took the task away from 
the research enterprise, but had meanwhile become dependent on it for authority. 
Science is an unreliable ally. By 1992, with funding ensured, researchers wanted 
not to give 'new' advice but instead to be left alone to get on with data collection 
and the testing of global models in order to assess and reduce a growing number 
of uncertainties. There was not much that was 'new' anyway. The scientific 
perspective is not that of the policy-makers; rather, 'it is important that we are 
able to predict the effects of global environmental changes on the long-term 
climate, but our present understanding of the problem is far from complete and 
our ocean-climate models are not sophisticated enough, nor is present computing 
power sufficient' (Smithon 1994: 9). 
The IPCC consists of a small secretariat and bureau of about thirty people, the 
former based in Geneva inside the WMO's headquarters. Its budget in 1992/3 
was under 2 million French francs. Biannual plenary sessions bring together 
leading government scientists and research managers, plus mainly junior gov-
ernment officials in charge of designing national climate policy or preparing 
international negotiations - or both. While formal decisions are taken at these 
plenaries, most of the real work of the Panel - collecting and assessing scientific 
evidence and theories - takes place in Working Groups whose subdivisions act as 
writing teams for individual chapters. The structure of these chapters has been 
decided both by small groups of lead authors and by the WG (Working Group) 
Chairman, who together also condense the findings of these chapters into 'policy-
makers' summaries' for general consumption. Each Working Group represents a 
more or less stable research network which operates in a symbiotic relationship 
with the writing teams. The networks provide data and ideas for the authors, and 
the IPCC management structure brings research results and needs to the attention 
of governments and other interested parties, including UN agencies. 
The IPCC Bureau and the bureaux of its WGs are able to function as the 
decision-makers, selecting authors and reviewers for reports (in consultation with 
governments), negotiating consensus and transmitting research needs to govern-
ments. Three WGs were set up to deal with knowledge issues. The most coherent and 
basic WG dealt with scientific assessment (WG I, Science), and is coordinated from 
the Hadley Centre of Climate Prediction and Research in the UK Meteorological 
Office (UKMO). lthashad a major impact on UK research policy and environmental 
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diplomacy. WG I as a whole reflects the existing research interests of the WMO, 
coordinated as the WCRP, while WG Il, dealing with climate-change impacts, 
reflects those of UNEP. As part of the WRCP, UNEP's research programme also 
complements the more ambitious IGBP (ICSU/IGBP 1992). WG m attracted 
most countries, but was attended by government officials and NGO lobbyists 
rather than scientists. The pmpose of WG m was to define 'realistic' response 
strategies, but it was also, de facto, the meeting place for those people with whom 
scientists did not want to mix.9 From both IPCC reports and especially their more 
controversial policy-makers' summaries, actors in the world of politics and com-
merce would develop threat images, select options and define positions based on 
particular interests. Bureaucratic empire-builders, NGOs driving for new members 
and party-political and commercial competitors all quickly took up 'global warming' 
prevention as a goal to suit themselves. 
The main achievement of the IPCC so far has been its reports, which are 
addressed both to policy-makers and to the UN. The first science assessment was 
published in 1990 (Houghton et al. 1990) and updated for UNCED in 1992. A 
Second Assessment is under way for 1995, but will not become available in time 
to assist in the preparations of the first meeting of the parties of the FCCC, as 
scientists refuse to be hurried by political timetables (Pearce 1994: 5). These 
same scientists had, however, helped to define these timetables by promises made 
when the research programmes were marketed as strategic knowledge needed by 
policy-makers. 
The WG structure, as it turned out, proved highly unsuitable for policy-
making, as the producers and users of knowledge hardly ever met. It reflected a 
highly linear conception of policy-making in which scientists think and 
recommend, while politicians merely add values and implement (Bolin 1994; 
Boehmer-Christiansen 1994b). 
IPCC ADVICE, OR THE ART OF AMBIGUITY 
The IPCC first met in the Autumn of 1988. By 1990 the first stage of funding for 
global systems research had been achieved, and experts began to talk (as those 
opposed to rapid-abatement action had already done for some time) more about 
those uncertainties that needed studying than about confirming the predicted 
warming range (namely, a rate of increase in the global mean temperature, during 
the next century, ofabout 0.3°C per decade, with an uncertainty range of between 
0.2 and 0.5). Environmentalists responded with that one version of the pre-
cautionary principle which proved attractive to those in favour both of higher 
energy prices and of regulation for non-environmental reasons. 
Like all lobbies, the research lobby speaks with more than one voice. For 
example, two climatologists who had attended the 1985 Villach Conference and 
contributed to the work of the IPCC (and therefore added their voice to what 
appeared to many to be calls for immediate action) argued shortly afterwards, 
when addressing the science-policy community, that the range of scientific 
uncertainty was still so large that neither the 'do nothing' option nor the 'prevent 
186 Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen 
emissions' option could be excluded from consideration (Warrick and Jones 
1988: 48-62). Full support for a research effort which would narrow the range of 
scientific uncertainty, and which would indicate how socioeconomic and en-
vironmental (but not political) systems were likely to be affected, was needed. 
The IPCC follows this example. While much has been made of its scientific 
consensus, especially in the UK, this consensus includes clear statements on 
uncertainty, and, if read closely, remains highly ambiguous, especially as far as 
the Executive Summaries go (Houghton, Jenkins and Ephraums 1990: xi-xxiii). 
Instead of using the terms 'model' and 'prediction' (as injected into the 1990 
policy debate), scientists might have used more neutral terms such as 'numerical 
experimentation' and 'scenario-building'. Ambiguity and its political utility are 
readily documented. In 1990, IPCC lead authors had agreed that they could 
calculate with confidence - not measure - average global temperature increases 
from models which a few pages later were admitted to be 'comparatively crude', 
and from which two important greenhouse gases, water vapour and ozone, as well 
as aerosols and processes involving the biosphere, had been omitted.10 The 
Executive Summary combined the phrase 'will result' with the phrase 'a likely 
increase' - a grammatical device to create both certainty and uncertainty simul-
taneously. It was not stated that the predicted rate of temperature increase was 
likely only in association with specific emission scenarios. Given these assump-
tions, the prediction was 
a rate of increase of global mean temperature during the next century of about 
0.3 degree C per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2 to 0.5 degree C per 
decade) .... (T)his will result in a likely increase in global mean temperature 
of about 1 degree C above the present value by 2025 and 3 degrees C before 
the end of next century. 
(Houghton, Jenkins and Ephraums 1990: xi) 
This uncertainty range is huge, and ensured that most researchers, but not all, 
could support the consensus. The real source of friction, as already mentioned, 
was the prescribed emission scenarios. The IPCC has always admitted in its fuller 
reports that its understanding of the links between greenhouse-gas concentrations 
and 'climate sensitivity', involving a consideration of the actual changes pro-
duced by their accumulation and interaction in the air, remained poor. While 
some may well decide that increased greenhouse-gas concentrations provide 
sufficient reason for mitigation and adaptation strategies, the IPCC has never 
explicitly said so. To have decided this would have been against the interests of 
research. Both environmentalists and the promoters of advanced energy tech-
nologies could, however, select phrases which would allow them to claim that the 
IPCC supported their policy proposals. 
Like many other environmentalists, a former director of UK Friends of the 
Earth could claim that 'the consensus view of the IPCC' was that a 60-per-cent 
reduction in CO2 is needed to stabilise the climate at an acceptable temperature 
(Gee 1994: 17), and Greenpeace continues to campaign in the belief that the 
climate is 'in danger of catastrophic destabilisation' (Greenpeace, undated). The 
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UK Treasury, also bowing to the 'authoritative IPCC assessment by several 
hundred scientists', emphasised 'huge uncertainties' instead, and concluded that 
another decade of research would be needed before any policy could be made in 
response to man-made changes, adding that there should not be excessive costs 
for the world economy (Her Majesty's Treasury 1992), a view privately sup-
ported by some IPCC leaders. The IPCC had wisely 'calculated with confidence' 
that an immediate 60-per-cent reduction in emissions would have to take place if 
the stabilisation of current concentrations were to be the goal, but this was not 
advocated, and the difficulties of linking calculated temperature rises with real 
temperatures were pointed out. When addressing the World Energy Council, 
Houghton discarded the idea of certainty altogether, explaining that 'IPCC publi-
cations explain the degree of scientific uncertainty regarding future climate 
change . . . . Research therefore needs urgently to be undertaken in order to 
reduce scientific uncertainty' (WEC 1993: 47). And Bolin, in turn, supported the 
statement that 'as long as we do not know the natural carbon cycle adequately the 
prediction of atmospheric concentrations due to future emissions remains un-
certain' (ibid.: 43). The uncertainty of uncertainties is worrying scientists. 
Some sections of government and a growing number of scientific 'sceptics' 
have rejected not the idea of some level of warming but the idea of a dangerous 
level of warming, and hence have challenged not so much science but more some 
of the policy responses it has given rise to (Lindzen 1992; Michaels 1992). The 
debate clearly continues, and it is my judgement that the uncertainty involved will 
increase for quite some time yet. The coal industry is now supporting research 
into global greening (carbon dioxide stimulates plant growth), thereby recalling 
Russian claims made during the 1970s that global warming should be encour-
aged.11 Little significant consensus was reached on this subject in the other, 
subsidiary WGs. And to the extent that the findings of these WGs would depend 
on WG I, their results must remain irrelevant to policy as long as WG I is largely 
reporting research needs - as is now admitted by the academic group making 
assessments using emission scenarios. Had it not been for opposition on the part 
of US and UK policy advisors fully aware of the scientific base, an international 
climate regime reflecting the demands of environmentalists and European energy 
interests might have committed other countries to considerable policy changes 
and possibly created disaster for the poorest and most dependent on cheap energy. 
The political pressures to reduce fossil-fuel use in favour of more expensive 
options may yet turn out to be unstoppable unless 'science' is used to reverse 
these pressures. Having said this, however, scientific messages can themselves be 
reversed, science being by nature self-correcting. 
THE WMO AS A RESEARCH COORDINATOR AND 
SCIENCE-POLICY ADVISOR 
The decision to establish a panel on climate change was made at the WMO' s 1987 
Congress where, after extensive briefing by the Secretary of the Brundtland 
Commission, the WMO also made a strong bid for a consideration of the 
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socioeconomic implications of climate change, as suggested by the AGGG. The 
WMO had become concerned that UNEP might 'run with' the global-warming 
issue without proper scientific advice (WMO interview 1992). The WMO invited 
governments to join the IPCC by appointing their WMO representatives. About 
thirty countries did so and thus gave their blessings to what can be called the 
largest international exercise of scientific-advice-giving.12 The panel, as en-
visaged in 1987, was 'to provide the international assessment that would enable 
the Directors of National Meteorological Services to advise their governments on 
the evidence for and nature of the climate threat and what they might do about it' 
(McTegart and Zillman 1990: 10). It was to be small, involving experts from no 
more than fifteen to twenty-nine countries active in climate-change research, and 
including both a few other nations and those main scientific bodies responsible 
for international leadership in climate research. 
The IPCC was set up jointly with UNEP, but with the WMO very much in 
control. And the political response to the WMO's proposal surprised the research 
community not involved in the AGGG, for 
almost overnight, greenhouse-induced climate change moved from being the 
business of specialised bodies ... to become the centrepiece of a major political 
happening ... an impressive array of world leaders, mostly unaware of what had 
been going on in national scientific laboratories and the UN system over the 
preceding decades, immediately seized on the need for drastic action. 
(McTegart and Zillman 1990: 8)13 
In 1988, the WMO Executive Council agreed the brief of the IPCC after considerable 
debate. It was agreed that uncertainties and gaps in present knowledge with regard to 
climate change and its potential impacts needed to be identified. And links both with 
existing research programmes and with the IGBP were also stressed. 
The choice of the WMO by the global research enterprise as the organisation 
most fitted for the task of promoting global research and advice-giving has surely 
been wise. The WMO is by far the most effective organisation for advancing the 
interests of interdisciplinary research. With a world-wide network of meteoro-
logical offices and a senior scientific elite deeply involved in atmospheric and 
oceanographic research, it has provided the essential national-international 
linkage for effective policy-making and research implementation. These WMO 
links were particularly important for the IPCC because they brought informal 
contacts not only with the ICSU and national research bodies but also with 
national meteorological offices and government departments. Since 1987 the 
research agenda underlying the IPCC has grown enormously, and the WMO 
appears to be laying claim to it (WMO 1992). 
THE FRAMEWORK TREATY ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
The negotiation of a treaty (albeit an ambiguous one) on climate change had 
become unstoppable by the end of the 1980s. In 1992, the treaty emerged rich in 
exhortations and good advice, but weak on commitments on the energy-policy 
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side. Rather, it codifies enormous data-collection needs and research commit-
ments, serving both the natural sciences, the earth-observation industry and 
assorted bureaucracies. Tough international policy decisions dealing with 
immediate problems were postponed, or left to the national level to be decided on 
the basis of sovereignty. The process of scientific advice-giving can here 
therefore, in retrospect, be analysed as a dimension of 'power' politics, power 
referring both to energy and to the capacity of nations, official stakeholders and 
other interests to shape outcomes. 
The negotiations were formally based on scientific evidence and its inter-
pretation, and for this reason, very few countries could genuinely participate, 
though efforts were made to include delegates from other countries as learners.14 
Less openly, the Convention also reflected expectations about future energy 
demands, fuel choice and energy technologies, as well as creating new markets 
for the earth-observation industry and hence space agencies and their suppliers. 
Most importantly from the perspective adopted here, the climate treaty provided 
the rapidly expanding and encroaching field of environmental science with an 
almost permanent research agenda at the very heart of the IGBP and WCRP, with 
a small human dimensions component more recently added by the International 
Social Science Council (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a, b; Price 1992). The data 
needs are enormous. The very objective of the FCCC depends on further 
scientific evidence. The objective of the treaty is the 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations ... at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level 
should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food supply is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
(IUCC (undated) UNFCCC) 
A tall order indeed. How and by whom will 'dangerous' be defined? The IPCC 
has already claimed that defining this objective should be its task. Two 'sub-
sidiary bodies' are to be set up by the Parties of the Convention in order to 
provide 'scientific-technical' information. The precise link between the IPCC 
and these bodies is not yet clear. Information will be needed on four subjects: 
• the stabilisation of concentrations 
• emission stabilisation 
• the ecological limits or levels of tolerance 
• emission inventories and reduction programmes. 
The emission-reduction commitments that governments have accepted so far, 
apart from being very easy ones (the EU as a whole has already stabilised its 
carbon-dioxide emissions), consist of major data-collection and planning efforts. 
This obligation, too, is very research-intensive and requires much national 
expertise. Governments are required to make national inventories of all their 
greenhouse-gas emissions ( other than CFCs controlled under the Montreal 
Protocol) using comparable methodologies. (The methodologies in question have 
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been defined by the IPCC with help from the OECD/IEA.) This information 
concerning implementation must then be communicated to the Conference of the 
Parties. Countries shall also 
formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate 
change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and 
measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change; and promote and 
cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of 
technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthro-
pogenic emissions. 
(IUCC (undated) UNFCCC, p. 8, para. 2) 
The relevant sectors specifically referred to are energy, transport, industry, agri-
culture, forestry and waste management. Other paragraphs of the same article 
mention sustainable management and coastal zone management, water resources 
and agriculture, impact assessment and research collaboration, and even training 
and education. Remote sensing will be essential, and the global-change research 
enterprise will provide the major market for this heavily subsidised activity 
(Mansell and Paltridge 1993). If knowledge is a public good, then the public 
should be involved in deciding what knowledge, and technologies, it wants to 
finance, raising another hornets' nest of issues. 
The Convention goes to considerable lengths to ensure that the parties will be 
provided with abundant technical advice. Two subsidiary bodies will be set up, 
one to give 'scientific and technological advice' and the other to assist the Parties 
with the implementation of the Convention. This former would provide the kind 
of knowledge that the IPCC's WGs have been gathering and assessing since 
1988. Its functions and terms of reference may be further elaborated in future, but 
the range of expertise is generally defined as 'scientific'. Its duties remain firmly 
linked to the natural and technical sciences, but will also include the identification 
of innovative and efficient technologies. The implementation experts of the 
second subsidiary body will not, it seems, be asked to advise on implementation 
as such, but rather on its measurement. A main task of this body will be to help 
countries with their inventories of emissions and sinks - a rather fundamental 
inquiry, in the nature of economic activities under national jurisdictions, which is 
already under way. This knowledge will become widely available. The Earth's 
surface has been made transparent. 
CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF SCIBNTIFIC ADVICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The climate-change threat rose to the top of the agenda in international political 
and diplomatic debates not so much because science meekly responded to public 
concern but more because a global network of national organisations, devoted to 
research into atmospheric sciences, climate forecasting, ecosystems, energy-
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demand forecasting and new energy and information-gathering technologies, 
actively helped to create and disseminate concern. Basic environmental research 
serves to diagnose problems, but once action is agreed other forms of knowledge 
are needed. The research enterprise must therefore continuously invent new 
problems which it can then credibly claim to solve. To acquire policy relevance 
for climate-change research, ambiguity, a weak consensus and scientific con-
troversy were as much an expression of real issues as they were a form of 
strategic behaviour. Once funded, scientific institutions demand freedom and 
prefer to withdraw from advocacy to an emphasis on uncertainty, ignorance and 
even indeterminacy. They seek to become neutral and value free. Such scientific 
advice has one advantage over most other tools of politics: it can legitimate 
U-turns on the basis of new evidence or persisting uncertainty. Science does not, 
therefore, make a reliable ally for environmentalists, and any international policy 
which defines itself in relation to 'rational and optimal' knowledge is pursuing a 
moving target that cannot be implemented. Scientific uncertainties invite delay 
not action. To the extent that science is always uncertain, it is useful to states that 
want to protect their sovereignty. International regimes are therefore particularly 
attractive to the research enterprise.15 Here, action-oriented agreements are most 
easily resisted, while commitments to more research (or learning), via lowest-
denominator agreements, are most attractive. This makes the research enterprise 
a potential ally for the development of regimes that remain very open to future 
politics, and allow for the growth and exchange of information, but avoid genuine 
global regulations. The consensual knowledge that academic policy advisors seek 
will rarely if ever be available in the complex area of global environmental 
impacts (Wynne 1992). It would be against the interest of research if it were. 
The Parties to the FCCC will meet in 1995 in Berlin to consider whether they 
have made adequate commitments. Many governments are now considering their 
reply without additional scientific guidance. They will probably agree to do more 
research and collect more data. Responses beyond this are likely to be defined in 
a purely national context. Energy, information and the climate are far too import-
ant to be ignored for long in international relations, and the IPCC has successfully 
brought them to the attention of most governments. It allowed natural-science 
research and branches of economics both to define the global-change problem as 
a research issue and to suggest solutions, most of which would require further 
massive research (or subsidisation) efforts. The main allies at this early stage of 
problem definition have comprised the Northern environmental lobbies, some 
commercial interests and several international bureaucracies with strong research 
interests. Opponents have comprised a small number of scientists who did not 
want to be part of a 'government science' programme with strong energy-policy 
implications, as well as fossil-fuel and cheap-energy interests which promised to 
defeat 'new' fuels and technologies when an era of expensive energy ended in 
1986. The oil companies, as the owners of gas, have emerged as the major 
winners - but this is another story. Global warming provided the justification for 
intervention on the side of potential losers, but the costs of this intervention have 
proved unpalatable to most governments. 
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In the end, the concept of the atmosphere as a global common needing joint 
protection proved of little help in analysing and explaining observed behaviour. 
No common interest could be identified beyond that which institutions could 
create between themselves. Research bodies and the global knowledge claims 
they make are self-serving and are best constrained, like other political actors, by 
open politics and the free flow of information. The climate-change story is 
therefore a hopeful one, since at the relatively anarchical international level, 
interests and values are expressed openly and the role of science in international 
relations is revealed more readily, perhaps, than it is at many national levels. It 
must remain the task of politics to transform available knowledge into policy in 
the context of many other ingredients. The question remains of whether the global 
epistemic community and the international environmental regimes it has created 
are indeed benign phenomena. Instead of being protectors of an asserted common 
property or resource, they may be just another manifestation of dominance and 
power politics - this at least is how they appear to be perceived at the global grass 
roots. 
The study of the IPCC reported here suggests that for complex environmental 
issues there can be no common policy enterprise for mankind, only attempts to 
generate such an enterprise by certain actors with reference to global threats that 
cannot be proven. Such threats nevertheless possess considerable political and 
technical innovative potential. The assumption that leading members of the 
climate-change community subscribe 'to holistic ecological beliefs about the 
need for policy coordination subject to ecosystemic laws' (Haas, P. 1993: 9) is 
not justified in this case and would even be dangerous. Indeed, climate scientists 
have disagreed as much as anybody else about what to do. Humanity would be ill 
advised to accept any coherent plans put forward by climate-change experts for 
the management of entire ecosystems, or, in this case, of the entire atmosphere, 
biosphere, hydrosphere ... indeed of virtually everything and everybody. 
NOTES 
1 This paper is based on the project 'The formulation and impact of scientific advice on 
global climate change' (Y 320 25 3030) funded by the UK Economic and Social 
Research Council under its Global Environmental Change Initiative. Many people 
have commented on drafts of this paper, including IPCC participants, energy special-
ists and government officials, as well as research scientists and officials from British 
research councils. The UK Department of the Environment could have commented, 
but declined. David Victor, Jim Skea and Simon Shackley in particular have made 
most helpful comments. All assistance is gratefully acknowledged, but errors and 
misinterpretations remain entirely my own. What in retrospect may appear as 
intentional is perceived by some as coincidental. A full history cannot yet be written. 
2 The IGBP was planned during the early 1980s by US research institutions and then 
disseminated globally for approval and implementation by the ICSU in response to the 
concern about climate change which had meanwhile been generated. In 1984, Roy Rapley, 
Head of Remote Sensing and Associate Director of the Department of Space and Climate 
Physics at the ULC's Mullard Space Laboratory, became its Executive Director. 
3 About half of the lead authors in the IPCC science reports (WG I) came from the UK 
and USA; contributing authors and reviewers were selected by them. Policy-makers' 
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summaries were drafted by very small groups of senior science managers close to the 
UK government. Hartmut Grassl, Vice-Chairman of WG I from the Max Planck 
Institute for Meteorology, is the new Director of the WCRP at the invitation of the 
WMO, the ICSU and the Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission. 
4 Apart from the critique presented here, there is a more fundamental objection. Pure 
environmental regimes, usually assumed by theorists, do not exist because of the 
many and varied impacts on costs of production, trade and competition. Trade or 
financial interests may therefore drive environmental 'regimes'. 
5 This book is based on Aspen Institute workshops held in the USA and West Germany. 
Major participants were the US National Corporation for Atmospheric Physics (NCAR) 
based in Boulder and the Austrian International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
where the climate threat was explored by two Germans, H. Flohn (climatologist, 
WMO) and W. Hafele (inventor of the breeder reactor) during the 1970s. 
6 Opposition by social scientists in the EC Commission was overruled (CEC interview). 
7 Organisations attending included the Joint Research Centre of the CEC, UNEP, the 
UNDP, the US Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences and the Consortium 
for the International Earth Science Networks. 
8 A 1992 German IGBP newsletter (Global Change Prisma) lists fifty-six satellite and 
four space-shuttle launches between 1992 and 1998 for remote sensing. The countries 
involved are the USA (NASA and NOAA), Japan, Russia, Germany, India, the UK 
and France - the major global-change research nations. 
9 WGs II and ill were merged in 1993 and a third group on cross-cutting (naturaV 
socioeconomic) issues set up. This time, natural scientists have already planned joint 
meetings between WG I and the new WG III, thus by-passing governments. 
10 It had previously been thought that aerosols would lead to another ice age. Luckily, 
the recent major volcanic eruption in the Philippines could be used to explain the 
less-than-predicted level of warming in 1992. The role of water vapour is not well 
understood, but would be affected by the unknown impacts of actual warming - as 
distinct from radiative forcing. 
11 The Russians were quickly thrown out of WG I. 
12 The Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) is 
much older and has over fifteen working groups. It has never attracted the same 
attention, but may have been more effective as a low-profile organisation. 
13 W.J. McTegart was the Australian Vice-Chair of IPCC WG II until 1993, and I am 
most grateful for his assistance over several years. W.J. Zillman is Director of the 
Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology. Both are thanked for their help. 
14 Interpretation includes an expert assessment of predictions derived from general 
circulation models of the atmosphere, coupled to a consideration of oceans as energy-
transfer mechanisms. These models developed from weather-forecasting and nuclear-
winter (fall-out) research. Adapted for testing the effects of a changing atmospheric 
composition, they are best viewed as numerical experiments. The IPCC, however, 
called them the only available tool both for prediction and for the exploration of 
uncertainties. Only a handful of countries possess these models: the USA, Germany, 
the UK, Japan and France. 
15 Others that may be considered for comparison are the acid-rain regime under the 
Geneva Convention and the control of marine pollution under the Law of the Sea 
Convention. Ozone is a different matter in that its agreement was one which advanced 
the interests of two chemical companies. Biodiversity also deserves to be studied. 
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11 Environmental regimes 
Effectiveness and implementation review1 
Owen Greene 
Sustained international cooperation is important for tackling many transnational 
environmental problems. Research into the development and implementation of 
international environmental regimes is therefore important for everyone who is 
concerned with such problems, as well as to researchers interested in inter-
national institutions or processes of cooperation and conflict. 
There are now hundreds of international environmental agreements, of which 
at least 120 are multilateral with contemporary relevance and some international 
legal substance (Sand 1992; UNEP 1993). However, less than twenty-five of 
these have received wide academic and public attention. There has also been a 
tendency to focus most attention on the agenda-setting and regime-formation 
stages of regime development. This is understandable, since these stages are 
typically most politically salient and accessible. But the implementation and 
effectiveness of established regimes matter too. Moreover, the principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures of the regime normally continue to be 
negotiated and developed throughout its lifetime. 
This chapter discusses factors affecting the effectiveness of environmental 
regimes, and the significance of institutional design. In particular, it explores the 
role both of implementation-review procedures and of systems for monitoring 
environmental performance. This is partly in order to illustrate the ways in which 
international institutional mechanisms can determine regime effectiveness. How-
ever, it is also to demonstrate the importance of monitoring and implementation 
review processes for the development, implementation and effectiveness of inter-
national environmental regimes. 
The next section situates this discussion in the broader field of research both 
into the processes of global environmental change and into social responses to 
transnational environmental problems. It then briefly reviews the results of recent 
research on the development and implementation of international regimes. The 
section after this examines the factors determining regime effectiveness and 
levels of compliance with commitments, and encourages a concern with insti-
tutional design. The particular significance of implementation review and 
verification processes in this context is explored in the next section. Some key 
issues in institutional design are then identified. The significance of review 
procedures in helping institutions to adapt effectively to changing circumstances 
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is highlighted, together with their role in managing the development and imple-
mentation of commitments in complex regimes, where effectiveness depends on 
changing the behaviour of a large number of actors, of many different types, 
operating in a wide variety of circumstances. To illustrate this argument, and to 
encourage hesitation before using the Montreal Protocol as a model for insti-
tutional design in these circumstances, the priorities for the further development 
of the climate-change convention are briefly discussed. 
STUDYING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 
This chapter focuses on the role of international regimes in social responses to 
global environmental change. The classic definition of an international regime is 
that of a set of 'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given issue area' (Krasner 1983). This 
distinguishes it from an international organisation, and also from international 
conventions or structures that apply across a wide range of issue areas. It en-
compasses informal or politically agreed rules and procedures as well as legally 
binding ones. A regime is thus seen as an international social institution. 
The notion of a regime was originally developed by 'institutionalists' who 
were concerned to demonstrate, against the claims of 'neorealists', that inter-
national institutions can matter in world politics (Rittberger 1993; Levy, Young 
and Zurn 1994). This broad point is now more or less accepted by most inter-
national relations scholars, and was probably never doubted by diplomats and 
others practically involved with international policy. Now, the key questions in 
this area of study are: why, when and how do international regimes form and 
develop; what determines their significance or effectiveness; and how can they 
shape or restructure transnational or domestic institutions and practices? 
So-called 'regime theory' has been subjected to substantial criticism. In part 
this is because it is mainly used and developed within the neoliberal-
institutionalist and neorealist perspectives in international relations. Thus, critics 
of these perspectives and of the research agendas they generate understandably 
include 'regimes' in their target lists. However, it is certainly true that the study 
of international regimes can lead only to a partial understanding of social 
responses to international problems. Communities respond to global environ-
mental change at a number of levels. The many social, political and economic 
processes driving environmental change, and changing behaviour and social 
structures, extend far beyond the realm of 'international environmental politics'. 
By focusing on the development and implementation of international agree-
ments and their associated institutions, procedures and rules, students of inter-
national environmental regimes can miss a lot. Moreover, they are concentrating 
on processes in which governments, international organisations, 'experts', 
powerful domestic and transnational interest groups and organised environmental 
pressure groups play a privileged role. An excessive focus on international 
regimes could lead one falsely to assume that other communities are of marginal 
importance in global environmental change. 
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Nevertheless, having acknowledged this, I believe that the development and 
effectiveness of international environmental institutions remain an important area 
of study. Sustained international cooperation is useful or essential for tackling 
many transnational environmental problems. Agreements negotiated by states, 
and the development of institutions involving influential international and 
domestic actors, are key ways in which such cooperation can be organised and 
maintained. They provide an important framework for the interactions both 
between international and domestic actors and processes, and between 'know-
ledge', power and interests relevant to a particular issue area. Moreover, a regime 
provides a focus for the formulation and implementation of policies to tackle a 
particular set of transnational environmental problems. 
Critics of 'regime analysis' further point out that the classic definition of a 
regime is somewhat vague, and that the components (norms, rules, etc.) it 
identifies are in practice hard to distinguish. Again, they have a point. The 
concept of a 'regime' remains essentially contested even amongst its supporters, 
and in practice it is defined and used in a range of different and inconsistent ways 
(Milner 1993). 
It is obviously important to be as clear as possible on what we are talking 
about, particularly in discussions on 'regimes' per se or when conceptualising the 
constitutive structures and processes of world politics. However, if social scien-
tists shied away from using essentially contested concepts, whole disciplines 
would collapse. In my view, a broad understanding of a regime as 'an inter-
national social institution with agreed-upon principles, norms, procedures and 
programmes that govern the activities and shape the expectations of actors in a 
specific issue area'2 provides a good enough basis for getting on with studying 
actual regimes. A large number of researchers have proceeded on this basis in 
recent years, and have demonstrated this to be a productive approach generating 
reasonably robust and policy-relevant findings. 
Empirical research on regimes over the last decade has refuted some of the 
early propositions about their character and formation. It has demonstrated that 
they come in a variety of different types. They can form and operate in a wide 
variety of circumstances, and in the absence of hegemonic powers.3 Moreover, 
once established, they can survive and influence shifts in the distribution of 
power in international society, and can persist even if their obligations become 
inconvenient to one or more powerful states or if there is a deterioration in overall 
relations between their participants.4 Thus, at least a number of regimes have 
been shown to be much more than epiphenomena: regimes can be robust and can 
have significant consequences. 
Although states are typically the formal members of regimes, many case studies 
have demonstrated that non-state actors are often very important in the formation and 
development of international environmental regimes.5 In relation to implementation 
processes and regime effectiveness, the links between international environmental 
institutions, states and non-state actors and processes appear to be particularly 
important and complex (though less research has been carried out on these). In other 
areas, such as arms control or trade, agreements mostly directly aim to regulate 
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government action. The mechanisms by which governments can ensure domestic 
implementation are typically well developed and relatively direct. In contrast, imple-
menting environmental commitments often involves the complex task of changing 
the practices of a wide range of non-state actors, semi-autonomous state industries or 
agencies, and local authorities. 
In spite of attempts to identify one, it now seems clear that there is no single 
type of factor or process determining when, why and how regimes develop and 
what consequences they have. Power and interests certainly play a key role. 
However, so too do several other factors. 
For example, understandings from the natural and social sciences typically 
play an important role in debates about the nature and scale of the environmental 
'problems', their impacts and the formulation and implementation of policy 
responses. 'Knowledge' is clearly a key condition for the rational management of 
natural resources and the environment. Moreover, scientific and policy processes 
are in continual interaction, and they shape each other. Thus, scientists and 
environmental knowledge will be influenced by international environmental 
institutions. But scientific institutions, advisory bodies, 'epistemic communities' 
and individual scientists also typically play a major if not structural role in the 
development and implementation of such regimes. 
Moreover, in addition to power, interests and 'knowledge', social learning, 
individual leadership and the international context can also be critical (Levy, 
Young and Zurn 1994). Combinations of all such factors, and of different types 
of actors, are usually significant for any given regime. Their relative importance 
changes as the regime develops through various stages: agenda-setting; insti-
tutional choice (the formulation, negotiation and agreement of the provisions of 
the regime); implementation; and further development. Moreover, the com-
binations involved are likely to be regime-specific and also, to a significant extent, 
historically contingent.6 
Thus, our subsequent discussion should aim to identify and explore a range of 
possible mechanisms by which institutional design, and particularly implement-
ation review, could relate to regime implementation and effectiveness, and should 
be cautious about generalising from a few well-known conventions. 
EFFECTIVENESS AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The definition of 'effectiveness' is itself contested. There are a range of possible 
definitions, and assessments of regime effectiveness can depend greatly on which 
criteria are used (Young 1994; Levy 1993). For example, an international insti-
tution could very successfully change the behaviour of relevant actors in line with 
its rules but nevertheless have little, or even an adverse, impact on the environ-
mental problem itself. Alternatively, the environmental problem may be reduced, 
but with little contribution from the relevant international regime. 
In this chapter, we are mainly concerned with effectiveness in terms of 
whether a regime contributes to the management or resolution of the environ-
mental problem it was designed to address. However, since the causes of environ-
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mental change are often poorly understood, it can be relatively difficult to 
examine the effectiveness of a regime by using this criterion. Thus it is con-
venient in this and the subsequent section to focus mainly on a more directly 
observable behavioural understanding of effectiveness: how can a regime 
promote compliance and changes of behaviour in line with its norms and rules? 
As is well known, the prospects for achieving the changes in behaviour which 
a regime seeks to promote depend substantially on factors that are external to the 
international institution itself. They will partly depend on the patterns of interests 
of the actors involved: there will always be some groups with an interest in 
opposing such changes, and others who would be positively affected. The distri-
bution of coercive or structural power will be similarly significant: for example, 
pressure from a powerful state could be vital in securing or enforcing change. 
Non-coercive forms of influence, such as the existence of leaders, lobby groups 
or 'epistemic communities', have also been shown to be important (Haas 1992; 
Young and Osherenko 1993). Since those states and other actors which lack the 
capacity to implement the desired changes cannot comply with commitments 
even if they want to, the level and distribution of capacity amongst the regime's 
participants is also likely to be critical to its success. 
The nature of the issue area is also important. The scientific or social com-
plexity of the processes that the regime is aiming to manage or prevent will have 
an effect, as will the number and diversity of the actors involved. Moreover, 
international or public concern to 'do something about the problem' can be 
intensified by 'early warnings' or dramatic events. The unexpected appearance of 
the 'ozone hole' over Antarctica helped to galvanise support for phasing out 
CFCs. Other problems are less likely to become clearly transparent before it is too 
late to take effective preventive action. Evidence of anthropogenic climate change 
has, for example, only been accumulating gradually, tempting supporters of 
urgent action to try to link freak weather conditions with climate change in order 
to raise public concern. 
Another potentially important characteristic of the issue area that is rarely 
emphasised is 'monitorability': the ability to monitor either the behaviour of 
relevant actors or processes, or the implementation of potential commitments. 
This depends on a combination of: the intrinsic characteristics of the relevant 
activities or materials; the state of both scientific understanding and monitoring 
technology; the existence of monitoring and data-collection infrastructures; and 
the social, economic and political characteristics of the societies or states con-
cerned. Monitorability is an important determinant of the verifiability of (that is, 
the ability to verify compliance with) commitments, a factor which could in itself 
have a significant influence on the behaviour of significant actors. Perceptions of 
verifiability could affect the willingness of governments to negotiate or sign 
agreements. An awareness that others can monitor their environmental perform-
ance could affect the behaviour of governments and other actors. The ability to 
monitor and assess the performance of others could affect distributions of power 
and interests, and help with learning and capacity-building processes (Greene 
1994). 
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All these 'external' factors could change behaviour in line with the rules of an 
environmental regime. However, an international regime cannot properly be said 
to be effective if it merely codifies changes that the relevant actors would have 
made anyway. Still less do high levels of compliance necessarily indicate effect-
iveness. Many regime commitments do not require changes of behaviour. Some 
are symbolic, or so ambiguously worded that compliance with them is virtually 
impossible to assess. 
To be effective, a regime must make a difference. More precisely, its insti-
tutions, rules and procedures must alter external facts or processes (either directly 
or indirectly through their effects on the patterns of power, interest, influence, 
knowledge and capacity discussed above) in ways that change the behaviour of 
environmentally relevant actors. Thus, it is not enough to examine institutional 
design or external factors separately. The key issue is how they interact. 
There are a range of factors that are internal to an international environmental 
institution that could be important in determining effectiveness. The nature and 
formulation of the rules and commitments of the regime, including the ways in 
which politically and legally binding provisions are combined and the 
mechanisms by which rules are developed or revised, can be important. For 
example, it has been shown that compliance with MARPOL rules to limit oil 
pollution from tankers became much better when they focused on technological 
regulations relating to tanker construction and port facilities instead of oper-
ational rules relating to the conduct of operators at sea (Mitchell 1994). The 
structure and role of the international secretariats or organisations associated with 
the regime can also be important. For example, a professional and relatively 
autonomous secretariat can play a significant leadership role and facilitate and 
provide resources for the effective operation and development of the regime. 
UNEP played a key role in the formation and early development of the regional 
seas and ozone conventions. 
Mechanisms for resource transfers amongst participants can critically affect 
patterns of interest and capacity amongst participants. The ways in which scien-
tific and technical knowledge-generation and advice are institutionalised can 
affect learning processes, the distribution of influence and the development of 
epistemic communities (Parson 1993; Haas 1992). Similarly, the design of con-
sultative and dispute-resolution mechanisms can make a big difference to 
whether problems or concerns tend to be neglected or to escalate damagingly, or 
whether they are routinely tackled in a timely and constructive way. Finally, as 
discussed in more detail below, provisions for monitoring and reviewing the 
implementation and adequacy of commitments could significantly affect com-
pliance, performance and the further development of environmental regimes. 
The effectiveness of a regime depends on the extent to which a combination of 
these institutional characteristics and mechanisms are developed in such a way 
that they influence and interact with actors in a way that promotes desired 
changes in behaviour. 
The best strategies for effective institutional development depend on the 
situation. For example, on the basis of a number of case studies, Haas, Keohane 
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and Levy have suggested that the development and implementation of environ-
mental commitments depend particularly on three factors: levels of concern 
(about the problem and about performance in implementing response measures); 
the development and maintenance of appropriate contracts and commitments; 
and the capacity to implement commitments (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993). If 
one accepts this framework, then an effective regime should be designed so that 
its rules and mechanisms address whichever of these three factors appears to be 
lacking. If the main problem is a lack of concern amongst some or all actors, then 
the main area where a regime could be effective is to increase awareness both of 
the problem and of appropriate responses to it, and to encourage better perform-
ance - for example, by improving knowledge about perfonnance, increasing 
domestic concern, embarrassing laggards and non-compliers, or facilitating the use 
of sanctions or rewards. If there are problems in all three areas, then it is a priority 
to develop institutions that are designed to tackle these problems on all fronts. 
In order to achieve a better understanding of the ways in which regime 
effectiveness can be promoted, it is useful to identify and examine the mechan-
isms or pathways by which international institutional factors can influence both 
behaviour and implementation processes. These can broadly be divided into 
interest-based and learning-based mechanisms, and further divided according to 
whether they affect the behaviour of 'unitary' states or whether they affect 
domestic or non-state actors and processes. 
In the next section, we examine in more detail the ways in which monitoring 
and implementation review processes could affect regime effectiveness. This is 
partly illustrative: in principle, a similar exercise would be appropriate for each 
of the other main components of international institutions. However, it also aims 
to demonstrate the potential importance of devoting careful attention to the 
relatively neglected issue of the development and design of implementation 
review mechanisms in environmental regimes. 
IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW MECHANISMS AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Implementation review processes are the processes by which regime participants 
collect, exchange and review information relating to behaviour and performance. 
As such, implementation review is similar to verification. It includes monitoring, 
data collection and information exchange; data analysis; and assessments of the 
extent to which agreed measures are being implemented. However, it is not so 
focused on providing assurance against the risk of covert and deliberate cheating. 
Rather, it plays a broader variety of roles in promoting implementation and 
effectiveness. 
Implementation review in environmental regimes typically involves a wide 
range of informal as well as formal processes. Individual governments or infor-
mal groups of states may engage in an independent monitoring and assessment of 
the other participants' environmental performance. There will also normally be a 
wide range of non-governmental monitoring and review activities involving all 
sorts of expert or interest groups. However, numerous international environmental 
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agreements have also set up formal provisions or procedures for implementation 
review (Victor, Lanchbery and Greene 1994). These include provisions both for 
reports from governments and other recognised participants to be prepared, 
exchanged and audited, and for the environmental performance or compliance of 
regime members to be assessed. Finally, they may establish rights or procedures 
for independent inspections or monitoring systems. 
In many cases, these mechanisms are relatively neglected. Reporting rates are 
often poor and reviews can be nominal (USGAO 1992; Victor, Lanchbery and 
Greene 1994). If they do operate, however, implementation review processes 
may result in additional monitoring and information collection in a form that is 
appropriate for reviewing national performance or compliance. They can increase 
overall transparency, and also affect patterns of access to relevant information. 
They can also provide an international framework within which regime members 
and other interested actors can discuss and assess national performance, and 
where governments are under at least some obligation to address findings or 
questions raised. The procedures will shape the access to, and participation in, the 
review process; and potentially provide a focal point both for the activities of 
concerned non-state actors and for institutional development. 
The classic 'neorealist' way in which an implementation review mecha.,ism 
can affect behaviour is that systems for verifying compliance could affect the 
calculations of costs and benefits made by individual states when they choose 
whether or not to join agreements or whether to comply. States may decide that it 
is not in their interests to accept or comply with commitments unless they are 
reasonably sure that treaty partners are also complying. Governments may be 
deterred from free-rider strategies by the threat of exposure. Similarly, countries 
that entered agreements reluctantly or under coercive external pressure may 
prefer covert non-compliance unless their environmental performance is made 
transparent to others. Moreover, the international review system can provide 
procedures that make it easier for treaty partners collectively to identify poor 
compliance and organise multilateral responses to it. In this way, the imple-
mentation review or verification system affects both the 'rules of the game' that 
self-interested states perceive themselves to be playing and the risks and potential 
payoffs involved in pursuing different strategies within it (Ausubel and Victor 
1992; Greene 1993). 
There are, however, a number of other mechanisms by which implementation 
review procedures could affect the implementation and effectiveness of environ-
mental agreements.7 Continuing for a moment with interest-based pathways 
involving self-interested unitary states, increasing transparency, information ex-
change and reviews could make it easier for states to achieve and maintain 
agreements which allow them to perform functions more efficiently through joint 
action. Centralising or coordinating monitoring and review activities can itself 
save time and money. This is an important mechanism if one believes, with 
Keohane (1984 ), that the main function of a regime is to achieve such benefits 
and to avoid the transaction costs that cooperating states would other- wise have 
to bear. 
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Monitoring and implementation review could affect the patterns of power and 
influence amongst states. In some circumstances, superior monitoring and assess-
ment capabilities or access to information and review processes could be a 
significant source of influence. For example, multilateral monitoring and review 
systems could give weak member states access to information and a voice in 
international assessments. On the other hand, states with superior monitoring and 
assessment capacity may be better able to shape international assessments by 
working through international institutions. Furthermore, international organis-
ations could be empowered: new monitoring or advisory organisations may be 
established, and existing ones could increase their resources and their influence 
as review systems are developed. 
Monitoring and implementation review could also change states' behaviour by 
affecting learning processes. Their understandings of the environmental prob-
lems themselves could be changed. Moreover, states could learn more about their 
own interests, though it is not clear that this will necessarily improve regime 
effectiveness. 
Just as important, monitoring and reviewing the environmental performance 
of other parties could help states to learn about their treaty partners. If govern-
ments know more about the circumstances and implementation experiences of 
other states, reactions to non-compliance are likely to be more sophisticated and 
less prone to undue suspicions of bad faith. Non-compliance could be due to a 
variety of factors, including: inadequate national capacity; obstruction on the part 
of powerful domestic or transnational interest groups; inappropriate implement-
ation measures; or unachievable commitments. A better understanding of the 
reasons for poor performance could help other parties to respond in ways that 
promote regime effectiveness, by targeting assistance, being flexible about some 
non-compliance, adjusting targets or advising on more effective implementation 
policies. 
Leaming from the monitoring and reviewing of national implementation could 
thus help to target international assistance to increase national capacity. More-
over, by monitoring the implementation experiences of other countries, states 
may be better able to design effective domestic policies and measures of their 
own. Increased information and transparency could help governments to identify 
international best practice, or avoid the mistakes of others. International monitor-
ing and information systems could also supplement inadequate national systems, 
thus improving the national capacity to implement policy. 
As discussed above, states are not usually 'unitary' when it comes to develop-
ing and implementing environmental commitments. In any case, changing the 
behaviour of domestic and transnational actors is critical for the effectiveness of 
most environmental regimes. How could implementation review processes affect 
the behaviour of domestic actors? 
First, such procedures could affect the cost-benefit calculations that powerful 
domestic interest groups or government bureaucracies make when calculating 
their interests. For example, trade ministries or powerful industrial groups could 
change their assessments of possible regulations or constraints if they knew that 
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compliance in other states would be transparent, or if information gained as a 
result of international reporting procedures indicated that potential domestic 
costs could be offset by new trading opportunities. International monitoring and 
review mechanisms could also directly affect bureaucratic interests. Ministries 
involved in them could increase both resources and influence. Alternatively, they 
could reveal information to other branches of governments or interest groups 
about domestic practices that a ministry would prefer they did not have: know-
ledge is power in bureaucratic politics. 
Furthermore, monitoring and implementation review procedures could change 
distributions of power and influence within a country. They could empower not 
only individual bureaucracies but also the entire state apparatus in relation to 
domestic society. International agreements could legitimise and provide 
resources for the development of systems that help the government to monitor 
and regulate new areas of domestic activity. Alternatively, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), special-interest groups or political parties may gain access 
to government information that was previously denied to them. 
Moreover, in most environmental agreements, environmental NGOs and 
industrial associations have some standing or participation rights in the inter-
national review process. International implementation review meetings have 
provided an additional forum where such groups can exert pressure or embarrass 
their governments. They also facilitate the formation of transnational coalitions 
of like-minded national groups. 
Implementation review procedures may be particularly significant for the 
empowerment of experts in established regimes. Scientists and other experts, 
particularly if they are outside the government, often find their influence reduced 
once the process of regime formation moves from agenda-setting to hard 
negotiations. To the extent that experts are important for monitoring and imple-
mentation review, international review procedures could increase their influence 
both in implementation processes and in the revision of commitments. In the 
International Whaling Convention (IWC), the Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution agreement (LRT AP), the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES) and many other important 
environmental agreements, scientific and technical advisory groups have been 
established to assist with the review process, a process which gives them direct 
and privileged access to the Conference of the Parties. 
Learning processes could also be important in this context. National senior 
scientists or technical advisors may be nominated by their government to partici-
pate in international panels. There they learn from international monitoring and 
information exchanges, and may also be inducted into the dominant 'epistemic 
community'. They may then provide an effective information channel to national-
and local-government officials, industrial groups, and such like. Governments 
and other domestic groups are typically more willing to accept advice from an 
intergovernmental expert panel or from national experts than from foreigners. 
Moreover, enhanced transparency may help domestic actors to learn from their 
counterparts elsewhere. International reporting and review systems could 
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facilitate information exchange between those domestic groups whose behaviour 
is critical for implementation. For example, electric-power producers or regu-
lators may be better able to formulate and share best practice relating to energy 
efficiency or gas emissions at power stations, or to design effective regulations or 
voluntary agreements between industry and government. By reading national 
reports or participating in review meetings, environmental activists may learn 
more about best environmental practice or campaigning tactics. 
There are, thus, many potential pathways by which international monitoring 
and implementation review procedures could change the behaviour of states and 
domestic actors, and thus influence regime effectiveness. The importance and 
effect of each of these pathways will depend on many factors over which 
international policy-makers can have little direct influence. But it will also 
depend on institutional design, which is a matter which parties can control. 
One key issue is where the information used in the international imple-
mentation review process comes from, and its usefulness and reliability. The 
process is undermined if there are no guidelines or systems for this, and if the 
information used is collected on an ad hoe basis. Numerous environmental 
agreements, including the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), 
LRTAP and the Montreal Protocol, require parties to provide regular reports on 
their own activities according to specific guidelines, so that national reports can 
be interpreted, assessed and compared with commitments. Such guidelines also 
often require states to establish new national data-collection and data-assessment 
systems, thereby generating information that would otherwise not be available. 
There will often be a question mark over the reliability of reports provided by 
states about their own performance. Governments are normally reluctant to reveal 
embarrassing information, and they may be tempted to suppress or distort data 
that reveals inadequate compliance. Where such concerns are potentially signifi-
cant, they can to some extent be addressed through institutional design. 
A key part of the strategy is to formulate international commitments so that 
they are relatively verifiable, and so that the incentives or possibilities for 
providing inaccurate information are reduced (Greene 1994). Thus, govern-
ments are less able or willing to distort data if they also need it to manage core 
economic activities or government programmes, or if it is collected by relatively 
independent international or domestic bodies that are likely to resist government 
interference. Similarly, governments are more likely to stay honest if the information 
can be independently gathered or checked by other countries, international or-
ganisations or environmental NGOs, or if it relates to areas where there is already 
a high degree of transparency, or where there is a risk that 'whistleblowers' will 
expose false reports. 
Moreover, international monitoring and review procedures can be established 
specifically to collect or validate data relating to national implementation. In 
LRTAP, the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the 
Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) maintains an 
international network for monitoring and assessing the chemical composition of 
rain, which can be used to deduce overall emissions of acid-causing substances 
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from a particular country (Gehring 1994). The UN Food and Agriculture Organis-
ation has long-established rights to collect data on land use and flora (which it 
does using its own systems), and most international agreements, plus most 
international conventions for the prevention of flora, come under its auspices. 
The International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICW) has pro-
visions for national reports on catches to be checked by foreign inspectors 
attached to factory ships or shore stations. Similarly, the 1980 Canberra Conven-
tion on Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Convention on 
the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals permit international inspectors to 
board any vessel which they suspect to be in breach of the Convention, to make 
inspections and to confiscate any illegal catches (Lanchbery 1995). 
A complementary approach is to design rules and review procedures that 
promote transparency in the ways in which national reports are prepared, or to 
establish systematic and expert reviews of these reports by international bodies 
that can compare them with relevant independent information and follow up with 
further questions or country visits to resolve any questions that may arise. This, 
for example, is the approach recently adopted in the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC) for reviewing national reports on greenhouse-gas inven-
tories (Greene and Lanchbery 1995; Victor and Salt 1994). 
Each national submission in the FCCC contains substantial amounts of infor-
mation involving complex and uncertain judgements, and would normally raise 
many technical questions. An effective review will therefore require substantial 
resources and expertise. This highlights another generally significant institutional 
factor: the extent to which the review involves a competent and well-resourced 
international technical review body. Unless the relevant facts about performance 
are entirely straightforward or transparent, a process whereby the assessment of 
national implementation is simply carried out by the Conference of the Parties 
without a prior systematic technical review is unlikely to promote learning, and 
is more likely to reflect pre-existing interests than to shape them. 
The rules of access and participation, and the openness of the information-
exchange and review process to all interested parties, are important. They 
obviously affect the ways in which learning processes and interest- or power-
based mechanisms operate. Most contemporary environmental agreements 
normally allow interested non-members to participate as observers in reviews 
during the meetings of parties. However, their access to the detailed review of a 
party's implementation is normally more restricted. In the case of the Montreal 
Protocol, for example, for reasons of commercial confidentiality detailed data on 
imports, exports and the production of ozone-depleting substances in national 
reports may normally only be reviewed by the Ozone Secretariat and, if specific 
concerns about compliance are raised by other parties, by an Implementation 
Committee consisting of elected representatives often member states. Aggregate 
figures are circulated to all interested parties (including NGOs), together with a 
report from the Secretariat, and these form a basis for the review by the Meetings 
of the Parties. 
Whether restrictions or open access is most likely to improve effectiveness 
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depends on the particular circumstances. In general, openness is likely to promote 
learning and also the influence of 'outsiders', including environmentalists. 
However, confidentiality and restricted access may be important in order to elicit 
appropriate detailed information on implementation, or to make the review 
process less vulnerable to damaging disputes or misunderstandings. Openness 
could empower opponents of environmental protection as well as supporters. 
There are numerous other potentially significant design features, such as the 
flexibility and level of formality of the process, the extent to which it is routine 
and systematic, the ways in which concerns about poor performance are raised 
and addressed, and the procedures for judging or resolving disputes about 
compliance. 
However, perhaps the most important issue relates to the overall design. How 
do the implementation review procedures relate to the other institutional mechan-
isms within a regime, such as dispute resolution, responses to non-compliance, 
and reviews of commitments? In principle, the implementation review processes 
should be designed to reinforce each of these other mechanisms and vice versa. 
However, this is easier said than done. The next section briefly identifies some 
desirable overall design characteristics, and then discusses the potential role of 
verifiability, implementation review and procedures for developing commit-
ments in the further stages of the climate-change convention. 
REVIEW AND OVERALL INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
As emphasised above, an effective regime is one whose institutions, rules and 
procedures are well adapted to affect external factors and processes in such a way 
that the behaviour of relevant actors is changed in line with its objectives. These 
factors are specific to the situation and issue area involved. Moreover, institutions 
are established through a process of compromise amongst national and inter-
national policy-makers who have at best only a partial understanding of the 
external environment and of the most effective way of responding to it. Further-
more, the external situation is constantly changing. An institutional design that is 
extremely effective at one time will need continually to adapt and develop in 
order to remain useful. 
This implies that a key characteristic of an effective regime is flexibility and 
the capacity to adapt its institutions, rules and procedures in a timely way in the 
light of its experience with implementation and as patterns of power, interest, 
influence, knowledge, capacity and concern develop. 
Many international environmental conventions seem ill-equipped to achieve 
this. They have no provisions for regular meetings of the parties, and the pro-
cedures for review or for revising procedures and commitments are often unclear 
(Victor, Lanchbery and Greene 1994). For example, the 1940 Washington 
Convention on wildlife preservation in the Western hemisphere effectively has 
no review mechanisms and no provisions for meetings of the parties. Its Annex 
of endangered species is incomplete and almost permanently out of date: no 
species have been added since 1967. 
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In contrast, the parties to the 1946 International Whaling Convention (IWC) 
meet annually to review national reports of whale catches and the reports of 
expert groups set up to monitor whale populations or aspects of whaling acti-
vities. These expert groups can be set up or terminated by majority vote at any 
meeting of the parties. Commitments can easily be revised in the same way by 
amending the Schedule to the Convention. Similarly, CI1ES has several expert 
standing committees reviewing and advising the Conference of the Parties, which 
meets every two years. There are also provisions for additional Extraordinary 
meetings, which are occasionally held, and commitments are frequently and 
easily revised by altering the Appendices listing endangered species (Victor, 
Lanchbery and Greene 1994). 
CITES and the ICW both share some of the essential flexible characteristics of 
'framework conventions'. These are conventions which establish the basic prin-
ciples, norms and procedures of a regime, including provisions both for regular 
reviews of implementation and of the adequacy of commitments and for the 
subsequent negotiation of protocols. The routine reviews facilitate learning and 
institutional development, and provide a forum for agenda-setting. Using these 
protocols, parties can develop or revise procedures and commitments as they see 
fit. The UNEP regional seas agreements (such as the 1976 Barcelona Convention 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution) and the 1985 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer are widely regarded as 
paradigms of this institutional approach. In contrast with the ICWs somewhat 
alarming potential for dramatic and sudden changes in rules, once the Montreal 
Protocol came into force, parties could only revise its main rules or commitments 
by separately negotiating and ratifying Amendments (as occurred in this case 
with the 1990 London Amendments and the 1992 Copenhagen Revisions). 
Framework conventions are now widely regarded as the most appropriate 
model for the design of new conventions to tackle a wide range of global or 
regional environmental problems. For example, the main conventions emerging 
from the 1992 'Earth Summit' - the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC), the Biodiversity Convention and the Desertification Convention - are 
all framework conventions. 
For the reasons discussed above, this appears to be an effective overall 
approach to institutional design, leaving a great deal of flexibility to develop each 
regime's institutions, rules and procedures differently according to its particular 
situation and tasks. This latter point needs emphasis, because it should not be 
assumed that the institutional development of successful regimes such as the 
Montreal Protocol is a good model for the development of other conventions 
addressing different and often more complex issue areas. 
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which came into 
force on 21 March 1994, is a case in point. The FCCC imposes few obligations 
on parties to it. The Convention allows each party to adopt whatever national 
programmes and conmitments to limit greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions it deems 
appropriate. However, the substance and implementation of these measures are to 
be regularly and internationally reviewed. All parties are obliged to provide 
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detailed national inventories of greenhouse gases, together with a general des-
cription of steps taken or envisaged to implement the Convention. In addition, 
each developed country must provide: a detailed description of the policies and 
measures it has adopted to limit GHG emissions, projections of emissions in 2000 
and a specific estimate of the effects of its policies and measures on net GHG 
emissions. These reports are to be regularly reviewed by the Conference of the 
Parties, with the assistance of two subsidiary bodies and expert review' panels. 
At least until future protocols are negotiated, this 'pledge and review process 
will be central to the effectiveness of the Convention. By the end of 1994, the 
process had begun. All OECD states except Turkey and Mexico had made 
unilateral commitments to limit GHG emissions on which they should have made 
a start. Moreover, the first national reports submitted by developed-country 
parties were being subject to an initial review in preparation for the first Confer-
ence of the Parties in March 1995, pending more detailed scrutiny during the 
subsequent year. 
Now that the FCCC is established, the question is how to further develop the 
regime to make it more effective. If one were to follow the Montreal Protocol 
paradigm for the development of a framework convention, attention would focus 
on starting a process of negotiating a series of increasingly stringent commit-
ments to limit national GHG emissions. 
In this context, a first priority would be to establish the stabilisation of 
developed parties' net GHG emissions at 1990 levels after the year 2000 as a 
legally binding obligation. Such a commitment would consolidate the already-
declared unilateral commitments and encourage states to do more to ensure that 
they meet them. However, it is not clear that it is then a priority to press for more 
stringent targets and timetables. Encouraging other aspects of institutional 
development seems a higher priority, including establishing a well-developed 
implementation review process and promoting the effective formulation and 
implementation of national programmes to at least stabilise GHG emissions at 
1990 levels. It is important to note that several OECD countries (and the EU) are 
still a long way from implementing policies that are likely to achieve this goal by 
2000. 
Moreover, it is important to be aware of the fact that the formulation of 
international commitments relating to national GHG emissions involves complex 
choices. 
An effective protocol needs to set significant targets for limiting GHG 
emissions but also to allow states real flexibility about how they achieve them, 
not only to allow for efficiency and adaptability in view of countries' widely 
varying circumstances, but also to encourage states to focus on achieving their 
commitments rather than on developing tough negotiating strategies. To promote 
effective implementation, commitments should also be verifiable and subject to 
effective implementation review. 
In principle, a protocol involving commitments relating specifically to a few 
important and relatively verifiable gases or sectors could go some way to meeting 
these requirements (Greene and Salt 1993). For example, limits on carbon-dioxide 
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emissions from fossil-fuel burning (which probably account for more than half of 
any anthropogenic climate change) would be relatively verifiable, at least for 
developed states (Fischer, Katscheer and Di Primio 1990). Moreover, in most 
countries this is a sector large and diverse enough for the state to have a 
significant range of choices about how to implement commitments efficiently. 
However, this approach appears to be unnegotiable for the foreseeable future. 
Several key states are insisting that any binding limits on net GHG emissions 
should be comprehensive: they should cover all of the main GHGs and sectors 
(apart from substances restricted by the Montreal Protocol). In any case, just 
because compliance with commitments to limit some types of emissions (such as 
methane from agriculture) is very hard to verify, it does not mean that we should 
abandon the attempt to establish obligations or incentives to limit such emissions. 
However, any commitment expressed in terms of limits on parties' overall 
annual GHG emissions poses real challenges for the design of an effective 
regime. For example, how are national emissions of one GHG to be compared 
with those of another? The so-called 'global-warming potential' of some GHGs 
remains poorly understood and subject to change. Furthermore, if the national-
emissions inventories for those gases and sectors that can be measured or 
monitored reasonably accurately were to be aggregated with those that are highly 
uncertain in this respect, the overall monitorability of any commitment relating to 
overall GHG emissions would prove to be poor, both for the government con-
cerned and for the international community, and this would undermine any 
effective implementation review. If the implementing state itself cannot measure 
whether it is complying with its commitments, implementation is bound to suffer. 
A promising strategy for tackling this problem is to build on the 'pledge and 
review' process that has already been established within the FCCC (Greene and 
Salt 1994). Thus, procedures could be established by which those parties legally 
obliged to limit their net annual GHG emissions should report on how they intend 
to achieve compliance. Each state would announce targets for each gas and 
sector, set so that their combined effect (calculated according to internationally 
agreed methods) would be sufficient to meet their obligation. 
For some gases (such as carbon dioxide, as emitted from fossil-fuel burning) 
and some sectors, such a pledge would already be verifiable and amenable to 
implementation review. In others, this would not be the case, and the procedures 
for pledge and review would then require parties to further disaggregate their 
pledges. For example, a national pledge to reduce methane emissions from rice 
production by 10 per cent is relatively unverifiable. But a collection of national 
sub-commitments to achieve this - for example, by stabilising paddy areas; 
reducing inundation periods by 25 per cent; changing rice varieties; and carrying 
out programmes to reduce the use of organic fertilisers - could be amenable to 
effective implementation review. 
This process would generate a verifiable set of political pledges and indicators 
of performance for each country according to its own preferences and circum-
stances but on the basis of a globally negotiated (but relatively unverifiable) 
overall legal commitment. These pledges would be defined by each country 
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concerned, but in consultation with a review body and according to international 
guidelines. Such sub-commitments will often be closely related to a govern-
ment's domestic targets and implementation programmes. This has the advantage 
that procedures for reviewing the implementation of commitments will not only 
be closely linked to the process of reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of 
policies governments have adopted to meet these commitments, but may also be 
more effectively linked with programmes to assist with implementation. 
Variants on this approach could also be useful for the development of other 
environmental regimes dealing with great complexity, and indeed both for pro-
moting action relating to Agenda 21 and for increasing the effectiveness of the 
Commission on Sustainable Development. However, this would require specific 
study. As emphasised above, implementation review processes and other institu-
tional characteristics of regimes can be a key factor in regime effectiveness, but 
their design should be sensitive to the particular context and adaptable in the light 
of experience and changing priorities. 
NOTES 
1 This chapter draws on research done at Bradford University and funded by the ESRC 
Global Environmental Change Programme, and also on recent work done with col-
leagues in the project on the Implementation and Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Agreements at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA). The author gratefully acknowledges the stimulation and support 
received. The views expressed are the author's own, and not necessarily those of the 
institutions. 
2 This is very similar to the working definition and approach proposed by Levy, Young and 
Zurn 1994. 
3 Hegemonic-stability theorists argued that this would not be the case, but the 
maintenance development of international trade and other regimes after the USA 
slipped from its hegemonic position in the 1970s provides counter-evidence. 
4 The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty provides an example of this-particularly in 
its survival and continued influence during the mid- to late 1980s when the US 
Administration found many of its provisions uncongenial. 
5 See, for example: Elliott 1994; Princen and Finger 1994; Petersen 1992; Wapner 
1991. 
6 This may not always be the case. Future systematic empirical research comparing a 
range of different regimes may allow the development of some reliable and useful 
general findings on this and related issues. 
7 The discussion in this section draws upon previous ESRC-funded work (for example, 
Greene 1993), and also has drawn substantially on recent work and discussions with 
colleagues in the IIASA project on the Implementation and Effectiveness of Inter-
national Environmental Agreements, particularly with D. Victor and J. Lanchbery, 
Juan-Carlos Di Primio and Anna Korula (see, for example, Victor et al. 1994; Victor, 
Lanchbery and Green 1994). 
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12 Hegemonic ideology and the 
International Tropical Timber 
Organisation* 
David Humphreys 
Our traditional societies always cared for the well-being of nature. Unfortun-
ately for historical reasons they were forced to produce what they do not eat, 
and eat what they do not produce. 
(An African NGO's perspective, 12th Session of the International 
Tropical Timber Council, Cameroon, May 1992) 
This chapter will argue that contention among actors in the international system 
arises from clashes of ideologies. Willetts, earlier in this volume, examines the 
environmental values advocated by actors. An ideology may be seen as an 
attempt to formulate the practical consequences of affirming a particular set of 
values. As Willetts has argued elsewhere, an ideology is 'a programmatic asser-
tion of political values, which are held to be of universal validity for their 
proclaimed domain' (Willetts 1978: 244). An ideology has two broad features: 
first, there is a description of the processes by which social and political change 
occur; second, there is a normative prescription of how social and political 
change should occur. The normative component of ideologies will be the central 
concern of this paper. Adopting a neo-Gramscian approach, this paper will 
examine the ideological orientation of the International Tropical Timber Organis-
ation (ITTO). Gramsci saw ideologies as 'political and social programmes and 
the concepts on which they are based' (Augelli and Murphy 1988: 15). Three 
competing ideologies will be considered: the current hegemonic ideology of 
neoliberalism and two counter-hegemonic ideologies, namely those of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) and ecologism. 
HEGEMONIC AND COUNTER-HEGEMONIC IDEOLOGIES 
The currently hegemonic ideology of neoliberalism is articulated by core inter-
ests, but also attracts qualified support from co-opted peripheral interests. Here, 
hegemony is used in a neo-Gramscian sense, as opposed to Keohane's definition 
of hegemony as a 'preponderance of material resources' (Keohane 1984: 32). 
Robert Cox sees hegemony as 'a structure of values and understandings about the 
nature of [world] order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state 
entities' (Cox 1992: 140). 
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What is the nature of the hegemonic ideology? Ruggie sees the postwar 
economic system as a compromise between two demands. The first was the desire 
on the part of the postwar hegemon (here the Keohane definition of hegemony is 
used), namely the USA, to establish a multilateral free-trading system. The 
second was the demand for social and economic stability as expressed by a new 
collective balance in state-society relations in the industrialised world. Ruggie 
refers to this as the embedded liberalism compromise (Ruggie 1983) which can 
be read as one of ideological hegemony (Donnelly 1986: 638). Although 
American hegemony has declined (Keohane 1984), there has been a rise, on the 
other hand, in the economic power of the European Union (EU) and Japan, both 
of which accept the basic tenets of neoliberalism. Hence, despite the decline of 
the hegemonic power, the hegemonic ideology has persisted. 
Three of the norms of neoliberalism will now be considered. 1 The first is the 
recognition that states have sovereignty over their resources. Principle 21 of the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment recognised that states 
have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources, but married this with a 
responsibility to ensure that exploitation does not damage the environment of 
other states. Stockholm Principle 21 also stipulated that states have a responsi-
bility to ensure that their activities do not damage 'areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction', in other words the global commons, such as the atmosphere 
and the oceans. A second globally accepted norm is that trade should be free and 
open. Ruggie would see this norm constrained only by the demand for domestic 
social and economic stability. The norm of free trade has often been violated, 
although such violation has not detracted from its authority: norms are counter-
factually valid, as '[n]o single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm' 
(Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 767). Third, there is the norm of economic 
development. Governments from both North and South have promoted, encour-
aged and initiated modernising industrial development policies within their 
territorial domain, in part to achieve the domestic economic stability that Ruggie 
considers to be a feature of embedded liberalism. 
One ideology that challenges neoliberalism is the above-mentioned one of the 
NIEO. The South's demands for a NIEO can be seen as counter-hegemonic (Cox 
1983: 171; Lee 1995). In fact, Southern political elites have conceded a degree of 
acceptance to neoliberalism, whilst simultaneously, however, seeking to modify 
its norms. The sovereignty of states over their natural resources is accepted 
without question. However, while advocates of the NIEO accept the norm of free 
trade, they simultaneously seek to overturn it in certain respects. Trade should be 
free and open, but the market should be usurped with respect to, inter alia, 
financial-resource and technology transfers from North to South, external debt 
relief and the arrest of declining terms of trade. Advocates of the NIEO also 
uphold the norm of industrial development, but consider that such development 
should be firmly under the control of peripheral elites and not imposed by core 
institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
Northern-based transnational corporations and banks. 
'The South' should clearly not be seen as an undifferentiated 'actor'. Different 
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political elites within the South pursue different political agendas and objectives. 
It is also the case, as is argued by the structural theorists of the dependency 
school,2 that certain Southern political elites have formed a collaborative relation-
ship with their Northern counterparts. Nonetheless, it is equally the case that the 
vast majority of political elites within the South adhere to the NIEO as an 
ideology, and that they pursue the objectives of the NIEO within such fora as the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN, the Non-Aligned Move-
ment and the Organisation of African Unity. The NIEO programme hinges on 
linkages, involving bargaining issues, asserted by the South between the supply 
of commodities to the North and the demand for a macro-level restructuring of 
the economic system. The oil crisis of 1973 may be seen as the brief peak of the 
South's commodity-related bargaining power. Thereafter the NIEO challenge 
waned as the South had comparatively little to offer the North in exchange for 
what was demanded (Renninger 1989: 249). However, environmental degra-
dation, especially tropical-rainforest destruction, has given a new lease of life to 
the NIEO demands. The South has used the North's concerns about deforestation 
to attempt to strike a global bargain with the North. Throughout the forest 
negotiations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED), the South advanced its NIEO claims, especially for financial-
resource and technology transfers (Humphreys 1993). Some of these demands 
were included in UNCED's non-legally binding statement of forest principles 
which was concluded at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.3 The rise of forest conser-
vation as an international issue has enhanced the value of tropical forests, which, 
in turn, has increased the South's bargaining leverage. The South's efforts to 
translate the North's concern on forests into the hard currency of economic gain 
has strengthened the counter-hegemonic challenge of the NIEO. 
Advocates of the NIEO therefore seek to redefine the hegemonic ideology in 
terms of the perceived interests of the South. However, there are those who would 
consider that the NIEO ideology belongs not to a different economic system but 
to the same system as that of neoliberalism. Lummis, noting that one of the NIEO 
claims was that disparities in wealth between North and South are unjust, 
responds that 
The accusation of injustice cannot traditionally be made against inequalities 
between systems, but only within a system. The fact that the idea is intelligible 
today is evidence of the degree to which we accept that the world has been 
organised into a single economic system. 
(Lummis 1992: 44) 
Clearly, any ideology seeking to replace, rather than redefine, the norms of 
neoliberalism would constitute a far more radical ideological challenge than that 
of the NIEO. Such an ideology may be expected to emanate from environmental 
concerns. A neo-Gramscian view would see global environmental degradation as 
an organic crisis. The political and economic elites of the present neoliberal 
economic system have, thus far, proved unable to tackle successfully the major 
symptoms or causes of environmental destruction. However, aware of the 
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seriousness of the crisis, they have been prepared to co-opt environmental ideas 
and environmentalists in an effort to create a new coalition of political forces to 
deal with environmental degradation, but only in ways that do not threaten the 
ideological hegemony of neoliberalism. 
Here it is useful to note the distinction made by Dobson between environ-
mentalism and ecologism. Environmentalism merely seeks to control the effects 
on the environment of industrialisation and development. Ecologism, with its 
critique of consumption and production patterns, meets two of the requirements 
of a definition of ideology, namely 'a description of ... "political reality" [and] 
a prescription for the future': ecologism is not 'simply embedded in other 
political ideologies - it is an ideology in its own right' (Dobson 1990: 3 and 130). 
In what ways may environmentalists and ecologists view the three norms of 
neoliberalism under consideration here? 
In the case of forests, a bottom-up challenge to state sovereignty has emerged 
centred on the argument that local communities should partake in domestic and 
international policy-making, and that indigenous forest peoples should be granted 
title to their ancestral land. The ecologist opposes the notion that natural re-
sources should be used by economic and political elites in line with national 
development policy; use of the word 'national' here serves to exclude the local. 
While environmentalism seeks concessions from the state on the participation of 
local communities, ecologism goes further and argues for a shift both in power 
distribution and in social relations. 
Free trade, the second global norm, is also challenged by environmentalism. 
Environmental economists argue that the free market ignores social and environ-
mental costs, which should be internalised into the price mechanism. However, 
the ecological view is that economics and free trade have been driving forces for 
environmental degradation. Lohmann argues that economics has evolved around 
a set of purposes 'providing a rational framework for a capitalist type of social 
organisation' (Lohmann 1991: 195). To Lohmann, nature has infinite value that 
cannot be internalised into a price mechanism or assigned a monetary value. 
Environmentalists and ecologists differ once again on the norm of industrial 
development. The environmentalist seeks to ensure that environmental values 
prevail over developmental values so as to yield 'sustainable development'. 
However, the ecologist rejects developmentalism, and consequently dismisses 
the linkage of the environment with development (Sachs 1991). Environmental 
degradation is seen as an intrinsic feature, rather than an accidental condition, of 
modernising development. 'Sustainable development' is considered to be a rescue 
hypothesis for a discredited ideal. 
Ideologies are not enclosed, hermetically sealed entities. Ideologies, including 
counter-hegemonic ideologies, should not be seen as independent variables. The 
dynamic interplay between ideologies defines international politics. Ideas from a 
counter-hegemonic ideology articulating the aspirations of a sizeable peripheral 
group may be absorbed into, and may redefine the norms of, the hegemonic 
ideology. The notion of 'sustainable development' can be seen as the modifi-
cation of a hegemonic norm following the co-option of a counter-hegemonic idea. 
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'Sustainable development' fuses the neoliberal's emphasis on development with 
the ecologist's concern for sustainability. While still lacking clear definitional 
precision, the concept has gained widespread acceptance in international society 
since the mid-1980s. The decision at UNCED to create the Commission on 
Sustainable Development, an organ reporting to the ECOSOC of the UN, bears 
testimony to the degree to which the concept has been endorsed within the United 
Nations system. 
In short, ecologism stresses the empowerment oflocal peoples, local modes of 
exchange free from the influence of the market, and opposition to top-down 
economic development. Figure 12.1 summarises the principal differences be-
tween environmentalism and ecologism on the three norms of neoliberalism 
under consideration here. 
It is emphasised that a diverse spectrum of 'green' thought exists spanning 
environmentalism and ecologism, and that the distinction drawn here is an 
ideal-type one only: environmentalism and ecologism are two poles of a single 
continuum of thought. Environmentalism would not necessarily challenge neo-
liberalism; agents of this ideology would seek to co-opt the environmental 
challenge. Advocates of neoliberalism may thus safely become environ-
mentalists, but to adopt an ecological world-view would be to compromise their 
original beliefs. The Club of Rome report, The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 
1974), would fall into the environmentalist category as its authors took the 
National 
sovereignty 
Free trade and 
the market 
Environmentalism 
Governments should integrate the 
views of local communities and 
indigenous peoples into the 
national policy-making process. 
Environmental economics should 
internalise social and 
environmental costs. Market and 
non-market incentives should be 
used to promote environmentally 
friendly policies. 
Development Environmental values should 
prevail over developmental values 
to yield 'sustainable development'. 
Ecologism 
A shift in power relations from the 
national to the local level is 
necessary. The rights and basic 
needs oflocal communities and 
indigenous peoples should prevail 
over the perceived 'national interest' 
as determined by governments. 
The environment has infinite value 
and cannot be internalised into a 
price mechanism or assigned a 
monetary figure. 
'Development' is a driving force 
of environmental degradation. 
'Sustainable development' is seen 
as a rescue hypothesis. 
Figure 12.1 Environmental and ecological views on the three norms ofneoliberalism 
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ideology of the system as a given. Cox has criticised the systems-dynamics 
approach of the Club of Rome for accepting the system's currently dominant 
norms (Cox 1976: 181). However, ecologism, with its emphasis on a shift in 
power distribution, clearly challenges not only neoliberalism but also the 
ideology of the NIEO. Both neoliberalism and the NIEO see the state as a central 
actor. However, in emphasising the empowerment of the local, the ecologist 
eschews state centricity, and a realisation of the ecologist's world-view would 
necessitate not system maintenance, with the hegemonic ideology absorbing 
potentially counter-hegemonic ideas, but system transformation, driven by a new 
ideology. 
The struggle of the ecologist begins in international civil society, in other 
words in that part of international society comprised of non-governmental 
voluntary-membership associations. Augelli and Murphy focus principally on 
intergovernmental agencies when considering international civil society in their 
neo-Gramscian analysis of US foreign policy during the 1980s. Such agencies are 
part of international civil society as they are private membership organisations 
(Augelli and Murphy 1988: 139). On this view, the ITI'O should also be seen as 
a part of international civil society. However, one area of international civil 
society much neglected by many neo-Gramscian writers is that of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). But in order to fully appreciate the work 
of intergovernmental organisations, it is necessary to consider the role of NGOs. 
Conservation NG0s4 lobby intergovernmental organisations - such as the ITI'O, 
where they have been granted observer status. The ideological position of NGOs 
will be considered below. 
With his focus on the means of production, Gramsci, like other Marxist 
writers, exhibits a clear bias in favour of economic development, something 
which we have seen is anathema to the ecologist. The ultimate outcome of the 
ecologist's project would be not a single economic system but a multitude of 
different systems of social organisation; in its purest form it would constitute a 
very un-Gramscian notion of hegemony. The hegemony in question would not be 
that of a social class. The ecologist aspires to the hegemony of local knowledges 
and belief systems over the 'intellectual and ideological imperialism' of scientific 
rationalism (Banuri and Marglin 1993: 2), to the hegemony of decentralised 
systems of land use over centralised systems, and to the hegemony of localised 
methods of production independent of the influence of international capital.5 
Gramsci considered that for any social group to achieve hegemony, it must 
engage in constructing, and leading, a coalition of social movements.6 Here the 
question of political tactics arises; should ecologists attempt to achieve the 
hegemony of localised systems by working with core institutions, seeking to 
achieve incremental change, or should they work outside such institutions, en-
gaging in pressure-group activity while maintaining the purity of their ideology? 
This question has preoccupied, and frequently divided, many of those involved in 
the green movement. Many of the more radical conservation NGOs are aware that 
one hazard of the former tactic is that of 'co-option', in which they legitimise the 
policies of the very institutions they seek to change. 
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Cox has argued that international institutions perform an ideological role, and 
that they may act as a mechanism through which universal norms are expressed 
(Cox 1983: 172). Alternatively, 'international institutions may also become 
vehicles for the articulation of a coherent counter-hegemonic set of values' (Cox 
1980: 377). This paper will now assess the ideological orientation of the ITIO-
or, more accurately, that of those actors who participate in the ITIO's work. 
Attention will first tum to the contents of the International Tropical Timber 
Agreement of 1983 - the 'ITIA 1983'. 
THE INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER AGREEMENT, 1983 
The ITI A 1983 emerged from a protracted series of negotiations held under the 
auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), and entered into force in April 1985. Since then the International 
Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994 ('ITIA 1994') has been negotiated, but at the 
time of writing it has yet to enter into force. The ITIA 1983, which had been due 
to expire on 31 March 1994, may now remain in force until such time as the ITI A 
1994 receives the requisite number of ratifications. 
The ITI A 1983 reflected the three global norms of neoliberalism. First, the 
sovereignty of the producing members over their forest resources is asserted.7 
Second, an objective of the Agreement is 'the expansion and diversification of 
international trade in tropical timber' .8 And third, industrial development was 
explicitly endorsed; the Agreement was principally a commodity agreement that 
aimed at encouraging 'further processing of tropical timber in producing member 
countries with a view to promoting their industrialisation' .9 
However, one clause of the ITIA 1983 had a clear ecological orientation, 
namely to encourage 'national policies aimed at sustainable utilization and con-
servation of tropical forests and their genetic resources, and at maintaining the 
ecological balance in the regions concerned' .10 This objective rests uneasily with 
the 'expansion and diversification' of the timber trade, an objective entirely in 
keeping with the norm of free trade, but one which conservation NGOs have 
asserted is incompatible with a sustainable trade (Friends of the Earth/World 
Rainforest Movement 1992: 4). 
As well as containing this internal contradiction, the ITIA 1983 also con-
flicted with clauses of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 
(GAIT) in two ways. 11 Possibly the most important environmental case to go 
before a GA TI panel, and one with particular ramifications for the international 
tropical-timber trade, was the 'dolphin-tuna' case between the USA and Mexico. 
In this case, the USA had banned imports of tuna fish caught by Mexican 
fishermen using nets that ensnared dolphins. The Mexicans complained to the 
GA TI, and a GA TI panel subsequently ruled that GA TI Article XX(g) on the 
conservation of natural resources12 could not be invoked by one party to ensure 
the protection of natural resources beyond its territorial boundaries.13 Further-
more, under Article XX(g) the onus to prove a case lies with the party wishing to 
conserve the resource, not the party allegedly depleting it. As the World Wide 
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Fund for Nature (WWF) notes, 'This may be logical in the context of a free trade 
agreement, but does not further the objective of ensuring that any trade liberalis-
ation resulting from the agreement is sustainable' (Arden-Clarke 1991: 17). 
The second tension between the m A 1983 and the GA TI concerned GA TI 
clauses prohibiting discrimination between like products on the basis of their 
manufacture.14 In effect, the GAIT gives unsustainably produced timber the 
same status in the international market as sustainably produced timber; GAIT 
signatories would be unable to use tariffs or quotas to favour timber from 
sustainable sources (Arden-Clarke 1990: 8). The WWF has recommended that 
the I'ITO Secretariat seek a waiver from the GAIT for any trade measures 
necessary to contribute to the sustainability of the tropical-timber trade, and has 
further recommended that the GA TI be amended to allow discrimination be-
tween sustainably and unsustainably produced timber (Arden-Clarke 1990: 11). 
The Secretariat did not seek such a waiver,15 however, and the GAIT was not 
amended during the Uruguay Round to allow for trade discrimination against 
unsustainably produced products. Under neoliberalism, free trade is clearly of 
greater normative force than resource conservation. 
THE INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER ORGANISATION 
When the mA 1983 came into effect, there were twelve tropical-timber 
producer countries and fifteen consumer countries. By March 1994 membership 
had grown to twenty-three producers and twenty-seven consumers. The mA 
1983 created the International Tropical Timber Organisation, the highest 
decision-making organ of which is the International Tropical Timber Council 
(ITIC). There are three permanent committees that meet alongside the me, 
namely the Permanent Committee on Reforestation and Forest Management, the 
Permanent Committee on Forest Industry and the Permanent Committee on 
Economic Information and Market Intelligence. Voting rights within the ITIC 
and the permanent committees are divided equally between tropical-timber pro-
ducer countries and tropical-timber consumer countries. The votes of consumer 
countries are determined by their share of global tropical-timber imports. 
Producer countries' votes are determined principally by their share of global 
tropical-timber exports, with some consideration also given to the forest areas 
involved. Indonesia, Brazil and Malaysia are the three countries holding the 
largest shares of votes for producer countries. Japan holds the most votes for 
the consumer countries, with the EU bloc second. However, with the exception 
of the votes for the headquarters site of the I'ITO (Yokohama) and for the choice 
of Executive Director (a Malaysian), no vote has been taken at an me session; 
the ITIA 1983 emphasises that the me 'shall endeavour to take all decisions 
... by consensus' .16 However, an awareness of the different voting allocations of 
the member countries can influence how a consensus develops. 
Representatives from NGOs and timber-trade organisations may attend ITIC 
sessions as observers,17 and they may be invited to sit on national delegations in 
an advisory capacity. For example, a representative from the Timber Trade 
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Federation has sat on the UK delegation, while a representative from the Nether-
lands Timber Trade Association has sat on the Dutch delegation. Representatives 
from the WWF have served as forest-conservation advisers on the national 
delegations of Denmark, Malaysia and the UK. Other NGOs, either unable to 
gain a place, or unwilling to serve, on national delegations, but which have 
attended ITTC sessions as observers, include Friends of the Earth (FoE), Survival 
International, the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Rainforest Action 
Network (USA). 
In 1990 the ITTO, with its Target 2000, adopted a target date by which time it 
is intended that the entire international trade in tropical timber should come from 
sustainable sources (ITTO 1990b: 7). This decision was adopted following a 
proposal by the Permanent Committee on Forest Industry. The main work of the 
three permanent committees comprises the vetting and approval of pre-projects 
and projects. Examples of projects, to name just a few, include the building of 
databases on the tropical-timber trade, research on incentives, reforestation 
projects and projects to improve the further processing capacity of producer 
countries. A pre-project is the preparatory phase of a project and is essentially 
concerned with background research and information collation. Not all projects 
go through a pre-project phase; this occurs only if exploratory research or 
preparatory activity is required. Proposals may be submitted only by ITTO 
members or by the Secretariat. In principle, inappropriate or poorly designed 
projects should not pass through the permanent committees. Pre-project and 
project proposals must fall within the remit of one of the three permanent 
committees. As Figure 12.2 details, two-thirds of ITTO project expenditure has 
centred on the work of the Permanent Committee on Reforestation and Forest 
Management. By 31 December 1992, the ITTO had also undertaken fifty-five 
approved pre-project studies.18 
This section will assess the ideological bias of the ITTO throughout the 
lifespan of the ITTA 1983. Consideration will first be given to the norm of the 
Permanent committee Approved Total budget /ITO budget 
projects US$m US$m 
Reforestation and forest management 96 99.9 71.2 
Forest industry 60 39.5 25.7 
Economic information marlcet intelligence 23 10.4 9.6 
Total 179 149.8 106.5 
Figure 12.2 Project work of the International Tropical Timber Organisation as at 31 
December 1992 
Source: UN document TD/fIMBER.2/3, 'Background, status and operation of the International 
Tropical Timber Agreement, 1983, and recent developments of relevance to the negotiation of a 
successor agreement', 26 February 1993, paras 46--7, pp. 9-10 
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sovereignty of states over their forest resources. The mo has produced three 
sets of guidelines that have been adopted by members at I'ITC sessions. In May 
1990 the me adopted guidelines on the sustainable management of natural 
tropical forests (ITTO 1990a). The guidelines contain forty-one principles for 
sustainable forest management, and thirty-six recommended 'possible actions' 
that could be taken for these principles to be realised. The mo Executive 
Director recommended that the guidelines be modified 'into more specific guide-
lines which are compatible with regional and national forestry practices'. 19 The 
me has also adopted guidelines both on biodiversity conservation (ITTO 1991) 
and on the sustainable management of planted forests (ITTO 1993). 
It could be argued that the adoption of such guidelines by IITO producers 
represents an erosion of some measure of sovereignty. However, producer 
governments have proved unwilling to enforce the mo guidelines at the country 
level, and to date not one country has used the guidelines as the basis for its own 
national guidelines. Furthermore, the poor level of national reporting has been a 
sustained topic of criticism for the NGOs, who have continually criticised 
member governments both for not demonstrating a greater commitment either to 
the mO's guidelines or to its Target 2000 objective, and for failing to follow 
through on ITI'C decisions (Callister 1992: 7; Friends of the Earth/World Rain-
forest Movement 1992: 12-17). 
A second NGO challenge to sovereignty comes from the claims on the part of 
indigenous peoples and NGOs that forest dwellers should be granted title to their 
customary lands, and that local communities should participate in decision-
making. Indigenous peoples' groups are becoming increasingly well organised. 
One such group to have addressed the mo is the Coordinating Body for the 
Indigenous Peoples' Organisations of the Amazon Basin (COICA).20 NGOs have 
forged a close working relationship with indigenous peoples' groups, and the 
former have lobbied the I'ITC on behalf of the latter. At the I'ITC's eleventh 
session, NGOs drafted a resolution which, if accepted, would have affirmed a 
commitment from mo members to respect the rights and secure the livelihoods 
of forest-dwelling peoples.21 The draft was discussed informally outside the 
Council, where the European Community voiced support, but was not adopted 
due to producer opposition.22 Despite the lobbying of the NGOs and indigenous 
peoples' groups, no IITC decision has recognised land rights claimed by forest 
peoples. This, in effect, reinforces the norm of sovereignty; such claims can only 
be considered by the domestic legislative organs of the country concerned, and 
not by the IITO. 
Attention will now turn to the norm of free trade. The IITO has debated the 
possible use of market interventions to promote a sustainable tropical-timber 
trade. In 1989 a proposal on labelling systems for the promotion of sustainably 
produced tropical timber23 was tabled by the British delegation. The objective of 
the proposal was to provide a mechanism whereby timber from sustainably 
managed sources could be labelled as such in the producing country, thus ena-
bling buyers in the consuming country to identify such timber. Prepared by FoE 
with some input from the Oxford Forestry Institute (OFI), the proposal met with 
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opposition from Indonesia and Malaysia (Colchester 1990: 169), and the report 
of the Permanent Committee on Economic Information and Market Intelligence 
strongly implies that the proposal threatened the interests of the producer coun-
tries and the timber trade.24 The British delegation subsequently redrafted the 
proposal during the course of the session without consulting FoE. In the new 
version,25 every reference to labelling had been excised, and the proposal referred 
only to incentives for sustainable forest management. At this stage FoE withdrew 
their support for the proposal. The revised proposal was not debated but instead 
became the subject of further research.26 
Following these developments, the British delegation engaged the OFI and the 
UK Timber Research and Development Association (TRADA), who drafted a 
proposal on financial and non-financial incentives for sustainable forest 
management. The proposal examined possible financial incentives, such as the 
funding of forest-management services by tax transfers, debt-for-nature swaps 
and grants, and non-financial incentives, including security ofland tenure, certifi-
cation schemes for good forest-management practice and the development of 
non-timber forest products. The OFl/fRADA report27 was debated at the ITTC's 
tenth session in 1991 at a specially convened round table. In a comment that 
illustrates the ideological tensions within the ITTO, the round table Chairman 
considered there was a 'need to define an acceptable compromise between the 
environmental value of the forest and the economic value of trade in tropical 
timber' .28 Seemingly reluctant to acknowledge that any tension existed between 
the ITTA 1983's objective both to expand the tropical-timber trade and, simul-
taneously, to conserve the resource, the ITTC passed a decision inviting members 
to enhance their ability to attain Target 2000 'by investigating liberalized trade 
in tropical timber within the framework of the multilateral trading system' 
(italics mine).29 
The British delegation later engaged the London Environmental Economics 
Centre as consultants to study the economic linkages between the tropical-timber 
trade and sustainable forest management. Their report30 considered how environ-
mental and social costs could be internalised into the price mechanism. However, 
by March 1994, four years and eight ITTC sessions after the original FoE 
proposal, the ITTC had not passed a substantive decision on either labelling or 
incentives. The labelling/incentives debate illustrates how the ITTO' s consensual 
decision-making procedures have blocked any form of market intervention, so 
that the norm of free trade has, de facto, been preserved. Any proposed initiative 
failing to attract the unanimous support of member countries is unlikely to be 
passed in an ITTC decision. 
A further case illustrates how ecological challenges to free trade have been 
thwarted. In June 1992 the Austrian parliament passed legislation increasing the 
import tax on tropical-timber products and stipulating that all such products be 
labelled. At the ITTC' s thirteenth session in 1992, an Austrian delegate stated 
that what mattered to the Austrian parliament was the growing desire of con-
sumers to be informed on the contents of products.31 The delegate asserted that 
the legislation was not discriminatory, nor motivated by protectionism, nor a 
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restriction to trade. The measure was applauded by conservation NGOs at the 
ITI032 but met with opposition from producer countries. Following a protest to 
the GATI'33 by member governments of the Association of South-F.ast Asian 
Nations, and complaints from Austrian industrialists concerned about the possi-
bility of a trade war, the law was amended in December 1992 (Chase 1993: 
760--3; Traynor 1993).34 
The norm of free trade and the norm of conservation may be seen as emanating 
from differing ideologies, with the former belonging to neoliberalism and the 
latter belonging to ecologism. This is a form of normative incoherence which to 
Donnelly arises 'from inconsistencies between individual norms (either outright 
incompatibility or vagueness that allows for inconsistent interpretation) or from 
significant "logical" gaps in the overall structure of norms' (Donnelly 1986: 605). 
The findings of a study commissioned by the IITO to research global forestry-
management practices lend weight to the view that it is impossible 
simultaneously to expand the timber trade and to move that same trade towards 
sustainability. The study team concluded that 'The extent of tropical moist forests 
which is being deliberately managed at an operational scale for the sustainable 
production of timber is, on a world scale, negligible' (Poore et al. 1989: xiv). The 
report found that less than 1 per cent of the global tropical-timber trade, namely 
from Queensland, Australia, came from sustainable sources. 
Consideration will now be given to the norm of development. Neither the 
producers nor the consumers have contested the economic exploitation of tropical 
forests for timber and for other forest products. Given this, and given also the 
conservation mandate of the IITO, it is perhaps not surprising that the IITO 
guidelines for the sustainable management of natural forests reflect inconsist-
encies between developmental and ecological objectives. 'Possible Action 33' 
notes that environmental impact studies should 'assess compatibility of logging 
practices with declared secondary objectives such as conservation and protec-
tion' (ITTO 1990a: 9; italics mine). 
The most sustained critique of development has emerged from conservation 
NGOs and indigenous peoples' groups who have used their statements to the 
ITTC to challenge narrow definitions of sustainability. A COICA spokesman 
speaking to the IITC in 1991 insisted that 'one cannot speak of sustainability 
without sustaining the livelihoods of those who live in the forests.' 35 Similar 
points have also been made by conservation NGOs. An ITTO Mission to Sarawak 
to investigate the sustainability of forest-management practices was criticised by 
the World Rainforest Movement for choosing a narrow interpretation of its terms 
of reference, investigating only the extraction of timber and 'thereby 
marginalising not only human considerations but also alternative forms of land 
use' (Colchester 1990: 171). 
The rights to timber, as asserted by the timber traders and consumer and 
producer delegations, and the rights to land, as asserted by the alliance between 
indigenous peoples' groups and NGOs, have been one of the most acute points of 
conflict within the IITO, with the former adopting an economistic view of 
sustainability, and the latter arguing that sustainability cannot ignore broader 
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social concerns. While both the producers and consumers endorse the notion of 
'sustainable development', it is the NGOs, with their stress on local communities 
and indigenous peoples, who are closest to the Brundtland ideal of 'sustainable 
development' which, with its emphasis on past and future generations, is essen-
tially centred on the basic needs of people (Brundtland 1987: 43). 
Consensual decision-making procedures, far from leading to agreement among 
the ITIO's membership, have served to mask disagreements, thus effectively 
reinforcing the hegemonic ideology. Donnelly may see the history of the ITIO as 
'a diplomatic codification of unresolved conflicts' resulting from normative 
incoherence (Donnelly 1986: 605). Tropical forest conservation, while central to 
the ITIO' s mandate, has not been allowed to challenge the sovereignty of 
producer members over their forests, to interfere with free trade or to prevent the 
exploitation of tropical forests for timber products. 
Within the ITTO, the NGOs have provided a coherent challenge to neo-
liberalism. It is more difficult to be certain on the precise strength of this 
challenge. This leads us back to the distinction made at the start of this paper; 
when does a challenge cease to be an environmentalist one, advocating adjust-
ments to the hegemonic ideology, and when does it become the counter-hegemonic 
ideology of ecologism? The increasingly strident critiques provided by NGOs 
indicate that the challenge posed by NGOs is, overall, closer to the ecological end 
of the spectrum drawn above. In short, the NGOs have promoted a counter-
hegemonic ideology. The ITIO membership has attempted to co-opt NGOs, and 
in doing so has been prepared to listen to their concerns. However, many NGOs 
are concerned that their attendance at ITIC sessions could legitimise the ITIO's 
poor conservation record. In 1992, the WWF withdrew its representatives from 
all ITIO national delegations,36 and many other NGOs which originally attended 
ITTC sessions as observers have ceased to do so.37 
THE INTERNATIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER AGREEMENT, 1994 
The UNCTAD negotiation conference for a successor agreement to the ITIA 
1983 began in April 1993 and was scheduled to end in June of the same year. The 
scope of the successor agreement was the central point of contention throughout 
the negotiations. The consumers favoured a continuation of the tropical-timber-
only format, as did those timber-trade organisations attending the ITIO. The 
producers, on the other hand, favoured an expansion of the scope of the successor 
agreement to include non-tropical-timbers. They were supported in this by the 
NGOs. 
However, the producers and the NGOs favoured an expansion of scope for 
different reasons. While advocating expansion, the NGOs also argued for a 
contraction of the mandate of the successor agreement. Disillusioned with the 
poor conservation record of the ITTO, the NGOs favoured a reduced role for 
forest-conservation and timber-industry projects in a new organisation focusing 
primarily on trade-related issues, such as statistics, market transparency and 
pricing. The NGOs considered that the ITIO did not have the competence to deal 
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meaningfully with forest conservation. However, as tropical and non-tropical 
timbers are substitutable for each other, they considered there was a need for a 
holistic view of the global trade in a new international timber-trade organisation 
(Callister 1992: 1-3; Friends of the Earth/World Rainforest Movement 1992: 
3-5). The producers also favoured an expansion of scope, but unlike the NGOs 
they favoured a high project profile for a new international timber organisation. 
The producers further argued that the producers-consumers distinction should be 
replaced by a developing countries-developed countries distinction. The pro-
ducers advanced some of the claims previously made in the NIEO debate and 
UNCED forest negotiations; in their view, the developed countries should 
undertake to supply the developing countries with financial and technological 
resources in order for the latter to attain sustainable forest management.38 Hence, 
while the producers and the NGOs agreed on tactics, namely an expansion of the 
scope of a new agreement, their ideologies, and hence their strategies, differed 
profoundly. Forest conservation remained the overarching issue for the NGOs. 
However, the producers used the ITIO as another forum to advance the ideology 
oftheNIEO. 
A consensus on the text of a tropical-timber-only agreement, the ITIA 1994, 
was finally reached in January 1994. After four negotiating sessions, the 
producers agreed to a continuation of the tropical-timber-only scope in exchange 
for some concessions from the consumers. These were as follows. First, the 
consumer agreed to sign up to Target 2000 outside of the ITIO.39 Second, and 
following the Austria labelling case, the producers succeeded in inserting a clause 
to the effect that nothing in the fIT A 1994 authorises 'the use of measures to 
restrict or ban international trade in ... timber and timber products'. 40 This clause 
effectively strengthens the norm of free trade by prohibiting discrimination 
between unsustainably and sustainably produced timber. Third, the consumers 
were successful in inserting clauses both on 'the provision of new and additional 
financial resources' and on technology transfer 'on concessional and preferential 
terms and conditions' .41 
This is the second time the South has succeeded in including these demands in 
an internationally negotiated forest-related document, with UNCED's non-
legally binding statement of forest principles being the first. Furthermore, as well 
as containing NIEO-related counter-hegemonic clauses, the ITIA 1994 also 
contains evidence that NGO campaigning impacted upon the negotiations. The 
Agreement contains a reference to the need to give due regard to 'the interests of 
local communities dependent on forest resources' .42 This is an issue on which 
NGOs have a long campaigning history, and the language of the clause is a 
modified version of the ecologist's counter-hegemonic demand for the empower-
ment of local communities at the expense of the state. 
Ideological polarisation, or alternatively normative incoherence, is more 
pronounced in the ITIA 1994 than in its 1983 predecessor. The ITIA 1994 
contains counter-hegemonic ideas from both the NIEO and ecologism, while 
simultaneously containing neoliberal ideas. Like the ITIA 1983, the ITIA 1994 
also contains clauses on the expansion of the tropical-timber trade and the 
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conservation of timber-producing forests. 43 The ITIA 1994 illustrates the tripolar 
ideological struggle that defines the contemporary international relations of 
global environmental change. 
THE ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO THE HEGEMONIC IDEOLOGY 
Ecologism challenges the Ruggie notion of embedded liberalism as a set of 
economic relations that is compatible with the requirements of domestic social 
and economic stability. Ecologism seeks to attain a set of international economic 
relations that is compatible with domestic and global ecological stability. The 
two are not necessarily incompatible. For example, domestic economic and social 
instability may lead to poverty, which is one of the prime causes of environmental 
degradation. Nonetheless, there are interfaces where economic stability and 
ecological stability are discordant, and it is at such interfaces that ideological 
tensions become manifest in domestic and international environmental policy-
malcing. 
Following on from Ruggie, we would expect a challenge to embedded 
liberalism to arise should ecologism execute a collective shift in state-society 
relations. In other words, ecological concerns become a major source of concern 
for domestic societies, including NGOs, so that the governments of these 
societies express a new collective concern in the international arena However, a 
value shift on the part of those powerful economic actors that support and 
perpetuate neoliberalism, namely the USA, the EU and Japan, would be 
necessary. As Donnelly notes, there is a relationship between power hegemony 
and ideological hegemony: 'hegemonic power does ultimately require material 
power, and even hegemonic ideas have a limited ability to attract such power' 
(Donnelly 1986: 638). 
The attempt by Austria to introduce a unilateral labelling system can be seen 
in this light. The comments, noted above, of the Austrian delegate at the ITIC' s 
thirteenth session reveal that the legislation was passed as a result of consumer 
pressure or, as Ruggie may say, of a change in Austrian state-society relations. 
However, with economic actors, both inside and outside of Austria, not prepared 
to support the legislation, the Austrian parliament finally yielded to the hege-
monic ideology. 
If attempting to execute a collective shift in state-society relations is the first 
way in which NGOs will continue to challenge the hegemonic ideology, the 
second is at the international level. Conservation NGOs will continue to lobby 
intergovernmental organisations such as the ITTO with the intention of executing 
a value shift in such organisations, the ultimate objective being for such shifts to 
be effectively translated into policy changes at the country level. However, the 
ITIO experience to date suggests that such value shifts are difficult to engineer, 
and that even where guidelines are enunciated, they do not necessarily result in 
policy changes at the country level. · 
Disagreements in international society on environmental issues arise from 
competing ideologies, each of which seeks to attain or maintain a position as the 
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hegemonic ideology. For the time being, the agents of neoliberalism have suc-
cessfully staved off the challenges of the NIEO and ecologism. But these two 
ideologies will continue to gain force. First, the South, as the UNCED process 
and the negotiations for the ITIA 1994 have demonstrated, is prepared to use the 
North's environmental concerns, especially over tropical forests, to advance the 
case for a macro-level adjustment in global economic relations. And second, with 
many environmental problems worsening, the concerns of NGOs will continue to 
be transmitted to policy-making elites. Certainly, the case of the ITIO illustrates 
the need to consider further the role of NGOs in international relations. A purely 
state-centric analysis masks the real disagreements in international relations. By 
viewing conservation NGOs as the vehicles of a counter-hegemonic ideology, it 
is possible to expose some of the deep, and hidden, ideological disagreements 
that lie within international society as the result of environmental concerns. 
NOTES 
* I am grateful to Mandy Bentham, Peter Hough and Kelley Lee for their helpful and 
constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
1 Norms have legitimacy only in reference to a specific ideological context Other 
neoliberal norms include the free movement and convertibility of currencies, and the 
nonn that those in a position of authority should not engage in corruption or profit 
from illicit activities. 
2 See, for example, Frank 1967, Wallerstein 1979 and Wallerstein 1984. 
3 UN document A/CONF.151/6/Rev.l, 'Non-legally binding authoritative statement of 
principles for a global consensus on the management, conservation and sustainable 
development of all types of forests', 13 June 1992. 
4 'Conservation' is used here to refer to all NGOs with a political orientation along the 
environmental-ecological continuum. To refer to any given NGO as either environ-
mental or ecological would be highly contentious given the ideal-type nature of the 
distinction. 
5 Such views may be dismissed as romantic Utopianism, and it is certainly not easy to 
imagine how such a process can be achieved; most ecologists concede that there are 
no easy answers to this question. 
6 Gramsci referred to this as a war of position. The alternative scenario for gaining 
hegemony, a war of movement (referred to by some neo-Gramscian writers as a war 
of manoeuvre), is in effect a revolution. (See Forgacs 1988: 225-30.) A war of 
movement is not considered a viable option for the vast majority of ecologists, and 
those ecologists who advocate revolutionary tactics have become isolated from main-
stream green debate. 
7 UN document TD/TIMBER/11/Rev.1, 'International Tropical Timber Agreement, 
1983', Article 1, p. 8. 
8 Ibid., Article l(b). 
9 Ibid., Article l(d). 
10 Ibid., Article l(h). 
11 Note that the recently negotiated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 
consists of: the GATT 1947; all legal instruments that have entered into force under 
the GATT 1947 prior to the date of entry into force of the World Trade Organii.ation 
Agreement, 1994; the instruments concluded during the Uruguay Round; and the 
Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994. See Article 1 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, 1994, in GATT 1994: 23. 
12 For Article XX(g), see GATT 1986: 38. 
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13 GATT document DS21/R, 'United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: Report 
of the Panel', 3 September 1991. 
14 GATT 1986: Article II, pp. 3-5; Article IIL pp. 6-7; Article XI, pp. 17-18. 
15 Luis V. Opie, Information Officer, GATT, personal communication (letter), 16 
November 1993. 
16 UN document TD/TIMBER/11/Rev.1, op. cit., Article 12, p. 11. 
17 Any NGO interested in the ITIO's work that successfully presents its credentials at 
the start of an ITIC session is granted observer status: Lachlan Hunter of the ITIO 
Secretariat, personal communication to Peter Willetts, Yokohama, 23 March 1992. 
18 UN document TD/TIMBER.2/3, 'Background, status and operation of the Inter-
national Tropical Timber Agreement, 1983, and recent developments of relevance to 
the negotiation of a successor agreement', 26 February 1993, para. 48, p. 10. (This 
source does not provide a breakdown concerning the permanent committees respon-
sible for these pre-projects.) 
19 B.C.Y. Freezailah, ITIO Executive Director, 'Foreword' in ITIO 1990a. 
20 The COICA, based in Lima, Peru, brings together 300 different Amazonian peoples 
united in eighty local federations and centralised in five national bodies. 
21 Survival International internal document, 'Report on the Xlth meeting of the ITTC, 
Yokohama, 28 November-4 December 1991.' 
22 Francis Sullivan of the WWF-UK, personal communication (interview), Godalming, 
UK, 21 January 1993. 
23 ITIO document PCM, PCF, PCl(V)/1, 'Pre-project proposal, labelling systems for 
the promotion of sustainably-produced tropical timber', 15 August 1989. 
24 ITIO document PCM(V)/D.l, 'Report to the International Tropical Timber Council, 
Fifth Session of the Permanent Committee on Economic Information and Market 
Intelligence', 3 November 1989, p. 6. 
25 ITIO document PCM, PCF, PCl(V)/1/Rev.2, 'Pre-project proposal, incentives in 
producer and consumer countries to promote sustainable development of tropical 
forests', 6 November 1989. 
26 The author is grateful to Simon Counsell of Friends of the Earth for explaining this 
process to him - personal communication (interview), London, 16 February 1993. 
27 ITIO document PCM, PCF, PCl(V)/1/Rev.3, 'Pre-project report on incentives in 
producers and consumer countries to promote sustainable development of tropical 
forests', February 1991. 
28 ITIO document ITIC(X)/12, 'Interim report of the Expert Panel, Round Table on 
''The agenda for trade in tropical timber from sustainable managed forests by the year 
2000", report by the Chairman of the Expert Panel', 3 June 1991, para. 8, p. 5. 
29 ITIO document ITIC(X)/16, 'Decision 3(X), sustainable tropical forest management 
and trade in tropical timber', 6 June 1991, p. 1. 
30 London Environmental Economics Centre, 'Draft final report: ITTO Activity 
PCM(IX)/4, the economic linkages between the international trade in tropical timber 
and the sustainable management of tropical forests', 16 October 1992. 
31 'International Tropical Timber Council, XIII Session, 16-21 November 1992, 
Yokohama, statement by Austria', p. 1. 
32 WWF International 'Timber labelling scheme seems inevitable', press release, 20 
November 1992. 
33 GAIT Focus, November-December 1992, p. 4. 
34 Here it is worth noting that no tropical-timber case has gone before a GATT panel, 
despite the contradictions between the ITIA 1983 and the GATT noted earlier. The 
Austria labelling case was resolved without recourse to a GA TT panel. 
35 'Position of the indigenous organisations represented by COICA at the tenth session 
of the International Tropical Timber Council', held at Quito, 4 June 1991; ECO, ITIO 
10th Session, No. 5, p. 3. (ECO is a NGO newspaper produced at selected inter-
governmental meetings, including ITTC sessions.) 
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36 Francis Sullivan, personal communication (interview), 21 January 1993. WWFrepre-
sentatives continue to attend ITTC sessions as observers. 
37 An examination of ITTC lists of participants reveals that the Australian Conservation 
Foundation has not attended an ITTC session since 1990, and that Survival Inter-
national, the Rainforest Action Network and COICA have not attended since 1991. 
FoE continues to attend as an observer. 
38 The information on the positions of the producers and consumers is trawled from 
ITTO and UN documents, principally: ITTO documents PrepCom(l)/5, PrepCom(ll)/2 
and ITTC(XN)/6; and UN documents TDtrIMBER.2/R.2 and TDtrIMBER.2/R.3. 
39 UN document TDtrIMBER.2/L.6, 'Formal statement by the consumer members', 21 
January 1994. 
40 UN document TDtrIMBER.2/L.9, 'International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994', 
Article 36, p. 30. 
41 Ibid., Article 1, paras (g) and (m), pp. 6-7. 
42 Ibid., Article 1, para. G), p. 6. 
43 Ibid., Article 1, paras (e) and (1), p. 6. 
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